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Abstract 
 
Many, in academic and policy circles, rightly consider economic growth to be 
the desideratum to positively change the plight of a large proportion of the world 
population. Its resonance is all the more significant for Africa, not only because the 
region’s economic performance has been lacklustre, but also because of its 
implications for the very survival of states in the region. While the voluminous 
research on the subject of economic growth is testimony to the validity of this line of 
research, definitive answers to the fundamental factors that shape the economic 
growth trajectories of countries have not been forthcoming. Recent research, 
however, provides strong, theoretical and empirical evidence highlighting the 
primacy of institutions in explaining observed differences in levels of income among 
countries. More specifically, the degree to which a country’s political institutions 
provide for a credible regime of property rights at low transaction costs ultimately 
defines its success on the economic sphere.  
On balance, scholars have shied away from applying this, otherwise useful 
paradigm, to an African dataset. Research on African political economy, which 
predominantly focussed on political instability, had little scope to utilise positive 
political theories. By providing empirical evidence, whereby a all-Africa data obeys 
conventional economic theories, I show that I have legitimate grounds to adopt a 
positive political economy approach on Africa. Of the rich array of political 
institutions, the effects of which reverberate on the economic landscape, I select 
those institutions that credibly tie the hands of government from adopting 
opportunistic behaviour.  Accordingly, institutions of credible commitment are the 
explanatory variables for the research. Still, further fine-tuning is unavoidable, given 
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the fact that the vector of credible commitment institutions comprises several 
elements. 
I decompose the credible commitment variable into three major categories; 
namely institutions of delegation, rule of law, and veto players. The study reports a 
number of findings, which back-up our hypothesis that observed differentials in 
economic growth among African countries reflect corresponding differences in 
qualities of political institutions. For instance, there exist statistically meaningful 
links between Central Bank independence variables and economic growth of 
countries. A similar conclusion is drawn with regard to judicial independence. 
Additionally, using a string of proxies for the rule of law variable, I find that this 
dimension of credible commitment maps positively onto economic growth. As for 
the veto players’ paradigm, it is shown that, while size and diversity in preferences of 
actors influence economic growth, its effects are conditional on the quality of status 
quo policies.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
All existing indicators of wealth of nations and well-being of their citizens 
have long established that African countries have fared poorly as compared with 
other regions. Such regular flagship publications as the World Development Report 
(World Bank 2006), the World Economic Outlook (IMF 2007) and Human 
Development Report (UNDP 2007) have underscored Africa’s dismal record along 
several dimensions. According to the 2007/2008 Human Development Index (UNDP 
2007), all of the twenty-two countries deemed to have low levels of human 
development were from the African region. Detailed comparisons reveal extremely 
steep imbalances in quality of life between African states and other regions. For 
instance, Senegal’s level of income, measured in terms GDP per capita (PPP $US), 
was only 2.98 percent of that of Luxembourg. There existed a twenty-year gap in life 
expectancy at birth between Senegal and Japan, while adult literacy in Senegal was a 
mere 1/3 of that in Georgia. I chose Senegal to highlight the staggering welfare 
differences, since this country was top of the pile in the low human development 
group. Naturally, the figures for the other countries in the group further underline the 
scale of African underperformance. One needs also to understand that the current 
disparities in well-being across countries mirror a long-standing pattern of 
divergence. Several African economies stagnated, even in periods when global 
output expanded exponentially. 
Arguably, no other variable encapsulates the lacklustre performance of 
African countries so clearly as that explained by economic growth. To put matters 
into perspective, I make no claim that economic growth is a panacea for all political 
and economic problems of countries. Inasmuch as I uphold that the concept of 
underdevelopment cannot be boiled down to a single measure, economic growth 
 14
remains by far the most potent tool in bringing about better living conditions for 
many. Given the desperate conditions in the region, our preoccupation with 
economic growth in Africa becomes all the more apparent. Economic growth is, 
therefore, the sole dependent variable in this thesis. Within the broader research 
question of which factors explain observed differences in wealth of nations, studies 
that focussed on African underperformance featured frequently. As mentioned above, 
the particularly strong emphasis on investigating the stagnation of several African 
economies by many scholars and researchers cannot be faulted. Such lines of 
investigation reached their zenith when it became de rigueur to include an ‘African 
dummy’ in cross-country economic growth accounting.  
In its mildest conceptualisation, the African dummy explicitly postulates the 
inapplicability of conventional scientific theories in an African context. The 
candidates as to why Africa is deterministically expected to under-perform range 
from environmental to socio-cultural conditions. Establishing whether this assertion 
is true or not, in all conceivable issues, is beyond the scope of this research.  Though 
this researcher has strong reservations on the epistemological values of the African 
dummy approach, this issue, that is, its relevance to economic growth studies on 
Africa, is not the main theme of the research, is. Leaving aside issues regarding the 
loose theoretical underpinnings that inform the African dummy paradigm, I build and 
test an economic model that has been the workhorse of economic growth accounting 
in all contexts; namely the Solow growth model.  
Essentially, the research method I apply in this thesis is a quantitative one 
which is based on augmenting economic models with the relevant political variables. 
More specifically, it is based on cross-country growth accounting framework using 
both cross-sectional and panel models alternatively. While the latter model allows for 
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a broader account of variations in data, cross-sectional models are also well-suited to 
this purpose in light of the fact that institutional (political) variables have limited 
scope for temporal variation. Both in terms of statistical significance and 
theoretically postulated direction of causation, the all-Africa setting replicates what 
other studies have found based on the Solow model. Our analysis in this regard 
indicates that the choice of the research method, both for the panel and cross-
sectional models, was justified. Put differently, augmenting the economic models 
with the appropriate explanatory variables was a plausible approach. 
Still, the underlying rationale for choosing the above economic models was 
not methodological per se. As shall be explained in the main body of the text, recent 
economic growth studies stress that political institutions had primacy in explaining 
long-term variations in the economic growth trajectory of countries. Notwithstanding 
the fact that, under short time horizons, economies respond to changes in such 
proximate factors as investment and technology, robust economic growth sustained 
over the longer-term depends very much on the quality of institutions. Africa is 
underrepresented in research on formal institutions partly because of conventional 
view that there exists little variation among African countries. Once this stumbling 
block that prevents us from investigating the economic effects of institutions in 
Africa, is dealt with, I turn my attention to such practical issues as measurement, 
estimation and analysis. This research differs from the two prevalent lines of debate 
in current economic growth studies. In contrast to those studies that assess the 
relative strength of institutions, geography and trade on economic growth, here the 
focus is squarely on the effects of institutions on economic growth. Also, given our 
interest in cross-country variations, I abstract away from growth diagnostic studies 
that attempt case-specific binding factors on economic growth.  
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Political institutions that provide for credible regimes of property rights at 
low transaction costs enable economic agents to commit to growth-promoting 
investments. The flip side of this statement is that when governments trade-off 
economic rationale for myopic political goals, be it through manipulation of policies 
or outright expropriation, economies face sub-optimal levels of investment and 
slower economic growth. In less technical terms, credible commitment is about tying 
the hands of governments from reneging on policy promises. As North and Weingast 
(1989:3) explain, in an oft-cited work, credible commitment rarely depended on 
governments’ reputation but on a ‘set of rules that do not permit leeway for violating 
commitments.’ Credible commitment is, therefore, the explanatory variable in this 
study. Whether or not cross-country variations in economic growth in Africa could 
be mapped onto corresponding differences in political institutions of credible 
commitment, is the overarching research problem for this thesis. Put differently, I 
test whether African data lend support to propositions from positive political theory 
with regard to a positive nexus between credible commitment and economic growth. 
Because the onus was on this study to justify the legitimacy of such a line of 
investigation in an African context, there existed no reason to invoke an African-
exceptionalism paradigm.  
I decompose the credible commitment variable into three broad components, 
each one capturing a distinct solution to problems of credible commitment. When 
delegation is used as a commitment technology, policy making prerogatives are 
transferred from government to (quasi) independent actors. While this institution of 
credible commitment could be further broken down into several kinds of institutions, 
Central Bank independence and judicial independence are notable for their resonance 
on economic outcomes. The second batch of institutions of credible commitment are 
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organised under the theme of rule of law. Unlike the case of delegation, whereby 
commitment presupposed transfer of policy making authority, in this case, the 
executive’s discretion to renege is minimised by rules of the game laid down at the 
outset. Thirdly, when there are multiple veto players, with diverse sets of preferences, 
the scope for any one political actor to change the rules unilaterally is diminished. 
Accordingly, the veto players variable provides us with the last institution of credible 
commitment for investigation in this thesis. As is discussed in the main body of the 
research, evidence from the analysis suggests that economic growth differences 
among countries in Africa can be partially attributed to variations in quality of 
institutions of credible commitment. 
1.1) The argument of the dissertation 
1.1.1) Theory 
 
This study draws its theoretical framework from two, otherwise interlinked, 
sub-fields in political science. Following insights from the new institutionalism, I 
emphasise the role of political institutions in shaping the behaviour of political actors. 
However, a further fine-tuning is essential, as the new institutionalism itself consists 
of three, not necessarily overlapping, components. Accordingly, in line with insights 
from rational choice theory, our proposition in this thesis is that political institutions 
that tie the hands of government from reneging on policy promises were deliberate 
acts on the part of rational political actors with an objective of achieving specific sets 
of economic policies. In her presidential address to the American Political Science 
Association, Margaret Levi (2006:8) elaborates credible commitment as a means of 
constraining government officials ‘from exploitative behaviour and betrayal.’ A case 
in point is given by those situations wherein credible commitment was the raison 
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ďêtre for the political act of institutional delegation. Main proponents of rational 
choice theory in the new institutionalism include Margaret Levi, Douglass C. North, 
Kenneth A. Shepsle and Robert H. Bates. The selection of rational choice theory in 
this study implies that I abstract away from issues of evolution of institutions and 
their conflict-resolving attributes that are integral parts of historical institutionalism. 
Similarly, the theoretical framework of the thesis assumes away the cultural-
embeddedness theme underscored by sociological institutionalism (Koelble 1995).  
Consider the divide between African countries that performed better, and 
those that performed less well in terms of economic growth. Some characteristic 
features of the economies of those countries (e.g. South Africa and Cape Verde) 
which registered relatively better rates of economic growth include stable 
macroeconomic policies coupled with high rates of private investment. Contrast 
these with such countries as Nigeria, Ethiopia and Benin, which endured extensive 
political instability and expropriation of private property through populist policies. I 
postulate that differences in institutions of credible commitment, between the two 
sets of countries, partly explain the observed growth differentials. Such an approach, 
whereby institutional variations among countries were mapped to economic 
outcomes, falls within the domain of positive political economy. While some 
scholars (Alt and Shepsle (1990)) place the scope of this paradigm in a simultaneous 
treatment of both institutional evolution (equilibrium in institutions) and institutional 
outcomes (institutions as equilibrium), others focus primarily on the economic 
effects of institutions (Persson and Tabellini 2000). Here, I follow the latter 
approach. As shall be discussed in the chapter on the review of literature on the 
political economy of growth, one can identify three broad political/institutional 
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solutions to problems of credible commitment, namely institutions of delegation, 
constitutional rules and a system of veto players. 
1.1.2) Research method 
 
While the analytical method applied in this thesis is decidedly quantitative, 
note should be taken of the fact that qualitative studies are also suited to explaining 
economic growth measurement of economic growth. The essence of our analysis is 
that political institutions of credible commitment causally affected the economic 
growth trajectories of African countries. Such a proposition implicitly assumes that 
there exist statistically meaningful differences in the performance of African 
economies in the first place. I make this point since there is a tendency in 
conventional studies to lump together the political economy of growth of countries in 
Africa. In order to show that our research method is a legitimate one, I need to test 
the African data on a theoretically robust economic growth model. The obvious 
candidate in this regard is then the Solow growth model that has long been applied to 
explain growth performance under different contexts. The logic is that if the direction 
of causation and levels of significance of the proximate factors (i.e. investment, 
initial income and technological progress) in the Solow model could be replicated in 
an all-Africa data, then one has few reasons to worry about subjecting African data to 
established scientific theories. 
The build-up of the basic Solow growth model is, therefore, a necessary 
factor. I produce a panel data set that consists of forty-five African countries over the 
period 1960-2004. As is the norm in cross-country time series growth accounting, the 
temporal dimension of the data is broken down into nine five-year time periods, i.e. 
1960-64, 1965-69, etc. I also subject the data to a string of different estimation 
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techniques, so as to ascertain whether the findings were artefacts of model 
specification or were driven only by a few cases.  As far as testing of the basic Solow 
model is concerned, the share of missing data was only 4.8% (that is, 78 out of 
1620), and the fact that only 12 countries returned a few missing data indicates that 
the panel came very close to being balanced. So as to achieve our overarching 
objective in explaining the political determinants of growth, I then augment the basic 
Solow with the relevant political/institutional variables. A note of caution is in order 
here. In a number of instances I also use only cross-country data, as a result of data 
limitations on the political variables.  
1.1.3) Findings 
 
The essence of this study rests on explaining political (institutional) 
determinants of economic growth in Africa. Within the broad spectrum of the 
political variables paradigm, our focus (hence, the findings) is on those institutions 
that credibly commit governments to adopt/sustain growth-promoting policy regimes. 
To start with, formal institutions do matter in shaping political economy outcomes in 
Africa. While examining the relative strengths of institutional and socio-cultural 
factors, as they affect economic growth in Africa, was beyond the scope of this 
research, studies that totally dismiss the former factors and under-represent African 
data risk omitted variable bias and selection bias respectively. At this juncture, it is 
important to highlight the point that, even after I controlled for the unit effects, the 
findings in the economic model were concomitant with the predictions of the Solow 
growth model. As important as this point may be, our major interest is in the political 
determinants of economic growth in Africa. More specifically, I set out to establish 
whether empirical evidence from Africa lends support to hypotheses from positive 
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political theory with regard to a direct mapping from institutions of credible 
commitment to better economic performance of countries. Results indicate that 
political institutions that credibly minimise the risk of policy reneging by 
government did indeed explain growth differentials among the countries. 
The first set of commitment technologies I investigated were institutions of 
delegation; namely Central Bank independence and judicial independence. I find that 
both political and economic independence of Central Banks were statistically 
significant in explaining economic growth in Africa. Also, it is shown that the rate of 
turnover of Central Bank governors was a strong factor associated with economic 
performance. With regard to judicial independence, I develop new measures of this 
variable by drawing on the relevant literature on the subject. Additionally, I make use 
of widely-applied indicators provided by the Polity data and the Freedom House civil 
liberties component. Coefficient estimates based on both cross-sectional and panel 
data endorse our proposition that judicial independence helps achieve credible 
commitment to policies and, hence, facilitates economic growth. Furthermore, the 
African data supports the view that English common law is better tuned to protecting 
property rights. Rules of law provided the second vector of institutional solutions to 
credible commitment. I decomposed this variable into a rule of law and a measure of 
corruption sub-components before empirically testing their significance to economic 
growth. I further developed a composite measure using factor analysis with principal 
factors method. Here also, I find that the relevant variables had a significant bearing 
on the economic growth trajectory of African states. A somewhat different finding 
was derived in the third set of institutions of credible commitment, i.e. veto players. 
In this case, I found that the positive effect of number and diversity of veto players 
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on economic growth hinges on the quality of ex ante economic policies. Details of 
the findings are provided in the relevant chapters below. 
1.2) Value-added of the thesis 
 
It is believed that this research makes a number of contributions to the 
literature on the political economy of growth, both in Africa and in a broader context. 
Firstly, and to the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the only study that deals with 
a comprehensive list of institutions of credible commitment and their effect on 
economic growth. In contrast to existing studies that primarily focus on very specific 
institutional domain, this approach could be more informative. For instance, assume 
a situation wherein the degree of Central Bank independence is low in a given a 
country, while at the same time the country possesses a very stringent fiscal rule that 
limits public debt. Research that investigates either of the institutions provides only a 
partial picture of the economic effects of institutions of credible commitment in that 
country.  
Secondly, it also further deepens this line of research by concentrating on an 
otherwise overlooked geographical location. Recall that I provide empirical evidence 
that justifies our research focus on Africa. Considering the findings reported even 
under data limitations in Africa, the study highlights the use values of research on 
formal political institutions in the region. Similarly, it argues that studies that 
underestimate cross-country diversity in Africa (either by collapsing African data 
into mean values or including few countries in the models) are untenable, both 
methodologically and analytically. 
Thirdly, I introduced a number of new quantitative political variables that 
account for different dimensions of credible commitment in the region. In all such 
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cases, theoretical stipulations and practical applications on operationalising the 
variables were drawn from the pertinent literature. Data coverage of the political 
variables had only been confined to a handful of African countries prior to the 
present research. Nevertheless, one should note that inasmuch as I strongly argue 
against a dismissive view of the role of formal political institutions in Africa I also 
emphasise that the available data require significant refinement. What I am asserting 
here is that analysis, even within the bounds of the existing data, passes the statistical 
tests that one requires to draw inferences.  
Fourthly, the economic effects of political institutions of credible 
commitment are in certain cases mediated through the quality of pre-existing 
economic policies. The discussion using the variable that accounts for the number 
and diversity in preferences of veto players attests this point. The study shows that an 
interactive term, between policy and the political variable, was more suited to 
explaining observed growth differentials among countries.  
Fifthly, the research underscored the drawback of a partial analysis when one 
can deduce conflicting effects of two political institutions on a single economic 
outcome. For instance, I identified a scenario whereby the presence of multiple 
political actors with diverse interests creates a collective action problem while, at the 
same time, reduces the scope of the executive from reneging on policies. 
 
1.3) Structure of the thesis 
 
In this section, I provide an outline of the structure of the study. Accordingly, 
Chapter 2 provides a review essay on the political economy of growth. In addition to 
a statement of the research problem, I synthesise the literature with a particular focus 
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on political institutions that credibly commit governments to growth-friendly 
economic policies. 
Chapter 3 introduces the research method applied in this study. It traces 
developments in quantitative cross-country economic growth accounting, thereby 
underscoring the utilities of applying both panel and cross-sectional specifications.  
Additionally, I highlight the comparative advantages of economic growth studies 
which focus on cross-country differences. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss why the thesis’ focus on Africa is well-justified. I 
develop, in particular, three major themes on this score. In order to further elaborate 
the research setting, I briefly discuss current research that shows that the African 
dummy was only an artefact of the model specification problem; empirically show 
how the African data replicate the global pattern in using one important political 
variable, and also argue that African economic growth data is not driven by the 
(exceptional performances) of Botswana and Mauritius. 
In chapter 5, I elaborate on model specification issues, as well as definition 
and measurement of the economic covariates. The most important task of this part of 
the research is to provide empirical evidence on the basis of the Solow model, 
whereby the findings, based on African data, are commensurate with theoretical 
stipulations of conventional economic theory. 
Chapter 6 presents findings and discussions on the first vector institution of 
credible commitment, as identified in the review essay. Accordingly, I analyse the 
economic effects of the institution of delegation variable, by focussing on institutions 
of Central Bank independence and judicial independence. 
Chapter 7 deals with the second set of political institutions of credible 
commitment, i.e. rule of law. It empirically tests the hypothesis that institutional 
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variables, which tie the hands of government through rule of law and control of 
corruption, partially explain the observed economic growth differentials among 
African countries. 
In Chapter 8, I concentrate on the economic growth implications of 
institutional differences among countries of the region, in terms of the number and 
diversity in preferences of veto players. This enables us to investigate the proposition 
that the presence of multiple veto actors with diverse preferences acts to reduce 
executive discretion and, thereby, to enhance commitment to policies. 
Chapter 9 summarises the analysis and findings of the thesis, pinpoints its 
limitations, and suggests potential areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2. A Review Essay on the Political Economy of 
Growth 
 
A general consensus has long emerged in international development debate 
that a lasting improvement in the lives of a large section of the world population 
presupposes a strong and sustained growth in developing economies. It is an 
indication of the importance of the issue of economic growth that ISI Web of 
Knowledge finds 18702 references for economic growth over the past five years. 
Even after allowing room for more egalitarian ways of distributing wealth to reduce 
poverty, the case for economic growth, as the most potent tool in enhancing the 
economic status of societies, remains strong (See Barro (1996) for the broader 
implications of growth; Schultz (1998) for the effects of economic growth on 
inequality). Consequently, the search for the preconditions of growth has become a 
basic research question for a wide spectrum of disciplines.  
However, the economics of growth tells only part of the story. As shall be 
discussed in this chapter, despite the fact the strong links between economic growth 
and factor accumulation are very apparent, I observe that the latter variables did not 
fall into place automatically. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that equivalent levels 
of spending, in such growth-promoting factors as physical capital and human capital, 
shall provide comparable returns across countries. The essence of economic growth 
then closely correlates to the question of a country’s ability to provide a conducive 
environment towards this end. As such, our preference for a political economy 
approach, in this thesis, squarely matches Olson’s (1996: 19) assertion that ‘a 
country’s institutions and economic policies are decisive for its economic 
performance’.    
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Our interest in investigating the implications of institutions on economic 
growth is informed by, among other things, two stylised facts. Economies quite often 
expand and contract in response to short-term domestic or external shocks. The 
economic history of countries shows that such fluctuations occurred in all parts of the 
globe, albeit at varying rates of incidence and depth affecting national output. For 
instance, Hausmann et al. (2005) identify eighty episodes in which different 
countries experienced rapid accelerations in economic growth that lasted for at least 
eight years. What is notable is that sixteen African countries did go through such 
growth spurts. However, the subsequent economic collapses in many African 
countries eroded all the gains reported above. The point here is that, in order to 
obtain a better understanding of economic welfare of societies, one should look 
beyond such factors as weather effects and terms of trade shocks. Hence, it is more 
rewarding to concentrate on those factors which have lasting effects on the economic 
growth trajectory of countries.  
The other stylised fact that informs our focus on institutions is related to the 
difference between proximate and fundamental causes of economic growth. 
Proximate factors that explain growth, such as physical and human capital 
accumulation, will have limited effects on economic growth if the incentive structure 
is distorted by predatory policies of governments. The long-term resource 
commitments that are required for sustained economic growth materialise only if the 
institutional fundamentals are conducive. One prominent approach in this line of 
research is political economics, which underlines the centrality of political 
institutions in determining economic performance, either directly by shaping the 
incentive structure or through its impact on policy choices. 
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Since the aim of this thesis is to provide a positive analysis of the links 
between a vector of institutional variables and economic growth for a sample of 
countries, a comprehensive synopsis of the literature on the political economy of 
growth serves to highlight not only the basic research question but also to elaborate 
the important theoretical and empirical advancements attributed to positive political 
economy. Needless to say, the review is selective given the rich array of insights and 
subsequent voluminous studies encompassed in the positive analysis of the impact of 
political institutions on such economic variables as growth, inequality and policies 
adopted. For the purposes of organisational coherence, I synthesise the chapter in an 
incremental way, whereby each section traces important developments that laid the 
groundwork for the current technically rigorous state of the art research.  
While the sheer size of the literature on the subject is beyond the limits of a 
single study, I also confined synthesis of the literature to the thesis’ main focus, i.e. 
institutions of credible commitment.  Accordingly, section 3.1 elaborates on the basic 
research question and emphasises the primacy of institutions in explaining observed 
large variations in economic performance across different polities. An equally 
noteworthy development was the fact that, well before a positive analysis of impacts 
of institutions on economic performance gained prominence in the research agenda, 
useful refinements were going on with regard to institutions in political science. As 
such developments helped inform the former, it is imperative to include a brief 
summary of such studies as is provided in section 3.2. In sections 3.3.and 3.4., I 
provide a synopsis of literature on the credible commitment paradigm, including 
theoretical underpinnings and typology of such institutions. The next section reviews 
empirical studies on the relationships between institutions and economic growth. 
Last section summarises. 
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2.1) Statement of the research problem 
 
Individuals and societies across the world make up heterogeneous sets of 
material deprivation and affluence as well as starkly contrasting fortunes in terms of 
capabilities and opportunities. Such variation in time and space particularly comes to 
the fore when I make a comparative analysis to trace the growth path of countries. 
Consider, for instance, disparities in terms of Gross National Income per capita based 
on purchasing power parity, which measures total domestic and foreign value added 
claimed by residents of a given country. Belgium, with a population size more than 
thirteen times less than that of Nigeria, commands a GNI per capita about thirty 
times greater. Based on the same indicator, the gap between the ninth richest country, 
Ireland, and Albania is about seven-fold. In the early 1950s, South Korea and 
Ethiopia stood comparatively on similar levels of development, which is a far cry 
from their current status, in which an average Korean is twenty-five times more 
productive than her Ethiopian counterpart. Figures on other aspects of human 
development, such as access to health services and education facilities, mirror a 
similar pattern of successes and failures.  
It is also equally true that economic growth sustained over a long period of 
time is a sine qua non for a country to achieve better living standards. In a lecture 
given at the World Institute for Development Economics and Research, Nancy 
Birdsall (2006) vehemently underscores the point that not only was the world not 
becoming flat, as argued by Thomas Friedman (2005), but it was also the case that 
the 100-times income gap between the US, Europe and Japan on one side and 
Ethiopia, Haiti and Nepal on the other reflected the presence (absence) of economic 
growth for 100 years in the former (latter). 
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Consequently, economic growth and factors determining its rates have long 
been a major preoccupation for scholars. Earlier studies on the long-run growth 
differentials across countries closely followed the neoclassical theory in which the 
causal links run from rates of factor accumulation to economic growth. The standard 
approach along this line of thinking decomposes rates of growth of GDP into 
corresponding rates of growth for labour and capital and a residual amount attributed 
to total factor productivity (Solow 1957). A central hypothesis of the literature is the 
notion of diminishing returns to both labour and capital that posits relatively higher 
growth rates for poorer nations. Put differently, it predicted convergence between 
high-income and low-income countries, since initial very low levels of factor 
accumulation for the latter imply more returns to factor inputs.  
Nevertheless, this paradigm largely failed to tally with empirical evidence, as 
most underdeveloped countries were unable to catch up. Not only have there been 
countries that entertained largely uninterrupted growth for centuries, and countries 
that have been unable to take-off for a long spell of time, but also a few initially poor 
countries have been able to make significant strides economically. Such diametrical 
disparities persisted even after differences in factor investments were controlled for. 
Pritchett (1997) includes a fourth segment, comprising countries that managed to 
initiate growth but failed to sustain the momentum.  
In response to the inadequacies of the neoclassical approach, endogenous 
growth theory explains economic growth differences among countries on the basis of 
constant or increasing returns to human and physical capital. Following Lucas 
(1988,1990) and Romer (1986,1990), it argues that due to the existence of 
externalities or research and development-induced productivity gains realistic 
possibilities exist for sustained differences in both levels and rates of growth of 
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national income across countries. It also hypothesizes that some industries 
particularly allow broader room for learning-by-doing, so that countries that had a 
comparative advantage on those industries also perform correspondingly better in 
terms of economic growth. As such, endogenous growth theory attaches much more 
weight to the productivity with which a country utilises its human and physical 
capital.  
The productivity parameter in turn captures both the technical efficiency level 
of the economy and the allocative efficiency of resource allocation. Arguably, as 
discussed in Olson et al. (2000), I raise at least a couple of basic shortcomings of this 
approach with regard to explaining empirical growth evidence. First, technology-
associated productivity potentials do not alter in short time horizons so that it could 
not adequately explain the plight of several countries that regressed (despite initial 
growth). Second and more importantly, it does not explicitly endogenise the 
structural variables that determine factor accumulation and productivity. 
For many, institutions were the foremost candidates among the list of 
structural factors deemed critical in explaining observed cross-country differences in 
economic growth (North 1992, Acemoglu et al. 2003, Rodrik et al. 2004). In a 
lecture given at the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the 
United Nations University, North (1997:2) elaborated upon the ‘humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction’ stating that ‘a set of political and economic 
institutions that provides low-cost transacting and credible commitment makes 
possible the efficient factor and product markets underlying economic growth.’ As a 
result, source-of-growth accounting exercises may be better modelled when they are 
able to account for the productivity implications of differences in institutional 
qualities.  
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The basic research questions, thus, revolved around explaining which 
institutions particularly matter and how the effects of the institutional variables 
channel into rates of growth of national output. Notable among the string of studies 
which emphasised the particular significance of institutions in determining economic 
growth were Rodrik et al. (2004), who explained that once I control for differences in 
institutions, the effects of geography and trade on economic growth were weak, Hall 
and Jones (1999) who stress the link between economic performance and social 
infrastructure, and Acemoglu et al. (2001) on the expropriation risk which economic 
agents face. The robustness of empirical research on the kinds of institutions that 
matter for growth and the way the relationships occur have not been insensitive to 
the theoretical foundations on which they were based. A striking case in point can be 
the great divergence between the recommendations of normative economic theory 
and positive political reality in terms of such economic variables as public goods 
provision and fiscal scale and balance.  
If I go by the stipulations of normative economic theory, for instance, low 
levels of public deficits would have been the equilibrium fiscal outcomes for all 
countries. Nevertheless, empirical evidence indicates that political factors have much 
resonance in determining the observed levels of high and sustained deficits 
(Volkerink and de Haan 2001, Elgie and McMenamin 2008). As a consequence, any 
empirical work on growth differentials among countries presupposed a coherent 
theoretical framework such as that provided by positive political economy.    
More specifically, the explanatory power of studies that solely rely on 
normative theory to deduce on the growth-governance nexus was arguably very 
limited for a number of reasons. To start with, if basic theoretical premises, such as 
individual rationality with competitive markets, had been sufficient to ensure growth-
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friendly social institutions, I would have observed much less variation in types of 
institutions among countries. For example, socially beneficial outcomes, including 
solutions for some common-pool problems and secured property rights, do not 
automatically fall into place due to markets. Neither are different political institutions 
equally effective in producing those outcomes. Secondly, political systems and 
processes are perhaps the most important factors determining whether a given 
country is able to adopt growth-promoting economic policies.  
These factors add up to highlight the strong rationale for undertaking a 
political explanation of economic outcomes in broader country contexts. Thirdly, the 
more focussed research question, of how different political governance variables 
impact on economic outcomes, needs to underline the endogeneity of the political 
institutional factors. This is a useful departure from normative studies because it 
emphasises that adoption of certain institutions is a conscious political outcome 
rather than a mechanical one. Approaches that accommodate these issues adequately 
provide a good springboard to study the relationships between governance and 
economic performance. 
2.2) Institutions and institutionalism 
 
As explained above, the overarching issues that crosscut the wide spectrum of 
studies on economic growth centre around two basic findings. One side of the story 
stresses the indispensable role which sustained and strong economic growth plays in 
addressing multifaceted global problems, while a correspondingly rigorous view 
pinpoints institutions as being fundamental in determining the growth performance 
of countries. I also made passing reference of the fact that, among the diverse lines of 
thought, positive political economy provides arguably the most plausible 
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explanations on the economic growth-institutions nexus. However, the development 
of positive political economy on growth was preceded by important refinements with 
regard to institutions in political science. As such, a brief summary of research on 
institutions will serve to highlight the building blocks of positive political economy 
on growth. I show that the importance of institutions in shaping individual behaviour 
and political outcomes is very much entrenched in current political science, to the 
extent that discourse on the subject is not about whether institutions matter per se, 
but is tilted more on the mechanics of the links between institutions and political 
economy outcomes. The presentation is organised in such a way that important 
concepts and practical applications of institutions are highlighted.   
Institutions, and, more specifically, institutional explanations of observed 
regularities in human behaviour, have undoubtedly been a core preoccupation of 
political science for a long time. However, inasmuch as such a statement tells of a 
crucial line of thinking, it also risks over-generalising the otherwise notable 
conceptual differences with regard to institutions, including definitions of institutions. 
Following Crawford and Ostrom (1995), one can identify three broad approaches in 
which institutions are defined. Accordingly, institutions can be construed as 
equilibrium outcomes emerging out of the interactions of individuals bestowed with 
rational behaviour. This institutions-as-equlibria approach places particular emphasis 
on the stability of the resultant systems for such outcomes to qualify as institutions. 
This view is particularly encapsulated in the works of William H. Riker, who states 
that ‘… prudence in research directs the science of politics toward the investigation 
of empirical regularities in institutions, which, congealed tastes, are “unstable 
constants” amenable to scientific investigation’ (1980:432). The two other 
approaches, namely institutions-as-norms (Coleman 1987) and institutions-as-rules 
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(North 1990, Ostrom 1990 and Williamson 1986) exhibit broad similarities in that 
both emphasise the importance of linguistic constraints on individual behaviour, but 
differ from the institutions-as-equlibria approach, which attaches significance to 
interactions among rational agents.  
While the existence of different streams of institution conceptualisations is 
likely to have reflected on evolving empirical research on political institutions, it is 
also the case that the study of institutions in political theories gained momentum with 
what is known as the new institutionalism. March and Olsen (1984) provide an 
excellent account of how this line of thought can be shaped to allow better 
understanding of organisational factors in political life. They categorised previously 
predominant views in politics along five themes wherein the effects of political 
institutions had not been adequately accommodated within political theories. To start 
with, political life was considered to be contextual, in that there is a one-way 
causation from exogenous factors such as class, geography, ethnicity and economic 
conditions to specific forms of political organisations. Secondly, it was also 
understood in a reductionist way, in that political life was viewed as the aggregate 
consequence of individual behaviour, thereby attributing fewer roles onto the impact 
of political institutions in shaping individual behaviour.  
Another factor worth noting is that when political behaviour is taken to be 
embedded in an institutional structure of rules and norms it leaves little room to 
accommodate observed utility-maximising behaviour of individuals in political life. 
Additionally, it was unable to explicitly account for the way in which institutions and 
political behaviour evolve through some form of efficient historical process. Finally, 
political theories preceding the new institutionalism did not explain the 
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instrumentalist dimension of behaviour by stipulating that political decision-making 
derives solely from a sense of purpose, direction, identity and belonging. 
The new institutionalism can be credited with bringing the issues of 
institutions to the centre of political science, in the sense that the starting point for 
subsequent voluminous and diverse research was that institutions do matter. 
According to Immergut (1998), new institutionalist theory emerged as a reaction to 
the behaviouralist revolution in political science. A number of issues differentiate 
new institutionalism from behaviouralism in political science. Unlike behaviouralist 
views, new institutionalism asserts that expressed preferences are not necessarily 
identical with true preferences. For instance, there exist several instances whereby it 
is strategically advantageous for agents to conceal their true preferences. Another 
premise of new institutionalism is that not only may the sum of individual 
preferences not equate with public interest, but also such an aggregation could 
translate inefficiently and imperfectly into outcomes. As explained in Koelble (1995), 
new institutionalism, while having a common denominator that institutions are 
important, embodies diverse views with regard to the role that should be accorded to 
institutions, organisations and calculation of utility. It also asks how much weight 
ought to be given to the individual and to the institutional context.. Scholars broadly 
differed in terms of the analytical approaches to dealing with the causes and effects 
of institutions, which can be better elaborated with the three different varieties of the 
new institutionalism. 
2.2.1) Sociological institutionalism 
 
The basic idea behind sociological institutionalism is that, in addition to those 
effects shaped by institutional contexts, individual decisions are determined by 
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cultural and organisational fields or sectors. It provides a broad definition of 
institutions in that the idea of institutions encompasses rules, procedures, 
organisational standards and governance structures as well as conventions and 
customs (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). While institutions define individual behaviour, 
it rules out any possibility for rational actors to design institutions to meet utility-
maximising objectives.  
As explained in Granovetter and Swedberg (1992), individuals are embedded 
in numerous social, economic and political relationships, so much so that these 
relationships are beyond their control and cognition. Still, our knowledge of norms, 
preferences, motives and beliefs can often provide us only with a necessary but not a 
sufficient, condition to explain outcomes, since one also needs ‘a model of how these 
individual preferences interact and aggregate’(Granovetter 1978:1421). I draw a 
couple of important insights when the issue of interaction and aggregation is 
introduced into the analysis of individual decision making. Given that groups which 
are considered similar on average generate different outcomes, to deduce individual 
dispositions from aggregate outcomes is considered wrong. Additionally, it rejects 
the notion that behaviour is dependent solely upon norms.  
Arguably, the concept of diffusion is one of the most influential insights one 
gains from sociological institutionalism. Institutionalism based on organisation 
theory stresses that individual behaviour is characterised by bounded rationality and, 
therefore, their action is shaped by inter and intraorganisational processes (Zucker 
1987). While its relevance extends to various social, political or technological 
innovations, Van den Bulte and Lilien (2001) underscore the inherent 
interdependence behaviour in that whether or not agents adopt others’ behaviour or 
actions depends on the degree of their exposure to other actors’ knowledge, attitudes 
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or behaviour concerning the innovation. A logical consequence of such a line of 
thought was that research increasingly focussed on questions of why and when 
people choose to adopt.  
Additionally, as reported in Gilardi (2004), the fact that diffusion processes 
are characterised by an S-shaped curve (that is, adoption is slow at first before 
picking up higher rates later, only to slow down eventually) is not only its main 
result but an extremely robust one. Some of the models that include the diffusion 
process include threshold models (Granovetter 1978) and information cascades 
models (Lohmann 2000). Since I consider policies and institutions to be strictly 
exogenous variables in this thesis, the question of adoption discussed by the 
sociological institutionalism literature will be of little use. Also, its proposition on 
the agent-institution nexus is significantly tilted in the latter’s favour (particularly in 
light of the focus on cultural factors). 
Hall and Taylor (1998) provide a comprehensive as well as comparative 
assessment of sociological institutionalism. Accordingly, I can identify three major 
features which distinctively are attributed to sociological institutionalism. To start 
with, this paradigm presents a broader definition of institutions than those of 
historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. Sociological 
institutionalists stress that the definition institutions should include symbol systems 
and cognitive scripts as well as formal rules and norms. Additionally, they argue that 
the effect of institutions in defining behaviour should not be restricted to purposeful 
actions of actors. Rather, institutions are construed as shaping basic preferences and 
their identity. Finally, the adoption of new institutional structures reflects actors’ 
choices to enhance the social legitimacy of the organisations or its participants.    
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2.2.2) Historical institutionalism 
 
Historical institutionalism places much more weight on understanding and 
explaining specific real world political outcomes while it does not reject the idea that 
agents are rational. In explaining policy-making process, this component of new 
institutionalism assumes that a historically constructed set of institutional constraints 
and policy feedbacks structures the behaviour of political actors and interest groups. 
Needless to say, research along the historical institutionalism dimension follows an 
inductive approach and is prone to start from very specific issues (Immergut 1998, 
Weingast 1996). If the idea of embeddedness, be it cultural or political, is the 
catchphrase for sociological institutionalism, one can say the same for the relevance 
of path-dependence in historical institutionalism. According to Mahoney (2000), 
three features define the concept of path-dependent processes. Firstly, events that 
occurred at early stages exhibit particularly potent effects on final outcomes. Its 
analogy to economic growth studies could not be more emphatic in that the idea of 
convergence is a central theme in growth research. The inclusion of a parameter on 
initial levels of income in the quantitative models is because countries which were at 
lower levels of income at the initial period are likely to grow faster. Hence, economic 
growth is path-dependent. 
Secondly, the relationship between early events and final outcomes is 
stochastic at best. What this statement implies is that there exist no single set of 
initial conditions that have a decisive role on a given set of final outcome. The most 
important point here is that, while early events shape final outcomes, the very fact 
that the early events are themselves chance occurrences should instil some form of 
indeterminacy towards their effects on final outcomes.    
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Thirdly, inertia sets in once contingent historical events occur so that path-
dependent processes gain deterministic characters. What shape or form this inertia 
takes hinges on the type of sequence analysed. For instance, in situations whereby 
the sequences are characterised by self-enforcing mechanisms, the likely outcome of 
the inertia shall be reproduce a particular institutional pattern overtime. If, on the 
other hand, the sequences are reactive, inertia involves reaction and counterreaction 
mechanisms. As such, the occurrence of one event leads another event to take place 
A note of caution is in order, however, for there are different interpretations of the 
concept of path-dependence in political science. For instance, Levi (1997:28) 
explains that path-dependence means ‘once a country or region has started down a 
track, the costs of reversal are very high’ while Pierson (2000:251) conceptualises 
path-dependence as a ‘social process grounded in a dynamic of increasing returns.’ 
.    
Historical institutionalism exhibits a number of attributes which put it apart 
from the other two brands of new institutionalism. Methodologically, historical 
institutionalists are eclectic in that they apply both calculus and cultural approaches 
to specify the relationships between institutions and actions. Put differently, they 
explain that the functional view of rational choice institutionalists and cultural 
approach of sociological institutionalists are equally applicable. Also, historical 
instituionalists assign prominent role to power and asymmetrical relations of power 
in their analysis. Furthermore, as mentioned above, historical institutionalists are 
strong proponents of an image of social causation that is path-dependent.  Finally, 
historical instituionalism does not consider institutions to be the only causal forces in 
politics (Hall and Taylor 1998).  
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2.2.3) Rational choice institutionalism  
 
A hallmark of rational choice institutionalism is a ‘search for generalizable 
features of political behaviour rooted in the incentive structures that individuals face’ 
(Thelen 1999:370). To this end, studies along the lines of rational choice 
institutionalism apply deductive models so as to create, elaborate and refine any 
given theory of politics. In contrast to the two other variants of the new 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism upholds the view that rational actors 
design institutions intentionally so as to ‘stabilise exchange relationships, to induce 
cooperative behaviour among self-interested individuals, and to minimise transaction 
costs to the parties’ (Koelble 1995: 239). Furthermore, rational choice 
institutionalism differs from sociological institutionalism in that its major function is 
to provide a coherent explanation of the emergence and persistence of collective 
behaviour and collective action. It is such an exercise that will enable us to 
understand why observed culture, social norms and formal institutions exist. Given 
its deductive approach to analysing different issues in politics and economics, it is 
not difficult to discern the logic as to why rational choice institutionalism applies a 
number of behavioural assumptions. While acknowledging variations within this 
paradigm, Hall and Taylor (1996) identify four major features that often make up 
rational choice institutional analysis. 
To start with, behavioural assumptions are part and parcel of rational choice 
institutional analysis. Some of these behaviours, which rational actors are expected to 
observe, include a fixed set of preferences and tastes, actors behaving instrumentally 
and consistently so as to maximise the attainment of preferences, and agents acting in 
a strategic manner. Such behavioural assumptions did not prevent research along this 
paradigm from providing plausible explanations to quite a number of economic and 
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political outcomes. Also, rational choice institutionalists portray a distinctive image 
of politics, i.e. politics as series of collective action dilemmas. The propositions that 
the actions of self-interested agents produce more often than not sub-optimal social 
outcomes and that institutions are indispensable to mediate such conflicts between 
individual rationality and the common good are at the heart of rational choice 
institutionalism.  
Moreover, rational choice institutionalism strongly stresses the role of 
strategic interaction in the determination of political outcomes. Actors not only think 
strategically when choosing to behave one way or another but they also make their 
actions conditional on what they expect others to behave. In addition to downsizing 
the ‘history matters’ thesis of historical institutionalism, it argues that institutions 
structure such interactions in different ways including determining the choice set and 
minimising uncertainties. Fourth, institutions are created only if they facilitate the 
utility-maximising behaviour of actors. 
The fact that a sizeable chunk of research along the rational choice 
institutionalism tradition focussed on American congressional behaviour is no 
surprise, as this paradigm (rational choice institutionalism) traces its origins to the 
workings of the latter. Notable among these are Riker (1980), who stressed that over 
the long-term, institutions as well as tastes of agents matter in shaping political 
outcomes, Shepsle and Weingast (1981) on how institutions transform the pure 
majority rule into a different legislative game, and Weingast and Marshall (1988) on 
how legislative institutions, as in the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual 
institutions, reflect goals of preferences or individuals and the relevant transaction 
costs. A conceptually related study, but undertaken under a different context, is that 
of Tsebelis (1994). Accordingly, he shows that conditional delegation of power to 
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international institutions, such as the European Parliament, makes it possible for the 
selection of one, among many possible equilibria, accelerates European integration, 
and diffuses responsibility for politically unpopular measures. In the broader state of 
things, this is an emphatic endorsement of the rational choice institutionalism 
paradigm in that not only do institutions shape individual behaviour but it also 
underlines the point that institutions are designed to achieve well set objectives.  
Notwithstanding the competitive spirits among several protagonists of the 
three branches of the new institutionalism with regard to relevance in explaining 
political life, not only does each provide a different angle on viewing a problem, but 
it is also true that there exists a good deal of overlapping in explaining outcomes. 
Still, it seems the study of institutions on the basis of rational choice theory has been 
more amenable to positive treatment. In a review essay on comparative politics and 
rational choice, Bates (1997:703) looks into seven published works to argue that, 
while some of the criticisms directed at this theory have some seeds of truth, one way 
in which rational choice institutionalism contributes to political science scholarship 
is through analysis of ‘the effect of institutions in generating equilibria in otherwise 
indeterminate political environments.’  
He explains the numerous ways in which rational choice theory has been 
applied in the study of politics. Accordingly, some studies apply the tools of rational 
choice theory to study the self-interested behaviour of politicians who seek to fulfil 
their ambitions for office in the context of democratic institutions including electoral 
rules and strategies, budgetary expenditure and industrial regulation. Rational choice 
theory has also been instrumental in exposing the institutional conditions that 
encourage ethnic-based political organisations, which have been a growing 
phenomenon in recent times.  
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It follows, then, that political institutions, broadly referring to the set of 
constraints and opportunities that shape individual behaviour, determine social 
choice and collective action in politics and economics. The way institutions impact 
on political and economic outcomes can be subjected to a formal analysis with the 
help of positive political theory. This is because positive political theory is basically 
concerned with the understanding of political phenomena through the use of 
analytical models that crosscut different contextual settings (Austen-Smith and 
Banks 1998). One such application is a theoretical as well as empirical modelling of 
various economic outcome variables including growth and choices of policies. On 
the theoretical modelling dimension, for instance, a series of studies have shown that 
political institutions impact on economic outcomes by reducing (raising) costs of 
bargaining, contracting, monitoring and enforcement (North 1990, Olson 1996). I 
also come across several empirical positive political models dealing with a range of 
issues such as fiscal policy outcomes (Persson et al. 1999), security of property rights 
(Keefer and Knack 1997) and the stability effects of different institutions (Tsebelis 
1995). A correspondingly useful strand provides a positive analysis of the effect of 
institutional factors on economic outcomes by accounting for the differential 
transaction cost implications of institutions (Dixit 2003). 
At this juncture, a note of caution is in order. Because the major focus of this 
thesis is a positive analysis of the impact of political institutions on economic 
outcomes, I deliberately refrained from dealing with another important dimension of 
institutional study. This dimension, which, unlike positive analysis, does not rely on 
any formal analytic models, draws on normative insights to show, among other 
things, possibilities to undertake institutional engineering to come up with a set of 
pre-defined political outcomes. Reilly (2001) is an excellent case in point in this line 
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of approach in which he assesses the potentials for conflict management through 
engineering electoral institutions. Using electoral institutions from several countries 
including Australia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and 
Estonia, he shows that institutional designs of electoral systems and rules that 
encourage centripetalism in political outcomes help manage conflicts in divided 
societies. Centripetalism, in this context, refers to envisaging democracy as a conflict 
managing mechanism in which conflicts ‘must ultimately be solved via negotiation 
and reciprocal cooperation, rather than simple majority rule’ (2001:7) whereas 
societies made up of politically salient and diverse ethnic groups are deemed divided. 
While this work is inherently normative, it does not completely rule out possibilities 
for a positive analysis of institutions for conflict managements.     
All in all, it is now broadly accepted that institutions are crucial factors that 
shape a diverse set of political and economic outcomes across different contextual 
settings. Although political science has long acknowledged the importance of 
institutions in determining political life, a rigorous line of theoretical and empirical 
studies has come to surface after the onset of the new institutionalism. It is also 
posited that all its three branches, namely rational choice institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism and organisational institutionalism have been instrumental in 
providing a coherent understanding of political as well as economic outcomes. A 
closer look at the literature shows that the plethora of studies on the effects of 
institutions can be attributed to the fact that it was amenable to a positive analysis of 
issues in question. One can state, in a very comprehensive way, that the basic theme 
of these studies is that institutions matter to political and economic outcomes. To 
deal with more specific research questions, such as how a particular set of political 
institutions affect economic growth, a further refinement of the theoretical 
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foundations and empirical assessments is essential. I provide a brief explanation of 
the concept of positive analysis before I embark on a synthesis of the wider literature 
on the political economy of growth from the perspective of institutions of credible 
commitment in the next sections. 
2.3) The credible commitment paradigm            
2.3.1) Theoretical underpinnings 
 
The effect of institutions on such social outcomes as production, resource 
allocation, and public policy materialises primarily because institutions ‘constrain, 
direct, and reflect individual behaviour’(Alt and Shepsle 1990:1). It is now widely 
accepted that an important yardstick for measuring the quality of a country’s political 
institutions is positively associated with the degree to which government is credibly 
committed to providing growth-promoting policy fundamentals (See Acemoglu et al. 
2001, North 1990, Hall and Jones 1999 and Rodrik et al. 2004). The award of the 
1993 Nobel prize in economics to D.C. North is a strong endorsement of the 
importance of this line of research. Several reasons exist as to why a credible 
commitment policy regime is considered a public good to any political system.  
Firstly, that there is a high likelihood for governments to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour by reneging on commitments made to private agents goes 
beyond a theoretical possibility, but economic history provides numerous cases of 
outright expropriations of private wealth or through exorbitant tax rates or other 
similar policy reversals. According to Weingast (1995), the spectre of a government 
with the wherewithal to protect property rights being at the same time capable of 
confiscating private wealth, arguably represents the fundamental dilemma of an 
economic system. Similarly, absence of credible commitments signals uncertainties 
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that adversely compromise economic outcomes. Such is the importance of 
uncertainties that one set of utilities of institutions is to ‘increase predictability, 
reduce uncertainty, or induce stability in human interactions’ (Alt 2002:149). 
Unfortunately, political economy outcomes are rarely driven by normative 
considerations as is observed in variations in credible commitments across countries. 
Accordingly, below I briefly elaborate on the two broad theoretical theses on 
problems of credible commitment.  
2.3.1.1) A time-inconsistency policy paradigm 
 
Before it acquired wider currency in the political economics literature, the 
concept of credible commitment had first been used to explain hitherto unknown 
phenomenon that riddled western economies in the 1970s. A dominant paradigm at 
the time hypothesised that governments can only boost national output at the expense 
of higher inflation or manage to contain price spirals at the expense of output forgone, 
which strongly highlighted the potency of monetary policy. Empirically, such a 
trade-off was disproved when most economies experienced high rates of inflation 
and unemployment simultaneously, a situation called stagflation. Research, 
particularly spearheaded by the seminal works of Kydland and Prescott (1977) as 
well as Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983), argued that the problem boils 
down to governments’ reneging on policy promises. With the help of a formal model, 
the presentation below highlights the commitment problem. The essence of the time 
inconsistency of policies problem lies in the presumption, supported by empirical 
observation, that private agents, being rational, are able to predict the commitment 
problem on the part of government. As such, the macroeconomic difficulties reflect 
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the lose-lose outcomes emerging from governments’ not credibly committing to 
policy promises.  
Assume government maximises a social welfare function whereby social 
well-being declines with higher inflation, p, and positively correlates with national 
output. In accordance to the standard norm, equation (2.1) provides the loss function 
for government in that, with this type of specification social welfare is maximised 
when the losses, represented here by the difference between actual output and 
potential output (first term) and rate of inflation, is minimised.   
)1.2()( 22*  pyyU   
I envisage output to rise by the extent with which private agents’ expected level of 
inflation deviates from actual rates of inflation. Put differently, there exists a clear 
incentive on the part of government to set actual inflation rate above that expected by 
the private sector, and based on which the latter already commits economic resources. 
If actual output is then modelled as in equation (2.2), then, by substituting it into 
equation (2.1), I will have a loss function in either form of equation (2.3) or equation 
(2.4).    
)2.2( eppy  
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As can be deduced from the model, output reaches at its optimum when 
inflation rate is set at zero, and more importantly, when government credibly 
commits to zero inflation. Needless to say, the zero inflation is the very same level 
that private agents use to make economic decisions. Hence, I have a maximum 
output level as shown by equation (2.4a). 
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However, governments more often than not act on the incentives to ‘mislead’ 
private agents and, hence, renege on rate of inflation ex post. In effect, the whole 
exercise reverts back to minimising the first equation by setting first differences to 
zero.  This would have given us a solution, as shown in equation (2.6), had it not 
been for the critical assumption that agents are rational. It means that private agents 
form decisions not based on the promised level of inflation but are broadly capable 
of forecasting that the actual inflation rate shall be higher. The national economy 
then ends up in a lose-lose situation with higher than optimum rate of inflation 
(equation 2.7) and lower than optimum level of output (equation 2.8). 
 
Note that the above presentation of problems of credible commitment is a 
very concise representation of the otherwise voluminous and mathematically 
rigorous models on the subject. Following Rogoff (1985), a heated debate ensued as 
to how political institutions help control for problems of credible commitment with, 
understandably, monetary policy becoming the main policy issue of concern. More 
specifically, the viability of delegating a policy-making prerogative to an 
independent and non-elected organ as an institutional remedy to time inconsistency 
of policies proved strong. Research that ensued along this line examined the use 
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values and pitfalls of delegation among different policy issues (for example, Lafont 
and Tirole (1994), and McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987)).  In a parallel case, 
Lukas and Stokey (1983) argue that the temptations for governments to renege on 
policy promises and hence compromise credibility needed to be curbed through 
institutional rules, as in the case where the motivation on the part of government to 
reduce its real debt leads to a time consistency problem for optimal policy. Equally 
important to the time inconsistency of policy hypothesis, there also exists another 
theoretical proposition on problems of credible commitment. 
2.3.1.2) A political instability paradigm 
 
In the discussion above, problems of credible commitment emerge primarily 
as a consequence of a government’s tendency to depart from policy promises made 
in an earlier period. Similarly, a policy reversal is likely to occur if there is a 
significant probability for a change in government and if the successor government’s 
preferences are much at odds with the incumbent. For instance, Persson and 
Svensson (1989) discuss how a government facing defeat uses fiscal policy, public 
debt in this case, to influence policy at later periods, thereby leading to a problem of 
credible commitment. A related theoretical stipulation on problems of credible 
commitment as a result of political cycles is also given by Tabellini and Alesina 
(1990) for public debt, Alesina et al. (1996) for uncertainty in electoral outcomes, 
and Cukierman et al. (1992) for tax policy. Almost all the theoretical models provide 
results that mirror cases when the credible commitment problem originates from time 
inconsistency of policy of a given government. In either case, the adverse effects of 
problem of credible commitment emanate from the choice of economically sub-
optimal policies and public goods provision and through direct impact on private 
 51
investments. Accordingly, political/institutional solutions for credible commitment 
problems induced by instability overlaps with those mentioned for time 
inconsistency of policies.   
It is also worth noting that, when triggered by high frequency in government 
turnover, the risk for major policy U-turns comes not only from the incumbent but 
also from those newly installed in office. Apart from putting in place institutional 
constraints such as fiscal rules and delegation to non-political actors, problems of 
credible commitment can also be addressed if the political environment allows for 
broader sets of checks and balances. Studies have shown that political institutions 
that accommodate multiple and diverse veto players positively associate with the 
effectiveness of delegation (Moser 1996, Lohmann 1998). On the same note, Keefer 
and Stasavage (1998) show that credible commitment through delegation can only be 
obtained in countries where political institutions provide for checks and balances on 
the executive and where political instability is moderate and polarisation high. 
Logically, a major preoccupation for research on political economy of credible 
commitment rested on the fit between these theoretical stipulations and concrete 
evidence. We now know that, contrary to predominant views in mainstream 
economics, the way a country’s institutions evolve and, correspondingly, the quality 
of its political institutions, ultimately determine its economic performance over the 
long-run. Here, because this study is informed by positive political economy I 
abstract from the former and focus on institutions as equilibrium to the political 
process. Next I turn our attention to institutional solutions to problems of credible 
commitment. 
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2.4) A typology of political institutions of credible 
commitment 
2.4.1) Institutions of delegation 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the common denominator in all 
conceptualisations of delegation is a voluntary transfer of decision making authority 
by a principal to an agent that acts on her behalf, scholars largely remained within 
the confines of their research interests in defining delegation. For instance, and on a 
lighter side of things, to highlight the widespread nature of delegation in public life, 
Bendor et al. (2001) cite a story from the Bible in which God delegates some of His 
authority to Moses. Even the omnipotent and omnipresent deity finds delegation to 
His advantage. Using game theory models, they elaborate on the situations when 
delegations occur and what outcomes could ensue. It is shown that although in most 
cases principals prefer to delegate to agents who share their preferences, one also 
finds several real-life situations in which this is not the case. Delegation could also 
occur when a principal in pursuit of a specific goal lacks the skills, capacities or 
resources required to achieve her goals while an agent possesses the qualities which, 
encouraged by an incentive regime, agrees to undertake the task (Coleman 1990). 
Given its advantages in terms of efficiency as well as reducing uncertainty, one can 
understand its broader applicability to solving several political economy issues. The 
growing interest in research on delegation is also not difficult to understand. 
Ström (2000) portrays parliamentary democracy as a series of delegation 
relationships. The study, while explaining that the rationale for delegation in a 
parliamentary democracy stems from our lack of time to decide on every political 
issue and also mistrust of our abilities, argues that parliamentary democracy can be 
described as a chain of delegation involving at least four discrete steps. This chain of 
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delegation includes that from voters to elected representatives; from the legislature to 
the executive branch; from the head of government to the heads of different heads of 
executive departments; and from the heads of different executive departments to civil 
servants. It is highlighted that the singularity principle (single or non-competing 
agents for each principal; a single principal for each agent) is not only one of the 
features that differentiates parliamentary systems from presidential ones, but that the 
former also enjoy better decisional efficiency and inducement towards effort. Agency 
problems perhaps are the major obstacles that different variants of delegation 
encounter. Without delving too much into the voluminous literature on this topic, 
suffice it to say that such problems occur when, among other things, principals 
cannot observe the actions of agents (moral hazard) and when principals do not know 
the competencies and preferences of agents (adverse selection). Institutional checks 
provide one set of remedial measures to address agency costs (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991).  
When it comes to the link between institutions of delegation and economic 
policy, several scholars stress that it is the former’s effect on credible commitment 
that takes centre stage (Thatcher and Sweet 2002; Elgie and McMenamin 2005). Put 
differently, delegation of economic policy to an independent institution instils 
credibility to the policy regime, thereby enabling economic agents to commit 
growth-enhancing economic resources.  As mentioned above, even if the issue of 
why countries differ in adopting such institutions is a question of high relevance to 
economic performance, in this thesis I take institutions as exogenous and, therefore, 
focus on empirical studies that test their relationship with economic outcomes. 
Insulating economic policies from myopic political goals through delegation is but 
one dimension whereby this commitment technology improves economic 
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performance. Delegation also ensures a transparent regime of contract enforcement 
and dispute resolution among economic agents and, perhaps more significantly, 
between government and private economic actors. It does so if the political system 
provides for an independent judicial framework to exist.  
More specifically, by focussing here on a review of the economic 
implications of delegating monetary policy to an independent Central Bank and 
judicial independence, I abstract away from the otherwise extensive literature on 
other dimensions of delegation. One notable line of research, in this regard, is 
delegation to administrative authorities. In a study on Authorités adminstratives 
indépendantes in France, Elgie and McMenamin (2005) show that observed 
variations in degrees of independence among these institutions map into credible 
commitment as well as policy complexity objectives. Similarly, highlighting the 
point that the relationship between delegation and credible commitment is not one-
to-one, Majone (2001) adds a transaction cost dimension to explain the reasons for 
delegation; as in Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) who also make a closely related 
point. However, a comparatively stronger endorsement for credible commitment, as a 
rationale for delegation, is provided in Gilardi (2002). The common theme of these 
studies is the search for rationale behind observed levels and variations in delegation 
to different entities. In this thesis, however, I consider institutions of credible 
commitment to be strictly exogenous. Such an approach is informed by our 
overarching theme, i.e. analysing the implications of these types of institutions on 
economic growth in Africa. A more focussed list of justifications, on Central Bank 
independence and judicial independence, is given in Chapter Six. 
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2.4.1.1) Central Bank Independence 
A broad spectrum of studies in political science and economics debate the 
pros and cons of delegation of decision making by political actors to independent 
agencies as a remedy for politically-motivated inefficiencies in government decision 
making. In a study on the American legislature, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) 
report that legislatures are more inclined to delegate policy-making authority to the 
executive when targeting of benefits is difficult. Additionally, legislatures delegate 
broader powers to the executive in complex policy areas and when the costs of ill-
informed policies are considered high. Delegation to nonmajoritarian institutions, a 
reference to those public institutions which ‘(a) possess and exercise some grant of 
specialised public authority, separate from other institutions, but (b) are neither 
directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials’ (Thatcher 
and Sweet 2002: 2), is often closely identified with the unique positions Central 
Banks hold in economic policy making. Some scholars were sceptical not on the 
usefulness of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions per se, but its operational 
sustainability, citing possible political interventions, as in those between independent 
Central Banks and diverse coalition governments (Bernhard 1998), partisan 
identification of political actors (Weingast and Moran 1983); and relationships 
between wage-setting unions and inflation-setting Central Banks (Calmfors and 
Driffill 1988 and Iversen 1998).  
Still, problems of operational sustainability were not the only anomalies 
scholars identified with regard to Central Bank independence. One of these problems 
is the democratic deficit thesis discussed in Elgie (1998, 2001) in which the study 
looked into Central Bank reforms in different European states, and the institutional 
architecture of the European Central Bank, to highlight possible scenarios whereby 
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Central Bank independence could compromise democratic accountability. Others 
relax the assumptions that political actors were poised to renege on decisions to 
delegate or tamper with the independence of Central Banks. Rogoff (1985), for 
instance, applies the envelope theorem (a mathematical theorem used to reduce 
computational complexity) to explain that an independent Central Bank head might 
not share the social welfare objective of stabilising output, but still manages to 
stabilise prices and hence avoid the time-consistency problem. He argues that legally 
binding the Central Bank to a focussed set of objectives (which is one of the 
identifying principles of Central Bank independence) or choosing a conservative 
head, reduces the Bank’s ability to respond to unforeseen shocks. This line of 
argument seems applicable across many other institutions of credible commitment as 
well, in that rarely do models of credible commitment deal with situations when 
policy changes enhance economic efficiency. 
The likelihood that Central Bank independence lowers otherwise necessary 
flexibility in policy, as stipulated in Rogoff (1985), can still be tackled in the 
delegation set-up. Lohmann (1992: 282) takes up this issue and proposes that 
monetary policy be delegated to a ‘partially independent conservative Central 
Banker’ with implicit escape clauses in the case of severe supply shocks. She states 
that partially delegating monetary policy to a conservative Central Banker with 
powers to react to supply shocks is superior to other delegation architecture; namely 
the discretionary regime, full or partial commitment to a zero-inflation rule, and the 
institution of a fully independent conservative Central Banker. In a study that 
somewhat departs from the prevalent research focus on Central Bank independence, 
Moe (1999:1569) presents a comparative analysis of regimes with regard to the 
question of how different political systems fare in terms of adopting Central Bank 
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independence. Political systems that inherently allow for broader checks and 
balances are more in tune with Central Bank independence. In addition to providing 
empirical evidence to back up his propositions, it is also shown that ‘granting 
independence via a statute is only credible for legislative systems with at least two 
decision-making bodies which both have veto rights (for example bicameral 
systems)’.     
I leave a deeper discussion of operationalisation of Central Bank 
independence variable for the empirical analysis chapter. Here, I provide a snapshot 
of some of the studies that deal with this issue. Research has come up with diverse 
sets of indices for operationalising the institution of delegation with regard to 
independence of the Central Bank. One such work along this line is Cukierman et al. 
(1992), in which they find that different indicators apply for industrial and 
developing countries for measuring Central Bank independence and, therefore, its 
link with price stability. While legal independence is the preferred option for the 
former, it was indicated that actual frequency of change of the chief executive officer 
of the bank is a better proxy for a Third World setting. Similarly, in measuring the 
degree of Central Bank independence, a number of studies, including Alesina (1988) 
and Alesina and Summers (1993), stresses quantifying the political independence of 
the Central Bank. As such, they highlight the institutional relationship between the 
Central Bank and the executive, the procedure to nominate and dismiss the head of 
the Central Bank, the role of government official on the board of the Central Bank 
and the frequency of contacts between the executive and the Bank. Such variables, 
on aggregate, estimate the effect of delegation as a solution to the credible 
commitment problem, to account for the broader links of this political variable to 
outcomes in both the monetary and real sectors.  
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Generally, studies show that the economic effects of delegation-based 
institutional solutions to problems of credible commitment are best understood in the 
arena of monetary policy. Yet measurements of Central Bank independence may not 
have been without problems, as they involve a good deal of subjective assessments. 
For instance, the indices developed by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman (1992), 
arguably the most commonly used ones, include as many as 13 and 16 factors 
respectively ranging from the way in which Bank governors are appointed, and 
tenure length, to levels of lending to government. The analytical validity of these 
indices may not be robust, due to their subjectivity bias, and also in the light of 
recent theoretical developments (Mangano 1998). However, several cross-country 
studies indicate that Central Bank independence, measured by turnover rates of 
governors, may explain the inflation differentials among countries. Cukierman (1994) 
cites several institutional changes in different countries that provided broader legal 
independence to Central Banks, as testimonies that highlight the importance of 
credibility for low inflation. Extensive reviews are given in Eijffinger and de Haan 
(1996) and Berger et al. (2001). It is apparent that there exist other fundamental 
institutional preconditions for economic growth that cannot be dealt through 
delegating policy prerogative to an independent institution, for which rules-based 
solutions are more feasible.  
2.4.1.2) Judicial Independence 
 
As in the case in the review of the literature on Central Bank independence, 
here also I defer questions of measurement of this institutional variable to the 
empirical part of the thesis. I probe into the vast literature on judicial independence 
to synthesise its treatment of three major questions, i.e. what is judicial independence, 
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under what conditions do political systems provide for judicial independence, and 
what is the relevance of this variable to economic growth of countries.  In a paper 
presented at a conference on the theme of the ‘Economic Analysis of Political 
Behaviour,’ Landes and Posner (1975) provide one of the earlier definitions of 
judicial independence. Accordingly, when the judiciary is independent, its decisions 
do not hinge on any political factors which, under other circumstances such as in the 
legislature, could have resulted in a different outcome. Put differently, while such 
factors as the electoral strength of people who are affected by a decision will have a 
bearing on executive or legislature decisions, judicial independence implies that 
courts do not shape their decisions along these lines. A slightly different definition of 
judicial independence is given by Ramseyer (1994:722) in which he used the concept 
‘exclusively to refer to systems where politicians do not try to intervene in the courts 
to reward and punish sitting judges for the politics of their decisions’ (italics original). 
Beyond the fact that the latter conceptualisation of judicial independence 
focuses on politicians’ behaviour, while that given by Landes and Posner (1975) 
stresses behaviour of the judiciary, both underscore the impartiality of the judiciary 
from political factors. The Freedom House definition of judicial independence is a 
comprehensive one, both in terms of its legalistic dimension as well as in its actual 
application. In contrast to conventional definitions which emphasise impartiality 
from political influence, judicial independence in this case requires the judiciary to 
be free from other economic and religious influences. Still, the issue of independence 
from politics to define judicial independence is not shared by all scholars. In their 
study on the determinants of U.S. Supreme Court labour-relation decisions, Spiller 
and Gely (1992:464) consider the court as ‘a self-interested ideologically motivated 
institution, subject not to the traditional legal rules of precedent but to the constraints 
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imposed by the political interests of the other institutions of government’. With 
regard to the question of the rationale for delegation (that is, via judicial 
independence), Aranson et al. (1982) identify several reasons. The managerial 
explanation as to why delegation occurs includes reducing workloads, reducing the 
need for frequent changes in statutory amendments, efficiency considerations and 
establishing relative permanence among those who make decisions. 
The most important political explanation for delegation, as given in Aranson 
et al. (1982), is that it helps to ‘depoliticise’ the problem. An independent judiciary 
can limit the power of other branches of government, by enforcing laws without 
interference from the executive and the legislature and also by ensuring that laws and 
policies are compatible with constitutional requirements (Hayek 1960). Given the 
fact that robust economic growth depends on extensive economic transactions and 
resource outlay, the importance of secured property rights becomes all the more 
apparent. The risk of expropriation by government, as clearly discussed in North and 
Weingast (1989), can be reduced by an independent judiciary that acts as a check on 
the executive’s interference with property and contract rights (Mahoney 2001). 
Furthermore, legal traditions that attach priority to private property rights, in 
comparison to those constructed to solidify state power, reflect differences in degrees 
of judicial independence. As discussed in Beck et al. (2003), this difference also 
affects economic growth in that, in legal traditions that give priority to the rights of 
individuals, financial development is correspondingly more intensified. All in all, the 
growing literature on judicial independence largely upholds the views that this 
institution of delegation enhances economic growth of countries. 
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2.4.2) Rule of law and credible commitment       
 
Our interest in this section is to look into how the rule of law, defined as ‘a 
set of stable political rules and rights applied impartially to all citizens’ (Weingast 
1997:245), affects economic performance by credibly committing governments to 
sustain policies that promote economic growth. While there exist several 
constitutional rules fine-tuned to meet commitment goals, an oft-applied policy 
sphere is given by a model of constitutional rules on fiscal policy. In many instances, 
fiscal rules that establish constraints on executive discretion are put in place in order 
to minimise risks of opportunistic behaviour by political agents that would also 
create uncertainties in the economy. These rules which comprise ‘statutory or 
constitutional restriction on fiscal policy that sets a specific limit on a fiscal indicator 
such as the budgetary balance, debt, spending, or taxation’(Kennedy and Robbins 
2003:2), have had effects on the fiscal policies of countries. It is worth noting that 
fiscal policy, particularly budget deficits and public debt, often reflect not only 
absence of credible commitments but also could result from common pool resource 
problems. As such, there exists a high likelihood that rules set in motion to tackle 
these problems might occasionally overlap. Rotte and Zimmerman (1998), for 
instance, identify three basic ways in which fiscal restraint can be achieved through 
rules. Accordingly, one rule is to link legislation or constitutional amendments with 
limits on budget deficits or macroeconomic targets as was the case in the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings law in the United States or Article 115 of the German Basic Law. 
Secondly, international rules that condition access to foreign finance or domestic 
fiscal health could also achieve similar results of credible commitment. Finally, rules 
set by international treaties, such as that of the Maastricht treaty, act to limit 
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executive discretion on public spending. Studies on developing countries, albeit few 
in number, have partially addressed commitment problems while explaining the 
importance of fiscal rules and budgetary institutions for fiscal outcomes (e.g. See 
Alesina et al. 1999).  
The question of credible commitment also closely correlates with security of 
property rights. In the real world of transaction costs, agents’ economic behaviour, 
which determines the types and levels of economic activity, depend on the degree to 
which property rights are secure. These establish not only rights over use of property, 
but also a credible mechanism of contract enforcement and low risks of government 
expropriation. As such, the system paves the way for the proliferation of intensive 
and impersonal exchanges, reduced transaction and transformation costs, as well as 
other forms of economic organisation vital for growth. In the broadest terms, secured 
property rights help reduce ‘uncertainty by structuring human interaction’ (North 
1992:13). The provision of such institutions has long been one of the traditional roles 
of governments. In as much as putting in place an efficient legal system that specifies 
and enforces property rights ultimately rests with governments, the structure of 
property rights represents an important element in the vector of governance variables. 
An overwhelming balance of evidence indicates that sustained economic growth 
requires a high volume of impersonal economic exchanges among agents that, in 
return, critically hinge on the existence of a low risk of expropriation on private 
returns by other agents as well as by government. In other words, it presupposes a 
regime of secured property rights. 
Accordingly, property rights provide an important set of institutions to 
operationalise the credible commitment variable and to assess its link to economic 
performance. Several studies empirically investigated the relationship between 
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measures of security of property rights and economic growth. De Soto (2000) and La 
Porta, et al. (1997) show that Latin legal systems tend to perform worse in protecting 
property rights as compared to the Common law system. They find that because of 
the loose protection of the rights of minority shareholders and creditors, ownership of 
firms is very concentrated, and capital markets are less developed, in countries that 
apply Latin legal systems In recent times, subjective measures of institutional quality 
have began to be widely used in empirical studies of institutions and development. 
These are based on either polls of experts or cross-country surveys of firm managers 
or citizens in general.  Knack and Keefer (2002), for example, utilise the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indicators to show that social polarisation 
reduces the security of property and contract rights and, through this channel, growth. 
The ICRG measures of insecurity of property rights consist of expropriation risk, risk 
of repudiation of contracts by government, rule of law, quality of the bureaucracy 
and corruption of government, for a large number of countries. 
Other notable efforts to measure institutional quality broadly, with security of 
property rights being a crucial component, include the operation risk index of the 
Business Environment Risk Intelligence, the country risk review of DRI, the country 
risk service and country forecasts of the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom in the 
World Index of Freedom House and the World Development Report of the World 
Bank. An extensive description of these measures is provided in Kaufmann, et al. 
(1999) and Aron (2000). An interesting objective measure of property rights is given 
by the concept of contract intensive money (CIM) as a measure of security of 
property rights, which was formulated and empirically applied by Clague, Keefer, 
Knack and Olson (Clague, et al. 1996). CIM is defined as a ratio of non-currency 
money to the total money supply, or (M2-C)/M2 ), where M2 is a broad definition of 
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the money supply and C is currency held outside banks. The intuition was that in 
situations where contract and property rights are secure and well-defined, 
transactions that heavily rely on outside enforcement are advantageous and that 
agents use currency for a small proportion of the transactions. CIM is higher in 
countries whose citizens find the existing regime of property rights credible. They 
then show that it is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the 
relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.  
So far I have looked into two unrelated broad categories of institutional 
solutions to problems of credible commitment. One widely-applied way to constrain 
government from opportunistically using policy tools towards otherwise 
economically non-optimal purposes is to hand over such policy tools through 
political delegation, to agents deemed to be insulated from political interference. It is 
argued that empirical investigation of the economic implications of such institutions 
depends on applying viable indicators for the delegation variable, a case explained 
using monetary policy. Another institutional mechanism to bring about credible 
commitment is to institutionalise rules that limit the policy choice set for government. 
Given that not all policy instruments can be transferred to independent organisations, 
and that some remain strictly under the jurisdiction of the government, I discussed 
how rules enable governments to credibly commit, with examples from fiscal policy 
and security of property rights. Nevertheless, the rules-based solution has 
continuously come under scrutiny due to the fact that many governments historically 
followed predatory policies to expropriate private returns. Next I elaborate on how 
such problems can be institutionally tackled through a system of veto players. 
2.4.3) veto players and credible commitment         
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According to Lohmann (2003), apart from setting physical or transaction 
costs high enough to discourage changes, credibility can result through institutional 
means, by way of increasing the political cost of reneging. Such political costs are 
correspondingly large when there exist institutional checks and balances. Keefer 
(2004) argues that such links between checks and balances and credible commitment 
represent the most powerful explanation of contrasting development outcomes 
among countries. Similarly, checks and balances positively affect economic 
performance to the extent that investors are insulated from ex post opportunistic acts 
on the part of government (North and Weingast 1989). With regard to quantifiably 
measuring the degree of checks and balances in a political system, existing indicators 
can be broken down into two dimensions. Some studies proxy commitment problems 
through subjective perception survey on risk of appropriation in a given country. 
Notable effort in this respect includes the ICRG data that produces country risk rate 
based on aggregate index of political, financial and economic risks. However, the 
application of such opinion survey data is limited in that they mostly measure 
outcomes, and not quality of institutions such as checks and balances per se. Quite a 
few objective indicators are better suited to mapping the institutions of credible 
commitment and economic performance. 
One broadly used measure in this regard is the POLCON variable produced 
by Henisz (2000), who applied a spatial model of political choice to derive a political 
constraint index for executives. It incorporates information on the number of 
independent branches of government with veto power as well as the distribution of 
preferences across and within those branches. More specifically, the index includes 
the number of formal constitutional veto points such executive, judiciary, number of 
legislature houses; degree of diversity of veto players; and the cohesiveness of each 
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veto player. Based on an extensive list of cross-country data, he finds that there 
exists a statistically significant relationship between this political constraint variable 
and economic growth. Another objective measure on scale of checks and balances in 
a given political setting is provided in the Database of Political Institutions (See Beck 
et al. 2001). They argue that executive control of the legislature is strong when 
electoral checks are few, thereby curbing political competition and legislative seats 
dependent on party nomination. As such, the institution of checks and balances is 
proxied by the number of veto players, while adjustments are made on the basis of 
independence of the veto players from each other’s influence. 
In order to empirically test the hypothesis that political systems with larger 
sets of checks and balances enjoy better policy stability because they allow for 
broader interests to be represented, Stasavage (2002) models private investment on 
the above mentioned indicators and other political instability variables. His findings 
attest to a positive relationship between checks and balances and private investment, 
possibly mediated through the impact of institutions of checks and balances in 
credibly committing government to policy promises. It should be noted that the basic 
idea behind stipulated positive association between checks and balances and credible 
commitments stems from the political costs that naturally emerge from attempts to 
change policy paths by the executive. As such, it is not difficult to deduce that the 
more in number and the more diverse in preferences are veto players, i.e. political 
agents whose agreement is required in changing policies, the more stable would 
policy choices would be. One caveat often mentioned here is that such systems, to 
credibly commit government, may also compromise policy flexibility that sometimes 
is critical to economies adapting to changing conditions. Furthermore, veto players 
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are but one set of proxies for institutional checks and balances, as the latter can also 
be instrumented by other variables such as regime type in cross-country studies. 
Any series review of the literature on veto players is incomplete without 
noting the contributions of George Tsebelis. By definition, credible commitment 
implies that the policy framework needs to be stable inter-temporally. In Tsebelis 
(1995), he argues that the potential for policy change declines with the number of 
veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto 
players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units 
of each veto player) of these players. Using legislative data from two sources (i.e. the 
NATLEX computerized database in Geneva and Blanpain’s International 
Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations), Tsebelis (1999) finds 
evidence that corroborates the theoretical hypothesis mentioned above. More 
specifically, the ideological range of government, the range of the coalition, and 
government duration, mattered for policy stability. Still, the most important insight 
with regard to the veto players institutional variable is that it facilitates all political 
systems irrespective of differences in regime type, party system, and type of 
parliament. As explained in Tsebelis (2000), many political phenomena such as 
reasons for independence of bureaucrats and judicial independence, can be better 
understood using the veto players theory. A detailed discussion of the wider 
applicability of the veto players theory is provided in Tsebelis (2002). 
2.5) Empirical studies on nexus between institutions and 
economic growth 
 
Our endeavour to provide a précis of the major works, which is focussed on 
the relationships between political institutions and economic growth, is shaped by a 
few practical considerations. To start with, finding a single feature of political 
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systems, which cross-cuts country-level differences, is very difficult. The search for 
the silver bullet has led some (e.g. Freedom House) to resort to applying dozens of 
criteria which, at the final analysis, could be collapsed into a common denominator. 
At the other extreme is Tsebelis (2000), who stresses the vitality of the veto players 
variable as being universally applicable. As such, the organisation of the literature, in 
this section, is unavoidably subjective. Secondly, notwithstanding the fact that 
credible commitment is the mainstay of this thesis, one needs also to be cognisant of 
the overlapping nature of institutions. For instance, a credible regime of property 
rights presupposes expeditious contract enforcement (i.e. a transaction cost angle). 
Arguably, few other politically-provided public goods would have more 
resonance on economic outcomes than that of secured property rights. This can 
clearly be inferred from the very definition of property rights as an ‘individual’s 
ability in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the asset) directly 
or to consume it indirectly through exchange (Barzel 1997:3, Italics original). A 
discussion of the literature on property rights-economic growth nexus, if any, is thus 
one of the themes of this section. Our starting point, nevertheless, is a related issue 
which has much pertinence to Africa. Changes in the global political landscape since 
the early 1990s, which induced countries to adopt more open political systems, have 
also engulfed Africa. As such, it is a useful exercise to assess the empirical literature 
on the (probable) relationships between democracy and economic growth. I dwell on 
this latter issue first. 
2.5.1) Does democracy cause economic growth? 
 
Given the fact that the lion’s share of global wealth is accounted for by 
democratic countries, this question appears to be tautological. Yet, such a consensus 
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on democracy’s positive effects on economic growth is far from being the norm in 
the appropriate literature. In one of the earlier works on the subject, Schweinitz 
(1959:385) portrays an ‘ambivalent impression about the appropriateness of 
democratic political institutions’, given the multifaceted economic problems which 
developing countries encounter. While there exist a number of ways, whereby the 
inimical effects of democracy on economic growth manifest themselves, Huntington 
and Dominguez (1975) argue that democracy encourages redistributive politics. 
More to the point, current consumption grows exponentially at the expense of profits, 
thereby leading to lower rates of economic growth. Another channel, through which 
the effects of democracy on economic growth could be weakened, is the presence of 
reverse causality. For instance, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) apply a generalised 
least squares-autoregressive moving average estimates, based on data from 131 
nations, to investigate this issue. They report that, while economic development 
causes democracy, democracy does not cause economic development. Brunk et al. 
(1987) also report similar results on causation from economic development to 
democracy. Following the work of Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), this thesis, 
whereby economic development is a requisite to democracy, was also endorsed, 
among others, by Dahl (1989). 
As mentioned above, an equally boisterous string of literature exists which 
asserts that democracy causes economic growth. In one of such works, Arat (1988) 
attacks the modernisation theory’s (à la Lipset) view of democracy evolving as 
countries develop economically. As argued in Olson (1971 & 1996), autocrats are 
unable to credibly commit and, hence, they affect economic growth adversely. 
Nevertheless, he, as well as North (1990), on property rights and economic growth, 
shies away from explaining as to whether democracy is the answer. Put differently, 
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their arguments did not establish sufficient conditions for democracy to map onto 
economic growth. Earlier empirical studies that reported an affirmative response to 
the inquiry on the effects of democracy on economic growth include Kormendi and 
Meguire, using data on 47 countries; Grier and Tullock (1989), using data on 59 
countries; and Pourgerami (1991) on the basis of data on 106 developing countries. 
Though comparatively very little, research also reports that the institutional quality-
economic growth nexus applies both ways. In this regard, Chong and Calderón 
(2000), based on 35 countries covering the period 1972-1995, show that each 
variable affects the other. However, the institutional quality variables chosen, such as 
nationalisation potential and bureaucratic delays, do not necessarily reside in 
democracies. 
2.5.2) Property rights and economic growth 
 
In as much as putting in place an efficient legal system that specifies and 
enforces property rights, ultimately rests with governments, the structure of property 
rights represents an important element in the vector of governance variables. Several 
studies empirically investigated the relationship between measures of security of 
property rights and economic growth.  These come against a background in which 
even North (1990:107) argued that it is ‘impossible to feel institutions, let al.one 
measure them’. The challenge was to come up with proxies of property right 
variables amenable to empirical analysis. North and Weingast (1989) argue that 
Britain’s “Glorious Revolution” in the late 17th century restrained the King’s and his 
government’s predatory powers, which in turn increased the security of property 
rights and led to the rapid development of capital markets and economic growth. 
This contrasts with the case in Spain, where extensive powers of arbitrary 
 71
expropriation induced economic stagnation. It shows that a quantitative measure on 
the risk of expropriation by government can be used to instrumentalise the property 
rights variable. A transaction cost perspective on the existence of insecure property 
rights was also given by North (1987), who asserted that inefficient property rights 
exist because the cost of monitoring, metering and collecting taxes might lead to a 
situation in which a less efficient property rights structure yields higher tax revenues 
for the ruler. 
The fact that institutional changes are path-dependent and slow to change has 
induced research to emphasise cross-country analytical settings. Put differently, 
obtaining sufficient data points for a meaningful intra-country study is difficult. The 
existence of a strong property rights regime is widely used as an institutional quality 
variable to explain growth differentials among countries. According to Scully (1988), 
the economic payoff of having institutions that ensure rule of law, private property, 
and market al.location of resources becomes clearer when comparison is made across 
countries. The study, which included 115 countries covering the period 1960-1980, 
estimates that those countries with better rules of law and secured property rights, 
enjoy economic growth rates three times greater than those countries which lack 
these institutions. In terms of economic efficiency, the gap is two-and-half in the 
former’s favour. The premise that legal systems alone could ensure protection of 
security rights may not, however, be tenable as far as policy is concerned. The 
‘ideological and perceptions’ variable, as explained in North (1992:8), also needs to 
be considered, because the credibility of the system ultimately rests on agents’ 
ideologies. In other words, it is only when private agents believe that government is 
credibly committed to protecting property rights, which they engage in growth-
promoting activities such as investment.  
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The theoretical intricacies that relate property rights with growth are 
discussed in Keefer (2004). Accordingly, the paper mostly refers to definitional and 
causality problems with respect to secured property rights. The former is linked with 
associating security of property rights with a particular set of political systems such 
as democracies. Nevertheless, a number of studies indicate that whether property 
rights are insecure or not may not have much to do with the political system per se 
but more so with how they are perceived by economic agents. As such, insecure 
property rights slowdown growth even if they result from a general level of 
insecurity or reflect governments’ short-term horizons in preferring expropriation to 
growth (Keefer and Knack 2002). Similarly, research on the security of property 
rights shies away from dealing with the allocation of rights altogether, or wrongly 
blends it with security of rights at best. The allocation of rights largely deals with 
how political systems differ in terms of providing rights to citizens. This otherwise 
grey area in the literature is all the more important as it explains intra-regional 
growth differences among East Asian countries. For instance, despite being Asia’s 
first democracy, the Philippines under Marcos suffered from the adverse growth 
impacts of cronyism in which ‘access to property rights was granted in exchange for 
political loyalty’ (Root 1996:132). 
Property rights mostly affect economic growth through expected returns on 
private investment. More secured property rights are generally associated with lower 
than expected expropriation and higher returns on private investment, which Besley 
(1995:906) identifies with the Lockean theory of property rights. Investment is also 
enhanced when property rights ensure transferability of assets through market or 
non-market transactions. Access to financial markets to borrow capital at reasonable 
cost is also possible when, in lieu of property rights, assets are used as collateral and 
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when it is possible to smoothly transfer them in the event of default. Other channels 
include better access to common property and public goods, reduced uncertainty in 
transactions, and facilitating the internalisation of externalities thereby reducing 
returns to redistributive or rent-seeking activities (Saleh 2004). One 
microeconometric study that asserts these theoretical insights is that of Besley (1995) 
who showed that private property rights, as opposed to communal rights, in 
Ghanaian agriculture, were very important in increasing security against 
expropriation and in bettering the transferability of land.  
As discussed above, the prominent challenge for research on the property 
rights-growth nexus has been one of finding a measure for the security of property 
rights variable. In certain growth-accounting exercises, the institutional quality 
variable applied to measure security of property rights was set in very broad terms as 
in Barro (1991:432), who interprets political instability as ‘adverse influences on 
property rights, and thereby as negative influences on investment and growth’. His 
findings were based on a sample of 98 countries covering the period between 1960 
and 1985. However, political instability signifies several structural problems that it 
may not always be wise to relate to the collapse in the security of property rights. 
That institutions themselves are endogenous had long created a doubt as to the 
viability of quantitative studies that postulated a one-way relationship from quality of 
institutions to growth. Higher income levels may lead to stronger institutions because 
countries will be capable or willing to spend on them (Eggertson 1990; Mauro 1995). 
In this regard, a study by Acemoglu et al. (2001) made some strides when they 
instrumented the security of property rights by settler mortality rates, in the 18th and 
19th centuries. Colonised areas, which had lower mortality rates initiated better 
quality institutions and vice versa. 
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More or less similar trends were applied in Knack and Keefer (1995) and 
Rodrik, et al. (2002). In recent times subjective measures of institutions have began 
to be widely used in empirical studies of institutions and development. These are 
based on either polls of experts or cross-country surveys of firm managers or citizens 
in general.  Knack and Keefer (2002), for example, utilise the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) indicators to show that social polarisation reduces the security of 
property and contract rights and, through this channel, growth. The ICRG measures 
of insecurity of property rights consist of expropriation risk, risk of repudiation of 
contracts by government, rule of law, quality of the bureaucracy and corruption of 
government for a large number of countries. Other notable efforts to measure 
institutional quality broadly, with security of property rights being a crucial 
component, include the operation risk index of the Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence; the country risk review of DRI (this measure is provided by the credit 
rating agency Standard and Poor’s); the country risk service and country forecasts of 
the Economist Intelligence Unit; Freedom in the World Index of Freedom House and 
the world development report of the World Bank. An extensive description of the 
measures is provided in Kaufmann, et al. (1999) and Aron (2000). 
To sum up, the wide literature on the relationship between the institutions of 
property rights and economic performance identifies several policy-relevant findings 
that stem from the significant causal links between the two variables. Be it by 
altering transaction costs, which themselves are determined by the political and 
economic equations, or impacting on agents’ behaviour via uncertainty, (in)secure 
property rights have been robust factors in explaining cross-country differences in 
economic growth. At least three areas need to be further explored in future research. 
Firstly, the theoretical framework is not strong when it comes to reverse causality 
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from higher levels of income to better institutions. Secondly, studies mostly focus on 
security of property rights, while little attention is paid to the equally important issue 
of allocation of property rights. Thirdly, cross-country studies could be made more 
informative through dynamic modelling as compared to comparative static analysis.  
2.6) Discussion and summary 
 
Arguably, the most crucial agenda in current development debate is to 
explain the fundamental factors that are behind observed differences in economic 
growth among countries. Economic theoretical and empirical models that were 
oblivious to accounting for the effects of political institutions in determining political 
economy outcomes by and large failed to provide plausible explanations as to not 
only why countries, differ in adopting growth-promoting institutions and policies but 
also how political institutions shape economic performance. Scholars partly 
responded to this inadequacy by augmenting economic growth models with a string 
of political and economic variables, albeit not necessarily on strong theoretical 
foundations. Nevertheless, a better exposition of the effects of political variables on 
economic outcomes presupposes strong theoretical underpinnings to inform 
empirical growth accounting exercises. A growing literature on the theme of positive 
political economy stipulates that cross-country differences in long-term economic 
growth reflects corresponding differences in political institutions that provide 
credible property rights regimes with low transactions costs.  
However, the theme of institutions and their effect in shaping individuals’ 
behaviour predates its application in explaining economic growth trajectory of 
countries. After all, as Peters (2004:1) puts it succinctly, ‘the roots of political 
science are in the study of institutions’. Accordingly, I discussed the literature on 
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institutions and institutionalism with particular emphasis on the three variants of the 
new institutionalism literature; namely, sociological institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, and rational choice institutionalism. I assessed not only their 
similarities and differences but also with regard to their relevance to a study of 
economic growth in a cross-country setting. It is shown that, since this study 
considers institutions to be strictly exogenous, rational choice institutionalism is the 
most appropriate paradigm for the issue at hand. Note that, to a certain extent, the 
path-dependence concept in historical institutionalism tallies with the idea of 
convergence from economic theory on growth. I also reviewed the literature to 
elucidate the notion of positive analysis and justify its use in this study. 
Notwithstanding the fact that in several instances there exist overlaps between 
positive and normative analysis, the approach I use to address our research question 
remains decidedly positive. This sets the stage for a closer scrutiny of the literature 
on institutions of credible commitment. 
Theoretically, problems of credible commitment are postulated to emerge as a 
consequence of two phenomenon. The first one, known universally as problem of 
time inconsistency of policy, and often wrongly considered as the only source of the 
credible commitment problem, stipulates that governments attempt to outsmart 
private agents by reneging on policy values once the latter form expectations and, 
hence, commit resources. It explained that the economic problems in this respect 
emerge because governments act opportunistically ex post while rational agents are 
not deceived by such surprises. As a result, the net economy-level effects would be 
sub-optimal outcomes in important parameters, including rates of inflation and 
national output. Apparently, the institutional solution to this dimension of credible 
commitment problem is one that ties the hand of government. Secondly, problems of 
 77
credible commitment emanate from political instability, by inducing myopic policy 
preferences in governments, which are inimical to growth. A textbook example in 
this case is that of political cycles in fiscal policy, whereby incumbents faced with 
likely replacements, engage in policy choices that constrain the policy space for 
incoming administrations. In each case of the credible commitment problem, 
resulting policy uncertainty adversely affects private investment both in type and size.  
Empirically, a number of political institutions are well-positioned to ensure 
that governments are credibly committed to policies that encourage productive 
engagements temporally. In this respect, institutions of delegation are able to smooth 
out politically induced policy volatilities by transferring policy prerogatives to 
nonmajoritian and independent organisations. It was shown that several studies used 
different measures of Central Bank independence to proxy for the economic effects 
of this dimension of delegation. Another set of institutions that addresses the credible 
commitment problem is given by formal rules which are difficult to alter. For 
instance, constitutional rules that require budgets to balance or provide for property 
rights security exemplify solutions to problems of credible commitment based on 
rules. However, it is also explained that rules might be weak unless the political cost 
for reneging is set prohibitively high. In this regard, systems of checks and balances, 
often proxied by number of veto players and the distance in their preferences, 
provide an important institutional solution to problems of credible commitment. 
Accordingly, a number of studies provided a quantitative account of the size and 
diversity of veto players and mapped such institutions to political economy outcomes 
on economic growth. Two points are worth noting here. Firstly, even if 
operationalisation of the variables reflects conceptual differences in defining checks 
and balances, on balance, findings overlap in indicating positive links between these 
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institutions and macroeconomic policies. Secondly, the institutions of checks and 
balances can be operationalised by variables including, but not limited to, veto 
players.   
Naturally, given the focus of this thesis, I expect institutions of credible 
commitment to partially explain the differences in economic performance and policy 
adoption between the stronger and weaker economies in Africa. In this respect, a 
starting point would be to assess the existing literature on credible commitments and 
economic performance in Africa. However, there exists a conspicuous absence of 
discussion of Africa, and in particular in an all-Africa setting, in studies that 
modelled the economic implications of institutions of credible commitment. 
Admittedly, there are several studies that included political variables in growth 
accounting on Africa, mainly by focussing on political instability and effects of 
ethnic diversity. These, however, did not try to systematically model political 
economy outcomes of such vital institutions as credible commitment. For instance, 
economic models indicate that, in Africa, political instability leads to reduced 
investment, growth-retarding policies and, therefore, weak growth. Positive political 
economy models, on the other hand, stipulate that absence of institutions that 
credibly commit governments to, say, protecting private property, result in myopic 
policies that ultimately lead to economic regress. In this regard, this thesis offers a 
new dimension to the evolving debate on the political economy of growth in Africa. 
Still, the reorientation of the research focus towards an African context should not be 
a simple transposition from a different setting. I need to elaborate our assertions that 
such an approach is a legitimate one.  
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Chapter 3. Empirical models for economic growth accounting 
 
During the past several decades, global economic output has expanded at an 
unprecedented rate. This phenomenal achievement, however, has been largely 
clouded by the unevenness in economic welfare achieved across countries. Several 
countries in Africa missed out on the spurt in growth, even during the 1950-1973 
time spell, a period which Angus Maddison (2008) characterised as the ‘golden age’ 
for economic growth. It is also not difficult to discern a close correlation between 
countries’ records, in terms of economic growth, and a number of important political 
economy features. For instance, the observation that poorer countries account for a 
disproportionate share of the world league of weak states, is hardly a random event. 
It, therefore, comes as no surprise that economic growth has commanded significant 
interest for academic research. Scholars from a wide spectrum of disciplines have 
investigated possible fundamental determinants of economic growth in cross-country 
comparative settings.  
The field of growth accounting may have registered a quantum leap with the 
introduction of institutional arguments as having defining roles in the expansion of 
national output in the long run. Similarly, and perhaps to a lesser extent, 
methodological developments have also been instrumental in broadening our 
knowledge of the political economy of growth. The proliferation of cross-country 
economic growth studies, over the past several decades, could also be partly 
explained by the emergence of very powerful computers. As will be explained below, 
the crucial importance of methodological frameworks for an economic growth study 
is all the more apparent when our comparative units of analysis are entities as diverse 
as countries.  
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In this study, we use both cross-sectional and panel data models of economic 
growth. As such, it is imperative to elaborate on the specifications of these models 
when used in economic growth studies. While panel data models would have the 
edge in terms of accounting for the factors that shape growth, we need also highlight 
the validity of applying cross-sectional models. To start with, the tendencies for 
cross-sectional models to reject the null hypothesis can be mitigated by subjecting 
those models to a battery of robustness tests. Additionally, cross-sectional models 
provide a useful alternative when, as a consequence of data limitations, it is 
impossible to estimate panel data models. Lastly, given the fact that our explanatory 
variable (i.e. institutions) is characteristically sticky, the application of cross-
sectional models is, therefore, appropriate. This chapter sets out to achieve two 
related objectives.  
Firstly, we delve into the rich literature on economic growth studies so as to 
elaborate on the research method applied in the thesis. Cognisant of the fact that 
economic growth accounting is not the sole method for assessing performance of 
countries, we compare and contrast the cross-country growth accounting method 
with the other methods. Secondly, we trace the development of the Solow model in 
order to elaborate further on the economic growth accounting method. We do so by 
underlining the point that, under certain circumstances, cross-sectional and panel 
models are complementary to each other. We organise the chapter as follows. In the 
next section, we look at the different approaches to investigating economic growth. 
We discuss the rationale behind cross-country growth accounting in section 3.2. 
Section 3.3. traces the development of the Solow economic growth model in all its 
variants, including the augmented ones. We summarise and conclude in section 3.4. 
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3.1) Major approaches in economic growth studies 
 
Cross-country economic growth accounting does not enjoy a methodological 
monopoly, albeit it is, by far, the most powerful one. Other approaches include the 
application of single country long time series, so as to decompose sources of 
economic growth into three possible factors, namely labour, capital, and total factor 
productivity (see AERC 2009 for a series of single country long time series studies 
on some African countries). At this juncture, it is important to highlight the structural 
similarities between single case studies and cross-country growth accounting, in that 
both aim to assess the partial effects of different factors. As such, I do not explain the 
former approach here. Suffice it to say that in situations, where the variable of 
interest is slow to change. The cross-country growth accounting is a better approach.  
Similarly, the concept of growth diagnostics has, in recent times, been used to 
identify economic growth determinants (Rodrik et al. 2005). As such, a brief 
elaboration of this method and its merits vis-à-vis our preferred approach, i.e. cross-
country analysis, is very appropriate. However, this tells only part of the story, since 
the rationale for the choice of this particular approach, is not confined solely to 
methodological attributes. As the next section shows, the growth diagnostics 
approach very much follows normative economic models which renders them 
unsuitable to address the basic research question of this thesis. 
3.1.1) Growth diagnostics 
  
Growth diagnostics is a very recent addition to the flourishing literature on 
the search for the factors that determine economic growth of countries. Introduced by 
Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, and Andrés Velasco (See Rodrik et al. 
2005&2008), it aims to identify the most binding constraints on economic activity 
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and also the corresponding policies required to remove these obstacles to economic 
growth. Using a decision tree, i.e. a method used to explore options and choose 
among possible outcomes, it then sets out to review and analyse which of the two 
broad factors hinder economic growth significantly for the country in question, 
namely high cost of financing domestic investment and low private return to 
domestic investment. These latter factors are then broken down further into what the 
researchers consider significant bottlenecks to growth. This line of research closely 
resembles the analytic narrative approach in political science which combines 
historical and comparative research with rational choice models in order to 
understand institutional formation and change (Bates et al. 2000). Needless to say, its 
focus and, hence its findings, are entirely based on specific case studies. A number of 
reasons can be highlighted as to why this method is not considered suitable for this 
thesis.  
To start with, research based on this method is primarily informed by 
normative considerations. Which factors to include in the decision tree is an issue 
usually left to the discretion of researchers. Though cross-sectional growth 
accounting partly suffers from a similar limitation, it nevertheless compensates for its 
limitations as it is amenable to robustness tests. On the basis of which particular 
factor(s) included, researchers could come up with divergent findings while studying 
the same subject. On a related note, such an approach will only be able to explain 
short-run changes in economic growth, since factors considered binding at a 
particular point in time may not hold for the next period. Secondly, it runs the risk of 
being mechanistic, in that it gives little consideration for possible inconsistencies 
between economic rationale and political applicability. Put differently, countries that 
fail to adopt economically sound policies do so not out of lack of knowledge about 
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which policies work. After all, such knowledge has become a global public good 
thanks to the communication revolution of the past few decades which made 
distribution of scholarly works easier. It is, rather, because the political institutions 
that produce and sustain such policies are absent. As such, analysis that overlooks the 
resonance of institutions falls short of accounting for the basic factors that define 
economic growth. Thirdly, we learn much from empirical regularities that transcend 
physical borders as well as temporal demarcations. Economic growth is a classic case 
in point.  
3.1.2) Growth accounting 
   
Growth accounting aims to disentangle the contributions of changes in factor 
inputs and the unexplained residual from observed economic growth. As explained in 
Barro (1999), its premise is that economic growth occurs primarily from growth in 
such factor inputs as labour and capital. This paradigm for explaining economic 
growth was first introduced by Solow (1956) where he applied a neoclassical 
production function to the subject of growth empirics. I provide an in-depth 
presentation on this subject in sections below as it is the research method for this 
thesis. That observed expansion in national output across countries and over time is 
positively and causally linked with intensified use of labour and physical capital is 
not a matter of contention. What was debatable was that several countries registered 
robust growth rates sustained over a long-run above and beyond that explained by 
factor accumulation. In the economic growth literature, this unexplained residual 
came to be known as the Solow residual or total factor productivity. For instance, 
Solow (1957) estimates that about 88% and 12% of output growth per hour worked 
in the United States between 1900 and 1949 could be attributed to growth in total 
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factor productivity and factor accumulation respectively (estimates scaled down later, 
See Solow 1958). 
Subsequent studies, nevertheless, reported either mixed results or lower 
estimates for total factor productivity. Baier et al. (2006), for example, assess the 
contribution of total factor productivity in the economic growth performance of 145 
countries. Although there existed significant regional variations, they find that, 
globally, the contribution of total factor productivity to economic growth is about 
14%. While technology became the preferred candidate to proxy total factor 
productivity, researchers applied a string of other factors including human capital 
and policies. The gist of the matter was that the growth accounting models were, by 
and large, unable to account for the underlying causal factor for variations in 
economic growth across countries. In order to decompose sources of economic 
growth into factor accumulation and total factor productivity, growth accounting is 
often applied along two lines. A number of studies used a long time series data on a 
single country to investigate the factors that explain its economic growth 
performance beyond short-run oscillations. Another strand of economic growth 
accounting is tailored to expose those factors which are critical in defining observed 
differences among countries. It is this latter approach, which has led to a rich array of 
research on the subject, which I use in this thesis.               
3.2) Rationale for cross-country economic growth analysis 
 
A systematic review of the voluminous research on the political economy of 
growth serves to identify several points that shape the design of this study. First, it is 
now widely accepted that economic growth is the desideratum for addressing social 
and economic problems affecting a large proportion of the world population (Birdsall 
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2005, Islam 1995). Second, observed large and diverging levels of welfare among 
countries reflect differences in fundamental determinants of economic growth, 
namely institutions. The third and related point worth noting is that research along 
the tradition of positive political economy has been very instrumental in providing a 
coherent explanation with regard to the nexus between political institutions and 
economic growth. Accordingly, a resounding picture emerging from current political 
economy research is that institutions not only matter for economic growth but they 
exhibit primacy as well when compared with other possible basic determinants of 
growth such as geography and trade (Rodrik et al. 2004). Even critics of this line of 
thinking do not deny the importance of institutions per se but attribute knowledge 
gaps in the institutions-economic growth paradigm to conceptual and methodological 
intricacies (Glaser et al. 2004). It is, for instance, a challenge to explain how a 
relatively slow-changing variable such as institution causes another variable 
characterised by much dynamic variation like economic growth.  
In a study that traced the development path of about eighty countries covering 
the period 1850-1980, in which he finds political institutions to be fundamental in 
determining growth, Reynolds (1983:964) also stresses the volatility of growth 
stating ‘nothing is easier than to prevent or stifle economic growth.’ Nevertheless, 
the choice set for the political institution variables that make or break economic 
growth is so numerous that any study on the theme needs to be selective. 
Notwithstanding the possibilities that the emergence of highly powerful computers 
allows even theoretically weak works to surface, the need for systematic analysis of 
the fundamental factors behind global growth divergence has never been stronger. 
This need can only be met satisfactorily if empirical works are strongly grounded in 
plausible theoretical underpinnings. I can talk of underlying causes of economic 
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growth such as institutions once our method is capable of accounting for the 
proximate economic factors that shape economic growth. As I show later, once I 
control for unit effects, there exists no reason for a unit of investment to affect 
economic output differently in, say South Korea and Nigeria. What is so insightful 
about the Solow model is that it provides us with the required theoretical and 
empirical tools to undertake such types of analysis. 
One observes multiple features in economic growth dynamics of countries 
that define present-day patterns in the economic status of each country. A few 
countries, mostly consisting the West experienced an economic growth path that 
significantly outpaced rates of growth in their population. In contrast to these 
countries, which entered intensive growth for a long period, a larger set of countries 
continued to register only extensive growth, whereby increments in output have been 
absorbed by growth in population. The diverse pattern also includes countries that 
have gone through only momentary spurts of growth as well as those making strong 
strides lately.  
Accordingly, Maddison (2003) shows that the median rate of growth in per 
capita GDP, for the twenty richest countries over the period 1820-2001, stood at 1.6 
percent with a range of only 0.7 percent. A stronger growth mostly occurred since 
the early 1960s in all developing regions, but only the East Asian region kept up the 
momentum, while in Africa and Latin America, growth largely faltered. Reflecting 
the fact that such disparities in long-run economic growth rates map onto a series of 
political economy outcomes including material deprivation and conflicts, the case for 
accounting for fundamental determinants of economic growth is apparent. A well-
tested medium to do growth accounting is to augment the basic economic model with 
theoretically stipulated relevant variables. As such, it is imperative to explain the 
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conventional growth modelling approach before I introduce the formal political 
economy analytical models that identify the direct and indirect channels for links 
between institutions and growth. 
A handful of reasons justify our choice of cross country economic growth 
analysis in this study. Firstly, economies from all regions in the world have 
increasingly become intertwined through trade and investment. If economic rationale 
were the sole issue, globalisation should have a balancing effect on levels of income. 
Instead, divergence in economic growth among countries has become the norm. As 
such, a research method fine-tuned to reveal the extent and causal factors of such 
cross-country variations is a more informative approach. Secondly, institutions are 
inherently slow to change, in that in many instances, countries tend to introduce 
piecemeal institutional reforms. Given this stickiness in the institutional variable, it is 
extremely difficult to draw the level of variation required for a quantitative study 
from individual country studies. The effect of institutions in shaping political 
economy outcomes can be captured through cross country studies. Thirdly, some of 
the theoretical hypotheses of the economic growth literature are next to impossible to 
test in a case study setting. Most notable among these hypotheses is the notion of 
convergence, a concept which holds that levels of income across countries tend to 
equalise over the long-run. Economic growth analysis is, therefore, better served 
when conducted in a cross country methodological setting. 
3.3) The Basics 
3.3.1) The Solow model 
 
Given its strong influence on the subsequent large volume of economic 
growth studies, a brief elaboration of the seminal work of Robert Solow (1956) is in 
 88
order. Accordingly, the level of output in an economy characterised by a competitive 
market structure is determined by size of the labour force, stock of capital and by the 
technology with which these factor inputs are utilised. The Solow model is based on 
a Cobb-Douglas production function with level of output determined by capital, K, 
labour, L, and labour-augmenting technological progress, A. A Cobb-Douglas 
production function is a linearly homogenous production function with a constant 
elasticity of substitution in which each factor’s share of income is constant over time. 
Hence, a temporal model of growth with constant returns to scale is given by: 
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           Where Y(t) is rate of growth in real GDP 
In essence, economic growth registered at a particular point in time can be 
decomposed into two broad categories, i.e. returns from higher use of factor inputs 
and the Solow residual, or what is conventionally attributed to production technology. 
Because marginal products are not changed by scale under constant returns to scale, 
it is generally advisable to use the intensive form (also referred to as the “ratio” or 
“per capita” representation) of the production function. Hence, for the above 
equation this translates into: 
)2.3())(ˆ()(ˆ)(ˆ  tkftkty   
Where 
)()(
)()(ˆ
tLtA
tYty  denotes output per effective unit of labour and 
)()(
)()(ˆ
tLtA
tKtk   denotes capital per effective unit of labour. 
0))(ˆ(,0))(ˆ(  tkftkf  
 89
The task of decomposing sources of economic growth has crucial 
implications. Not only can one decipher clear dichotomies in sources of growth 
between advanced and underdeveloped economies, it also helps to identify a crucial 
concept in economic growth accounting. Accordingly, that part of growth which 
cannot be accounted for by increased use of factor inputs is known as total factor 
productivity (TFP). Barro (1999) shows that the now advanced countries enjoyed 
TFP rates well in excess of two percent, as is the case for East Asian economies 
while the figure for countries in Latin America (not surprisingly excluding Chile) 
were far lower. Equation (3.2) captures the growth trajectory in that output per unit 
of labour is a function of capital per unit of labour with the condition that capital is 
modelled to exhibit decreasing marginal returns. The labour force and technology 
grow at exogenously given constant rates, equation (3.3) and equation (3.4) 
respectively, where n is the growth rate of the labour force and g is the rate of 
technological progress.   
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Assuming that a constant fraction of output, s, is invested and capital 
depreciates at a rate δ I find the stock of capital to evolve in time as given in equation 
(3.5). Note that for a closed economy, such as that envisaged in the Solow model, 
capital stock is ultimately a function of savings and depreciation. By redefining the 
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equation in its intensive form and through substitution, equation (3.6) provides us 
with an equation of motion for the capital stock per effective unit of labour. We now 
know how the way in which capital evolves defines the growth path of a country. 
More specifically, when actual investment, shown by first term in equation below, is 
above what is required to keep capital stock per labour to the previous period (second 
term) then the actual stock of capital per effective labour increases to a level that 
ensures the two terms converge. Conversely, shortfalls in investments induce capital 
stock per effective labour to adjust downwards towards the break-even equilibrium. 
Hence, with the help of the crucial assumption of diminishing returns to capital, the 
model projects an inbuilt dynamism for countries to ultimately converge into the 
steady state of output. 
)6.3())((ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ  gntktystk  
 
Finally, by setting equation (3.6) to zero thereby deriving the capital stock per 
labour at the steady state level,  
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I derive the basic Solow production function in log terms as, 
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So far, I have looked into the essentials of the model developed by Robert 
Solow, to quantitatively account for the factors that determine expansion of national 
output of countries. The model makes several predictions on economic growth: a 
high saving rate affects output positively; a high labour growth will have a negative 
effect on the growth of income per worker, and that, because of diminishing returns 
to capital, low income countries tend to grow faster, thereby lending support to the 
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convergence hypothesis. How fast capital stock per unit of labour approaches its 
steady state value ((1-α)(n+g+δ) at the final analysis, is determined by the rate of 
saving in the economy.  
Naturally, the growth theory formulated by Solow induced a string of 
scholars test its fit to empirical data on the economic growth of countries. It is rather 
difficult to clearly differentiate between the theoretical and methodological 
weaknesses of the model, as most critiques back up their arguments with models 
somewhat different from the textbook Solow model. Certain critical assumptions of 
the model, such as that on exogenously given technological progress, were at odds 
with real life data, which in turn leads one to question the convergence hypothesis. I 
further assess in the next section how augmented variants of the Solow model 
attempted to fine-tune the growth accounting exercise. 
3.3.2) Augmented variants of the Solow model 
 
While the Solow model remained unquestionably a crucial modus operandi 
for quantitative economic growth research, its limitations in terms of explaining 
variations in growth performance of countries increasingly became apparent with the 
advent of broader data sets and tests in different spatial contexts. One observes 
multiple features in economic growth dynamics of countries that define present-day 
patterns in economic status of each country. In lieu of its strong roots in neoclassical 
economics, the Solow model was unprepared to accommodate the possibility that 
non-market forces could have much bearing on economic growth. Instead, economic 
growth was modelled in a very mechanical way in that, once the right levels of 
factors are applied in the right technologically driven mix, economic growth was 
expected to fall into place.  
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Had that been correct, and market forces channelled economic resources to 
where they were scarce, African economies would have enjoyed much higher levels 
of capital flows. Rational actors, however, look beyond the technical derivations of 
production functions. Let us clarify this point with an example. Assume money put 
into countries A and B fetches a return of 100 at the official rate. Assume also that 
there is a 30% percent risk of expropriation in country A while the risk in country B 
is 10%. Then, the expected return of the investment in country A equals 40 (i.e. 
0.7*100-0.3*100) while capital invested in country is expected to return 80 (i.e. 
0.9*100-0.1*100). That return to investment in country B is twice that in country A 
reflects a credible regime of property rights in country B. If it were for the technical 
predictions of the production function, I would observe same levels of capital 
accumulation in both countries.     
The most notable anomaly of the basic Solow production function was that its 
predictions to convergence in levels of income between the richer and poorer 
countries never materialised, or, at the worst scenario, I observe what Pritchett (1997) 
called ‘Divergence, Big Time.’ In growth literature, the notion of convergence in 
income has three main strands in which basic characteristic features of countries are 
outlined for each type of ‘catching-up’ to occur. Firstly, the widely discredited 
absolute convergence hypothesis stipulates that irrespective of differences in initial 
conditions, per capita incomes of countries shall converge to one another. Secondly, 
according to the conditional convergence hypothesis, per capita incomes of countries 
that are identical in such structural characteristics as preferences, technologies, rates 
of population growth and government policies, tend to converge to one another 
independently of initial conditions. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) find evidence 
supporting this hypothesis for 98 countries from 1960 to 1985. A third dimension in 
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the convergence set is what is called the ‘club convergence hypothesis’ whereby per 
capita incomes of countries that are identical in their structural characteristics 
converge to one another in the long run, provided their initial conditions are similar 
as well. The structural characteristics usually encompass common features and refer 
to polarisation (e.g. ethnic), persistent poverty and clustering.  
As mentioned above, the weaknesses in the Solow model manifested 
themselves through large residuals, when economic growth equations were 
empirically put to test. In other words, the Solow-type neoclassical approach by and 
large failed to adequately explain empirically observed differentials in the growth 
performance of countries. In technical terms, there remained large unexplained 
residuals after accounting for increments in capital and labour inputs, implying that 
the root cause for economic growth lies beyond factor accumulation. As explained 
before, in the economic growth literature, this factor that determines growth above 
and beyond accumulation of factor inputs is termed ‘total factor productivity’, and 
because it meant anything and everything at the same time it induced research to 
provide quite divergent variables that proxy this concept. For instance, for the 
endogenous growth theory initiated by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) such 
variables as trade, human capital, endogenous technology and mechanisms of 
technological diffusion define total factor productivity and consequently economic 
growth.  There exists a large mixture of economic growth accounting approaches; so 
much so that a revival of the neoclassical view has not been out of the question. A 
case in point is provided by Mankiw et al. (1992) wherein they argue that not only 
did human and physical capital accumulation explain cross-country differences in 
growth, but convergence was also a plausible possibility.  
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The general idea with augmented variants of the Solow production function is 
that the reason for the basic model to fall far short of explaining empirical 
observations rests with the assumption of diminishing returns to capital. One widely 
applied remedy to address such deficiencies has been to augment the model with a 
human capital variable that controls for the significant effects of learning by doing on 
total output. Accordingly, equation (3.9) now provides for the production function to 
exhibit increasing return: 
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It is worth noting that with economic growth the augmented variant of the 
Solow model predicts a positive inertia for further technological deepening and, 
hence economic growth. Put differently, human capital is an important determinant 
of economic growth of countries, so much so that its inclusion in the growth model 
now enables one to explain observed divergence in levels of income between 
countries. In this scenario, economies of poorer countries catch up at a lower rate, or 
for a time series of a single country, the speed of convergence towards its steady 
state could be lower. This is confirmed by comparing the speeds of convergence 
between the augmented Solow production function (equation 3.11) and the 
neoclassical Solow model as shown in equation (3.12).  
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Generally, it is now apparent that growth in national output is not solely 
determined by factor accumulation and the technology with which the factors are put 
to use, as other important variables are also in operation. Neither are the cases for 
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exogenously determined technology, nor decreasing marginal returns to capital, as 
strong as had been thought. Had it been the case that capital-starved economies grow 
faster, empirical evidence on the income levels of countries over a long time span 
would have fit to the convergence hypothesis. In this respect, human capital became 
the foremost candidate in reducing the large residuals of the basic Solow production 
function. The pattern of high investments on human capital in East Asian economies, 
in the initial periods of their fast growth trajectory, lends support to the weight 
attached to this variable in the augmented variants of the Solow growth model. Still, 
human capital investment is ultimately endogenous to the growth model, in that it 
can only materialise as a consequence of growth-promoting institutions. While I 
leave the institution-economic growth nexus discussion for a subsequent chapter, it is 
a useful exercise to assess further technical developments in growth accounting. 
It is worth noting that research findings with regard to factors that determine 
economic growth have generally been sensitive to model specifications, both in 
functional forms and choice of variables. Even when the empirical work relies on a 
strong theoretical foundation, as is provided by positive political economy, such 
sensitivities have motivated researchers to come up with conceptual and 
methodological refinements for a better understanding of the basic factors as to why 
countries differ so diametrically in economic performance. An excellent example in 
this respect is the problem I encounter when I focus on a select few of institutional 
variables (for reasons of model parsimony) while theory indicates a large vector of 
variables affecting growth. In an article interestingly titled ‘I just ran two million 
regressions,’ Sala–i-Martin (1997) emphasises limitations in theories on economic 
growth in terms of pinning down specific variables, and suggests a technical solution 
to the problem. Such problems of model specification are more challenging when 
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one departs from conventional growth accounting to account for the institutional 
determinants of economic growth. For instance, not only is it true that a high 
likelihood exists that there is a two-way causal relationship between institutions and 
economic performance, but the effect of institutions on growth can occur indirectly 
by affecting factor accumulation.  
3.3.3) A note on current state of growth modelling 
 
I dwell more on highlighting prominent issues involved when one undertakes 
a quantitative analysis of the causes of differences in economic growth across 
countries. Note that economic growth accounting can also be undertaken within one 
country context by looking into how different political economy variables evolve to 
define the rates of economic growth over a long time spell for a given country. 
Specification-wise, the intricacies involved in growth accounting over a cross-
country setting are somewhat different when the research interest is to identify 
determinants of economic growth for a country in question. In a previous section that 
discussed the relative merits of large N economic growth studies, I underscored the 
point that the differences between case studies and cross country studies are not 
cosmetic. Our concern in this thesis is to study political/institutional variables that 
explain variations in economic growth performance among a set of countries. 
Broadly, researchers resorted to applying either a cross sectional analysis of 
countries on economic growth data, or a panel data analysis of the determinants of 
economic growth. Whereas either approach has its own pros and cons, it is 
impossible to disentangle the development of panel data models without giving due 
credits to cross-sectional models. In as much as one stresses the usefulness of panel 
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data models, it is also the case that, under a number of situations, cross-sectional 
models provide us with valid methodological tools. 
3.3.3.1) Cross-sectional models 
 
In quite a number of instances, scholars resorted to cross-sectional models so 
as to map economic growth to a vector of different theoretically stipulated variables. 
Notable among these are Barro (1991), Mauro (1995), and Sachs and Warner (1995). 
The growth model on a cross-section of countries takes the form     
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where iy  is the initial level of GDP per capita and ix  is a vector of other 
explanatory factors such as physical and human capital, trade, etc. β and τ are 
parameters to be estimated, while εi is the error term. The exact specification of the 
dependent variable has also been a matter of contention, with some studies using 
values for GDP per capita while others resort to GDP per worker.  
In this respect, Mankiw et al. (1992) measure income with log of GDP per 
working-age person on a cross-section of data comprising 98 countries in which they 
provide evidence in support of the assertions of the augmented Solow model. 
Accordingly, holding population growth and capital accumulation constant, cross-
country variations in levels of income are caused by differences in accumulation of 
human and physical capital. In doing so, the dependent variable for each country was 
derived as the average of all the years between 1960 and 1985, with no margin given 
to temporal variations of the variable. While collapsing a large time series data into a 
single observation may lead to a loss of information, the degree of error may not be 
significantly large if the short-run fluctuations in the variable do not reflect equally 
drastic changes in the right-side variables. For instance, though economic growth is a 
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very dynamic variable, one can not totally attribute the high fluctuations to an 
otherwise latent variable such as institutions.  
Another widely-cited work along this line is that of Barro (1991), who used 
growth rate of real per capita GDP as the endogenous variable in the growth equation. 
As in the study mentioned above, the sample dataset included a cross-section of 98 
countries and for a similar time frame. In this study, he undertook statistical tests on 
a range of economic variables to identify those which explain the observed variations 
in performance among the countries. The study finds that, in compliance with the 
convergence hypothesis, growth rates of countries inversely related with initial levels 
of income while human capital, proxied by initial year level of school enrolment 
rates, positively correlates with the rate of growth in real per capita GDP. The 
positive impacts of the human capital variable is likely to have been underestimated 
in the growth equation because human capital had also certain indirect positive 
effects, notably a positive association with ratios of physical investment to GDP and 
a negative one with fertility rates. Other variables that returned results which are 
largely concomitant with theoretical priors are share of government consumption in 
GDP, political stability and market distortion indicators. 
Note that, while I do not deny the risk of information wastage in cross-
sectional models, I caution against a wholesale criticism of these models. A number 
of reasons exist as to why this is so. It is true that such studies merge a large time 
series into a single observation, thereby making it very likely that important dynamic 
elements of the variables will not be brought to analytical scrutiny. However, this 
statement is very context-specific, in that the risk of information loss hinges on the 
type of variable under scrutiny. In our case, I try to explain the causal relationships 
between a dynamic variable (economic growth) and a slow-changing explanatory 
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variable. As such, the very nature of the variables partially mitigates the problem. 
Additionally, even when I apply cross-sectional models, the use of different 
robustness techniques helps to address the possible weaknesses of cross-sectional 
models. For instance, such techniques as robust regressions, regressions with robust 
standard errors and quintile regression, help to rectify the problems.    
Another oft-referred problem one faces with applying cross-sectional analysis 
for economic growth modelling is a high probability for endogeneity bias (Hoeffler 
2002, Nkurunziza and Bates 2003). This type of problem occurs when one or more 
of the independent variables in the model are themselves determined within the 
model. For instance, consider the case of the effect of political institutions on 
economic growth of countries wherein there exist strong possibilities for the former 
to be partially determined by economic performance. Political institutions are not 
always exogenous, in that putting in place good institutions usually requires financial 
costs that make richer nations better placed to establish such institutions. In this case, 
the model shall not capture the effects of economic status on a country’s ability to 
own growth-promoting institutions. Since the conventional approach to addressing 
problems of endogeneity requires either differencing or lagging the variables (both 
doable only in the presence of a temporal dimension for the data), the benefits of 
panel data models seem apparent.  
Nevertheless, this still does not totally rule out cross-sectional models. For 
instance, if the researcher finds a valid instrument for the relevant variable (what 
differencing or lagging does for panel data models) then cross-sectional models can 
control for the problem of endogeneity. Mauro (1995) did this in his study on the 
causes of corruption. Similarly, it is also the case that the problem of endogeneity 
bias depends on the features of the variable under scrutiny. For instance, the adoption 
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of certain institutions may have little to do with income levels in the country. A case 
in point is where most African countries inherited constitutions from departing 
colonial administrations.  
Still, the above presentation on the applicability of cross-sectional models 
should not be construed as implying that the two models are perfect substitutes. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there exist several instances where the use of cross-
sectional models is a legitimate one, I make a deliberate effort in this thesis to utilise 
the panel data specification as much as possible. As shall be explained in a 
subsequent chapter, some of the basic theoretical stipulations in the economic growth 
model presuppose panel data set-up for testing and verification. One such case is 
where the cross-sectional application returned results that conditional convergence in 
income did not occur in Africa. This result, which did not tally with theoretical 
propositions, changed when the panel data model was applied. All in all, I have 
ample reasons to conduct a more in-depth assessment of the panel model, to which I 
turn next. 
3.3.3.2) Panel data models  
 
Across a wide spectrum of disciplines, the use of panel data has proven to be 
an exceptionally strong tool for research, in that such datasets allow researchers to 
account for both the temporal and spatial attributes of variables. For instance, a 
cross-section data of thirty countries can only have less than thirty degrees of 
freedom, while if augmented by a time element of, say, three years, the model’s 
degree of freedom shall also increase accordingly. In other words, in the panel 
dataset, where total number of observations is now given by NT, our model will have 
more room for variation, so that it provides a better fit for the relationship between 
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the endogenous and exogenous variables. It is not difficult for one to see the 
significance of the broader information rendered by panel data, whereas for the 
cross-section type of data, it is only limited to N. While many economic variables 
inherently exhibit significant temporal variations as well as differences between 
cross-section units, political (institutional) variables are notoriously sticky. Panel 
data models enable researchers to explore both the temporal and fixed effects of 
variables. Before I summarize major empirical studies in growth accounting that 
have utilised panel data sets for analysis, I elaborate on the intricacies when one 
applies such techniques to identify basic determinants of economic growth variation 
among countries. 
Dynamic panel data analysis is the widely applied model specification type 
used to address problems of wastage of information, endogeneity bias and omitted 
variable bias that, under certain circumstances, could affect cross-sectional analysis 
of economic growth among countries. In the case of balanced panel, I shall have 
observations on each variable at the different points in time and for all countries. The 
dynamic character of the model emerges from the use of lagged values of the 
dependent variable as a right-hand side argument. Hence, the dynamic panel model is 
given by:   
)14.3(,,1,,   titititi xyg   
In this specification, economic growth as measured by rate of growth in real 
GDP per capita is a function of past values of the same variable and a vector 
comprising theoretically stipulated explanatory variables including institutions and 
human and physical capital. While there is no blue print as to how the error term 
should be modelled, one approach is to control for time dimension of the error 
component. In this case, I expect some variable effects which do not alter temporally 
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and others which transform accordingly. The decomposition of the error term into 
time variant and time invariant components gives us:  
)15.3(,,  tiiti   
where the first and second terms reflect the time invariant and time variant 
components. Hence, by substitution, equation (3.14) transforms into: 
)16.3(,,1,,   tiitititi xyg   
Equation (3.16) is also equivalent to: 
)17.3(,,1,1,,   tiititititi xyyy   
which again can be rewritten as: 
)18.3(,,1,
*
,   tiitititi xyy   
where 1*    
By deriving equation (3.18) in first difference form, I can eliminate ti,  because 
01,,  titi   
The main advantage of such an exercise is to solve the problem of 
heterogeneity and hence that of omitted variable bias. Now I have:   
)19.3(,,1,
*
,   titititi xyy   
However, it is now clear that the derivations carried out so far also introduced the 
problem of endogeneity in the model. This emanates from the fact that the lagged 
value of the dependent variable is endogenous to the error term lagged once. 
Logically, 
if )1,1,,, ()(   titititi fyfy   
 
Nkurunziza and Bates (2003) cite the types of bias that emerge from an OLS 
estimation of the model. Accordingly, the bias is negative for positive values of β; it 
 103
increases with β and slowly decreases as the time dimension of the panel is increased. 
Literature on growth empirics, by and large, favours the use of instrumental values to 
address the problem of endogeneity, as long as one is able to find legitimate 
instruments. The instruments used should be highly correlated with the explanatory 
variable in question (lagged value of the dependent variable) and not with the 
dependent variable. One solution in this respect is that of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 
wherein they argue that it is possible to use two-period lagged values of the 
dependent variable as well as first-differenced values of the other explanatory 
variables so as to remedy the endogeneity problem. However, the critical assumption 
they make that the differenced variables are strictly exogenous has come under 
strong criticism from a wide spectrum of research. A number of scholars found that 
these variables are in fact not exogenous in most instances, which in turn led to 
studies that further refined the methods. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) assert that the moment restrictions that one can 
derive from the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) findings, i.e. equations (3.20) and (3.21), 
indicate that there exist more valid instruments than the endogenous variables.   
  )20.3(0,,   tijtiy    
for j = 2,3, --- (T-1) 
  )21.3(0,,   tiktix   
for k = 1,2,3,---(T-1) 
They endorse the use of the Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) 
estimator calculated in two steps. First, I put all the instruments in a single vector: 
  )22.3(,,, 132*   tttt xxyyZ  
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And secondly, the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
instruments, (AH) in the equation below, is computed to combine the instruments 
efficiently, and then used to derive the GMM estimator: 
  )23.3('' **1**   YZAZXXZAZX HHGMM  
Note that our presentation so far on panel data estimates for growth 
accounting is based on the assumption that the error term has both time variant and 
time invariant components. The possibilities for panel data analysis, however, are 
multidimensional in accordance with specific type of relationships posited in theories. 
For instance, in the constant coefficients model I presume that neither country effects 
nor temporal effects are overly important, so that data can be pooled for estimation. 
For fixed effects model, one can let intercepts differ while holding slopes constant, or 
let slopes differ and intercepts remain constant, or both intercepts and slopes differ 
among sample units. Each case warrants different estimation procedures, as the 
statistical problems I face also differ according to the model in question. Additionally, 
I have at least two versions of the random effects model in that in one case the 
random error is heterogeneous among units such as countries but temporally constant 
for all, while for error component models, the error term is uncorrelated with both 
the cross-sectional and temporal dimensions of the model. These latter types of 
models are also often referred to as a two-way random effects model because they 
allow time invariant attributes of variables to be included in the models.    
Several empirical studies have used panel data sets to provide better 
approximations to factors that determine observed variations in growth performance 
among countries. One notable work in this regard is Islam (1995), where he applies 
different panel data estimators on a dynamic panel data model to test the 
convergence hypothesis in economic growth. The study highlights the incremental 
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use values of panel data specifications by sequentially estimating models of cross-
section and pooled cross-sections over five-year periods before embarking on 
dynamic panel estimates. Both cross-sections and pooled cross-sections provide 
results with few differences, as neither is able to properly account for individual 
effects. The findings indicate higher rates of conditional convergence and lower 
values of the elasticity of output to capital, because the dynamic panel data model is 
capable of controlling for the omitted variable bias. The study in particular applies a 
couple of panel data estimators, namely the minimum distance estimator, which 
emphasises the correlated nature of the individual effects and the least square dummy 
variable estimator. It generally stresses that the main advantage of the panel approach 
emanates from its ability to allow aggregate production function to differ across 
countries which, in this case, lends support to the conditional convergence hypothesis.  
Similarly, Caselli et al. (1996) further stress the methodological edge panel 
data estimation provides as compared to cross-section analysis of economic growth. 
As in most other studies, they pinpoint two rather important technical issues which 
specifications based on the latter types of data may not be able to internalise in the 
empirical analysis of growth differences. Accordingly, the study highlights possible 
inconsistencies of cross-country economic growth studies based on cross-sectional 
data, if there exist correlated individual effects and endogenous explanatory variables. 
When both the individual effects, which lead to omitted variable bias, and the 
endogeneity problems are significant enough, in the cases under scrutiny, estimates 
that do not account for these situations might become biased. By applying a 
generalised method of moments estimator (which has the inbuilt capacity to address 
these problems in dynamic panel data models), they find that per capita incomes 
converge to their steady-state at a rate of approximately 10 percent. The result is 
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somewhat at odds with prevalent estimates on convergence that revolve around two 
percent. The application of the generalised method of moments estimator on a 
dynamic panel data model returned results that reject the propositions of both the 
neoclassical Solow model and the augmented Solow model that includes human 
capital as a further explanatory variable.   
The findings using a generalised method of moments for growth empirics 
have also been endorsed by other similar studies. Tsangarides (2001), for instance, 
investigates the plausibility of the convergence hypothesis in different modes for 
OECD and Africa. In addition to underscoring the inadequacies of the cross-sectional 
models of cross-country economic growth accounting, he derives three important 
findings with regard to the growth literature. To start with, the dominant view on 
convergence that values it at 2-3% underestimates actual speed of convergence, in 
that the rate of convergence to steady-state both for Africa and the OECD stood in 
excess of 10 percent. Second, the study finds a string of political economy variables 
that significantly explain variations in growth performance among countries. These 
include initial conditions, investment, population growth, human capital development, 
government consumption, openness, financial development and the political 
environment. Another point worth noting is that both, in its textbook form and 
human-capital-augmented form, the Solow model is not consistent with observed 
variations in terms of economic growth among countries. As is the case for a number 
of other studies on the subject, this study also casts doubt on the robustness of the 
endogenous growth theory in addressing the question as to why countries differ in 
their growth performance over the long run. 
All in all, a number of practical rationales justify why empirical research on 
determinants of economic growth in cross-country settings could also use panel data 
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models, also often referred as cross-section time series data. As long as the specific 
nature of the variable in question demands it, panel datasets are inherently rich 
because they enable researchers to trace both temporal and spatial dimensions of 
political economy variables. For instance, should I be convinced that institutions vary 
as much within as in between cases, then I would need to rely on panel models to 
capture the multi-dimensional sources of variation. Similarly, should I have adequate 
reason to claim that units of analysis are not homogenous, then our use of panel data 
models helps us to satisfactorily control for heterogeneity of units of analysis. It is 
these particular cases of variation, as in the case when initial conditions diverge 
significantly, that the panel model enabled us investigate the convergence thesis. 
3.4) Discussion and summary 
 
The major aims of this chapter were to elaborate on the research method for 
the thesis and also to discuss the justifications for choosing the particular research 
method. I began by stressing the point that the extensive scholarly interest which the 
theme of economic growth has attracted over the past several decades has been well 
warranted.  The fact that the poor records that many countries registered with regard 
to economic growth was causally related to several political economy woes, was in 
itself important enough to justify the broad academic interest. As is the case for other 
challenging themes in political science and economics, the study of economic growth 
has also grown exponentially over the past several decades. 
As such, it was only logical for us to explain and justify the particular 
research method I apply in this thesis. As explained above, growth accounting is not 
the only methodology when it comes to the study of economic growth. If I were to 
use it in this thesis, then I would need to weigh its advantages vis-à-vis alternative 
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methods, i.e. growth diagnostics and case-based economic growth studies. Our 
presentation in this regard showed that the choice of a cross-country growth 
accounting approach was, in fact, an informed one. Still, the discussion, which 
underlined the use-values of cross-country specifications, tells only part of the story.    
A discussion, on the relative merits of cross-sectional and panel data models, 
was next in the pecking order. Though one can not indiscriminately use cross-
sectional and panel models as perfect substitutes, I underscored the point that there 
exist cases where the application of both models is a legitimate approach. I showed 
that the use of cross-sectional economic growth models could be justified due to a 
number of reasons. More to the point, I elaborated on the point that institutional 
variables are inherently latent, hence implying limited temporal variation, as well as 
the possibility of augmenting cross-sectional models with different tests of 
robustness.  
As for the panel specification, the Solow growth model, for all the right 
reasons, has long been the workhorse of economic growth studies. In so far as 
providing robust theoretical grounds and appropriate mathematical specification is 
concerned, this growth accounting model has been a phenomenal success. It provided 
a concise explanation as to why and how factor accumulation enters the production 
function. Naturally, a comprehensive assessment of the neoclassical Solow model, 
also tracing its refinements, was a useful exercise. Quite a long string of researchers 
embarked on applying diverse within and cross-country samples to empirically test 
the strength of the model, which to a certain extent has continued. The discussion 
presented in this chapter also provided a rationale for the use of the augmented 
Solow model in the thesis.   
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Chapter 4. The Setting 
 
The major objective of this chapter is to discuss the setting for the research as 
well as justify its focus on Africa. To do so, the chapter is organised as follows. In 
the first section, discussion is provided on four major paradigms on African 
development; namely the geography thesis, the socio-cultural and historical approach, 
the institutional approach, and political variables such as instability. Section 4.2 
pinpoints some rationale for growth studies in an African context. For a cross-
country quantitative study to have meaningful statistical derivations, there should 
exist meaningful variations in terms of the relevant variables. Section 4.3 shows that 
this is the case for Africa, in that the region hosts countries with diverse records in 
economic performance and quality of institutions. Two countries in the Region have 
made substantial strides in their economic performance over the past several decades, 
a fact which has led several scholars to label them as ‘outliers’. A discussion of 
Botswana and Mauritius is, therefore, necessary, and I deal with this issue in section 
4.4. The final section discusses and summarises. It is obvious that the main purpose 
of this chapter is, therefore, to underscore the point that our focus on Africa is a 
legitimate one. 
4.1) Competing theories on African economic performance 
4.1.1)A growth-inhibiting geography thesis 
 
This thesis, otherwise known as the ‘environmental determinism’ hypothesis, 
stresses that the underdevelopment of the region mainly emanates from natural 
conditions, which are deemed to be a hindrance to human development and 
production. Accordingly, Sachs and Warner (1997) model such geographical factors 
as fraction of countries in tropical climates, fraction of land-locked countries and 
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natural resource abundance in an international cross-sectional data, to explain that 
geographical variables are important determinants of growth performance in Africa. 
It is noteworthy that, while underlying the critical roles environment plays in 
defining economic growth, they did not uphold the notion that we need a unique 
theory for Africa. They also did not make the relative strength of the environment 
variable against other candidates such as trade and institutions.  
The study finds that a landlocked country’s growth is on average 0.58 
percentage points lower than a country with access to the sea while a country located 
in a tropical climate comparatively performs 0.85 percentage points lower than a 
non-tropical country. Since Africa has relatively more landlocked and tropical 
climate countries, it then follows that its economic performance is affected 
negatively. Estimates for other parameters including the ICRG institutional quality 
index and degree of openness of an economy, have produced results that largely 
confirmed theoretical priors. However, this study could not convincingly explain 
why, despite sharing similar environmental characteristics, cross-country variations 
in economic growth remained strong. Additionally, it is unable to account for those 
periods during which several countries in the region, managed to perform on a par 
with other regions. 
Similarly, Faye et al. (2004) discuss how, on average, countries that do not 
have direct access to the sea are likely to perform economically poorly.  A number of 
adverse dimensions, which relate to a country being landlocked, were identified, 
including political instability, large trade costs, dependence on infrastructure of 
transit countries that at the final analysis could lead to low scores on human 
development, and rates of economic growth for these countries. Nonparametric 
evidence is presented to show that the adverse geography hypothesis is not limited to 
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Africa, in that landlocked countries in other regions also compare less favourably in 
terms of economic performance with other countries. I can pinpoint a number of 
factors that question the robustness of this theory in explaining variations in cross-
country economic growth. To start with, it is based on a snapshot of the links 
between environment and economic growth in that it largely fails to control for 
temporal dynamism with regard to environmental factors. For instance, quite a 
number of countries in Africa changed from net food exporters several decades 
before, to net importers, as a consequence of environmental deterioration. As such, 
mapping long-run economic records to current environmental realities is likely to 
miss the point. Secondly, the theory is unable to explain why countries in the 
southern Africa region do not fit with its stipulations. A case in point is Botswana 
which lends support to the institutional paradigm that emphasises the importance of 
political institutions as fundamental determinants of growth. I probe further into the 
experiences of Botswana and Mauritius in a section below. 
4.1.2) Socio-cultural and historical factors 
 
This strand of literature on African development puts more weight on the 
very nature of states in Africa to explain likely causes of their underdevelopment. 
Accordingly, it postulates that colonialism has created modern institutions and 
systems at the expense of indigenous forms of governance. Clapham (1996) asserts 
that there exist significant idiosyncratic elements in African statehood, in that 
African states differ from other countries in their very configuration and origins. In 
this regard, it primarily singles out a couple of theoretical hypotheses considered 
important in explaining the abysmal record of African countries in political economy 
outcomes. Firstly, since most African countries were created territorially by forcibly 
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merging otherwise distinct ethnic groups, such a situation aggravated political 
instability in the postcolonial period. Secondly, political systems were characterised 
by neopatrimonial relationships between those in office and citizens, which in turn 
came at a high cost in terms of inability to adopt growth-promoting policies (See also 
Englebert 2000). As in the geography thesis, the plausibility of this approach is 
questionable, mainly because its relevance seems limited to Africa. I say so because, 
given that colonisation led to the emergence of states in other parts of the world as 
well, I would have expected those states to go through comparable economic growth 
trajectories to African states. Moreover, I hardly see any reason as to why the 
otherwise dissimilar colonial policies (e.g. direct rule, indirect rule, settler 
colonialism) should have equivalent resonance on African political economy. Finally, 
by lumping together state formation experiences in such countries as Ethiopia, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, it does not compare like with like. 
4.1.3) Institutions rule: a political economy paradigm 
 
So far, I have argued in favour of an all-Africa growth accounting exercise, 
particularly referring to diverse experiences in economic performance and quality of 
political institutions among countries in the region. It is also elaborated that 
approaches that utilise a particularistic theory to explain African economic 
performance have very limited explanatory force. Similarly, resorting to 
geographical and historical propositions limits us to very contextual analysis, while 
failing to account for the inherent temporal dynamism in economic growth. Positive 
political theory, on the other hand, provides a rich array of explanations as to how 
political institutions define the growth pace of countries. But this attribute also 
suffers from a drawback in that there exists no blueprint indicating the order of 
 113
importance of all political institutions in determining growth. Researchers largely 
responded to this problem by either subjectively focussing on only a limited number 
of institutions or by relying on highly aggregated measures, as indicated by the 
World Bank governance indicators, constructed using hundreds of individual 
variables drawn from 37 separate data sources provided by 31 different organisations. 
In this thesis, I partially circumvent this problem by focussing on one set of crucial 
political institutions that define the economic growth trajectory of countries, i.e. 
institutions of credible commitment. An additional logic for critically looking into 
the political economy literature on economic growth in Africa is to highlight the 
conspicuous absence of institutional variables vis-à-vis political economy outcome 
indicators. 
Ideally, it would have been very informative to synthesise the political 
economy studies on Africa in accordance with how each type of institution affected 
economic performance. However, there exists a noticeable difference in the way 
researchers addressed this issue within different contexts. For instance, research on 
African political economy, by and large, attempts to explain the channels and 
magnitude of a given outcome indicator, say political instability, on economic 
growth, which camouflages the fact that the former is in fact endogenous to types 
and quality of political institutions in a given country. At this point, I recall the 
Mauro (1995) study; for it crystallizes the broader view; which in international cross-
section data that includes eight sub-Sahara African countries, he instrumentalises 
poor institutional quality with degree of ethnic fractionalisation. One pitfall of this 
otherwise excellent work is that almost all the African countries included in the 
sample were not only those with high scores of ethnic diversity, but were also 
autocracies during the period in question. The point I make here is that, in organising 
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the existing African political economy literature, one naturally needs to draw on the 
above-mentioned features.  Accordingly, I discuss the literature in line with those 
political variables widely applied in African contexts. 
4.1.4) Political variables in African economic growth studies 
 
That political instability featured very frequently in studies on causes of 
cross-country differences in economic growth within an African content is all too 
apparent given high political volatility in the region (See Alesina et al. 1996, Fosu 
1993, Guillaumont et al. 1999). For instance, between 1970 and 1994, coups were so 
regular that they occurred in at least one country of the continent in every year, save 
for two years. Such often-violent events occurred mostly in Central, West and East 
Africa while southern Africa was mostly spared of this type of political upheaval. In 
terms of guerrilla warfare, every corner of the continent below the Sahara has 
endured episodes of bloody conflict. For some countries, such as Ethiopia and the 
Sudan, it lasted for more than two decades while, for others, it transformed into an 
open regional war, as in the case of the Great Lakes Region or a proxy regional war 
as in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, or culminated in genocide, as was the case in 
Rwanda.  
Still, amid the widespread political violence that engulfed the region, there 
existed some countries that have remained largely stable, not only under autocracies, 
but which have also managed to remain so after democratic reforms, with Kenya, 
Tanzania and Malawi being cases in point (for a video and slide presentation of the 
political economy of sub-Saharan Africa, see the African Research Program website 
of Harvard University at http://africa.gov.harvard.edu/). 
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I mentioned in passing above that research on the relationships between 
political instability and economic growth, by and large, focused on finding accurate 
instruments for the former and/or portraying such mediums as direct destruction on 
infrastructure and instability-induced sub-optimal private investments, in which 
political instability affects economic performance. In his oft-referenced study on 
growth determinants for 98 countries over the period 1960-1985, Barro (1991) 
proxies the political instability variable with two indicators, i.e. the number of 
revolutions and coups per year and the number per million population of political 
assassinations per year. Both were found to have significant negative associations 
with economic growth and, therefore, he argues that because political instability 
negatively affects property rights, it also deters investment and growth. In line with 
the style of most conventional studies based on economic theories such as Barro 
(1991), Gyimah-Brempong and Taynor (1999), political instability was included as 
an exogenously-determined argument and not as an outcome of political institutions. 
It is also worth noting that specifications that include an African dummy, risk a 
selectivity bias problem, because, in randomly including an African country, the 
likelihood of drawing a higher political instability value is correspondingly larger. A 
similar pattern is observed in the bulk of other studies. 
Accordingly, Easterly and Levine (1997) apply political instability as a 
control variable in their economic growth study, in which the instability variable was 
proxied by a number of indicators, including political assassinations, measures of 
civil liberties, number of coups and revolutions, and number of casualties of war. 
They argue that ethnic differences closely correlate with cross-country differences in 
public policy and political stability. A more pertinent assertion of the study to the 
issue at hand is that, while political instability adversely impacts on growth, its 
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effects are submerged by the more powerful effects of ethnic diversity on economic 
growth. Another measure used to quantify political instability in countries is the 
number of months of war in a country, but the application of this variable did result 
in a negative and yet statistically insignificant association between political 
instability and economic growth (Collier and Gunning 1999). On the same note, 
Nkurunziza and Bates (2003) apply the number of years an incumbent has been in 
office, and regime type, to capture the implications of political stability on economic 
performance of countries. Here, political instability is found to explain growth 
differentials among African countries but the sizes of the coefficient estimates are 
rather low. 
4.2) Rationale for growth analysis in an African context 
 
Our primary task in this particular segment of the study is to push through the 
argument that existing studies by and large had methodological weaknesses in 
dealing with institutional determinants of growth in Africa. One way to do this is to 
cast doubt on the frequently used African ‘exceptionalism’ hypothesis. I use the 
following presentation to clarify the point. Research on links between democracy and 
economic growth generally have come up with inconclusive results, in that half of 
the studies show democracy, positively and strongly, affecting economic 
performance, while the other half find significant inverse relationships (Przeworski 
and Limongi 1993). Some scholars argue that democracies are better placed to 
provide credible regimes of property rights, thereby predicting a positive slope in the 
economic growth equation (Goldsmith 1995, Leblang 1996). Others stipulate that in 
countries where the median voter is poor, the pressure for governments to spend 
more on current consumption at the expense of growth-promoting investments is 
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quite robust. This scenario ultimately leads economies to fall far from the production 
possibility curve (See Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) and Borner et al. (1995)). As a 
consequence, and as explained in Barro (1996), one expects a nonlinear functional 
relationship between proxies for democracy and economic growth of countries along 
a longer time span. By nonlinear, I mean that the effect of democracy on economic 
growth depends on the economic status of countries in the first place. If I assume that, 
democracy improves property rights, then I expect a significantly different effect on 
economic growth for a country which is poor and lacked property rights significantly 
from another country where property rights were better.  
I then ask if Africa confirms to these theoretical priors or exhibits a different 
pattern as postulated in the ‘particularism’ literature. I plot real GDP growth rates for 
forty African countries over the period 1965 to 2000 against the democracy variable. 
The democracy variable is drawn from the widely used Polity index (Polity IV 
Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002) that assigns 
values from a low of –10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). For 
exposition purposes, and with no loss of analytic power of data, I recode the Polity 
index into a 1 to 20 scale with increasing values referring to better scores on 
democracy. This maps countries in the Region from a low of 3 and 3.5 to Guinea and 
Sierra Leone respectively, to 17.34 for Botswana and 19.57 for Mauritius. As shown 
in Figure 1, I find a quadratic fit between the democracy and economic growth 
variables in Africa. While at low levels of development, democracy might have 
adversely affected growth, further consolidation in the democracy variable seems to 
have a positive payoff in terms of economic growth in Africa. A finding which 
broadly tallies with the above mentioned stipulations of research. This endorses our 
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assertion that if, designed appropriately, political economy studies can explain 
political determinants of economic growth in Africa. 
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Figure 1 Democracy and economic growth in Africa 
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NB. The above graph plots average annual real GDP per 
capita against Polity scores. Both variables refer a mean 
of the annual scores for the forty-five countries over 
the period 1970-2004. Since Polity is not a continuous 
data, the above graph should not be read as a functional 
relationship between democracy (Polity) and economic 
growth. It, however, provides a fair indication of the 
spread of data in the region. It is indicative of the 
non-linear relationship between economic growth and 
democracy. See Heston et al.(2002) for Real GDP per 
capita and Marshall and Jaggers (2007) for Polity. 
 
Previously, I maintained that positive political theories strongly elaborate on 
how a large vector of political institutions defines the economic growth path of 
countries. Broadly, the essential factors that explain why certain countries enjoyed 
robust growth, while others performed poorly, in a long-run time are span are 
existence, in the former, of political institutions that efficiently shaped incentives for 
productive activities. For instance, the political institutions ensured a credible regime 
of checks and balances on executive discretion to insulate private investment from 
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risks of expropriation of wealth and, therefore, encouraged economic agents to 
actively engage in productive activities. Similarly, in countries where political 
executives rule without the consent of the broad section of society, political leaders 
tend to establish extractive institutions. 
However, theories are, by and large, open-ended with regard to the relative 
strength of political institutions in affecting economic growth. I know, for example, 
that an effective bureaucratic delegation which addresses agency problems enables 
an economy to reap the economic advantages of not only technical efficiency, but 
also, that of a credible macroeconomic policy regime. It is also true that a 
functioning democratic regime can reduce risks of political instability thereby 
encouraging intensive and lasting economic transactions. While the positive 
implications of such political institutions for economic growth are apparent, what 
one cannot draw from theories is an ordered sequence of institutions in terms of their 
relative strength in determining growth. By limiting the focus of the study on one 
region, namely Africa, and hence reducing the set of pertinent political institutions, I 
partially circumvent this problem of rationalising the choice of specific political 
institutions for further investigation. For instance, if I classify countries as 
democracies based on Freedom House category of ‘free’, then only three countries 
(Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius) pass this test. Still, there are several other factors 
which justify the emphasis of our growth-accounting exercise on Africa. An all-
encompassing derivation of all such factors is that there exist adequate variations 
within the Region, both in terms of economic performance of countries and types of 
political institutions, so that it is suitable for empirical scrutiny. Accordingly, this 
section identifies and discusses the logic behind the focus on Africa. 
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4.3) Africa as a diverse set of performance and institutions 
 
To start with, African economic growth performance in a long-run time frame 
comprises a few countries that managed to transform into middle-income country 
status, while others either regressed continuously or, at best, registered modest 
growth. To explain the implications of such disparity, I examine how countries fared 
in terms of real per capita GDP between 1950 and 1990 (consistent with Maddison 
(1995). The exercise brings to the fore interesting points which support the 
proposition that economic growth within Africa has been far from even. For instance, 
between the two years mentioned above, Botswana’s economy, measured in terms of 
growth in per capita, grew ten-fold, a figure which was also a range for the region, 
given the absence of growth in most other countries. For the other group of countries, 
such as Ethiopia, Somalia and Chad, there was almost no significant change in rates 
of growth. By 1990, real GDP per capita in Mauritius, an open economy with 
relatively longer democratic practice, was three times greater than what it was in 
1950. It is also the case that, over the period mentioned above, neither resource-rich 
countries including Angola, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Congo nor politically stable 
countries such as Tanzania and Senegal managed to keep up economic welfare to 
levels enjoyed in the early 1950s.  
One can achieve a better grasp of economic health of countries through a 
sufficiently long time series on economic growth. Hence, to have a better 
understanding of how economies in Africa performed over an extended period of 
time, I resort to the PENN World Tables for the period 1990-2000 on 31 countries. 
During this decade, and measured in terms of rate of growth of real GDP per capita, 
the distance between the median value for the best performing economy (Botswana) 
and that of the slowest growing country (Gambia), is 6.44 percent. In about 41.3 
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percent of the years included, the countries registered negative growth rates, but the 
contribution to such an outcome is diverse across countries. If I apply a rule of thumb 
to classify countries that returned negative rates of growth for real GDP per capita 
for five or more years as contributing more to the aggregate poor performance of the 
region, then it is seventeen of the countries which significantly under-performed. 
Notable in the other segment of the growth spread are Mauritius and Benin. Thus, 
such scenarios endorse the assertion that economic growth in Africa reflects quite 
divergent individual country experiences. Since details of variables construction, 
with corresponding sources for both the panel and cross-sectional models are given 
in the Appendix, reporting this particular data set here may not serve any purpose.  
Similarly, with the help of a simple statistical exercise, I provide additional 
evidence that countries in Africa have undergone different economic growth 
episodes. This is clearly shown by the degree of variation, measured by the standard 
deviation, each country faced in its growth during the 1990s. Accordingly, those 
countries which, on average, performed strongly, also enjoyed a highly stable 
economic growth that did not exceed three percent, of which the subset mainly 
includes Botswana, Mauritius, and marginally, Benin. Nevertheless, stable rates of 
economic growth do not necessarily imply positive attributes, as the experiences of 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Tanzania show because these countries 
suffered from a low-equilibrium trap. Another group of countries, consisting of the 
largest countries of the region, such as Nigeria and Ethiopia, managed very erratic 
rates of growth, in that a very high positive performance in a given year was usually 
followed by a steep downward spiral in a subsequent period. Therefore, a central 
message which one needs to derive from the wide variation in economic growth 
performance, is that an African dummy may not be an adequate tool to understand 
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the political economy of growth in Africa. Such diversity in experience among 
countries in the region is equally observed with regard to the types and quality of 
political institutions that ultimately determine economic growth.  
On balance, political instability has been a major feature of the political map 
in Africa since independence, in which forty percent of the countries have 
experienced at least one period of civil war before the end of the last century. 
Compared with other regions, Africa has had a larger share of civil conflicts, so 
much so that, in one study, of the twenty seven countries sampled for investigating 
economic causes of civil wars, twelve were from Africa (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). 
However, as in the case discussed above for our dependent variable, such region-
level figures mask the high degree of variation in economic performance and 
political stability across countries in this part of the developing world. As such, it is 
imperative to hypothesise that the observed spread in types of political institutions 
among countries demarcates the line between the better and poorer performers in 
economic growth. While a detailed profile of such differences in political institutions 
is beyond the scope of this study, I handpick one important variable in the political 
institution vector for exemplification purposes. 
Accordingly, most African countries have adopted electoral modes of 
political governance, particularly since the early 1990s. Notwithstanding the fact that, 
in not a few instances, such moves reflected only rational responses to a changing 
global political environment, the experiences of countries in practising this 
dimension of democracy differed significantly. As Bratton (1998) documents there 
were 54 elections between 1990 and 1994, which covered more than half of the sub-
Saharan African countries, so that by the end of the decade, only four countries had 
not conducted any national elections. He also notes some differences between 
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countries in that countries that undertook founding elections late tended to have poor 
quality elections. I observe that in two dimensions of electoral rules that shape 
economic policy, namely district size and electoral formula, the African political 
landscape is quite diverse. For instance, as reported in Beck et al. 2001, for countries 
in the region, the mean district size for the lower house disperses as widely as 
seventy two for Namibia, thirty-six for Senegal and three for Mauritius in 2000. 
Variations between countries also exist in terms of electoral rules wherein, for 
example, Benin (arguably the only country to avoid big reversals from the recent 
batch of reformers) applies a proportional representation system to elect its 
legislature, as is the case for Mozambique (an emerging post-conflict democracy), 
while Zambia and Togo use the plurality rule. 
In all the discussion above, the overarching rationale I pursued for studying 
the political economy of economic growth in an African context rested on the 
region’s diversity in performance and institutional qualities. Beyond such conceptual 
issues, the conventional approach to growth analysis with an African dummy has 
also recently come under fire for its weaknesses in adequately explaining disparities 
in cross-country economic performances. Most notably, in a methodologically 
powerful work, Anke Hoeffler (2002:156) shows that once I fully account for 
unobserved country effects and for the endogeneity of investment ‘there is no 
systematic unobserved difference between African and non African countries.’ Put 
differently, not only do differences in levels of economic variables such as human 
and physical capital affect growth across the board, but also, the fundamental 
institutional variables determine economic growth regardless of where a country is 
located. As such, research designed to account for differences in long-term economic 
growth within Africa is more informative than that which bundles the continent into 
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one unit. One, therefore, expects basic patterns in determinants of growth to be 
broadly similar when done individually in different regional contexts, as Tsangarides 
(2001) confirms for OECD and Africa.  
All in all, the essence of the above discussion rests on the utilities of 
conducting a growth-accounting study in an African political economy context. 
Conventional economic growth studies on fundamental factors accounting for 
differences among countries rightly identified the African region to have registered 
consistently slower rates of growth in economic output. A bulk of these studies then 
embarked on a search for a particularly African variable to explain the reasons 
behind African underperformance. The view that African countries are poised to 
grow relatively slowly, even when they are at par with other regions in terms of 
institutional quality and factor accumulation, is so entrenched in economic growth 
studies that entering an African dummy has almost become synonymous with 
standard norm in research on growth. I differ from such an approach by stressing the 
region’s diverse experience both in terms of successes and underachievers in 
economic growth, as well as parallel variations in political institutions among 
countries. In doing so, I rephrase the basic research hypothesis in such a way that, the 
basic factors as to why some countries in the region achieved better growth than the 
others, relate to the presence of political institutions in the former that, among others, 
provided for a credible regime of property rights, stable and predictable political and 
economic systems and avoided predatory governance structures. 
4.4)The Botswana-Mauritius story(ies) 
 
Scholars who study the political economy of growth (or other dimensions 
such as democratic reforms or corruption) in Africa have paid particular attention to 
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the Botswanan and Mauritian experiences on these scores. This is understandable, 
given the much-heralded and exceptional progress these countries have made in their 
politics and economics since independence. With regard to economic growth, their 
achievements become all the more emphatic given the fact that, at independence, 
neither of these countries inherited conducive economic environment. When it 
achieved its independence in 1966, Botswana’s level of income was not even in the 
top twenty of African economies. Over the past 35 years or so, Botswana registered 
the fastest economic growth rate, not only among African economies but also 
globally. Again measured in terms of real GDP per capita using data from the PENN 
World Tables, Mauritius’ economy had contracted by 26.2% between 1950 and 1970. 
Following its independence in 1968, Mauritius’ economic growth was so 
phenomenal that not only did it recover all lost ground but, by the year 2000, its 
citizens enjoyed an income level three times greater than the 1950 level. It goes 
without saying that such drastic economic transformations in both countries occurred 
in conjunction with stable political environments. 
Of the string of studies that dealt with the political economy of growth, I cite 
two which sum up the major ideas behind the performances of these countries. 
Acemoglu et al. (2003) pinpoint five factors to unravel what they call the ‘puzzle’ 
which enabled Botswana to sustain good policies. These are relatively inclusive pre-
colonial institutions, minimal effect of British colonialism, the compatibility of 
institutions of property rights and economic interests of the elite in the post-
independence period, a rich resource base and critical decisions made by its post-
independence leaders (Presidents Khama and Masire). Whether all these factors are 
particular to Botswana is questionable and hard to verify. Nevertheless, I can single 
out a few issues that need to be examined further. Botswana is a land-locked country 
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which, as one of the so-called frontline states, endured the pitfalls of political 
instability from (Apartheid) South Africa. Additionally, rather than fuelling 
economic growth, high-value natural resources have been a curse for the political 
economy of growth. If so, linking Botswana’s strong performance to a selected few 
factors risks the problem of overgeneralization. In contrast to this, Mkandawire 
(2001) argues that robust economic growth in Africa was not confined to Botswana 
and Mauritius. He showed that ten of the twenty-seven countries, which achieved 
very strong growth rates during a period from 1967 to 1980, were African. Despite 
claims about clientalism and structural obstacles, Africa has had states that were 
‘developmental,’ including, but not limited to, Botswana and Mauritius.  
Given these points, is the argument that Botswana and Mauritius are outliers 
valid? At this point, it helps to elaborate what exactly is meant by an outlier. Also 
called “discordant observations,”  “rogue values,”  “contaminants,” “surprising 
values,”  “mavericks” or “dirty data”, outlier refers to either a) any observation that 
appears surprising or discrepant to the investigator, or b) any observation that is not a 
realisation from the target population (Beckman and Cook 1983). It is not difficult to 
construe a high subjective content in the first definition of an outlier. Considering a 
number of factors, I find no convincing reason to subjectively label these countries as 
outliers. In the 1960s, when these countries won their independence, Botswana 
lagged behind many countries in the region in its income level, while Mauritius was 
one of the better ones by regional standards. Presently, the World Bank classifies 
Botswana and Mauritius in the upper middle income category, and more importantly, 
along with four other African countries. In terms of resource, Botswana is in the 
resource-rich league together with the likes of Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria, 
while Mauritius does not possess high-value natural resources. Mauritius is an island 
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state like Madagascar or Sao Tome & Principe, while Botswana has no territorial 
access to the sea. Botswana is considered homogeneous in its ethnic make-up, 
whereas Mauritius, as in the case of most African states, is socially diverse. 
If I go by the second definition and declare that these two countries are 
outliers in African data, it means that the probability of selecting either country from 
an African distribution is very small, if not zero. Since our dependent variable is 
economic growth, I use this same variable to argue that Botswana and Mauritius are 
realisations from the target population, i.e. Africa. I will consider first the real GDP 
per capita income from the PENN World Tables for the year 1970. I do so because 
both these countries became independent in the late 1960s. For the year in question, 
the distribution of income in Africa showed a mean of 1557.11, with a standard 
deviation of 1214.02. Levels of income for Botswana and Mauritius were within one 
and two standard deviations from the mean, respectively. Put differently, in any 
random pick on this score, I would have a sufficiently large chance of including 
Botswana and Mauritius. In fact, if any country was to be an outlier, it should be 
Gabon, with a level of income 9.3 times greater than the mean income in Africa for 
the year under scrutiny. A similar picture emerges when I consider current income as 
classified by the World Bank.  
The effects of outliers are mostly felt in linear regressions, since they deviate 
from the linear relations which other data points follow. I defer parametric tests with 
regard to Botswana and Mauritius to the quantitative analysis chapters of the thesis. 
On the other hand, I raise some points that provide a clearer understanding of the 
general picture. Irrespective of the factors that caused them, observations affected by 
outliers do not obey theoretically stipulated functional relationships between 
variables. For instance, the Solow model predicts that higher levels of investment 
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feed into correspondingly robust growth performance. As such, inasmuch as I are 
correct to associate the lacklustre performance of other African economies partially 
with low levels of investment, I should expect to deduce the same for these two 
countries. On a related note, a stable political landscape, in which the state avoids 
predatory policies, fosters economic growth in the long-run. As per the definitions of 
outliers, I would have labelled Botswana and Mauritius as outliers had they achieved 
progress without the economic and political features mentioned above. To put 
matters into perspective, unlike the assertions of the conventional view, the strong 
economic performances of Botswana and Mauritius make them exceptional, but not 
outliers, in the technical definition of the term.      
4.5) Discussion and summary 
 
In this chapter, I set out to establish a rationale for applying a positive 
political economy approach to studying differences in economic performance among 
African countries. Several points were discussed, that highlight the value-added of 
this type of research. To start with, I argued, using empirical evidence, that the 
prevalent approach to modelling African political economy using context-specific 
theories is not an informative exercise. One such case in point is the good fit that an 
all-Africa data provides with the general positive political theories on the nexus 
between economic growth and democracy. Secondly, I questioned the robustness of 
studies that normally account for African economic performance by collapsing it into 
simple mean values. A couple of factors were invoked to sustain this argument, 
which stresses the presence of adequate variation between countries of the region, 
both in terms of types of institutions and economic performance. Thirdly and 
relatedly, the non-institutional theories such as the geography and history hypotheses 
 130
were of very limited explanatory power. Such theories were very descriptive of the 
African situations, as opposed to providing spatially comparative theories. 
Additionally, since they mostly rely on an average representation of the Region, one 
is unable to look into important intra-regional disparities. Finally, I discussed the 
cases of Botswana and Mauritius, which the conventional view considers to be too 
good to fit an African story. I showed that, as these countries exhibit many features 
of other African states, the claim that these countries are outliers to African data is 
technically untenable. 
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Chapter 5. Model specification and testing 
 
In preceding chapters, I discussed a number of vital points that ultimately 
allow for a systematic investigation of the political economy of growth from a 
credible commitment institutional perspective. As the voluminous debate on 
economic growth accounting was primarily an incremental value-added exercise (See 
Acemoglu 2004 for a review of recent developments), it then naturally followed that 
tracing the development of the field, both in its theoretical and technical dimensions, 
helped justify the choice of the particular functional specifications for the thesis. This 
chapter aims to accomplish a number of tasks. Firstly, I elaborate the quantitative 
models I use in this research. Secondly, a description of the economic variables to be 
used in the analysis is provided. In addition to explaining the variables included, the 
presentation also draws on economic theory to reveal directions of relationships of 
each economic covariate with the dependent variable. In the previous discussions, 
while emphasising the strong merits of panel data analysis, and rightly so, I also 
underscored the practicality of cross-sectional analysis.  
There are certain reasons which make the use of cross-sectional models 
equally appropriate as well as contextually unavoidable. One reason is that since 
institutional variables are often sticky, I will be able to draw more insights from 
cross-country differences than I do from changes on the temporal dimension. Also, 
African data, at a scale required for statistical analysis, is frequently missing from 
sources that report institutional and policy information on countries. This is not the 
case, however, for the four variables in the Solow model. As shall be explained 
below, with the exception of a few countries, the PENN World Table provides data 
large enough to build a panel along Solow lines and test it on Africa. 
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It is this last point which provides us with the third task of this chapter. 
Throughout the discussion so far, I have been forcibly making the point that the best 
strategy to disprove the ‘African exceptionalism’ paradigm is to test well-established 
theories on African data. Since this is a particularly very significant theme of the 
research, the extensive coverage I give it in this chapter is not difficult to grasp. If the 
predictions of the Solow model are replicated using exclusively African data, this 
then implies that, in contrast to the conventional view, there is wide variation in the 
economic performance of African states. Needless to say, this variation is manifested 
through both the spatial and temporal angles. I will be justified not to have resorted 
to invoking theories deemed particular to Africa.  
Fourthly, I attempt to establish that African data is not driven by the 
experiences of a few countries. Recall that, in a previous chapter, I argued that 
Botswana and Mauritius should not be considered as outliers, strictly based on the 
technical definition of the concept, to explaining economic growth in Africa. The 
discussion in this chapter provides us with parametric tests to back up these 
assertions. Finally, such issues as measurements of the economic covariates and the 
sources of data are tackled in this part of the thesis.    
The roadmap towards achieving the above mentioned objectives is as follows. 
In section 5.1., I provide a brief description of the cross-sectional model I shall be 
using in the study. The description is kept brief, not because its use here is limited, 
but the panel model is better placed to establish our overarching theme for this 
chapter. Also note that, apart from the cross-sectional models’ inability to account 
for dynamic effects in the relationships, there is much overlap between the two types 
of models. Taking these issues into account, section 5.2. embarks on a detailed 
elaboration of the panel model. I delve into the technicalities with regard to 
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measurements of both sides of variables, i.e. economic growth and economic 
covariates, as well as assessing how these variables distributed on the African 
economic map. I discuss data and conduct empirical tests in the following section. 
This section is decomposed into descriptive and quantitative analyses of economic 
factors that shaped economic growth for the countries in the region. By showing that 
African data is compatible with the predictions of the Solow model, the significance 
of this chapter echoes the overall gist of the thesis. I summarise and discuss the 
major issues in the final section.  
5.1) The cross-sectional model     
 
Before I delve into the descriptions and analysis of economic variables in 
both models, it helps to clarify the links between this chapter and that on empirical 
models. Accordingly, the presentation in the previous one, was essentially about the 
functional specification, and was tuned to address technical issues. Any mention of 
the actual variables, in the said chapter, was, at best, tangential. Lumping the two 
issues (i.e. functional specifications and elaboration on variables) into a single 
chapter would not be advisable. Hence, the case for the discussion in this chapter 
rests on these points.  
Arguably, from the family of cross-sectional economic growth studies, Barro 
(1991) is the most widely referenced material. As explained earlier, it is his finding 
of a significant negative coefficient estimate for a dummy on Africa, that led this 
latter theme to achieve currency among scholars. Economic growth is measured as a 
simple arithmetic mean of annual rates of growth in real GDP per capita over the 
period in question. This kind of measurement for economic growth is not shared by 
other influential economic studies of the recent past. For example, both Acemoglu et 
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al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004), emphasise the use of the natural log of real GDP 
per capita at a particular point in time as the appropriate measure in cross-sectional 
models. What is notable is that the differences were, by and large, marginal, and did 
not become major bones of contention in the growth literature (a notable exception to 
this consensus is Jeffrey Sachs’ paper on the relevance of geography, See Sachs 
2003). Here, I follow the latter and draw on the PENN World Table to define 
economic growth as natural log of the average real GDP per capita between 1990 and 
2003 of the forty-five African countries. 
What is not as clear-cut, however, is the type of economic explanatory 
variables that should be entered into the cross-sectional economic growth analysis. 
This is because the choice set for the economic covariates has been exponentially 
rising since the Barro study. Human capital, openness, investment, initial levels of 
income, public spending on capital formation, and spending on research and 
development are but a small sub-set in the domain of economic variables. In this 
thesis, I follow a more pragmatic approach. More specifically, I select the economic 
covariates in a way that minimises degrees of freedom. This condition is vital in an 
African context, where I face missing values for many variables. Note that the 
degrees of freedom is also an inverse function of the number of parameters to be 
estimated. It is for these reasons that I limit the economic controls to degrees of 
openness only. I do so not because openness is the only variable or the most 
important one to affect economic growth in Africa. Rather, the rationale is practical, 
as data on this variable, are available for all the countries. Additionally, I aim to test 
the robustness of the findings by replacing openness with other variables, albeit at a 
cost in terms of degrees of freedom.  
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5.2) The panel model 
 
I build the panel using data drawn from the PENN World Table (See Heston 
et al. 2006).The selection of countries to be included in the panel was largely driven 
by a number of considerations. To start with, the existence of an adequate temporal 
spread for the dependent variable has informed the final list of countries selected for 
study. This condition was also tied to the availability of data for the dependent 
variable from a single source that makes comparative analysis acceptable. Yet it has 
proved a rather less restrictive condition, as notable absentees were Angola, 
Seychelles and the new entrant to statehood in the region, i.e. Eritrea. Another 
criterion applied to ensure homogeneity in structural conditions was to limit the 
geographical coverage to countries that are located south of the Sahara and, hence, 
rule out North African economies. Accordingly, the resulting sample contains forty-
five countries, with the temporal angle stretching over the years between 1960 and 
2004.  
Note that the Solow model is essentially a neoclassical production function. 
Since this model assumes an institution free world, the fact that data, for a few of the 
African countries, included time during colonial spell does not have much bearing on 
the model. Additionally, as the major preoccupation of this research is to explain 
long-term growth, it is of paramount importance to smoothen short-term fluctuations 
in variables. Conventionally, this problem is addressed by collapsing the time series 
aspects of the data into equally-spaced time spans. Here, I lessen the effects of short 
term spirals in growth by constructing nine five-year episodes, thereby ultimately 
resulting in a sample size of 405. Another advantage of such an approach emerges 
from the fact that the latent effects of the institutional variables naturally require 
longer time spells to materialise.  
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5.2.1) The dependent variable 
 
Currently, there exists a battery of indicators used by scholars and 
practitioners to assess the health of economies, with particular emphasis placed on 
accounting for the determinants of variations across countries on the variable of 
interest. One characteristic feature of both stand-alone macroeconomic variables, 
such as rates of inflation, and composite ones, as in the case of the human 
development indictors, is that each is inherently limited to explaining only a subset 
of social welfare. As a consequence, research is better served by utilising a given 
measure that has a higher correlation to other outcome measurements. Our 
preference in using economic growth as the dependent variable is, therefore, justified 
as much by its strong theoretical foundations, as by the fact that the effects of other 
social indicators could be captured by it.  
Even when scholars provide for broader definitions and measurements of the 
concepts of development and economic welfare (Sen 2001), economic growth 
remains an integral component. This is shown in the derivations of the widely used 
UN publication, Human Development Index. The utility of the concept of average 
levels of income, as an analytical tool to capture cross-country differences in well-
being among countries, is all the more pronounced when it is operationalised in such 
a way as to filter out price effects. Logically, real GDP per capita best satisfies these 
conditions. 
In the previous chapter, I highlighted the shortcomings of the ‘African 
underdevelopment’ literature with regard to explaining differences in the growth 
trajectories of African countries. Empirical research that dummies Africa with a 
carefully selected list of a few countries runs the risk of camouflaging otherwise 
significant disparities observed in economic growth performance among the 
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countries of the region. Additionally, as shown in Figure 2, although there existed a 
significant spread in average levels of income among African countries, the general 
trend is skewed to the left. Such curvature accounts for the rather abysmal economic 
performance of a large number of countries in the past five decades. I group 
countries in quartiles for a more in-depth investigation of the pattern of long-run 
cross country economic performance in the region. The variable of interest here is 
the ratio by which a given country’s average income changed over the past fifty 
years. 
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Figure 2 A range spike for African economies 
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NB. In this graph, Income current and Income Initial 
refer to the natural log of real GDP per capita for the 
year 2000 and 1970 respectively while the magnitude of 
change is captured by the variable Ratio. As can be 
visually inspected, about 12 of the 43 included economies 
regressed during this period. I use data from PENN World 
Table (See Heston et al. 2006). 
 
The general pattern of the spread in real GDP per capita can be characterised 
along three major points. Firstly, the concentration of data points becomes sparse as 
one moves towards higher ratio values. In other words, the lion’s share of countries 
in the continent experienced a serious contraction in their economies, or, at best, 
registered growth rates that decidedly failed to outpace growth in the size of their 
population. Secondly, there exist sizeable variations in the length of the spikes which 
capture corresponding imbalances in growth rates achieved among the countries. 
Parallel with countries that have gone through significant economic stagnation, some 
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countries managed to at least triple their average incomes between the years 1960 
and 2000.  
Thirdly, there were wide variations in terms of levels of initial income among 
the countries in question. A few countries were within the middle income echelon as 
early as 1960, while others began their economic development at extremely low 
levels of average income. In studies of economic growth,  the question of how such 
initial disparities in income levels among countries evolved over time is a matter of 
paramount concern, both theoretically and empirically. I shall return to this issue of 
testing the convergence hypothesis in a subsequent section below, after first dealing 
with the description of each category.  
The bottom quartile consists of countries whose average levels of income has 
shrunk quite significantly during the period under consideration. Measured in terms 
of real GDP per capita, the range within this group of regressing economies is also 
very noticeable in that, in the worst case, the average level of income for a citizen of 
the Congo (Kinshasa) is only a quarter of what it was about five decades ago, while 
for that for the within-group best performer, i.e. Comoros, the corresponding figure 
is about eighty percent. The composition of the nine countries in this category 
includes resource-rich economies such as Nigeria and Congo (Kinshasa) as well as 
resource poor ones as in the case of Madagascar and Mozambique.  
Interestingly, this grouping comprises countries which were initially 
relatively poorer and failed to make inroads in the catch-up scenario of growth 
dynamics, but more importantly, it also hosted some that were in the better-off 
category with regard to initial income, notably Comoros and Mozambique. Note also 
the fact that with the exception of Zambia and to a lesser degree Madagascar, the 
other countries in this group have experienced prolonged and often violent forms of 
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political violence. It is also worth noting that the point of analysis here is the 
achievement (or lack of success) for a given country over the long-term, and not 
current income status. 
A characteristic feature of countries in the second quartile is that, over the 
past half century, their economies remained on either the edge of, slightly below, or 
above, their initial levels of average income. The range of real GDP per capita for 
this group falls in between 89 percent below the initial level of income for Senegal 
and about 20 percent more than the initial level of income for Ethiopia. These 
countries can best be described as stagnating economies, in that, in a period during 
which global output expanded exponentially, their economic performance remained 
largely lacklustre. Apart from their relatively better performance as compared with 
the previous group, which slides back in economic welfare terms, the countries in 
this category share a number of features of countries in the bottom quartile.  
Additionally, their post-independence political reality was defined by 
relatively stable autocracies, as in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo. 
Political instability, both in its elitist and broad forms, has ultimately affected the 
economic performance of these countries. For instance, Hartmann (1999) reports that, 
between the period 1960 and 1972 alone, Benin has gone through ten changes of 
Heads of State whereby six of the turnovers in chief executives were caused by 
military takeovers.  
The next group’s, i.e. the third quartile , income distribution pattern tends to 
be closer to the previous group, thereby providing further evidence that overall 
income distribution is skewed to the left. Nevertheless, the intra-group distribution in 
average levels of income is relatively more concentrated between the 21 percent and 
61 percent above initial income levels for Cameroon and Guinea Bissau respectively. 
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It also includes South Africa which maintained its higher income status of the initial 
years while, at the same time, it did not experience significant expansion. 
Additionally, I observe that the relatively higher ratio in terms of growth in real GDP 
per capita registered by Guinea Bissau is not very extensive, when one considers the 
very low initial level of average income for that country. Other countries, comprising, 
in this category, those countries, added twenty-five percent or more value to their 
economic status over the long-term, include Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mauritania, Namibia and Tanzania. With regard to political institutions, a similar 
pattern exists to the one mentioned for the previous group, with the exception of the 
particular case of South Africa and Namibia. The overall performance of this group 
is somewhat better than both the first two quartiles. 
In the uppermost quartile, apart from the case of Malawi, all countries in this 
category have managed to at least double the size of their economies over the five 
decades under scrutiny. It also includes the two star performers in Africa, both 
economically, and in relation to being long-surviving democracies. However, 
research on African political economy, by and large, overlooks a factor that has 
important implications for the study of economy growth. While both Mauritius and 
Botswana recorded significant leaps in economic growth, the respective values for 
each being four-fold and eight-fold, there existed clear dissimilarities vis-à-vis initial 
levels of income between the two countries. More specifically, while, during the 
early years, Mauritius had a middle income status, Botswana started from a very low 
level of development. As such, economic growth in Botswana converged not only in 
its conditional variant to other African economies, but also to economies outside 
Africa. Whether their economic achievements have partially been matched by other 
better-governed countries, in a way that allows one to deduce causality, is an issue I 
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leave for the quantitative analysis section. This group of countries also includes Cape 
Verde, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Lesotho and Zimbabwe.  
In a nutshell, these kinds of variations have partially been explained by 
differences with regard to economic variables among countries. For instance, it is 
broadly found that physical capital accumulation induces faster economic growth 
when, in particular, a country’s initial endowment of such resources is very low 
(Mankiew et al. 1992). Equally true is the assertion that this factor of production is 
hardly exogenous, in that its quality and size is ultimately a function of other 
temporally robust determinants. While I hypothesise that political institutions 
constitute the fundamental determinants of economic growth, a sizeable fraction of 
the variation in economic growth among countries is still explained by economic 
variables. As such, economic models (more specifically, the basic Solow model) 
shall be the logical starting points for any strong cross-country growth accounting 
exercise. This chapter develops and tests an African panel, informed by the Solow 
model. In this section, I took the first step in that direction by elaborating the 
distributional pattern of economic growth among African countries. Our dependent 
variable for the panel specification is the change in log of real GDP per capita 
between the start and end of period for each time episode (i.e. 1960-64, 1965-69, ---, 
2000-04). Next, I conduct a similar exercise on the pattern of distribution in 
economic covariates among the countries. 
5.2.2) Economic covariates 
 
The menu of economic explanatory variables used in growth empirics has 
actually been so extensive that an exhaustive listing is impractical. In fact, that the 
Solow model has been amenable to inclusion of a large set of right-hand side 
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arguments is reflective of the model’s wider applicability. Here, I narrow the choice 
of variable to those that feature in the bulk of cross-country economic growth studies. 
The discussion of the cross-country distribution of these variables is informed by two 
considerations. As elaborated previously, the economic variables on their own 
explain some portion of the variations, although the fact that large unexplained 
residuals still remain induces us to look for other more fundamental factors. 
Moreover, their use-values travel beyond empirical results, since the economic 
variables in question are also backed by strong theoretical foundations. It is also 
worth noting that measurement issues in economic variables have equally been bones 
of contention, in that estimates tend to be very sensitive to choice of specific 
measurements. This has certainly been the case with studies that model the effects of 
human capital on economic growth. An in-depth investigation of the pattern of 
distribution of the economic covariates in an African context is provided below. 
5.2.2.1)The convergence hypothesis  
 
One seemingly simplistic, and yet potent, derivation from the work of Robert 
Solow is the notion that, taking rates of saving and population growth as givens, a 
country’s economic growth trajectory tends to converge to a steady-state level of 
income per capita. Central to this conclusion, whereby the speed of convergence is a 
positive function of rates of saving, is the concept of diminishing marginal returns to 
capital. In contrast to higher saving rates, which make a country grow strongly, the 
relationship between a country’s economic well-being and its population growth rate 
is an inverse one. Scholars then transposed this concept of convergence in a single 
country context, to empirically test if and how such a convergence in levels of 
income materialises in a cross-country setting. In its crudest form, the idea of cross-
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country convergence portrays a scenario in which capital, induced by a search for 
higher returns, flows from capital-saturated economies to capital-starved poorer 
economies enabling the latter to register faster economic growth and, hence, achieve 
convergence. This concept is operationalised in cross-country economic growth 
accounting by including past values of income as explanatory variables. Before I 
assess the African experience in this respect, a brief description of the different 
variants of the convergence hypothesis is in order.  
A look into the distribution of the income variable reveals a mix of fast 
growth, regression, as well as stagnation. A handful of countries managed to narrow 
their income gaps vis-à-vis advanced countries, while others lagged behind. This 
mixed record on convergence led scholars to refine the conditions under which 
convergence occurs. A couple of concepts appear frequently in explaining the 
convergence hypothesis. Initial conditions refer mainly to the starting period for the 
analysis, whereas by structural conditions, I mean basic variables that define politics 
and economics such as resource base, ethnic make-up, colonial history, etc. The 
absolute convergence hypothesis predicts that, regardless of differences in initial 
conditions, countries in the long-run converge to the same levels of income. 
Evidence on this postulate is not abundant and all the indications are that there is a 
clear trend of absolute divergence.  
The conditional convergence hypothesis, on the other hand, argues that levels 
of income among a group of countries, with identical structural conditions, converge 
to one another, regardless of differences in initial conditions (Chatterji 1992, Johnson 
and Takeyama 2001). The set of structural conditions is an open one, ranging from 
preferences to technologies and policies. The third one is the club convergence 
hypothesis, which imposes stronger conditions than the conditional convergence 
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variant. Accordingly, not only should structural conditions be similar for 
convergence to occur, but also, such initial conditions as political polarisation and 
levels of poverty need to be similar among the countries (See Galor 1996). There is 
also an overlap between the conditional and club convergence themes in many 
instances. It is these theoretically plausible conditions that justify the inclusion of 
lagged values of the dependent variable as a right-hand side argument. 
The empirical question I investigate in this respect is if, in fact, levels of 
income per capita among African countries tended to converge over the long-run. Put 
differently, such a research question boils down to testing a null hypothesis that 
claims countries in Africa which were relatively richer in the early 1960s, performed 
economically better than the rest, to such an extent that the gap in income levels was 
wider by the turn of the last century. It is to be recalled from our discussion on the 
dependent variable that any widening in the gap of income levels need not 
necessarily result from initially better economies in the region growing faster than 
poorer ones.  
Rather, it could equally occur as a consequence of economic stagnation in the 
latter, while economic growth in the other economies could have stabilised. The 
parameter I apply for a descriptive analysis of convergence is average real GDP per 
capita of each country for the first and last time episodes. Unlike annualised growth 
rates, this measure is less prone to short-run fluctuations, thus providing a better 
representation of income levels. A negative slope implies that there exists a strong 
case to postulate that convergence in levels of per capita income among African 
countries has occurred. 
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Figure 3 Africa and the convergence hypothesis 
 
NB. By plotting the year 2000 level of income (Y-axis) 
against the initial income of each country (both terms 
refer to natural log of real GDP per capita), the above 
graph suggests a pattern of divergence among African 
economies. I include all the forty-five countries in the 
basic data.  Note that initial income dates differ as per 
reported in the data source, i.e. PENN World Table (See 
Heston et al. 2006). 
 
As is clearly shown in Figure 3, what appears to have happened in Africa is a 
strong divergence in levels of per capita income between the two groups of countries. 
The slope of the curve is 0.7228, and it also implies a positive correlation between 
initial level of income and current economic welfare, which is significant at one 
percent. The 95% confidence-level matching is, in particular, stronger at middle 
income levels. It signifies that any weakening of divergence that might have occurred 
was limited to the higher income countries in the region. In other words, a country at 
a very low level of development in the early 1960s within an African context is very 
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likely to have lost further ground by the end of the analytical period. Similarly, a 
given country situated, say, at the bottom of the top decile group of countries at the 
start of the period would have converged to the group average by the end of the 
period. This lends much support to the club convergence hypothesis, as compared to, 
in particular, the absolute convergence hypothesis. In other words, convergence in 
income levels tended to materialise among a cluster of countries, in which a 
comparable level of initial income is one element that defines the cluster. 
Alternatively, I can elaborate the pattern of convergence in average incomes 
in Africa by looking into the identities of the exits and entries to the top quartile 
income countries for each period in question. Accordingly, the countries that featured 
in this group in the initial period (i.e. initially better-off countries) in ascending order 
of real GDP per capita were Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Central Africa Republic, 
Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Gabon, Mauritius and South Africa. The 
corresponding set of countries at the end of the period includes Zimbabwe, Guinea, 
Equatorial Guinea, Cape Verde, Namibia, South Africa, Gabon, Botswana, 
Seychelles and Mauritius. The new entrants to the higher-income club at the end of 
the period, namely Botswana, Cape Verde and Zimbabwe, account only for about 
twenty-seven percent of the group. As such, the descriptive statistics applied to 
assess the long-run economic growth path of African countries suggest that, with 
regard to conditional convergence, the trend over the long-run has largely been one 
of divergence in real GDP per capita. One finds a linear positive association between 
a given country’s level of income at the initial period and that level of income which 
the country in question achieved by the end of the analytical period.  
Nevertheless, it would be untenable to conclude that the above presented 
evidence is sufficient enough to establish that conditional convergence in levels of 
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income has not occurred in Africa. I can identify at least two strong reasons as to 
why this is so. To start with, no attempt is made to control for the effects of other 
variables on growth in real GDP per capita. As a result, the findings discussed above 
are likely to refer to simple correlations as opposed to causality. Since the research 
agenda in this specific case is to investigate whether low (lagged) levels of income 
cause countries to grow faster, I should allow for estimating the conditional 
expectation of growth in income, by controlling for other relevant variables. 
Secondly, the descriptive approach is inherently incapable of addressing endogeneity 
bias, which naturally stems from having past values of the dependent variable as a 
right-hand side variable. Research on economic growth accounting has shown that 
such practical issues have been very important in the empirical testing of theoretical 
stipulations. Accordingly, I hypothesise a strong, negative coefficient estimate for the 
lagged income variable that establishes conditional convergence in Africa. This also 
tallies with findings in most  economic growth studies in the literature.  
5.2.2.2)Investment  
 
I have already mentioned in passing that the most important variable in the 
basic Solow production function determining the speed at which countries converge 
to their steady-state level of income is the rate of saving. The Solow model portrays a 
closed economy, in that it does not allow for foreign capital inflows to fill the 
domestic saving and investment gap. As such, capital accumulation, above and 
beyond what is needed to keep the capital-labour ratio at the previous period level, is 
an important factor affecting the rate of economic growth of a given economy. 
Following the organisation of our presentation in this chapter, I abstract from 
possible links of investment with economic growth to concentrate on three issues. 
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Firstly, I describe the temporal and cross-country dimensions of the pattern of 
distribution of investment in Africa. Secondly, it is useful to discuss measurement 
issues on the investment variable, so as to elaborate how it is dealt with in this study. 
Thirdly, I expose the theoretical stipulations of economic theory on the causal effects 
of investment on economic growth of countries. All these help define the more in-
depth descriptive as well as quantitative investigation of the investment-economic 
growth nexus in subsequent sections.  
During the early years of independence, African economies were 
characterised by diverse, but otherwise very low, levels of investment as a proportion 
of total output. The figures were relatively large for such countries as Zambia, Ghana 
and Congo (Brazzaville) in that these countries allocated about 65 percent, 60 
percent and 55 percent respectively of their GDP, in real terms, towards investment. 
For the bulk of the rest of the countries in the region, the share of investment in real 
GDP per capita fluctuated from as low as 0.93 percent for Rwanda to 13.05 percent 
for Kenya. The pattern of distribution of investment in the economies of the 
countries showed little change by 1970, in that most of the countries managed only to 
register single-digit figures for the share of investment in national output. This group 
accounted for more than half of the countries in the region. The low investment 
figures are noticeably more pronounced when I take the cases of those countries in 
which natural resource exports account for a significant share of their GDP in the 
equation. Taking into account the importance of investment, both to the early 
developers and the East Asian economies, the links between low levels of investment 
and abysmal economic growth rates in Africa seem to be almost tautological. 
More importantly, investment’s share in total GDP did not show noticeable 
growth over the forty-year period. By the year 2000, the mean of the share of 
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investment in real GDP per capita stood at a mere 8.51 percent, with a corresponding 
standard deviation of about 5.83 percent. If I factor out the effects of the resource-
driven case of Equatorial Guinea, the respective figures for the mean and standard 
deviation become 7.93 percent and 4.39 percent. All these lead us to summarize the 
distributional pattern of the shares of investment in total output of African economies 
along three broad categories. The first group consists of countries that either started 
from low levels or otherwise, but still managed to achieve a stable and robust share 
of investment. The second group refers to countries that remained trapped in the low 
equilibrium conundrum with regard to the investment variable. Finally, one can also 
identify a particular segment of countries that have experienced frequent contractions 
and expansions of investment in their economies. As shall be explained below, the 
relationships between shares of investment and rates of economic growth are far 
from uni-dimensional. 
Needless to say, measurement issues matter for an aggregate variable such as 
investment. This is reflected in the literature, where researchers often distinguish 
between investment in equipment and structure, or between public investment and 
private investment. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, the findings confirm 
theoretical postulations that there exist strong effects of investment on economic 
growth. Notable works along these lines, which found strong relationships between 
investment and economic growth, include Mankiw et al. (1992), Barro and Lee 
(1994), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Islam (1995), and Temple (1998). It is also important 
to stress that, in order to obtain a comparable measure of investment across countries, 
one needs to index the variable to level of national output. Accordingly, in this study, 
the investment variable refers to the natural logarithm of the share of investment in 
real GDP per capita averaged over each time period of the panel. I should also be 
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very cautious in accepting the exogenity assumption of investment in the production 
function. While it is true that the positive effects of investment feed into higher levels 
of economic performance, it is equally the case that growth will have latent effects 
on levels of investment in subsequent periods. Similarly, one needs to control for the 
oft-cited cases of the effects of investment being partly mediated by policy variables 
such as fiscal and trade policies. To sum up, the relevance of all these theoretical and 
measurement issues is that empirical works should internalise them to fully account 
for causal relationships between investment and economic growth of countries. 
5.2.2.3)Human capital  
 
It is to be recalled that I discussed in broader detail, in the chapter on 
techniques of economic growth accounting, the fact that endogenous growth theory 
provided one solution to the shortcomings of the textbook Solow model. More 
specifically, it allowed for constant or increasing returns to scale, in that divergence 
in levels of income can be explained when I internalise human capital accumulation 
as an explanatory variable. As such, it has largely become useful for cross-country 
economic growth studies to add variables that measure levels of human capital 
accumulation in an economy. A parallel observation is that the operationalisation of 
the human capital variable has not been a clear-cut issue, not least as a reflection of 
differences in definitions of human capital. The latter situation is exemplified by the 
debate as to whether human capital should be equated with educational achievements 
only (Mincer 1993) or should also include investments in health (Becker 1993). Such 
broad differences in definitions of human capital filtered into vectors of proxies used 
to test the empirical significance of human capital in economic growth models. As a 
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result, findings across a wide spectrum of studies on the human capital-economic 
growth nexus are, by and large, mixed. 
An exposition of the distribution of human capital among African countries is 
seriously undermined by the absence of data dating back to the early years of our 
analytical period. The presentation here is confined to only a couple of indicators on 
the educational dimension of human capital of the countries. Accordingly, one 
measure widely applied to proxy for human capital is the proportion of the 
population enrolled in primary education. Using gross primary school enrolment, 
defined as the ratio of the number of students of any age enrolled in primary schools 
to the number of school age population, I find steep differences in the first period, i.e. 
1960-64, ranging from a high of 98 percent for Mauritius to 7 percent and 5 percent 
for Ethiopia and Niger respectively. By the late 1980s, not only did the figures for 
gross enrolment ratios tend to converge among the countries of the region, but also 
they generally grew significantly, with a minimum value of 27 percent for Burkina 
Faso. Such convergence with regard to gross enrolment ratios for primary schooling 
gained further momentum by the end of the period under consideration. The 
narrowness in the gap between the period’s mean value of 93.36 percent and a 
median of 93.42 percent is indicative of the fact that the spread in data is minimal.  
The vector of proxies for measuring education includes, in addition to grades 
completed, the number of schooling years of different segments of the population. 
This spectrum, measuring the economic effects of education, hypothesises that the 
production function responds to the number of years of schooling of different age as 
well as gender groupings. Naturally, the higher the number of schooling years of the 
working age group of a given country, the higher are the rates of economic growth 
achieved. While the demarcation line for defining the working age is a matter for 
 153
debate, I here utilise the Barro and Lee (2000) data to describe the distributional 
pattern of human capital for the African panel data. Our preferred indicator is the 
number of average schooling years for the 15-plus age group. Not surprisingly, 
Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa feature consistently high by this score. On 
average, the working population of these countries would have spent between 6 and 
6.28 years in formal schooling for the 2000-04 period. At the lower end of the scale 
are countries such as Guinea Bissau and Mali, where the corresponding value is a 
mere nine months. In other words, a worker in the countries at the top of the scale is 
likely to have an education level six times greater than those from the lower end of 
the table.  
The temporal distribution of the education variable is more telling, in that 
during the initial period, I observe a highly concentrated pattern, with a respective 
average value and standard deviation of 1.56 years and 1.17 years. As in other 
features of African political economy, Mauritius registered, exceptionally a very 
good first-period average number of schooling years of about 3.48, which, 
surprisingly enough, was matched by Tanzania. What is important, however, is that 
over the long-run, a few countries managed to register significant growth on this 
specific variable. This trend of significant strides in the average number of schooling 
years is encapsulated by the figures for Zimbabwe, Kenya as well as Zambia. For the 
other group of countries, levels of human capital, as measured by schooling years of 
the working age population, either stagnated or regressed. Whether the diversity in 
the cross-sectional time series distribution of the human capital variable caused 
economic growth rates to differ across the countries in question is an issue I leave to 
the quantitative analysis section of the study. However, it is worth mentioning that 
the rather weak relationships identified in empirical studies are more reflective of 
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shortcomings in the operationalisation of the variable, and less of loose theoretical 
foundations. 
5.2.2.4) Other economic variables 
 
At the outset, I should caution that the specific determinants of economic 
growth discussed in this category of other economic variables are selective ones, all 
the more so because our hypothesis is that African data replicate those based on 
conventional theories. This certainly is the case with the variable that captures the 
motion for capital stock per effective unit of labour. One central stipulation of the 
textbook Solow model is the close mapping between a given country’s incremental 
capital-labour ratio and rates of economic growth achieved. In this section, I first 
elaborate on this concept of the evolution of capital augmented by descriptive data 
from African economies. It is also crucial to layout the direction of links which are 
postulated by economic theory between changes in capital stock and economic 
performance. Our second port of call in this section is a brief discussion of the 
economic growth implications of arguably the most potent macroeconomic policy 
tools, namely fiscal and monetary policies. I sum up the section by outlining the 
cases for a country’s degree of openness to the operations of the global economic 
system in affecting the pace of economic performance. Unlike those variables that 
constitute the basic Solow model, the economic policy variables are strongly shaped 
by political institutions.   
Accordingly, the Solow model stipulates that the rate of growth of capital per 
effective labour is a function of three variables. These refer to the rates of growth of 
population; the rates of depreciation of the capital stock and the rates of 
technological progress. After all, what is added on the capital stock per effective 
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labour is the difference between that proportion of income saved (in the closed 
economy setting of basic Solow, this is tantamount to investment) and the stock of 
capital depreciated in the previous period. I have explained this notion with the help 
of a mathematical model in the chapter on the techniques of economic growth 
accounting. Here, our interest is more on operationalising this variable, to make it 
amenable to empirical analysis. While higher rates of savings affect income 
positively, higher labour growth negatively impacts on growth once I account for the 
effects of technological progress and depreciation of capital. Without delving much 
into the details of the derivations, this variable is empirically taken to be a composite 
of rates of growth in population, technology and depreciation. The latter two are 
assumed to be constant across countries and sum up to 0.05. Hence, the variable is 
given as the natural logarithm of the rate of population growth augmented by 0.05. 
Naturally, the coefficient estimate is expected to be significantly negative, as it is 
mainly driven by the rate of growth of population (Islam 1995, Mankiew et al. 1992). 
Quite a large string of studies of conventional economic growth  indicate that 
prudent fiscal and monetary policies are a sine qua non to bring about robust 
economic growth rates sustained over a long-run time spell (Kormendi and Meguire 
1985, Easterly and Rebelo 1993, Levine and Zervos 1994, Sarel 1996). For instance, 
expansive monetary policies compromise price stability, thereby dislocating the 
economy away from growth-enhancing resource allocation. Similarly, higher levels 
of government consumption, mostly associated with large fiscal deficits, are found to 
have a detrimental effect on economic growth. The economic growth literature along 
the lines of the ‘African tragedy’ paradigm identifies such macroeconomic policy 
distortions as high deficits, inflation, black market premium, etc. as causal factors for 
the poor economic performance of the countries. As such, most studies of economic 
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growth, informed by economic theories, allow for the inclusion of macroeconomic 
policy variables with the oft-revealed purpose of drawing policy prescriptions on 
economic growth. This rather highly technocratic approach to policy-making misses 
the point that good policies rarely emerge from the benevolence of governments. 
Rather, they are consequences of political institutions that define the policy-making 
domain of governments. Here, I deal with this issue by looking into the interactive 
effects of the policy choices with institutional variables in an analytical setting totally 
based on Africa. 
Lastly, several works have shown trade to be a significant determinant of the 
economic growth of countries. For instance, in widely referred to works, Sachs and 
Warner (1995, 1997) find that the investment variable loses its explanatory power 
once a measure of the degree of openness of an economy is included in the economic 
growth model. Economic theory suggests a number of channels through which the 
economic performance of a given country is defined by the degree to which its 
economy is integrated into the global economy. One way is the reverse correlation 
between market competition induced by external forces and x-inefficiencies, which 
in the final analysis, contributes to better rates of economic growth. Inefficiencies in 
production occur for two reasons. The first one is allocative inefficiency, which 
refers to a sub-optimal mix of production factors, while technical (or x) inefficiencies 
signify the use of less appropriate production technology. Similarly, international 
trade can serve as an important conduit for the transfer of technology which enhances 
economic efficiency and also economic growth of countries. A basic difference in 
available proxies to a country’s degree of openness, is that between indicators based 
on trade indices only, and those incorporating a wider dimension. A case in point for 
the latter is the Sachs-Warner index, whereby a country is deemed to be closed if it 
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has failed in any one of five conditions ranging from ideological orientation to size 
of distortion in macroeconomic variables. Arguably, the ratio of international trade to 
GDP adjusted for price changes has more broadly been used in accounting for the 
effects of openness on economic performance. (Sachs and Warner 1995, Rodrik et al. 
2004).   
5.3) Data and analysis 
 
Basically, the crux of the overall presentation in this chapter rests on 
achieving two objectives. A study of the political/institutional determinants of 
economic growth in a cross-country setting, based on the augmented variant of the 
Solow production function, presupposes the development of a model to control for 
the effects of economic covariates. Furthermore, I need to establish that our findings 
along this line are compatible with theoretical priors of conventional economic 
theories. A logical first step towards achieving this end is to elaborate on 
measurement issues and theoretical stipulations, as well as the distributional pattern 
of each economic variable for the African cross section time series data built for the 
economic growth accounting exercise. I accomplished this task in previous sections. 
For instance, it is explained, using African data, why the notion of convergence is an 
integral component of economic growth studies, and how it should feature in the 
empirical model. The flip side, and arguably the more important one, of the 
discussion is to draw causal inferences on the effects of the economic explanatory 
variables on observed variations in economic growth among a panel of African states. 
In discussions below, I use the African panel data to conduct a descriptive analysis 
and also a quantitative analysis of the economic determinants of economic growth 
among the countries.  
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5.3.1) Descriptive analysis 
 
Our preoccupation with long-run economic growth patterns of African 
countries is justified by the fact that current abysmal political economic conditions 
are more reflective of achievements (or lack of) over such a time spell. 
Notwithstanding the diverse growth trajectories of individual countries, the African 
region registered strong growth performance in the first two post-independence 
decades, before a significant contraction afterwards. Using rather stringent conditions 
to identify growth accelerations, Hausmann et al. (2005) finds that, within the global 
data, sixteen African countries experienced strong growth episodes that lasted for at 
least eight consecutive years. I gather from this study that, had short-term growth 
spurts been adequate to bring about lasting improvements in living standards, many 
African countries would have currently enjoyed economic welfare levels on a par 
with advanced economies. Here, I shall be able to gauge the contributions of two 
dimensions for any variation in the dependent variable as well as spread of the 
explanatory variables. The panel data specification has the particular advantage of 
assessing the temporal evolution of a given variable and also that variation sourced 
by country-specific conditions. The presentation focuses on four major variables; 
namely, the dependent variable, measured by the log of the change in real GDP per 
capita income between start and end of period; log of initial level of income; log of 
average level of investment as a share of real GDP per capita; and a term that 
captures the evolution of capital. Note that details of the derivation of each variable 
are provided above. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of economic variables 
Variable  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Income Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.027 0.20 
0.08 
0.19 
-1.17 
-0.15 
-0.99 
1.65 
0.29 
1,46 
      
Initial 
Income 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
7.27 0.77 
0.72 
0.28 
 5.14 
 6.21 
 5.49 
9.93 
9.46 
8.65 
      
Investment Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.99 0.71 
0.57 
0.43 
-0.01 
 0.81 
 0.47 
4.51 
2.99 
4.15 
      
Population Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.88 0.36 
0.28 
0.24 
-1.31 
 0.08 
-0.50 
1.85 
1.67 
1.86 
 
NB. The number of observations is 379 while numbers of 
countries included and missing observations is 45 and 78 
respectively. Table shows the spread in the basic Solow 
variables for Africa for the panel 1960-2004. Income 
refers to change in log of real GDP per capita, Initial 
Income is log of real GDP per capita at start of period, 
Investment is log of share of investment in GDP, and 
Population is log of change in population augmented by 
0.05. Data is drawn from the PENN World Tables (See 
Heston et al. 2002) 
 
As shown in Table 1, both types of variations have been instrumental in 
defining the overall descriptive statistic for each given variable. The dependent 
variable is normally distributed with a mean of 2 percent and a standard deviation of 
about 0.2. A closer look at the spread of the economic growth variable, as measured 
by the standard deviation, reveals that changes in the variable that occurred within 
countries accounts for more than eighty percent of the overall variation in economic 
growth among African countries. In other words, country-level effects that shaped 
the economic growth trajectories of countries in the region ultimately explained most 
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of the variations observed in levels of income among African countries. As such, I 
can claim, with a five percent margin of error, that about 68% of the dependent 
variable falls within the interval [-0.3767023, 0.43025973]. In testing normality, it is 
mostly advisable to use techniques that allow visual inspection to ensure that the 
sample is drawn from a normally distributed population. Our results using a 
histogram along a Kernel density plot confirm that the dependent variable has a 
normal distribution. This is shown in Figure 4 below. Other diagnostic tests, 
including the Shapiro-Wilk W test and the Shapiro-Francia W’ tests, establish 
normality with respective values 0.84842 and 0.83896 at a 1% level of significance. 
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Figure 4 A Kernel density plot on economic growth in Africa 
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NB. The purpose of this graph is to show that our 
dependent variable in the Solow model is normally 
distributed. The bell-shaped plot imposed on the Kernel 
density highlights this point. As explained above, Heston 
et al. (2006) provides source of data. Recall that panel 
is for forty-five countries.      
 
Additionally, it is useful to provide a qualitative assessment of the 
correlations between economic growth and the identified economic covariates. When 
I calculate the simple linear partial correlations between economic growth and the 
explanatory variables, I find that only investment returns a value that confirms with 
theoretical priors, both in terms of direction and significance of correlation. To be 
more specific, the respective values for the partial correlation of change in log of 
income per capita to initial level of income, investment and the capital evolution 
term are 0.02 (0.618), 0.2116 (0.000) and –0.0809 (0.121), with terms in brackets 
indicating significance levels. Accordingly, only levels of investment seem to affect 
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economic growth performance achieved by countries over a long time span. In cases 
like this, where no analytical room is provided to control for the effects of individual 
specific factors or the temporal dimensions of variables, results of this type fall short 
of capturing the true mapping between the dependent variable and the vector of 
independent variables. A possible case in point is when a given country’s national 
output fluctuates drastically in line with changes in international prices of a given 
commodity, while little change is observed in the conventional variables of the 
production function.  
Nevertheless, the whole idea of using a panel specification is that it provides 
us with a rich array of possibilities to estimate the actual causal effects of the 
explanatory variables. I test this stipulation here, by deriving the linear correlations 
between the economic growth variable and associated economic explanatory 
variables, but controlling for country-specific effects on the former. While such a 
specification boils down only to fixed effects, in that it implicitly assumes country-
effects to be robust, I fairly expect the partial correlations between the dependent 
variable and the right-hand side arguments to improve. Note that, in not a few cases, 
the assumption of linearity in itself may not be a plausible starting point. Given all 
the above-mentioned reservations, I still find strong correlations between the two sets 
of variables. Accordingly, initial level of income is negatively correlated with the 
income variable as per the theoretical stipulations that lend support to conditional 
convergence. I digress here to recall that Barro(1991), who introduced the African 
dummy, finds weak evidence on convergence. Similarly, the logarithmic term for 
rates of population growth augmented by 0.05, so as to capture the evolution of 
capital, also returns a result that tallies with theoretical priors. As in the previous case, 
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investment has a strong and positive partial correlation with economic growth (See 
table below).   
Table 2 A correlation matrix between economic growth and selected economic 
variables 
Variable Correlation Significance 
Initial Income -0.16 0.00 
   
Investment  0.26 0.00 
   
Population -0.13 0.02 
 
NB. This table reports the correlations between the 
dependent variable and the basic Solow variables for 
Africa. The number of observations is 379 while number of 
countries included is 45. The correlation values for the 
forty-five countries are not reported here. It covers the 
period 1960-2004. Data is drawn from the PENN World 
Tables (See Heston et al. 2002) 
 
Another point worth noting, in discussing the descriptive aspects of the 
variables in economic growth accounting, is that it is now widely established that 
investment does not strictly fulfil the basic condition of variable exogeneity (Hoeffler 
2002). Insofar as current levels of investment partially define economic growth 
achieved at the end of the period, rates of investment are, at the same time, functions 
of levels of income. Put differently, one runs the risk of endogeneity bias if levels of 
income are modelled simply as linear functions of rates of investment. Such an 
approach is likely to artificially magnify the actual effects of levels of investment on 
economic growth. I find this case to be true in our data as well, in that the correlation 
coefficient between levels of income in the previous period (as proxied by the initial 
income variable) and current investment is significantly positive, regardless of 
whether I controlled for country-effects or not. This is also intuitively appealing in 
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that, ultimately, it is from national income saved that countries source their 
investments on physical capital accumulation. All in all, while I established that the 
theoretically stipulated links between the two sets of variables are also backed up by 
the descriptive statistics of the African cross section time series data, it is also 
imperative to investigate whether such a mapping signifies causal relationships.  
5.3.2) Quantitative analysis 
5.3.2.1) Basic Solow Model 
 
Inasmuch as panel data analysis provides us with a rich insight into 
postulated relationships among variables, it also offers wider possibilities for dealing 
with problems of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation that mar normal inferences. 
The development of a string of panel data analytic models, such as the constant 
coefficient models, fixed effects models and random effects models, reflects issues of 
model specification that address such problems. For instance, I may argue that the 
average partial effects of investment on economic growth do not entail any 
significant country or temporal dimensions and, therefore, can be dealt with pooled 
OLS. Similarly, it could be the case that omitted variables significantly differ within 
clusters, but remaining constant over time or as a weighted average between time-
invariant and cross-sectional differences. As such, it is a very useful exercise to 
ensure that the model selected to assess the quantitative effects of the explanatory 
variables (in this case, the economic covariates) are well-suited to deal with problems 
of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Apparently, part of the question of 
specifying the right models is addressed by the theoretical frameworks which inform 
the direction of relationships among the arguments. Statistical tests are also vital 
tools for tackling such concerns. 
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Accordingly, I conduct a Hausman test to determine whether the fixed effects 
or the random effects model is the appropriate one when I run the basic Solow model 
on African cross-section time-series data. Note that, while the fixed effects model 
provides a more consistent estimator, the random effects model has the edge when 
one considers efficiency. If there is no significant correlation between the 
unobserved country-specific random effects and the regressors, then the more 
efficient random effects model is the preferred type of specification. Failing to reject 
the null that the coefficients from the efficient estimator are closely similar to the 
consistent ones, implies that I should use a random-effects model. Our test results in 
this specific case (a Prob>Chi2 value of 0.0002) clearly establish that a fixed-effects 
model specification better captures the relationships between the variables. In other 
words, the within-country variations in the explanatory variables account for most of 
the overall effects on economic growth, once I control for country-specific effects. 
Needless to say, in certain situations, where variables hardly vary temporally, such as 
the case for social features, the use of random-effects shall be better suited to deal 
with the problem. 
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Table 3 Basic Solow fixed-effects model (Dependent variable is the natural log of 
change in real GDP per capita) 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Err. T P>|t| 
Initial 
Income   
-0.09 0.03 -2.98 0.00 
Investment  0.10 0.02  4.98 0.00 
Population -0.08 0.04 -2.33 0.02 
Constant  0.56 0.24  2.38 0.01 
     
   
  λ       0.0115413(0.00) 
  F(44, 323) = 2.101 (0.00)    
  Number of countries = 45 
  Number of observations = 371 
 
NB. This model presents results when basic Solow is run 
on the African panel introduced above. λ captures speed 
of convergence while the F value measures the joint 
significance of all the explanatory variables. As figures 
in parenthesis show, both are significant at one percent. 
Data is drawn from the PENN World Tables (See Heston et 
al. 2002) for the panel covering the period 1960-2004.    
 
In conformity with theoretical stipulations, all the variables that makeup the 
textbook Solow model significantly determine economic growth for the panel of 
African countries under consideration. As is justified by the Hausman test above, I 
started with a within-variation estimation of the model, controlling for country-level 
effects. Recall that, in preceding sections on descriptive analysis of the relationships 
between economic growth and the economic explanatory variables, I found a 
tendency for average income levels to diverge among African countries over a long 
time spell. However, that relationship was far from establishing causality, in that 
there existed little scope to assess the conditional effects of initial level of income on 
economic growth. Here, I find strong empirical evidence to infer that there has 
actually been a conditional convergence in levels of income among African countries. 
 167
The significantly negative coefficient estimate for the initial income variable implies 
that, in line with prevalent conventional economy theory, countries which were at the 
lower end of the income ladder at the start of the period have, on average, managed 
to catch up with better-off economies. The speed of convergence, as given by λ, was 
about one percent per the number of time episodes used to categorise the panel. 
Similarly, coefficient estimates for the variables investment and population 
tally with the theoretical hypothesis, both in direction of causation and significance 
of the estimates, thereby establishing the critical importance of rates of investment 
and population growth hold in defining the economic growth trajectory of countries. 
It is particularly worth noting that the size of the parameter estimate for investment is 
indicative of its strong resonance in explaining differences in economic growth 
among African countries. Nevertheless, the fixed effects estimation is somewhat 
limited in reflecting the true dynamics of the relationships between economic growth 
and the independent variables, for a number of reasons. Firstly, a good deal of 
otherwise important information is lost as a consequence of the collapsing of data for 
such an estimation. Secondly, in the event of one or more of the right-hand side 
variables being endogenous, coefficient estimates are likely to be biased. In 
economic growth accounting, this is a very likely scenario for the investment 
variable. Thirdly, I face problems of omitted variable bias, as it fails to control for 
the bulk of heterogeneity among the countries that affect economic growth. To a 
certain extent, such problems in model specification for undertaking economic 
growth accounting on a cross-section-time-series data can be addressed with the use 
of instrumental variable estimation techniques.      
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Table 4 Basic Solow GMM estimation (Dependent variable is the natural log of 
change in real GDP per capita) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Z P>z 
Initial 
Income 
-0.08 0.02 -3.29 0.00 
Investment  0.13 0.02  8.71 0.00 
Population -0.05 0.02 -2.41 0.01 
Constant -0.01 0.00 -4.15 0.00 
 
λ       0.0095(0.00) 
   Number of countries = 45 
       Number of observations = 281 
              m1 (first order correlation) = 0.02 
               m2 (second order correlation) = 0.72 
                  Sargan test = 0.26 
NB. The table introduces GMM results for the African 
panel. λ captures speed of convergence and is significant 
at one percent. m1 and m2 are tests for serial 
correlation, while the Sargan parameter is a test on 
appropriateness of instruments. Data is drawn from the 
PENN World Tables (See Heston et al. 2002)for the panel 
covering the period 1960-2004   
 
As shown in Table 4, the system-generalised method of moments has the 
methodological edge in better accounting for the effects of lagged dependent 
variables, entered as right-hand side arguments. Accordingly, the average partial 
effect of a country, being at the lower end of the scale at the start of the period, on 
subsequent economic growth is about seven percent. It shows that, over the long term, 
conditional convergence has been an important feature explaining the cross-country 
economic growth trajectories in the region. Additionally, I find that the per-period 
speed of convergence towards their steady-state level was about 0.95 percent. The 
log of investment as a share of real GDP per capita remained by far the strongest 
determinant of cross-country differences in economic growth among the economic 
covariates included in the textbook Solow model. The coefficient estimate for the 
variable on the rates of growth of population augmented by 0.05, otherwise known 
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widely in the literature as ln(n+g+δ), indicates the strong negative premium of 
population growth on economic growth performance of the countries. In comparison 
with the GMM model, the fixed-effects estimator returns results that exhibit an 
upward bias, which, in turn, is compatible with the structures of the two models. 
Naturally, it is necessary to conduct diagnostic tests to establish that the 
instruments used in the GMM estimator are appropriate. I use three such test 
statistics to validate our assertion that this specific model provides a viable account 
of determinants of economic growth in a dynamic panel data analysis. The m1 and 
m2 tests deal with the cases of first-order and second-order serial correlations 
respectively. The null hypothesis in both cases is no serial correlation, with 
corresponding p-values of probability of rejecting the null. The specification test 
stipulates that, while first-order serial correlation need not be zero, GMM estimators 
require for absence of second-order serial correlation to provide consistent estimates 
(Arellano and Bond 1998). The results from our tests indicate that I reject the null of 
no first-order serial correlation, while at the same time the test statistic fails to reject 
the hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. As such, it is appropriate to 
emphasise that the GMM coefficient estimates for the economic variables under 
consideration are consistent. Another diagnostic test for the appropriateness of the 
instruments is that of the Sargan test of over identifying restrictions. Here also the 
high p-value for the Sargan test leads us to not to reject the null of appropriate 
instruments. All in all, the GMM model is a more valid specification to conduct 
economic growth accounting based on country-level dynamic panel data. 
Conventionally, the robustness of selected models in reflecting the underlying 
relationships among variables is tested by simulating the sensitivity of coefficient 
estimates to alterations in model specifications. It is generally the case that results 
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which are derived under stringent conditions may fail to accurately account for 
quantitative relationships. Our model of a GMM specification on economic growth 
in Africa performs fairly well when subjected to this litmus test. As is shown in 
Table 5 below, the coefficient estimates for the major textbook Solow variables are 
compatible to theoretical priors, both in direction of causation and level of 
significance.  
 
Table 5 Basic Solow growth models for African economies (Different 
specifications) 
Variable OLS Fixed 
Effects 
DIFF-GMM SYS-GMM 
Initial 
Income 
-0.00 
 0.00 
 0.26 
-0.09 
 0.03 
 0.00 
-0.18 
 0.05 
 0.00 
-0.14 
 0.05 
 0.00 
Investment  0.05 
 0.01 
 0.00 
 0.10 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.13 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.11 
 0.03 
 0.00 
Population -0.04 
 0.02 
 0.06 
-0.08 
 0.04 
 0.02 
-0.04 
 0.02 
 0.01 
-0.09 
 0.05 
 0.05 
R-squ. 
F(3, 367) 
F(3, 323) 
Chi2 
N 
 0.05 
 5.22 
- 
- 
371 
- 
- 
 12.77 
- 
371 
- 
- 
- 
   113.49 
281 
- 
- 
- 
 31.04 
324 
 
NB. In this table, I run four models on the African panel 
data. Because OLS does not allow us to control for either 
country or temporal effects, the coefficient estimate for 
initial income loses significance. That parameter 
estimates in the other three models return results 
compatible to theory helps establish robustness of 
estimates. Values under each coefficient estimate 
represent robust standard errors and p-values 
respectively. Number of observations for DIFF-GMM and 
SYS-GMM are lower since differencing and use of lagged 
values leads to reductions of observations. Number of 
countries included is forty-five. Data is drawn from the 
PENN World Tables (See Heston et al. 2002)for the panel 
covering the period 1960-2004   
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5.3.2.2) Basic Solow augmented by economic policy variables 
 
A broad set of literature on determinants of differences in economic growth 
among countries took as its point de dèpart by augmenting the basic Solow model 
with a string of right-hand side variables (e.g. Hoeffler 2002, Temple 1998). 
Notwithstanding the fact that quite a large number of variables applied may not have 
strong theoretical foundations in causing economic growth differences, the case for 
economic policy variables has always been a strong one. Well-evidenced diagnostic 
analyses on the links between economic growth and policy variables have led many 
to draw a long prescriptive list of specific policy tools that enhance the economic 
growth performance of countries. Arguably, the most notable among the family of 
policy prescriptive approaches based on economic growth studies is what is called 
the ‘Washington consensus’ or equivalently labelled as the ‘first generation reforms’. 
The term ‘Washington Consensus’, which was invented by Williamson (1990), is 
often used to signify neo-liberal and market-fundamentalist policies. However, in a 
later paper, and following calls for a revision of the policies (Kolodko 1998), 
Williamson (2000:252) rues the ‘damage to the cause of intellectual understanding, 
and therefore of rational economic reform’ caused by the misuse of the concept.  
Backed by the IMF and the World Bank, there followed a wave of reforms which 
mainly embody a policy regime of current account liberalisation (with reference to 
trade and foreign exchange) and privatisation of enterprises. These approaches have 
been subjected to several severe criticisms following the dismal economic 
performance of Latin American countries which followed the reforms to the letter, 
and also coming against the backdrop of a different model in East Asia (See Gore 
(2000) for a critique of this paradigm. 
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Before I delve into the growth implications of the policy variables in an 
African context, it is worthwhile to take note of two of the major criticisms put 
forwarded against the policy-growth nexus. To start with, the uneven adoption of 
these policy variables across a wide spectrum of countries further endorsed the view 
that economic policies are fundamentally outcomes of the political process. For 
instance, a large number of countries have long incurred unsustainable levels of 
fiscal deficits, despite the widely recognised growth-harming effects of such policy 
preferences. Additionally, there exists legitimate apprehension among researchers 
that leads one to cast doubt on the strict exogeneity of these variables. It is quite 
likely that higher income countries can afford political institutions that provide the 
right incentives for agents. Bearing these in mind, I select a number of policy 
variables to assess their importance in terms of their causal relationships with 
economic growth. The set of policies chosen represent four broad categories that 
characterise the economic policy landscape of countries. These include fiscal policy, 
monetary policy, trade policy and security of property rights.  
Data for these series of economic policy variables are drawn from two 
sources. The first one is that provided by the Centre for International Development at 
Harvard University (See www.ksg.harvard.edu./CID/ciddata). Reference is made in 
particular to a measure of human capital accumulation and to the Sachs-Warner 
index of openness. Literature on the economic growth implications of the educational 
dimension of human capital has gone through serious claims and counterclaims with 
regard to appropriate ways of measuring education. As a reflection of such wide 
disparities in operationalising the education variables, the database mentioned above 
provides about thirty-three types of variables on education. The debate on this issue 
primarily centres around the comparative advantage of using average years of 
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schooling for the population vis-à-vis average grades completed. The primary 
schooling variable included in Table 6, measures the average number of years of 
schooling received by citizens of a given country. The other variable sourced from 
this database, i.e. the Sachs-Warner index, is a [0,1] binary variable of openness, 
whereby countries that fail to meet at least one of the five conditions are labelled 
closed and otherwise. Among these conditions are: that the country had average tariff 
rates exceeding 40 percent; that its non-tariff barriers covered on average more than 
40 percent of its imports; that it had a socialist economic system; that the state had a 
monopoly of major exports; and that its black market premium exceeded 20 percent. 
Similarly, I use data made publicly available by the African Research 
Programme at Harvard University (http://africa.gov.harvard.edu) for other policy 
variables. I proxy fiscal policy by real government consumption expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP. It is derived based on purchasing power parity prices of a given 
country’s Gross Domestic Product. The programme has used IMF publications to 
organise data on rates of inflations for African economies in a panel format. The 
variable on inflation measures growth in Consumer Price Index. There exist a 
number of ways to quantifiably measure the extent to which a country’s economy is 
integrated with the global economy. One such measure is that given by the World 
Bank and the PENN World Tables that assess a country’s openness by the share of 
international trade to its national output. The source used here provides this measure 
of openness for a panel of African countries, in that each entry signifies the share of 
imports plus exports in real GDP.  The other one is the Sachs-Warner index. I use 
both in this particular chapter. Moreover, I also take into consideration a widely-
applied indicator of security of property rights. Note that, though an institutional 
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variable, the property rights variable I test here, i.e. CIM, is constructed based on 
economic parameters.  
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Table 6 Economic policy variables and growth in Africa 
Variable FE 
Basic 
FE 
Inflation 
FE 
CIM 
FE 
Human 
FE 
Open 
FE 
SW Index 
F
Fis
Initial Income -0.09 
 0.03 
 0.00 
-0.11 
 0.03 
 0.00 
-0.08 
 0.05 
 0.06 
-0.08 
 0.05 
 0.06 
-0.11 
 0.07 
 0.12 
-0.12 
 0.07 
 0.09 
-0
 0
 0
       
Investment  0.10 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.10 
 0.03 
 0.00 
 0.11 
 0.04 
 0.00 
 0.10 
 0.04 
 0.01 
 0.08 
 0.05 
 0.08 
 0.06 
 0.05 
 0.15 
 0
 0
 0
       
Population -0.08 
 0.04 
 0.02 
-0.10 
 0.04 
 0.02 
-0.14 
 0.08 
 0.06 
-0.33 
 0.12 
 0.01 
-0.41 
 0.14 
 0.01 
-0.48 
 0.16 
 0.00 
-0
 0
 0
       
Inflation  -0.01 
 0.00 
 0.00 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.00 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.01 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.02 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.02 
-0
 0
 0
       
CIM    0.05 
 0.02 
 0.01 
 0.05 
 0.02 
 0.04 
 0.03 
 0.03 
 0.21 
 0.04 
 0.03 
 0.18 
 0
 0
 0
       
Human Capital    -0.01 
 0.00 
 0.49 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.34 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.25 
-0
 0
 0
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Table (Contd,) 
SW Index      0.02 
 0.08 
 0.77 
 0.02 
 0.08 
 0.74 
       
Openness       0.00 
 0.00 
 0.06 
       
Fiscal       0.00 
 0.00 
 0.04 
 0
 0
 0
       
Constant 0.56 
0.24 
0.02 
0.73 
0.25 
0.00 
0.54 
0.37 
0.14 
 0.76 
 0.38 
 0.04 
 1.13 
 0.60 
 0.06 
 1.25 
 0.61 
 0.04 
 0
 0
 0
       
N 
aic 
371 
-318 
 247 
-308 
 159 
-194 
 155 
-192 
 128 
-145 
 128 
-145 
1
-1
 
NB. Unlike the preceding table where number of observations differed based on the characteristics 
of the models, here the differences in number of observations reflect missing values on some 
policy variables. The models report results for Solow augmented for inflation, contract intensive 
money (CIM), human capital, the Sachs-Warner openness index, openness, and fiscal policy. Values 
under each coefficient estimate represent robust standard errors and p-values respectively. Note 
also that I use year 2000 values for the last time-episode since our data source (ARP 2008) only 
reports that. Number of countries included is forty-five. Data is drawn from the PENN World 
Tables (See Heston et al. 2002)for the panel covering the period 1960-2004
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As shown in table above, results indicate that a number of economic policy 
variables were very important in explaining differentials in growth performance 
among African countries. I ran seven models to investigate whether the inclusion of 
each economic policy variable, as a right-hand side argument, helped better explain 
economic growth in Africa.  For instance, monetary policy, proxied by rates of 
inflation, has significantly contributed to economic growth performance in Africa. 
Countries which have managed to sustain regimes of stable prices (note that this is a 
reference to low inflation countries), gained, on average, about 0.2 percent in terms 
of greater national output. The coefficient estimates for rates of inflation show that 
there existed a significant negative causal relationship between these dimensions of 
monetary policy and economic growth. A similar assertion can be made with regard 
to the contract intensive money, whereby differences in the degree of security of 
property rights among the countries explained about 5.3 percent of the total 
economic growth variation. At this juncture, it is worth noting that there exists a 
large menu of variables used to proxy monetary policy tools of countries, that shall 
be applied in later applications of the political variables. The results for the other 
variables of policy were, however, not as strong. 
Accordingly, the average number of years of schooling of a country’s 
population could not significantly explain differences in economic growth. As 
mentioned above, the specific measures introduced to value the educational 
achievements of countries, have always been bones of contention among scholars. As 
such, one finds a mix of results with regard to the effects of this policy variable in 
shaping the long-run economic performance of countries. Interestingly, the 
coefficient estimates for the education variable indicates a negative association 
between levels of schooling and economic performance. This is more a reflection of 
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a shortcoming in the specific educational variable used, rather than that of the 
theoretical foundation of education-growth nexus. Results for other variables; 
including the two measures of a country’s degree of integration in the global 
economy; namely openness and the Sachs-Warner index, as well as the share of 
government consumption in GDP, show directions of causation in line with 
theoretical priors, albeit insignificant ones. All in all, this exercise on the Solow 
model, augmented by economic policy variables, justifies our application of 
conventional political economy theories on Africa. It is also of critical importance to 
take into account a couple of factors in interpreting the results. Firstly, there is a 
significant limitation in economic policy data for Africa that fits into the panel 
specification. Secondly, the question of the underlying determinants of economic 
policy choices of countries, that is the political institutions, can not be overlooked.    
Finally, I included a number of fixed indicators that feature prominently in 
economic growth studies on Africa. Accordingly, the findings endorse our earlier 
proposition on the shortcomings of the African tragedy paradigm. The two prominent 
candidates, widely applied to proxy the African dummy in the broader growth 
literature (Easterly and Levine 1997, Mauro 1995), are social diversity, often 
measured by ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation scales, and the adverse 
geographical factors in the region. The logic here is that, if there exists adequate 
variation in ethnic diversity within Africa, as is the case in the global data, then I 
expect parallel findings of inverse relationships between economic growth and 
diversity. After all, it is this very notion of the continent being more diverse than the 
rest of the world that supposedly explained the absence of economic growth. In a 
[0,1] scale, the ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation variables are distributed with 
a mean and standard deviation of (0.65, 0.23) and (0.54,0.19) respectively. This 
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shows that Africa, far from being a right-skewed distribution, hosts countries of 
ethnically homogenous as well as heterogeneous societies. As such, I are now in a 
position to investigate whether the reported social diversity and geographical factors, 
determine economic growth in the region.  . 
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Table 7 Effects of fixed factors on economic growth in Africa 
Variable    RE 
Ethnic
RE 
Polar 
RE 
Geography(1) 
RE 
Geography(2)
Initial Income -0.01 
 0.01 
 0.56 
-0.01 
 0.02 
 0.69 
-0.02 
 0.02 
 0.23 
-0.02 
 0.02 
 0.23 
     
Investment  0.06 
 0.01 
 0.00 
 0.07 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.06 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.06 
 0.02 
 0.00 
     
Population -0.04 
 0.03 
 0.15 
-0.05 
 0.03 
 0.11 
-0.04 
 0.03 
 0.16 
-0.04 
 0.03 
 0.16 
     
Ethnic -0.10 
 0.05 
 0.06 
   
     
Polarisation  -0.01 
 0.07 
 0.83 
  
     
Geography(1)   -0.11 
 0.05 
 0.02 
 
     
Geography(2)    -0.11 
 0.05 
 0.02 
     
Constant  0.07 
 0.13 
 0.60 
-0.03 
 0.12 
 0.83 
 0.18 
 0.16 
 0.24 
 0.18 
 0.16 
 0.24 
     
chi2 
N 
27.34 
371 
 23.43
347 
 28.31 
349 
 28.31 
349 
 
NB. Data for ethnic and polarisation are drawn from 
Alesina et al. (2003) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005) respectively. The geography variables, which 
measure risk of malaria, are drawn from Sachs (2003). 
Because of absence of within-country variation in the 
variables, I run random-effects model. It includes all 
the forty-five countries in the panel. Values under each 
coefficient estimate represent robust standard errors and 
p-values respectively. 
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As can be observed from the above Table 7, social diversity, along ethnic 
lines, did not cause cross-country economic differences in the region. Besides being 
weak, the introduction of the ethnic variable in the model resulted in other variables 
losing their significance. I draw similar inferences when I apply the polarisation 
variable to proxy ethnic diversity in Africa. Given the fact that the variables ethnic 
fragmentation and polarisation provide diverging conceptualisations of social 
diversity, one would have expected either of the diversity variables to return 
significant coefficient estimates. When I ran the basic Solow model earlier, I showed 
that the bulk of cross-country variation (about 80%) in economic growth in Africa 
originated from within-country variation, as opposed to in-between country variation. 
It is this high degree of variation that the ethnic variable is structurally unable to 
account for. Additionally, recent research has cast some doubt on the political 
salience of ethnic diversity. Collier (2000), for instance, finds that ethnic diversity 
adversely affects economic growth only in dictatorships.  
Kasara (2007) goes further in that, with the help of empirical evidence, he 
shows that African leaders did not favour their ethnic groups. The strong results for 
the geographic variables also came at a cost, as initial income and population lose 
their significance. The geography variable seems to capture only some unaccounted-
for attributes of initial levels of income and the rates of growth of population. 
Additionally, I investigated whether the political dimension of ethnicity, reflected 
through choice of policies, was in line with the framework of the broader literature. I 
find a statistically significant negative correlation between degree of ethnic 
fractionalisation and share of government consumption in real GDP per capita, 
suggesting that ethnic diversity did not necessarily led countries to choose adverse 
fiscal policies. The relevant statistic is –0.2 at a one percent level of significance.  
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5.3) Discussion and summary 
 
Generally, the conventional economic covariates of the basic Solow model 
widely utilised to explain cross-country economic growth differences do also apply 
to the intra-Africa differences in the same variable. I used a number of descriptive 
tools to not only assess patterns of correlations but also to highlight the limitations of 
deducing findings based solely on these analytical instruments. The latter is all the 
more important to the issue of conditional convergence, in that its actual effect on 
economic growth was captured by the quantitative segment of the chapter. As is the 
case in the broader literature, investment measured by the log of share of investment 
in real GDP per capita remained the strongest determinant of economic growth 
among the family of economic covariates. A unit change in the rate of investment for 
a given country accounted for as much as ten percent of the economic growth 
differential in the cross-country setting. A parallel situation is observed for the 
variables controlling for both a given country’s initial level of economic growth and 
technological progress, albeit at a lower scale. It is also worth noting that, 
notwithstanding the analytical advantage of using GMM estimators, the findings 
remained robust to different model specifications (See Appendices) and were 
validated by a number of tests statistics.  
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Chapter 6. Delegation, credible commitment and economic 
growth in Africa 
 
As a prelude to the discussion on the economic effects of institutions of 
credible commitment on economic growth in Africa, I highlight a couple of 
observations from the preceding discussion on the economics of growth in Africa. 
Firstly, it was shown that variations in growth performance among the countries did 
follow the theoretical stipulations of conventional economic models; so much so that 
no robust empirical grounds exist to invoke an African ‘exceptionalist’ paradigm. 
Secondly, normative economic models are mechanistic, in that they fail to address 
the basic question of why countries differ in terms of policy choices, given that the 
knowledge of policy-economic growth nexus is a global public good.  As Acemoglu 
(2005:1026) puts it succinctly, before the onset of political economics, I had no 
better answer than to state ‘(some) politicians just don’t get it.’ Accordingly, the 
proposition that the dichotomy, between growth-promoting and growth-retarding 
policies, is essentially a function of differences in types and qualities of political 
institutions is the theme of this and subsequent chapters. More specifically, I apply 
empirical evidence on Africa to argue that variations in cross-country economic 
growth in the region mirror corresponding variations in political institutions that 
credibly tie the hands of governments from opportunistic behaviour, i.e. institutions 
of credible commitment. 
The subset of institution of credible commitment, I deal with in this chapter, 
is delegation which, in this particular case, refers to an act of transfer of policy-
making prerogatives from the executive to other agents. Widely considered to be a 
socially ubiquitous phenomenon (Diamond 1984 on delegation and financial 
intermediation; Vickers 1985 on delegation and the theory of the firm; and Thatcher 
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and Sweet 2002 on delegation to non-Majoritarian institutions), institutions of 
delegation have long served as important commitment technologies in economic 
policy. Here, our interest is to investigate to what extent different variants of 
delegation map into corresponding variations in economic performance in Africa, as 
measured by average levels of income. Accordingly, the delegation vector is broken 
down into two broad categories, each consisting of different measurements of the 
variable in question. More specifically, I analyse the economic effects of Central 
Bank independence and judicial independence. Both types of institutions signify the 
transfer of decision making power out of the hands of the executive. The chapter is 
organised as follows. In the next section, I investigate the economic effects of 
Central Bank independence, before embarking on dealing with the case of judicial 
independence. Subsumed in the section is a profile of the institution in question in 
the region; operationalisation of the variable, and data and analysis. The final section 
summarises. 
Before I delve into discussions on the economic growth effects of the above 
mentioned commitment technologies, it is important to stress that the selection of 
these institutions of delegation from the otherwise broader set was justified for a 
number of reasons. I digress here to recall that a brief synthesis of the literature on 
delegation was provided in the review essay literature. Firstly, the theoretical 
underpinnings that link Central Bank independence and judicial independence to 
economic outcomes were stronger as compared with other institutions, such as 
decentralisation. For instance, it is difficult to disentangle the economic effects of 
decentralisation, which devolves significant political power to sub-national levels of 
government, in an environment, whereby the distribution of economic resources is 
structurally tilted, in favour of the centre. Comoros provides us with a striking case, 
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where a decentralised political landscape existed alongside a significant regional 
resource imbalance. This is starkly different from the Ethiopian experience wherein 
weak sub-national governments hold hardly any leverage on the centre. The 
experiences across the region with regard to decentralisation are so varied that it is 
difficult to deduce a common denominator for analysis.  
Secondly, Central Banking in Africa provides us with an additional insight on 
the effects of transfer of policy-making prerogatives to multilateral organisations. 
This variable has the added analytical advantage that I will be able to investigate 
whether any effect of Central Bank independence on economic growth is driven by 
the handover of policy prerogatives to a regional body. Thirdly, if I abstract away 
from unique economic growth experiences, such as those of China and South Korea, 
then I find secured property rights (often cemented by judicial independence) to be 
strongly associated with the long-run performance of economies (See Torstensson 
1994 for the property rights-economic growth link). With regard to delegation to 
administrative authorities, it is the very fact of these types of institutions being so 
diverse, which is a prohibitive factor in our analysis. In other words, since not every 
institution necessarily addresses economic objectives, it is difficult to find a common 
theoretical denominator that links them with economic growth.  
6.1) Central Bank independence 
 
It is hardly an overstatement to say that Central Bank independence has long 
been a hallmark of delegation as credible commitment. Several examples exist 
whereby monetary policy is used opportunistically by political actors to achieve 
myopic political goals. In many instances, governments stage drastic policy reversals, 
expropriate private returns as well as significantly altering fiscal behaviour during 
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periods of electoral cycles. Economies bear the brunt of such political phenomena 
because the resultant uncertainties induce sub-optimal types and levels of economic 
activity. A battery of studies along this paradigm show that the act of delegating 
monetary policy to an independent Central Banker helps address the commitment 
problem (Cukierman 1992, Cukierman et al. 1992). This section has a gap-filling 
agenda in that it attempts to provide a quantitative probe into the effects of Central 
Bank independence (hereinafter, CBI) on economic growth in Africa. The road map 
towards this end is as follows. In the next section, I provide a bird’s-eye view of the 
evolution of Central Banking in the continent. The second section synthesises the 
political economy of CBI, with discussion of its theoretical foundations and the 
operationalisation of the CBI variable. In the section on data and analysis, I construct 
a new measure of CBI and empirically test its effects on economic growth in Africa.  
6.1.1) A background note on Central Banking in Africa 
6.1.1.1) Pre-independence Africa and Central Banking 
 
A number of Central Banks in Africa have had a history that far outdates the 
era of independence by decades, albeit not rivalling those of Sweden’s Riksbank 
(founded in 1668) or the Bank of England (founded in 1694). Nevertheless, the 
rationale for the founding of Central Banks in Africa involved diverse practical 
issues including commercial concerns, symbols of state sovereignty as well as a 
banker for government. For instance, the establishment of the Central Bank of South 
Africa (formally known as the South African Reserve Bank) in 1921 bore all the 
marks of commercial interests, in that the rise in the price of gold in London during 
those times opened up an opportunistic situation for arbitrageurs. The actions of 
these agents, who essentially bought gold from South Africa to sell it in Britain, put a 
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dent on the financial sustainability of commercial banks in the former. It was this 
perceived need, that the commercial banks could not keep exchanging gold for 
currency, which forced the country’s parliament to pass legislation for the 
establishment of the Central Bank. The autonomy of the South African Reserve Bank 
is enshrined in the constitution, wherein it is legislated that price stability is its most 
important objective. Perhaps a further proof of the Bank’s independence is given by 
its ability to achieve sound monetary policy amid the drastic political transformation 
of the mid-1990s.   
The creation of the Reserve Bank of South Africa also has an important 
resonance on monetary policy in neighbouring countries. Until well into the 1960s, 
the South African Rand served as the sole medium of exchange and legal tender in 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. Such an arrangement essentially 
implies that monetary policy-making for all these countries was a prerogative of the 
Reserve Bank of South Africa. Another Central Bank that evolved from a uniquely 
indigenous African political history is the National Bank of Ethiopia. It also 
represents one oft-observed trajectory, whereby Central Banks evolve from state 
owned commercial banks when the level of financial deepening in an economy 
necessitates the separation of purely commercial activities from monetary policy 
tasks. A case in point in this regard is the Bank of Ethiopia, which came into 
existence in 1931. Its functions prior to that period had been executed by the Bank of 
Abyssinia since 1906, which was also partially foreign-owned. Still, it was not until 
three decades later (in 1963), with the establishment of the National Bank of Ethiopia, 
that Central Banking activities were clearly demarcated.  
Although the functions of Central Banks evolved through time as per the 
requirements of modern economies, there exist a number of unique roles played by 
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Central Banks which differentiate them from commercial banks. Central Banks have 
a monopoly right to issue and supervise currency notes in a country. They also act as 
a banker to government, in that they assist governments in keeping public financial 
resources as well as issuing financial instruments on governments’ behalf. In 
addition to these activities, Central Banks act as lenders of last resort, by ensuring 
that an adequate flow of financial capital is available for other financial institutions, 
such as commercial banks and insurance companies. Arguably the most important 
function of Central Banks is the conducting of monetary policy in such a way that the 
amount of money in the economy is at a level that expedites economic activities in 
the real economy. It is to execute this latter task that the objective of price stability 
has always featured as a major objective for Central Banks. The application of 
monetary policy, and its implications for the economy, often stands at odds with 
political objectives of governments. It is this discord between economic efficiency 
objectives and political goals that justified the granting of autonomy to Central 
Banks in the conducting of monetary policy.  
However, the prevalent monetary policy regimes in pre-independence Africa 
were carved out by Britain and France. For most of the British colonies in West and 
East Africa, a multi-country currency board was the norm. A currency board is a 
rule-based arrangement in which the exchange rate is fixed to an anchor-currency, 
guaranteeing automatic convertibility and long-term commitment to the system. For 
instance, the East African Currency Board that comprised Kenya, Uganda, mainland 
Tanzania and, later on, in 1936, Zanzibar, fits this model. Its foremost objectives had 
much less to do with stable prices and more to do with controlling the supply of 
currency in the areas, issuing currency and pegging the exchange rate to the pound 
sterling. For French colonies, there existed a common currency among fourteen 
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countries spread throughout west and central Africa. The CFA Franc, also known as 
franc de la communauté financière africaine, became operational since 1945, 
following France’s ratification of the Bretton Woods agreement. It shared the 
convertibility feature with the currency boards, while at the same time being pegged 
to the French Franc. Such practice was also applied by French colonies in other parts 
of the region, as is attested by the experiences of Comoros and Djibouti. 
6.1.1.2) Post-independence Africa and Central Banking 
 
The early years of independence in Africa witnessed the emergence of 
Central Banks in all corners of the region. For the nationalist leaders who took power 
from colonial rulers, the setting-up of Central Banks was considered instrumental in 
achieving a couple of objectives. Firstly, Central Banks acted as symbols of 
sovereignty, thereby inducing several countries to introduce their own currencies. 
Secondly, the economic development agenda vehemently declared by the leaders 
presupposed a Central Bank that dictates credit allocation in accordance with 
national plans.  As a case in point, it took just half a decade of post independence 
period for the three countries to dissolve the East African Currency Board. Not only 
had this move derived its domestic political capital on the basis of nationalism and 
sovereignty, but it was very apparent that Kenya’s liberal policies could not have 
fitted Tanzania’s African socialism. It is particularly true that statist policies, such as 
that of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, had little room for a conservative Central Banker. 
Rather, the Central Bank was expected to play an active role in enhancing public 
investment as well as credit allocation, as administered by the government. For the 
other partner of the Board, Uganda, one can safely say that it went through such 
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violent political turmoil until 1986, that the functions of the Central Bank were far 
from the norm.  
Still, monetary unions that originate from colonial times remained an 
important modus operandi of policy for a handful of countries. In the west and 
central sub-region, Central Bank operations of the fourteen countries are delegated to 
two regional banks. Established following the devaluation of the Franc of the African 
Financial Community (CFA franc) in 1994, the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAMU) includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo with a common Central Bank called Banque 
centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l`Ouest (BCEAO). The parallel monetary union 
and Central Bank, comprising Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, are respectively called the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community and the Banque des Etats de l’Afrique 
Centrale (BEAC).  
The CFA franc is a common currency for all the countries in the two 
communities. As mentioned above, both these entities trace their roots as far back as 
1945, when the CFA franc was first created, on the same day that France ratified the 
Bretton Woods agreement. The consolidation of the regional economic and monetary 
union included, among others, such features as centralisation of external reserves, 
harmonisation of banking and monetary legislation and a fixed parity between the 
CFA franc and the French franc (now with the euro). A notable absentee from these 
economic and monetary arrangements among former French African colonies was 
Guinea, as it was the only country that had opted for full independence as opposed to 
remaining part of the French Community. Similarly, the Common Monetary Area in 
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southern Africa remained in place with the exception of Botswana, which left it in 
1975. 
6.1.2) Operationalisation of the CBI variable 
 
Volumes have been written as to why rational politicians choose to delegate 
monetary policy-making to independent Central Banks. According to Eijffinger and 
De Haan (1996), one can identify at least three reasons for the use values of CBI. 
The first justification emerges from the observation that countries with higher values 
of CBI exhibit, on average, lower rates of inflation. While theoretical stipulations on 
this line of thinking primarily point out the importance of CBI in addressing time 
inconsistency of policy problems, other paradigms, such as public choice and the 
dominance of monetary policy over fiscal policy, also highlight similar arguments. 
Another advantage of a CBI is that it helps reduce variability in inflation. 
Inflation variability, which in turn adversely affects resource allocations, is likely to 
be high in unstable political systems. In such situations, an independent Central Bank 
insulates the economy from inflationary spirals. It is also the case that the pattern of 
unemployment and inflation can be systematically related to the orientations of 
governments. Thirdly, the aggregate effects of low rates of inflation and less 
variability in rates of inflation, ultimately enhance economic growth. The bulk of 
empirical works on the economic effects of CBI have lent support to the theoretical 
propositions made above, especially with regard to its relationships with rates and 
variability of inflation (Keefer and Stasavage 1998, 2002). 
Earlier, I have argued that there exist strong theoretical reasons as to why 
rational politicians choose to delegate monetary policy-making prerogatives to 
independent Central Bankers. Political institutions, which allow for sufficient 
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autonomy/independence for the Central Bank, help curb the much-heralded time 
inconsistency of policies problems. It is, however, the case that the degree of 
independence of Central Banks is a dynamic concept, as it is also true that specific 
local political evolution of the polity has much say in it (See, Debelle and Fischer 
1994; Elgie and Thompson 1998).  
Neither temporally nor spatially has Central Banks independence been evenly 
distributed institutions, as the trajectory of the Bank of England, and that of the 
Bundesbank illustrate. Naturally, scholarly interest in issues of operationalisation of 
Central Bank independence comes to the fore so as to test empirical fit to the 
theoretical hypotheses. Before I deal with the intricacies of measuring Central Bank 
independence, a note of caution is in order. Although conceptually, Central Bank 
independence refers to lack of institutional constraints, and Central Bank autonomy 
to operational freedom in selecting instruments, there are also many intersection 
points that justify using the terms interchangeably. Next, I explain what 
characteristics define independence of Central Banks and also introduce its use in 
this study. 
Despite its wider economic relevance, the earliest attempt to quantifiably measure 
Central Bank independence was that of the unpublished work of Parkin and Bade in 
1982. Accordingly, CBI was equated with political independence and, on a scale of 
1-4 for twelve countries, it was defined as a function of the institutional relationship 
between the Central Bank and the executive, the procedure to nominate and dismiss 
the head of the Central Bank, the role of government officials on the Central Bank 
board, and the frequency of contacts between the executive and the bank (Alesina 
and Summers 1993).  
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A clearly defined institutional relationship between the executive and the 
Central Banks works in favour of CBI, as well as limited roles of government 
officials in the Central Bank board. Similarly, the more frequent the contact between 
the executive and the Central Bank the lesser is the CBI. The basic tenet of this index 
is that CBI is positively related to hands-off policies of government, with regard to 
the institutional and operational dimensions of the Central Bank. Subsequent studies 
adopted a more or less similar approach, with much focus on developed countries. 
More often than not, the dependent variable is either economic growth or rate of 
inflation but, as Sikken and de Haan (1998) show, fiscal policy outcomes, including 
public debt and budget deficit can be explained by CBI.  
Because the CBI indicator I use here is a blend of two of the most widely used 
CBI indicators, an elaboration of these measures is a useful exercise. The first 
method was developed by Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini, 
in a journal article published in Economic Policy in 1991. Accordingly, the degree of 
independence accorded to a CBI is broken down into the political and economic 
dimensions of independence of the Central Bank. The political independence of a 
Central Bank is defined as the ability of Central Banks to select the final objectives 
of monetary policy and, based on the principles of appointment, tenure and 
institutional relationship with the executive, it is gauged along the following eight 
criteria: 
 the governor is appointed without government involvement; 
 the tenure of the governor exceeds five years; 
 the Central Bank board of directors are appointed without government 
involvement; 
 the tenure length of the board of directors is more than five years;  
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 there is no mandatory participation of government representatives in the 
board; 
 monetary policy formulation requires no government approval; 
 the bank is legally obliged to pursue monetary stability as one of its major 
objectives; and 
 the Central Bank has a legal provision to protect it when in a conflictive 
situation with the executive. 
Economic independence of the Central Bank, on the other hand, refers to the 
autonomy of the bank in choosing instruments of monetary policy. The economic 
independence of the Central Bank is determined by the influence of government in 
determining the size of its borrowing from the Central Bank and the nature of the 
monetary instruments under the bank’s control. Accordingly, seven criteria were 
used to quantifiably measure this aspect of CBI that includes: 
 there is no automatic procedure for government to obtain direct credit from 
the Central Bank; 
 government accesses, if at all, direct credit at market interest rates; 
 direct credit to government is temporary; 
 it is also limited in size; 
 the bank does not participate in the primary market for public debt;  
 the bank is responsible for setting the policy rate; and 
 the Central Bank has either a sole responsibility or a shared one in 
supervising the banking sector. 
The scoring system used to measure both dimensions, as well as the overall level 
of CBI, is a simple sum of values registered for each criterion. A couple of 
limitations of the Grilli et al. (1991) CBI index are worth mentioning. Firstly, it is 
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decidedly an ex ante measure of CBI independence, in that the indicator solely relies 
on legal arrangements regarding the Central Bank and its relationships with the 
executive arm of the state. It is very obvious that what is legally provided and what 
actually occurs may not always tally. For instance, a Central Bank that has by 
legislation been given very limited scope in monetary policy-making could, in fact, 
exercise broader powers based on the discretion of the government. It is not difficult 
to find cases in which the reverse is true. Secondly, the CBI variable developed in the 
aforementioned study was applied to only 18 OECD countries. The relevance of this 
factor is not so much its applicability to other settings, as the fact that its derivation 
was largely influenced by institutional features of advanced countries in the first 
place. Their findings indicate that CBI significantly explains why some countries 
sustain higher rates of inflation, while they stressed the point that the effects of 
economic and political CBI are not necessarily equivalent. 
The other widely used CBI index is that proposed by Alex Cukierman (1992), 
which also had the additional advantage of embodying both legal and actual 
indicators of CBI. In order to calculate the degree of independence enjoyed by a 
Central Bank, entirely on the basis of the legal framework, sixteen criterion were 
identified along four major categories including:- 
 tenure length of the chief executive officer, the entity that appoints him/her, 
provision for dismissal, and ability to hold another office; 
 the policy formulation prerogatives of the bank, rules of conflict resolution 
with the government, and level of bank involvement in government budget 
formulation; 
 monetary stability as the overarching objective of the Central Bank; and 
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 regulations that provide the Central Bank broader authority in limiting the 
size, type and terms of lending to the government. 
Two other sets of proxy were included to augment the legal CBI measure, for the 
purpose of accounting for possible deviations of actual degrees of CBI from the legal 
one. Accordingly, he postulated that the actual turnover of Central Bank governors, 
or the ratio of the actual to the legal term of office of the governor, partly closes the 
gap. The inclusion of the actual turnover rate of governors was justified on the 
grounds that not only do empirical observations reveal that actual and legal terms 
often diverge but, more interestingly, it was based on the notion that beyond a given 
threshold there exists an inverse relationship between the two. The study also 
subscribed to the views of specialists from a sub-group of 24 countries on monetary 
policy, to derive a proxy for the actual measure of CBI. Based on his measure of 
legal CBI for 70 countries, and CBI based on turnover rate for 58 countries, the 
findings suggest that different indices should have varied effects on economic policy 
variables. As mentioned above, the CBI indices I develop in this study are a hybrid 
of the Grilli et al. (1991) indices and those of Cukierman (1992).  
At this point, I need to mention one other CBI study which has some relevance to 
Africa. Marco Arnone, Bernard J. Laurens, Jean-Francois Segalotto and Martin 
Sommer calculated indices of Central Bank autonomy for 163 Central Banks as of 
end-2003, and comparable indexes for a subgroup of 68 Central Banks as of the end 
of the 1980s (Arnone et al. 2007). The major advantage of this measure is its 
coverage of a very large number of countries worldwide and the inclusion of African 
countries, which in a majority of studies on CBI are underrepresented. For the same 
specific criteria discussed above for the Grilli et al. (1991) and for the Cukierman 
(1992) indices, they developed a three-variable vector of CBI for each country under 
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consideration. More specifically, the CBI vector for each country includes a measure 
of political CBI, economic CBI and an overall CBI. Notwithstanding the fact that it 
is, by far, the largest indicator of CBI in terms of number of Central Banks (a 
digression here is warranted to point out that, even if the number of Central Banks 
included is 163, the number of countries is actually 181), a few of limitations of the 
Arnone et al. (2007) indices are worth noting.  
Firstly, it is basically a de jure measure capable of assessing CBI, such as is given 
only in the legal landscape. Secondly, its temporal dimension is a narrow one, as it 
provides snapshots of only two points in the time scale. Thirdly, it leaves out a 
number of specific factors that otherwise influence CBI. One notable omission in 
their indicators is the qualification criterion set for Central Bank governors. While 
these problems are not specific to this dataset, there is also one strong limitation to it. 
Accordingly, and perhaps more importantly, the derivations of the standardised 
scores are informed mainly by the existence of data in contrast to actual assessments. 
Note that, in constructing our indices in this thesis, I do not allow missing values to 
partially dictate the scores. This also explains why, despite its broad coverage of 
African data, I refrain from using the Arnone et al. (2007) for the quantitative part of 
the analysis.  
For instance, the category of ‘monetary financing of public deficits and 
monetary instruments’ has eight criteria. For fulfilling each criterion, a country gets 
one point, and otherwise zero, so that the maximum score is eight. Malawi met five 
of the eight criteria and, therefore, obtains a standardised score of 0.63, while 
Mauritius achieved a score of four that apparently translates into a standardised score 
of 0.50. Put differently, the scores did not entirely account for actual CBI when 
driven by the availability of data. In this study, our use of the Arnone et al. (2007) is 
 198
solely limited to graphically explaining temporal trends in CBI indices of some 
African countries. Having taken these into consideration, I next discuss the economic 
effects of CBI in Africa. 
6.1.3) Data and analysis 
6.1.3.1) CBI and its evolution 
 
First in the pecking order of tasks in this section is to investigate whether 
there exists with adequate statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no 
systematic relationship between CBI and economic performance in Africa, the latter 
variable measured in terms of economic growth and/or quality of macroeconomic 
policy. I organise the analysis sequentially by starting from sources, measurement of 
variables on both sides of the equation, followed by descriptive and quantitative 
investigations respectively. Recall that, earlier, I underscored the weaknesses of the 
Arnone et al. (2007) data in undertaking a meaningful empirical analysis. However, 
one advantage of this data is that it provides fairly comparable observations for ten 
countries in two points in time. Note that the temporal dimension of data on CBI in 
Africa is extremely narrow and hard to find, as published resources have come to 
surface only very recently.  
Cukierman (1992), while arguably the only study to seriously attempt to 
account for dynamic changes in CBI among African countries, includes as few as 
less than one-fifth of the 50-plus countries that the region hosts. The data points for 
the countries already included are further reduced when one takes into account those 
entries registered as unavailable. Interestingly, it also overlooks monetary policy 
developments in all of former French colonies in Africa. The significance of this 
issue emanates from the fact that, unlike in other parts of Africa, these sub-regions 
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were unique in that monetary policy has always been delegated to regional monetary 
unions that have had a considerable life-span. A further limitation is the fact that this 
data begins from 1950, which is quite some time before African countries began to 
achieve their political independence. All of these points suggest that accounting for 
the dynamic features of CBI on economic outcomes in Africa is all but impractical. 
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Figure 5 Evolution of CBI in Africa 
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NB. Using figures from Arnone et al. (2007), the above 
graph portrays the evolution of CBI for Ten African 
States along the three CBI variables, i.e. political 
independence, economic independence and overall 
independence. In order to capture the low scores of South 
Africa and Zambia in all the variables, I rescaled the Y-
axis in those cases to the interval [0, 0.5]. The metrics 
remain the same.        
    
Taking the above mentioned limitation into consideration, and based on the 
Arnone et al. (2007) data, it is not difficult to discern that economic CBI has 
consistently been the most important aspect of delegating monetary policy authority 
in Africa. Recall that I earlier elaborated on the metrics used in the construction of 
the Arnone et al. (2007) data. In almost all of the countries included above, the 
economic CBI standardised score is about 0.6, while the corresponding values for the 
political CBI fluctuate between 0.2 and 0.4. An exceptional case is that of Uganda, in 
which case the margin between the two dimensions of CBI is very close. Still, the 
 201
narrowing of this margin between the economic CBI and the political CBI for 
Uganda has materialised only since around the year 2000. Zambia also seemed to 
have accorded its Central Bank a compatible level of independence, both in terms of 
economic instruments and political aspects of the CBI. Yet it differs from Uganda in 
that its CBI scores hardly reach 0.5, in contrast to that of Uganda which stands at 
around 0.6.  
Additionally, three other patterns are worth mentioning in portraying the 
diversity of experiences in CBI among African countries. The first one is that 
represented by Botswana, whereby political CBI is significantly and consistently 
lower than economic CBI. The other is that of Ethiopia, which increasingly enhanced 
the political CBI of its Central Bank with a concomitant downward spiral in its 
economic CBI. The Ethiopian experience is an exact contrast to that of Kenya, in 
which a reduction in political CBI is accompanied by improvement in the economic 
CBI of its Central Bank. In sum, one can discern a few notable features in the 
evolution of CBI in Africa. It can be deduced that almost all the countries have 
increased the degree of delegation of monetary policy to their Central Banks since 
the early 1990s as is shown by the overall CBI scores.  
Broadly, African countries seem to have a greater preference for provide their 
Central Banks with broader prerogatives in choosing policy instruments (economic 
CBI) than that of a limited political role in the hiring and firing of governors of 
Central Banks (political CBI). These attributes mostly reflect those of former British 
colonies in the region with the exception of Ethiopia and South Africa. Note that the 
diagrammatic presentation above is based on two temporal data points. While it 
shows situations with regard to CBI at the end of 1980s and around 2003, it does not 
purport to account for the dynamism in the CBI indicators. Nevertheless, there are 
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substantial reasons to believe that it fairly captures a trend in the variables. Firstly, 
institutional variables such as CBI are notoriously slow to change and, hence major 
fluctuations in the values between the periods are unlikely. Secondly, one observes 
an improvement in CBI levels across a wide spectrum of countries. As such, the 
presumption that there could have existed very diverging evolutionary patterns in 
CBI among countries is less plausible. 
6.1.3.2) A new set of CBI indicators for Africa  
 
In order to assess the empirical effects of CBI in Africa on economic growth, 
I construct two de jure and one de facto measures. The legal texts and other materials 
used to build the CBI indicators are available online at www.centralbanking.org.uk 
(See also, Appendix E). Unlike other widely available indicators of CBI that rely on 
very broad categories, those I develop here are focussed and deal with specific 
dimensions of CBI. The definitions and coding strategies applied are explained as 
follows. 
The political independence variables capture the degree of autonomy provided to 
the Central Bank governors. More specifically, I postulate three scenarios: 
 The Bank through its board of directors is allowed to appoint the governor; 
 The legally set term limit for the governor is greater than or equal to five year; 
and 
 There exists a professional qualification criterion required of the person under 
consideration to govern the Central Bank. 
The coding is based by the number of criteria a given Central Bank fulfils. 
Central Banks that meet al.l three criteria are assigned a value of one. Note that the 
existence of public sector officers in the director’s board does not imply a weakening 
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of the first case as long as government representatives do not hold a veto power. I put 
a value of 1 for Central Banks that satisfy all the conditions; 0.67 on Central Banks 
that satisfy two of the conditions set above while those that meet only one of the 
conditions are given a weight of 0.33. A value of 0 is assigned for cases where none 
of the above set criteria are achieved. 
Economic independence of a Central Bank refers to the types of monetary policy 
instruments at the disposal of the bank and the degree to which the bank is at liberty 
to use those tools without interference on the part of government. I develop the 
economic independence variable as a weighted average of two major sub-
components. The first of these deals with the question of establishing the identity of 
monetary policy-maker. It captures the theoretical stipulation that Central Banks with 
the authority to make monetary policy are more independent. Accordingly, coding 
statements and corresponding weights are given as follows: 
 Monetary policy is the sole prerogative of the Central Bank (1.00); 
 The Central Bank and the government share policy-making authority (0.67); 
 The legislation fails to clearly address the issue of who makes policy (0.33); 
and 
 Monetary policy is the sole prerogative of the government (0.00). 
Note that in cases where the bank is expected only to advise government on 
policy, it is taken as having full economic autonomy. 
The second sub-component of economic independence tackles the bank’s 
autonomy with regard to the fiscal behaviour of government. More specifically, I 
measure the existence and robustness of policy instruments that control government 
borrowing from the bank. This is quite an important indicator in an African context 
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where monetisation of fiscal deficits has been a widespread problem. The coding 
criteria and associated weights are given below. 
 The legislation contains stipulations which limit government borrowing with 
clear regulations on implementations (1.00). The strength of implementation 
is assessed by the ease with which government can violate legally-set limits. 
Autonomy with regard to limits on government borrowing is stronger in cases 
where the Central Bank can resort to parliamentary approval or change the 
banking laws; 
 The banking legislation provides for a limit on government borrowing but 
does not clearly indicate programmes of action when and if the core 
executive attempts to violate the rule (0.50); 
 The banking act does not include limits on government borrowing (0.00).  
Finally, the de facto indicator I construct to operationalise Central Bank 
independence is the annual rate of turnover of Central Bank governors. Political 
theory establishes that a higher rate of turnover of Central Bank governors implies a 
weaker degree of independence for the bank. 
6.1.3.3) Tenure of Central Bank governors in Africa  
 
A closer look at the distributional pattern of our de facto variable, i.e. actual 
rates of turnover of governors, is in order, as this variable is a particularly important 
proxy for Central Bank independence in developing countries (Cukierman et al. 
1992). When the Bank of Mauritius marked its 40th anniversary, Rundheersing 
Bheenick, its sixth Governor, explained that the average tenure of a governor for that 
part of the world was eight years, but with a wide deviation between two and twelve 
years. The average tenure for a governor of the Bank of Mauritius is six and a half 
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years.  This figure is very close to the average actual tenure of a Central Bank 
governor in Africa which stands at about 6.4 years. The regional average tenure for a 
Central Bank governor falls well within the range of independent Central Banks as 
the criterion in most cases is a tenure of five or more years. In its 45-year existence, 
the National Bank of Ethiopia has had seven governors, which implies an average 
survival rate of 5.6 years. Yet the reported value for governors’ average tenure in 
Ethiopia should not mask the fact that the last two decades have been the most 
volatile for the Bank in terms of  turnover rate. Five of the seven governors were 
hired and fired within the past twenty years.  
Table 8 Rates of actual turnover of Central Bank governors (Selected countries) 
Country Number of 
Governors 
Annual Turnover 
rate* 
BCEAO** 4 0.093 
Botswana 6 0.1875 
Ethiopia 7 0.1590 
Madagascar 6 0.1764 
Namibia 4 0.2352 
South Africa 8 0.097 
Sudan 14 0.3182 
Uganda 9 0.2195 
Zambia 12 0.2791 
 
NB. * Actual turnover rate is the quotient of the number 
of governors and the total years of existence for the 
Central Bank. ** BCEAO countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Guinée Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and 
Togo. Note that, for brevity reasons, this table reports 
results for 16 countries only. A detailed presentation 
with names and tenures is provided in the appendix.  
 
Such figures in an otherwise largely unstable political environment should 
not come as a surprise. One can cite a couple of reasons as to why this is so. To start 
with, both of the CFA Franc monetary unions in Africa have had noticeably low rates 
of turnover of Central Bank governors. The BCEAO and BEAC countries that 
comprise 14 countries have had only four and three governors respectively 
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throughout their existence. This means that for both of these entities the average 
tenure of the Central Bank governors exceeded ten years. Similarly, the Reserve 
Bank of South Africa has had only eight governors during its 86 years of existence. 
Nevertheless, as Table 8 shows, such figures should not camouflage significant 
differences in turnover across the entire region. The most unstable Central Bank 
regime is that of the Sudan where the average tenure of a governor oscillated around 
three years. Other notable cases include Zambia, with a turnover rate of 0.2791, and 
Namibia with 0.2352. Perhaps as a reflection of its political history, ravaged by civil 
conflicts and several coups d’état, average tenure of a Central Bank governor in 
Nigeria is only five years. However, I observe a pattern of improved longevity for 
Central Bank governors in recent times in this country.     
6.1.3.4) Descriptive analysis 
 
As discussed above, the political independence variable is a function of the 
system of governor’s appointment, her (perhaps a misnomer given that Linah K. 
Mohohlo of the Bank of Botswana is the only woman in the list) legal term limit and 
the qualifications required for the position. In the majority of cases, countries 
managed to meet only one of the conditions, with a corresponding value of 0.5. The 
extent of involvement by the executive arm of government is quite strong in certain 
countries. For instance, all the board members of the National Bank of Ethiopia are 
high-level politicians, and the governor is accountable to the board. Additionally, 
monetary policy is, legally, set to be the prerogative of the Finance Ministry. At the 
other extreme are the Central Banks of Botswana and Mauritius. In both countries, 
the Banking Acts contain robust provisions which dictate the involvement of the 
chief executive in the governor’s selection and decision making.  
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Table 9 Descriptive statistics of CBI variables 
Stats Political 
CBI 
Policy 
CBI 
Limit 
CBI 
Economic 
CBI 
Turnover
Mean 0.31 0.51 0.41 0.46 0.16 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.32 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
SD 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.07 
 
NB. Though figures reported are for forty-four countries 
in the region, fourteen countries share similar values 
because of membership to regional blocks. While Political 
CBI refers to hiring and firing of CBI governors, Policy 
CBI and Limit CBI account for identity of monetary policy 
maker and the Banks’ legal relationships vis-à-vis 
Governments. Economic CBI is a weighted average of Policy 
CBI and Limit CBI. I use the relevant Central Bank 
legislation to derive the basic indicators of 
independence. Recall that I refrain from using Arnone et 
al. (2007) for the quantitative analysis, since assuming 
missing values as lower CBI scores is untenable.  
 
The distributional patterns of the political CBI and economic CBI are skewed 
to the left. The fact that the mean value for the political independence variable is 0.31 
suggests that, in the prevalent cases, African countries do not provide significant 
autonomy to the Bank. A more or less similar inference can be made regarding 
economic independence for the Central Bank. However, the two components of 
economic independence exhibit diverging patterns of distribution. More to the point, 
African countries score better in terms of delegating monetary policy-making 
authority to the Central Banks. The policy dimension of the economic CBI for the 
bulk of the countries revolves around a mean value of 0.51. Such a distributional 
pattern sharply contrasts with that of the limit CBI which is indicative of the fact that 
government borrowing from the Central Bank remains a major risk for the 
independence of the Central Banks.  
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Several countries in the region either leave out any regulations on limiting 
government access to Central Bank lending altogether or the banking laws blatantly 
lack provisions that credibly allow the Bank to control for such eventualities. Finally, 
a common trend for all distributional patterns of CBI in the region is that there exist 
significant cross-country variations, as is shown by the standard deviations. Next I 
address the empirical implications of the political variables on economic 
performance of countries in the region.  
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Figure 6 Links between CBI variables 
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NB. The scatter in the above graph assesses links among 
the three CBI variables developed in the thesis. Both 
axes show scores on each CBI indicator. I include all the 
forty-five countries in the analysis. 
 
The purpose of the above diagrammatic presentation is to provide a visual 
assessment of possible links between the three sets of CBI indicators introduced here. 
It should be noted that political theory does not support the view that these variables 
should correlate strongly. The first scatter-plot, i.e. top left corner, highlights the 
relationship between the political CBI and the economic CBI variables. There exists 
a very strong covariation between these two variables, in that countries which 
accorded broader political independence to their Central Banks backed these 
measures with comparable autonomy in monetary policy-making, as well as in terms 
of Central Banks’ dealings with executives. When examining the individual country 
data, I note that a country in the higher rank group with regard to political CBI is 
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80% likely to be in the comparably higher group when ranking is along the economic 
CBI scale.  
Our result in this particular case resembles what Arnone et al. (2007) reported, 
as presented in Figure 5 earlier, wherein they indicated that only Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, both based on 1990 figures, had relatively lower economic CBI as 
compared to their political CBI figures. Such a strong correlation between economic 
CBI and political CBI in Africa possibly relates to limited policy tools at the disposal 
of Central Banks, due in some part to structural conditions, such as poorly-developed 
financial markets. 
In the corner left bottom, one can observe the relationship between political 
CBI and the de facto measure of CBI, i.e. actual rate of turnover of governors. Here 
also, I notice a rather weak, but still positive, association between these two variables. 
Reading from left in the figure, I can see that, as political CBI declines, the actual 
turnover rate of Central Bank governors showed an increase. Those countries that 
registered very short actual tenures for their Central Bank governors, including the 
Sudan, Mauritania, and Uganda, are also the ones that failed to give legalistic 
independence to the Central Banks in the hiring and firing of governors. The other 
extreme of the ranking order is primarily inhabited by the BCEAO countries. The 
scatter-plot at the bottom right end of the figure helps us to make some non-
parametric (that is, without invoking any assumptions about the distribution) 
observations.  
What I deduce from this particular segment appears to be at odds with earlier 
observations in that there does not exist any relationship between the economic CBI 
variable and actual turnover rates for Central Bank governors in Africa. All in all, 
inasmuch as political CBI and turnover rates correlate positively, I can state that 
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actual tenure of Central Bank governors in the region can be explained by the legal 
provisions on the hiring and firing of Central Bank governors.   
6.1.3.5) Quantitative analysis 
 
So far, it has been shown that there exist differences in levels of CBI for 
African countries in terms of the various instruments used to measure CBI. The 
hypothesis I draw from political theory for empirical investigation is that such 
differences in cross-country CBI map onto corresponding differences in economic 
performances for the countries. To this end, I develop economic growth models 
augmented with the political variables introduced in this section. Accordingly, 
annual average real GDP per capita of each country for the period 1990-2003 is used 
as the dependent variable. While I do not dwell much on the choice of the dependent 
variable here (recall that it is dealt with in a previous chapter), I need to elaborate on 
the control variable(s) and the political variables on CBI. Unlike the Solow model, 
economic growth studies based on cross-sectional models draw from open-ended 
theoretical foundations. As mentioned in Chapter 3, an excellent account of this 
anomaly in economic growth studies is provided in Sala-I-Martin (1997). This means 
that economic theory is at a loss when it comes to either the identity of the right-hand 
side variables or how many of them should be included. It is a reflection of this 
problem that I observe a long list of variables that have been included the models.  
In this thesis, I followed a more pragmatic approach, and permitted 
availability of data to decide which economic covariate(s) to include. This approach 
is useful, in that I will be able to minimise losses in degrees of freedom. For instance, 
if I use human capital as a control, the number of observations in the model collapses 
to 27. It is for this reason that I resorted to using openness to control for economic 
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factors. By using the degree of openness as an economic covariate, I do not imply 
that it is the only variable, where data for all countries are available. That is not all, 
however, in that, to ensure that the results do not loosely hinge on this variable, I 
conduct robustness tests by replacing them with other variables, and also by applying 
other estimation techniques. With regard to the political explanatory variables, a 
couple of notes are worth mentioning here.  
Firstly, the CBI indicators are constructed from the earliest available Central 
Bank acts. Most of the countries in the region have had their respective legislations 
introduced or significantly amended in the early 1990s which coincided with the 
wave of political reforms in the region during that period. For other countries whose 
Central Bank legislations dated back to earlier periods (notably, South Africa, 
BCEAO and BEAC members), any amendments in the laws are taken into account. 
Secondly, it is almost impossible that such measurements to be totally free of 
subjective assessments on the par of the researcher.  
I first focus on investigating the effects of the constituent parts of economic 
CBI on economic growth in the region. Recall that the former is made up of a policy 
dimension that controls for the identity of monetary policy making authority, and a 
term dimension which assessed the level of bank autonomy in controlling public debt. 
The findings reported in table 6.3. indicate that both components explain a 
significant level of variation in economic growth among countries. A marginal 
change in levels of economic CBI from the policy dimension induces a greater pay-
off in terms of economic growth. Countries that reform from a lower policy-cum-
economic independence CBI regime to a higher one are likely to enhance long-term 
economic growth significantly. This is important in the sense that, in several 
countries of the region, the Central Banks were always expected to address multiple 
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economic objectives, which in turn allowed governments to exercise significant 
control over monetary policy. A similar assertion can be made with regard to the 
limit dimension of economic CBI, albeit at a lesser level of significance. As such, a 
one percent change in favour of a Bank’s autonomy in limiting government 
borrowing explains more than 1.08 of one percent in growth differences.  
Table 10 Economic effects of CBI variables in Africa 
Variable (OLS with 
Political 
CBI) 
(OLS with 
Policy CBI) 
(OLS with 
Limit CBI) 
Openness 0.57 
0.21 
0.01 
0.48 
0.20 
0.02 
0.56 
0.20 
0.01 
    
Political CBI 1.27 
0.47 
0.01 
  
    
Policy CBI  1.36 
0.50 
0.01 
 
    
Limit CBI   1.08 
0.46 
0.02 
    
Constant 4.58 
0.76 
0.00 
4.65 
0.75 
0.00 
4.60 
0.74 
0.00 
    
R-squ. 
F(2,41) 
N 
0.41 
15.23 
44 
0.39 
10.12 
44 
0.36 
11.06 
44 
 
NB. The three models account for the growth effects of 
political CBI and economic CBI (Policy and Limit) 
respectively. Openness, drawn from the PENN World Table) 
is measured as a natural log of share of exports plus 
imports in GDP. Figures below coefficient estimates are 
robust standard errors and p-values. All the F values are 
significant at one percent. Estimation is by OLS. 
 
One serious criticism that can be labelled at the above presentation is that it 
overlooks a particular feature of monetary policy-making in Africa. This is a 
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reference to the common monetary areas of former French colonies in West and 
Central Africa, otherwise known as the CFA franc countries. By default, the 
countries in these regional blocks share similar values with regard to the derived de 
jure and de facto CBI measures. It means that the OLS regression assumption on 
statistical independence of error terms is violated. As such, I should be investigating 
this issue in order to establish whether the results reported above were driven by the 
structurally different CFA franc situation. I follow two approaches to investigate the 
significance of this problem for the above-reported links between the two sets of 
variables. In addition to introducing a dummy variable for membership in a regional 
monetary union, I run a generalised linear model to estimate one of the CBI 
parameters. 
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Table 11 Economic effects of CBI variables in Africa (with regional controls) 
 
NB. Models in 2nd, 3rd and 4th columns capture the links 
between growth and the CBI variables (OLS estimation), 
but this time I introduced dummies for membership in the 
regional monetary unions. Model in last column is a 
generalised linear model estimation applied on political 
CBI. Openness, drawn from the PENN World Table, is 
measured as a natural log of share of exports plus 
imports in GDP. Regional is a dummy that takes value of 1 
if country belongs to a monetary union and 0 otherwise. 
NA refers to not available. The F values are significant 
at one percent. Figures below coefficient estimates are 
robust standard errors and p-values. NA refers to 
statistic inappropriate. 
 
Variable (Political 
CBI with 
dummy) 
(Policy 
CBI with 
dummy) 
(Limit CBI 
with 
dummy) 
(GLM) 
Openness  0.57 
 0.20 
 0.01 
 0.49 
 0.19 
 0.01 
 0.54 
 0.19 
 0.01 
0.57 
0.20 
0.00 
     
Political 
CBI 
 1.29  
 0.46 
 0.01 
  1.27 
0.46 
0.01 
     
Regional -0.53  
 0.19 
 0.01 
-0.48  
 0.19 
 0.01 
-0.63  
 0.20 
 0.00 
 
     
Policy CBI   1.34  
 0.49 
 0.01 
  
     
Limit CBI    1.21  
 0.46 
 0.01 
 
     
Constant  4.66 
 0.72 
 0.00 
 4.71 
 0.72 
 0.00 
 4.73 
 0.69 
 0.00 
4.58 
0.74 
0.00 
     
R-squ. 
F(3,40) 
N 
 0.66 
 12.97 
44 
 0.44 
 9.23 
44 
 0.44 
 9.66 
44 
NA 
NA 
44 
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The introduction of the dummy variables helps to shed light on the 
significance, if any, of membership of the two monetary blocks for the findings in 
Table 12. Any disparity between the CBI variables estimations is attributed to the 
inclusion of a control on membership. I observe hardly any change to the coefficient 
estimate on the political CBI when the dummy for membership is included. The 
effect of political CBI on economic growth reported earlier was not conditional on 
the scores for the regional groupings. Political CBI would have continued to be an 
important variable even if I had ignored those cases from regional monetary unions. 
The model in the third column of Table 12 reports results with regard to the policy 
dimension of economic CBI, while corresponding estimates for the limit dimension 
are provided in Column 4. Yet again, I find very subdued effects of membership in 
the regional monetary unions on the economic performance of countries. Finally, in 
the last model, rather than relying on dummies, I sought to address this issue by 
applying a different estimation technique.  
Accordingly, the result from the generalised linear model, based on the 
political CBI, did not dampen the findings reported in the previous model. It also 
returned similar results for the other political variables. The generalised linear model 
is a technique which, in addition to accommodation of such non-normal distributions 
as poisson or logistic distributions, is capable of dealing with non-linearity issues. In 
this connection, it helps us assess whether, as a result of inclusion of regional 
monetary unions, the estimates still hold true.  
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Table 12 CBI Governors' turnover rate and economic growth in Africa 
Variable (Political 
CBI) 
(Economic 
CBI) 
(Turnover 
without    
dummies) 
(Turnover
with 
dummies) 
Openness 0.57 
0.21 
0.01 
0.49 
0.19 
0.02 
 0.67 
 0.20 
 0.00 
 0.59 
 0.20 
 0.01 
Political 
CBI 
1.27 
0.47 
0.01 
   
Economic 
CBI 
  
1.37 
0.49 
0.01 
  
Turnover    
-1.86 
 1.62 
 0.26 
 
-3.95 
 1.93 
 0.05 
Regional    -0.80 
 0.27 
 0.01 
Constant 4.58 
0.76 
0.00 
4.68 
0.73 
0.00 
 4.86 
 0.90 
 0.00 
 5.68 
 0.95 
 0.00 
     
R-Squ. 
F(2,41) 
F(3,40) 
N 
0.41 
15.23 
- 
44 
0.39 
10.95 
- 
44 
 0.26 
 6.92 
- 
44 
 0.37 
- 
 5.95 
44 
 
NB. First model is for political CBI as reported in 
tables above; column 3 presents results for the economic 
CBI, which is an equally weighted average of policy CBI 
and limit CBI and; columns 4 and 5 show estimates for the 
turnover variable without and with dummies respectively. 
Openness, drawn  from the PENN World Table, is measured 
as a natural log of share of exports plus imports in GDP. 
F values are significant at one percent. Estimation is by 
OLS. Figures below coefficient estimates are robust 
standard errors and p-values. 
 
From Table 12 above, our concern is primarily with the last two models. The 
model in column 2 is already discussed, while the economic CBI (i.e. in column 3) is 
merely an average of policy CBI and limit CBI. Since both the constituent parts of 
economic CBI were positively and significantly related with economic growth in the 
region, and because such results were not sensitive to the particular features of CFA 
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franc countries, the corresponding significant association between growth and the 
economic CBI is expected. The influence of actual rate of turnover of governors on 
economic growth in Africa seems to be weak, even though the direction of the 
relationship confirms theoretical priors. However, when I include controls for 
countries’ membership of monetary unions, the coefficient estimate for the turnover 
variable becomes very significant. Unlike the legalistic measures of political CBI and 
economic CBI, this variable, when I do not control for membership of monetary 
unions, does not explain cross-country growth differences in Africa. Taking into 
consideration the fact that turnover rates for both regional blocs are at the lowest 
extreme of the rankings, a plausible explanation is that the effect of membership of 
monetary unions manifested itself more through the turnover variable than through 
political CBI or economic CBI. 
Before summing up this section, it is important to highlight some caveats regarding 
the CBI-economic growth nexus in Africa. Firstly, theory on effects of independence 
of Central Banks on the economic landscape often underscores its effects mainly on 
inflation (Cukierman 1992, Fry 1998). Given the fact that theoretical assertions of 
the direct effects of CBI on economic growth are rather grey, I need to caution as to 
whether the reported results amount to causal relationships. The other point is that 
not only are Central Bank legislations not always readily available, but it is also 
difficult to ascertain whether adequate time has elapsed before the effects of CBI 
legislations take effect.  
This is partly a reflection of limitations of data and partly due to the inherent 
stickiness of institutional variables. Additionally, it is observed that countries are not 
equally forthcoming with regard to making information on Central Banks operations 
publicly available. For instance, our attempt to obtain information from officials of 
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the Central Bank of the Gambia, with regard to names and tenures of governors, 
proved fruitless despite repeated calls and emails. Since I have no way of 
establishing a link between Central Banks which do not impart the required 
information and CBI scores, it is difficult to assess the effects of missing data on the 
results. In the event that countries with higher scores on CBI self-select, i.e. Central 
Banks with higher independence release more information, selectivity bias might 
affect almost all the studies. It would be, however, an interesting line of research to 
investigate if and how the extents of information Central Banks choose to make 
public proxies their independence. As shown in Appendices L and M, estimates 
remain strong to different robustness tests including changes in model specifications 
and control variables.               
6.2) Judicial independence 
 
Several studies underline the utility of independent courts in promoting a 
credible regime of policies that ultimately lead to intensification of economic 
transactions. As economic agents believe that this third pillar of government is 
insulated from opportunistic behaviour of the executive, they enter into economically 
optimal long-term commitments, which are often reflected in types and duration of 
investments. According to Landes and Posner (1975:875), an independent judiciary 
is defined as ‘one that does not make decisions on the basis of the sorts of political 
factors (for example, the electoral strength of the people affected by a decision) that 
would influence and in most cases control the decision were it to be made by a 
legislative body.’ Without divulging much about the mechanics of measuring levels 
of judicial independence at this point, I can identify a number of approaches through 
which scholars dealt with the judicial independence-economic performance nexus.  
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The more prevalent paradigm on the economic implications of judicial 
independence stresses such practical issues as selection of judges, judges’ facing no 
political consequences of their decisions, tenure security and, to a lesser degree, 
effectiveness of the judiciary itself. The other spectrum argues strongly that the type 
of specific legal system in question matters is of equal importance in shaping judicial 
independence and, hence, economic growth. More specifically, it espouses that the 
stare decisis principle of English common law is more accommodative to judicial 
independence than other forms of legal systems (See, La Porta et al. 1999). This 
principle implies that precedent decisions are to be followed by the courts. 
In Africa, colonial legacy has been by far the most important factor shaping 
countries’ legal systems. For instance, countries in west Africa, a sub-region which 
hosts almost all former colonies of France, have adopted the French civil code since 
independence as their formal legal system. This also includes Guinea, even though it 
took the unique step of opting out of the French community in 1958. The influence 
of colonial experience is all the more apparent when I observe other countries in the 
sub-region which used to be under British colonial rule. English common law has 
become the dominant form of legal system in these countries, as Nigeria and Ghana  
provide cases in point. A strictly parallel pattern is observed when one examines the 
legal systems of those African countries that were under the fringe players of 
colonisation in Africa. Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique apply the Portuguese 
civil law system, while Equatorial Guinea adopted the civil law system of its former 
colonial master, namely, Spain. The fact that one part of Somalia was under British 
control, while the other was an Italian colony, is matched by a legal system that is a 
mixture of the systems of both these countries. Nevertheless, such categorisation of 
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African legal systems should not camouflage the otherwise significant roles played 
by both customary and religious laws in the region. 
That de jure and de facto indicators of a country’s judicial independence do 
not necessarily co-vary, implies that each factor captures a particular segment of the 
prevalence of the rule of law. Most countries have enshrined, in their constitutions, 
provisions which are intended to provide judicial independence within their 
territories. At a presentation in the fourth African Development Forum, Akiumi 
(2004) provided an insightful synopsis on the question of judicial independence in 
Africa, from the perspectives of African countries’ constitutions. The Ghanaian 
constitution, for example, clearly stipulates that judicial power is a sole prerogative 
of the judiciary, and specifically forbids government and parliament from having 
such powers. This is a far cry from the days when African governments 
circumvented the power of courts by setting up special courts. Uganda also includes, 
in its constitution, provisions which prohibit executive interference in the judiciary. 
Noticeable among these provisions is the restriction by any entity from altering the 
salaries and other benefits accorded to judges by the state. It was in fact the case that, 
in order to enhance the financial autonomy of the judiciary and, therefore to achieve 
judicial independence, several countries, including Kenya and Uganda, tied the 
budgets of the latter into the consolidated public fund. 
As can be deduced from constitutions of countries in the region, there exists a 
clear understanding that a system of tenure termination of judges is an important 
variable in the judicial independence equation. In Ethiopia, a judge cannot be 
removed before reaching retirement age unless there are compelling health reasons 
and/or upon a majority parliament vote. Anecdotal evidences, however, suggest that 
there has been a very high rate of attrition of judges in the Ethiopian legal 
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environment. Hardly any of those cases were apolitical, as one episode in particular 
highlighted the vulnerability of the judiciary to the whims of the executive. In a case 
that later became a cornerstone to questions of judicial independence in the country, 
a judge released, on bail, a former high-profile official of the ruling party who was 
charged on some counts related to corruption. However, not only did the government 
force her to resign, but it also rescinded the court’s decision to re-arrest the accused. 
To cement its position vis-à-vis the courts, a new law was passed that prevented 
judges’ from releasing people accused on corruption charges on bail. This particular 
case encapsulates the otherwise widespread leverage which the executive has on the 
judiciary (See Shakespeare 2009).  
To assess the degree of judicial independence in a country, legal provisions 
are necessary conditions, but are not sufficient, because even in an environment in 
which judicial independence is constitutionally enshrined, governments could have 
the wherewithal and the will to violate legal provisions. As is explained in section 
6.2.1 below, such phenomena take centre stage in studies that aim to provide 
quantifiable measures of judicial independence, which are also comparable among 
countries. 
6.2.1) Operationalisation of judicial independence 
 
Earlier, I elaborated the two strands of thought with regard to the postulated 
effects of judicial independence on the economic performance of countries. These 
views, in turn, shaped the conceptualisations and methods researchers used in the 
operationalisation of judicial independence, in ways amenable to empirical analysis. 
The first of these paradigms argues that legal origins matter strongly in explaining 
differences in degrees of judicial independence among countries. Friedrich 
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Hayek(1960) is widely credited with the proposition that the English legal tradition 
(the common law) is superior to the French legal tradition (the civil law) because the 
common law was associated with fewer government restrictions on economic and 
other liberties. As mentioned earlier, a refined version of this view was put forward 
by La Porta et al.(1999), who argue that the basic justifications for the two systems 
differ from the outset.  
Accordingly, common law systems were meant to limit rather than strengthen 
the state, and originated when the English aristocracy attempted to protect itself from 
property incursions by the state. In contrast, civil legal tradition reflected the 
intention of building institutions which enhanced the power of the state. Mahoney 
(2001) highlights that structural differences exist between the legal systems, in that 
common law systems provide greater judicial independence, while in civil law 
systems, the executive has greater scope to alter property and contract rights. 
However, operationalising the legal type variable is not a straightforward issue, as 
many countries apply a hybrid of systems. This is certainly the case in most African 
countries, where religious and customary laws are equally important.  
The second approach to defining judicial independence pays less attention to 
the legal origins of a country, which it holds to be of limited significance. Rather, it 
emphasises the specific stipulations in the legislation that established the judicial 
systems of countries, which is further augmented by the actual relationships that have 
evolved between the executive and the judiciary. Nevertheless, this line of thought is 
characterised by a conspicuous absence of a meaningful amount of empirical studies. 
As such, a couple of works are especially notwworthy. La Porta et al. (2004) 
operationalise judicial independence as a normalised sum of the tenure of Supreme 
Court judges, the tenure of administrative court judges, and the case law variable.  
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More specifically, tenure lengths of supreme court and administrative court 
judges are measured on a (0, 1, 2) scale, whereby the numbers in the cell reflect a 
tenure of less than six year, a tenure of more than six years but not of life time 
duration, and a lifelong tenure respectively. The case law variable is a dummy that 
takes a value of 1 if judicial decisions in a given country are a source of law. With 
one of the dependent variables being indicators of economic freedom such as 
property rights, they find that judicial independence explains differences in levels of 
economic freedom among countries. However, the paper does not give the details of 
the 71 countries included in the study.  
Similarly, Feld and Voigt (2003) test whether judicial independence affects 
economic growth, by constructing de jure and de facto measures of judicial 
independence. The de jure judicial independence variable is derived based on twelve 
individual variables that are hypothesised to positively associate with the former. 
These include issues such as whether judicial independence is provided for in the 
constitution; whether or not appointments of judges are made by professionals; the 
length of tenure of judges and their terms being non-renewable; adequate pay and 
less discretion of executives in determining salaries of judges; broader accessibility 
of the court and its proceedings; the task of allocating cases not concentrated in a 
single entity such as the chief justice; competency of the court, and transparency of 
court decisions. Effective tenure length, number of judges belonging to the same 
court, changes in the real incomes of judges, changes in the legal foundations of high 
courts and whether decisions of the courts require the approval of other branches of 
government, are variables included to account for measuring de facto judicial 
independence. Their findings indicate that real GDP per capita is affected by de facto 
judicial independence and not by the de jure measure of judicial independence. 
 225
As in other studies, the number of African countries contained in this study is 
very limited when, in particular, one thinks of undertaking a within an African 
context investigation of the economic effects of judicial independence. I also observe 
one possible anomaly of this indicator. The authors address the problem of lack of 
data by dividing each score by the number of variables for which data was available. 
This means that a country that scored highest scores on three variables obtains a 
maximum overall score if available data is for those three variables only. Any other 
country which provided data for all twelve variables, but which has managed to score 
maximum values for ten of them and minimum for the other two, will have an 
overall score of 0.83, which makes its judiciary less independent than the previous 
one (i.e. its overall score 1).  
In this study, I construct a new measure of judicial independence for forty-five 
African countries covering two time points. Following conventional approaches 
which draw hypothesis from political theories on the relationships between judicial 
independence and economic performance, I postulate the degree of judicial 
independence in a given polity to be a function of three factors. Firstly, judicial 
independence enshrined in a constitution is more credible, as the costs of changing 
the rules of the game are correspondingly higher. Put differently, countries which 
explicitly provide for judicial independence in their constitutions should theoretically 
exhibit more credible and economic growth-enhancing institutions. Secondly, I ask 
whether a government respected the independence of the judiciary by refraining from 
actions which compromise the latter’s decisions. For instance, there exist widespread 
cases in the region whereby branches of the executive either totally ignore court 
decisions or act in a direct contravention of its rules. Thirdly, and equally important, 
are the types and degree of discretionary powers which executives enjoy vis-à-vis the 
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judiciary. More importantly, I are interested in knowing whether branches of the 
executive are legally provided leverages that can be exploited to affect the 
independence of the judiciary. The individual factors in each of the three dimensions, 
and the associated coding, are as follows: 
 Does the constitution provide for independence of the judiciary?(JIConst) A 
dummy that allots a value of 1 when the response is ‘yes.’ While, as expected, 
countries in the region have, by and large, included stipulations on judicial 
independence in their constitution, this seemingly ubiquitous variable is 
absent from the constitutions of a few number of countries; notably Burundi, 
Equatorial Guinea and the Sudan.  
 Does the government respect the independence of the judiciary?(JIGov) This 
is also a binary variable that codes positive responses as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
There exist a number of cases that serve as litmus tests of a government’s 
stance with regard to the independence of the judiciary. A case in point is that 
noted when court rulings go against the government, and the government 
either abides by the decision or not. The standoff between three supreme 
court judges and one high court judge and President Mugabe of Zimbabwe 
over the detention of two journalists in 1999, is indicative of the vulnerability 
of judicial independence. Additionally, ineffective court systems, and those 
characterised by large scale corruption, are prone to executive encroachment. 
This variable is essentially a de facto one and is not as clear-cut as the others, 
due to the fact that multiple manifestations of actual encroachment on judicial 
independence exist. In order to circumvent this problem, I limit the 
operationalisation of this variable, based on two questions. Accordingly, I ask 
if, for the period in question, there existed a reported case whereby a dispute 
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between the executive and the judicial was resolved in the former’s favour, 
through political or administrative means. Also, an assessment of widespread 
corruption is considered to hinder judicial independence. A value of zero, 
signifying absence of judicial independence, is assigned in cases where a 
country meets one or both of these conditions.      
 Does the law assign the executive powers that compromise the independence 
of the judiciary?(JICheck) As in the previous cases, I give values of one, in 
situations where there are no noticeable laws or systems that allow the former 
to dictate terms to the judiciary. These could stem from various situations, 
such as when the courts are directly placed under the ministry of justice, or 
law officers are governed under civil service rules. Similarly, renewable term 
limits and changeable salary schemes for judges could impinge on the 
independence of the judiciary.     
I also include a composite indicator of judicial independence as a simple 
aggregate of values in each of the variables (JIOv).The basic sources of data to 
construct these variables are the annual human rights reports prepared by the U.S. 
Department of State. The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are submitted 
annually by the Department to the U.S. Congress, and these reports, covering the 
period since 1999 are accessible at its website at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt. Note 
that the thresholds for such qualitative terms as ‘widespread corruption’ are based on 
the above data source. Two other indicators are also used to proxy judicial 
independence. One follows Henisz (2000), who postulated that countries which 
scored three, or more than three on the xconst variable of Polity IV data, can be 
considered as having independent judiciaries. Naturally, his measure is also a binary 
one. The other one is the civil liberties segment of the Freedom House scores which 
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explicitly includes an entry for independence of the judiciary. Judicial independence 
is one of the four components that make-up the rule of law index. At this juncture, it 
is important to pinpoint a couple of points which could adversely affect the quality of 
the judicial independence variables. To start with, in situations wherein judges do not 
deviate from the government line as judicial autonomy is lacking in the first place, 
the possibility of observational equivalence is very realistic. In this case, the variable 
does not measure judicial independence per se but the self-restraint of judges. 
Secondly, the degree of reporting on judicial independence may not be similar 
between open and closed political systems. It is possible for those countries with 
open political systems to self-select into the model. Although the existing data source 
does not allow to account for such eventualities, such line of investigation is very 
informative for further research. 
One can cite a number of reasons as to why the Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices are judged to be fairly objective. To start with, these reports are 
based on inputs from wide and diverse sources with regard to human rights situations 
in a given country. Since the reports do not entirely depend on subjective 
assessments of experts, and also go beyond information provided by the governments 
of the countries included, they are better placed to be objective. Furthermore, the 
reports look into human rights issues from different angles, including arbitrary 
deprivation of life, disappearance, torture and arrest. More importantly, the reports 
include a section very much focussed on judicial independence. For instance, the 
subsection ‘civil judicial procedures and remedies’ assesses whether there is access 
to an independent and impartial court to seek damages for human rights violations. 
Another subsection on property restitution investigates whether there is a systemic 
failure of government to enforce court orders. The executive constraints (xconst) 
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variable of Polity IV is a seven-scale indicator that evaluates the extent of 
institutionalised constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. This 
data source includes an entry on judicial independence in the section on ‘slight to 
moderate limitations on executive authority’.     
6.2.2) Data and analysis 
 
Discussions so far elaborated on the theoretical foundations of the economic 
effects of judicial independence, with a focus on cross-country comparisons. Such 
presentations, coupled with the theory-driven operationalisation of the judicial 
independence variable conducted above, sets the stage for a quantitative investigation 
of the proposition that part of the variations in economic growth among African 
countries can be predicted by differences in levels of judiciary independence. I tackle 
this issue here with the help of a new variable on judicial independence, as well as 
with two other proxies for judicial independence. Recall that explanations on the 
economic covariates have already been dealt with and, therefore, a repeat in this 
section is not warranted. It is apparent that if any new measure is to be of value, then 
it should be able to strongly correlate with other widely-applied instruments. This is 
due to the fact that all such variables essentially claim to measure same dimensions 
of quality of governance. More to the point, our variable on judicial independence 
(JIOv) needs to be compatible with existing measurements, as it is derived from 
similar theoretical principles. As such, it is this task of asserting variable 
comparability that I first turn our attention to. 
A set of institutional quality measures comprising four variables is chosen to 
this end. The Feld and Voigt (2003) judicial independence variable includes nine 
African states for its de jure dimension, and only five countries (from the same set 
 230
involved in the de jure measure) for its de facto aspect. I do not include figures from 
this study, as the number of African countries included is too low. Many studies 
apply contract intensive money as a proxy for the quality of property rights in 
countries. This variable is used to assess the rule of law in a given polity, which, on 
average, positively correlates with the independence of the judiciary. As a 
consequence, I also examine whether JIOv for African countries tallies with their 
quality of institutions as determined by contract intensive money. The values of 
contract intensive money for the countries in the region reflect those for the years 
between 1998 and 2000. Moreover, the civil liberties scores of Freedom House data 
are included, as judicial independence constitutes one sub-component in the 
derivation of these scores. I classify countries on a binary scale, in which those 
countries that score 3.5 or less are considered to have a fairly independent judiciary. 
The robustness of the JIOv variable is also tested against one opinion survey-based 
indicator of judicial independence, namely the African Governance Report.  
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Table 13 Correlations among judicial independence variables 
 JIOv CIM Agr_Ji Civil Xconst 
JIOv 1.00     
      
CIM 0.54 
(0.00) 
1.00    
      
Agr-Ji 0.53 
(0.00) 
0.34 
(0.21) 
1.00   
      
Civil 0.57 
(0.00) 
0.42 
(0.04) 
0.64 
(0.00) 
1.00  
      
Xconst 0.56 
(0.00) 
0.44 
(0.03) 
0.54 
(0.00) 
0.87 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
NB. CIM is contract intensive money; Agr_JI is judicial 
independence from the African Governance Report; and 
Civil is the civil liberties score from Freedom House. 
Figures in parenthesis refer to levels of significance. 
The number of data points for the correlations include 45 
countries for JIOv, Xconst and Civil; 24 for Agr_Ji and 
34 for CIM. 
 
As can be observed from Table 13 above, the judicial independence variable 
developed here shows strong positive correlations with all but one of the other 
proxies of judicial independence and institutional quality in the literature. That the 
correlation of our measure of judicial independence (JIOv) with the F&G measure is 
not significant, though positive, can be attributed to the latter’s limited coverage of 
Africa. This is more so in the case when I take into consideration the fact that four of 
the five table-topping African countries in the de jure judicial independence measure 
of Feld and Voigt (2003) also have similar positions in the JIOv variable developed 
here. It is also worth noting that the limitations in the their variable in terms of 
accounting for judicial independence in Africa is further highlighted by its rather 
weak association with all the other variables included in the table. Apart from the 
significant correlations which I observe between JIOv and the other three indicators 
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of judicial independence, I can deduce a similar pattern of association between CIM, 
judicial independence from the African Governance Report and Civil.  
The essence of the discussion is not so much that these variables correlate 
positively and strongly with that measure developed here. Rather, it provides a 
rationale for why JIOv adequately captures levels of judicial independence in African 
countries. JIOv provides a better account of judicial independence as compared to 
other instruments for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is a far more inclusive variable 
in that F&G, for instance, include only ten African countries. Secondly, it does face a 
less severe subjectivity problem than is the case for most opinion-based measures, 
such as the one provided in the African Governance Report. Thirdly, it provides a 
very focussed proxy for judicial independence, in contrast to that produced by 
Freedom House. In the Freedom House measure, judicial independence is subsumed 
under the civil liberties category, which itself is a derivation of seven major 
categories of indicators. The rule of law dimension, which consists of judicial 
independence in the Freedom House data, is based on forty-four individual questions 
on civil rights. The comprehensiveness of the Freedom House measure in terms of 
geographical and theme coverage comes at a cost, in that it falls short of adequately 
providing a focussed proxy for individual institutions such as judicial independence. 
Our measure, however, is entirely concerned with judicial independence.   
Before assessing the economic growth effects of judicial independence as 
measured by JIOv, I first examine the implications of the other variables identified at 
the beginning of this section. Recall that the civil liberties scores from Freedom 
House and the xconst variable from Polity IV data (as is used by Henisz (2000)) are 
used to proxy judicial independence. Similarly, there exist strong theoretical 
stipulations which postulate that English law countries have a broader scope for 
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judicial independence. Accordingly, I build four models to empirically investigate 
whether judicial independence, as proxied by the variables mentioned, explains 
economic growth variations among African countries. In the first one, the civil 
liberties scores are taken as interval values, as they are given in the original Freedom 
House data. As such, higher scores in the [1, 7] scale indicate lower levels of civil 
liberties and correspondingly those of judicial independence (Civil). Most studies 
transform the civil liberties scores into binary values, whereby values below a given 
threshold signify that the judiciary is independent.  
In this case, I set this threshold at 3.5, whereby countries that score less or 
equal to 3.5 at a given point in time are considered as having fairly independent 
judiciaries (Civil(2)). The xconst variable from polity is also a dummy with a cut-off 
point of three. What is different from the civil scores is that higher xconst scores are 
associated with more independent judiciaries. Notwithstanding the fact that judicial 
independence is better captured as a scale variable, our use of xconst is only to 
replicate Henisz (2000).  The English variable gives a value of 1 if the English 
common law is the origin of laws in the country in question. 
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Table 14 The economic effects of judicial independence in Africa 
Variable Fixed effect 
(Civil) 
Fixed 
effect 
(Civil 2) 
Fixed 
effect 
(Xconst) 
Random 
effect 
(legal origin) 
Initial Income -0.11 
 0.04 
 0.00 
-0.01 
 0.02 
 0.73 
 -0.01 
  0.02 
  0.62 
 -0.01 
  0.01 
  0.39 
     
Investment  0.11 
 0.03 
 0.00 
 0.06 
 0.02 
 0.00 
  0.06 
  0.02 
  0.00 
  0.06  
  0.01 
  0.00 
     
Population -0.04 
 0.04 
 0.36 
-0.03 
 0.03 
 0.31 
 -0.04 
  0.03 
  0.12 
 -0.06 
  0.03 
  0.04 
     
Civil -0.01 
 0.01 
 0.17 
   
     
Civil(2)   0.07 
 0.03 
 0.04 
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Table (Contd.) 
Xconst     0.06 
  0.03 
  0.09 
 
     
English      0.06 
  0.02 
  0.01 
     
F(3, 287) 
F(3, 287) 
F(3, 354) 
F(3, 368) 
N 
 9.45 
- 
- 
- 
301 
- 
 7.54 
- 
- 
301 
- 
- 
  11.25 
- 
360 
- 
- 
- 
  10.74 
371 
NB. The first two columns report results when JI is proxied by civil liberties. Estimates in 
column four capture the effect of the Polity variable while the last one shows the effect of 
legal origin. Figures below each coefficient estimates refer to robust standard errors and p-
values respectively. As discussed above, the type of economic control I use in Solow is well 
defined. Also, while the panel includes forty-five countries, data availability differs from 
country to country. The first three models are fixed effects. I apply random effects on the last 
one because there is no intra-unit variation in the English variable. All the F values are 
significant at one percent. 
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The coefficient estimates from the above table indicate that the chosen 
proxies for judicial independence do, in fact, predict economic growth differences 
among African countries. The results for the civil liberties scores return mixed results. 
When I add civil liberties scores as interval values, there seems to exist no 
statistically meaningful relationship between this variable and economic performance 
of countries. However, transforming the variable into a binary scale, as is 
conventionally applied, returns results that conform to theoretical priors. Accordingly, 
one can infer that differences in judicial independence as measured by the civil 
liberties score were important factors behind the observed differences in long term 
economic growth among African countries. Note that the negative sign on the 
coefficient estimate for Civil signifies its coding, as higher scores imply lesser 
degrees of judicial independence.  
Those countries whose political institutions delegated judiciary powers to 
independent courts reaped positive economic pay-offs in terms of higher levels of 
average income. Ceteris paribus, about seven percent of the economic growth 
variations among the countries of the region can be attributed to differences in 
degrees of judicial independence. A similar assertion can be made when I proxy 
judicial independence by the xconst variable of the Polity IV data. The positive and 
significant parameter estimate for the xconst variable is further proof of the make-or-
break role political institutions have on macroeconomic outcomes (at this specific 
juncture, that of judicial independence on economic growth). Finally, the findings 
provide further empirical evidence, based on African economies, of the growth-
friendly attributes of English common laws as compared to other legal origins. 
I now return to empirical testing of the judicial independence variables 
developed in this study; namely JIOv and its individual constitutive parts. Earlier, it 
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was explained that the overall judicial independence variable (JIOv) is aggregated 
from values based on the coding of each individual variables. These individual 
constituent parts include such issues as judicial independence enshrined in a given 
constitution (JIConst), respect of judicial independence by government (JIGov) and 
the presence of executive powers which tamper with on judicial independence 
(JICheck). The fact that the information required for constructing these indicators is 
available only for a very limited time spell obliges us to overlook the temporal 
dimension of the measures. A better account of the dynamic changes in degrees of 
judicial independence and subsequent effects on economic growth, was provided in 
the discussion which used the civil and xconst variables. Economic growth is given 
by average levels of income for the period 1990-2003, as is the case for degree of 
openness of the economy.  
It should be noted the discussion presented above, on the links between 
judicial independence and economic growth in Africa, was based on the Solow 
model, using panel data of the relevant variables. On the other hand, the other sets of 
results, reported below, use a cross-sectional economic growth model. Both models 
serve the same purpose of statistically investigating the effects of judicial 
independence on economic growth in the region. Here, I do so by scrutinising each 
judicial independence variable, as well as the composite measure. As such, the 
estimates under each column in Table 15 below assess the effects of including 
judicial independence explicitly in the constitution, the degree of respect of judicial 
independence by government, whether or not government is given important legal 
tools that give it a leverage on judicial independence, and a composite measure that 
captures all of these variables respectively.  
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As can be observed, the very fact that the independence of the judiciary is 
included in the constitution of countries, is a weak predictor of either judicial 
independence or economic growth. The estimate for this parameter returns a 
direction of relationship which is at odds with theoretical postulations. I should, 
however, be wary of reading too much into the effects (or lack of) JIConst on 
economic growth, when one carries out a close examination of the pattern of 
distribution of this variable among African countries. This is basically due to the fact 
that, with the exception of the three African countries, all countries in the region 
have this institution included in their constitution.  
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Table 15 Effects of judicial independence on economic growth in Africa (further 
evidence) 
Variable Constitution Government Relative Overall 
Openness  0.63 
 0.18 
 0.00 
0.61 
0.16 
0.00 
0.60 
0.16 
0.00 
0.57 
0.16 
0.00 
JIConst -0.03 
 0.31 
 0.93 
   
JIGov  0.48 
0.19 
0.02 
  
JICheck   0.67 
0.29 
0.02 
 
JIOv    0.28 
0.11 
0.02 
Constant  4.11 
 0.09 
 0.00 
4.23 
0.11 
0.00 
3.25 
0.12 
0.00 
3.92 
0.11 
0.00 
R-squ. 
F(2,41) 
N 
 0.53 
 7.05 
44 
0.59 
7.89 
44 
0.59 
9.21 
44 
0.59 
8.62 
44 
 
NB. The table reports results when JI is measured by 
constitutional stipulations, actual government acts, 
presence of executive powers and a composite of all three. 
Figures below each coefficient estimates refer to 
standard errors and p-values respectively. All the F 
values are significant at one percent. All are estimated 
using OLS. 
 
Next in line is the question of any branch of government actively tampering 
with the independence of the judiciary. A long-standing standoff between the 
Government of Ethiopia and the country’s oldest trade union, the Ethiopian 
Teacher’s Association, encapsulates this point.  As the Union resisted government 
interference on its autonomy; the two sides went to, first the Federal High Court, and 
then the Supreme Court. Despite the courts’ decisions favouring the Union, the 
police prevented the Union leaders from resuming their functions. Finally, the whole 
saga ended with the imprisonment, and then exile, of the Union leaders (See ILO 
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2009). The broad repercussions of such executive interference with the independence 
of the judiciary are not difficult to grasp. The JIGov parameter captures this very 
notion and, as shown in the findings, this variable was a strong determinant of 
economic growth in Africa. Put differently, I can draw the conclusion that there 
exists systematic statistical evidence that lends strong support to the hypothesis that 
countries with political institutions that ensure delegation of judicial powers to 
independent courts do register higher rates of economic growth.       
Nevertheless, the findings suggest that the most potent features of judicial 
independence in terms of economic growth in Africa are those linked to the 
presence/absence of legally-provided stipulations which encroach on the 
independence of the judiciary. In many instances, the executive-judiciary 
relationships are carved out in such a way that the judiciary is made very reliant on 
the goodwill of the executive in conducting its operations. A case in point is when 
the court system is brought directly under the control of one or many departments of 
the executive. Another situation is that in which the job tenure and financial pay of 
the judiciary are structured in such a way that they can easily be altered by the 
executive. I find that the degree of judicial independence, measured along this scale, 
has had a strong impact on economic performance among African countries. Note 
that it is the existence of rules and legislation per se that mattered in this variable, 
and not necessarily whether government actively exploited it or not.  
The point that the structure of relationship between the government and the 
judiciary could tilt in favour of the former is figuratively captured by the coefficient 
estimate of JICheck. I further find that, based on the composite indicator for judicial 
independence, JIOv, one can infer that the degree of delegation to independent 
judiciaries explains sizeable variations in cross-country economic growth differences 
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in Africa. All in all, it is shown that the politics-economics nexus in Africa is strong 
as exemplified by the economic effects of one form of delegation discussed here, i.e. 
judicial independence. 
Before concluding this section, it is of much critical value to discuss the 
robustness of the estimates to different specifications. To this end, I ran three 
different models and test whether the coefficient estimates significantly differ from 
the results reported here. I firstly applied the Huber-White sandwich estimators for 
estimating the standard errors in the basic equation. This helped us control for such 
problems as heterogeneity, lack of normality, leverage or influence. Secondly, I 
estimated Robust Regression models whereby observations are weighted in 
accordance with how they behave in the data set. The more deviant an observation is, 
the less weight is attached to it. Thirdly, a quintile regression is run, for which the 
measure of central tendency is the median. Unlike the OLS, which is based on the 
mean, estimates based on quintile regression help one to reap the advantages of the 
median, in being more resistant to outliers. Note that such exercises have the dual 
advantage of establishing the robustness of estimates, as well as choosing a stronger 
model (in case the findings across the estimates diverge significantly). Results not 
reported here show that the parameter estimates for the political variables remain 
strong in all the different specifications applied. I subjected the estimates to different 
robustness tests, as reported in Appendices N and O. The coefficient estimates for the 
political variables remained significant when different estimation techniques and 
controls are included.  
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6.3) Discussion and summary 
 
This chapter set out to investigate if and how commitment technology via 
institutions of delegation had an influence on economic performance of African 
countries. To this end, I chose two of such institutions; namely Central Bank 
independence and judicial independence. Notwithstanding the fact that reliable data 
for Africa on the issues were rather sketchy, I still managed to find some interesting 
results, which indicated the positive association between these sets of political 
variables and economic growth in the region. It was shown that, while both political 
and economic dimensions of Central Bank independence explained growth 
differentials among African countries, it was the rate of turnover of Central Bank 
governors that had the strongest impact on economic growth. As in the case for the 
Central Bank independence variable, I also introduced new measures of judicial 
independence in the region. By augmenting these variables with proxies widely 
applied in the literature, I found that judicial independence did have statistically 
meaningful effects on African economic performance. I draw some important 
insights from the analysis provided above. The analysis of economic effects of 
formal political institutions is a valid exercise. It is also the case that a broader 
database on such institutions could deepen future analysis. In order to establish the 
robustness of the findings in this chapter, I ran different specifications including least 
squares with robust standard errors, robust regression as well as quintile regression. 
Further, I undertook robustness tests by replacing the main economic control with 
human capital and initial income variables. In all the cases, initial findings remained 
robust. 
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Chapter 7. Rule of law-cum-credible commitment and 
economic growth in Africa 
 
The major theme of this chapter is to investigate if and how the rule of law 
variable has shaped economic growth in Africa. More specifically, I aim to provide 
empirical evidence, drawn from an African context, in support of political theories 
that link observed economic growth differentials among countries with 
corresponding variations in the quality of such types of institutions of credible 
commitment. Note that, unlike the preceding chapter, in which commitment 
presupposed reducing the policy-making prerogative of governments, the 
commitment technologies I deal with here fall entirely within the executive domain. 
Of the battery of rule of law variables, which credibly commit governments to 
growth-friendly policies, security of property rights is widely cited as being very 
important in terms of its resonance on economics (North 1990, Olson 1971 & 1996). 
As explained in Olson et al. (2000) and Clague et al. (1999), countries endowed with 
political institutions which minimise the risk of expropriation of private wealth by 
others, most notably by government, registered robust economic growth over a long 
time spell.   
As is the case throughout the thesis, the analytical method is based on 
empirically testing different variants of economic models augmented by the relevant 
political variables. The chapter is organised as follows. In the first section, I provide 
a brief account of the economic growth implications of security of property rights. 
The property rights variable is decomposed into three major segments; namely, rule 
of law, corruption and a composite rule of law variable. I then introduce, in the first 
section, different rule of law variables which empirically test its relevance to cross-
country economic growth differences in Africa.  In the second section, property 
 244
rights are proxied by levels of corruption. Interactive terms with press freedom and 
associational and organisational rights were also used to assess the corruption-growth 
relationship.  In the next section, I then apply factor analysis with principal 
component factors, so as to construct a composite rule of law variable and apply it to 
the empirical economic growth model. Subsumed in each of the above-mentioned 
sections are discussions on data sources, and description, as well as analysis, of 
findings. The last section summarises the major points of the chapter. 
7.1. Property rights, commitment and economic growth 
 
Although success stories were noticeably few, one can observe significant 
variations in economic growth trajectories among African economies. Recall that I 
established this point empirically in a previous chapter on the economics of growth 
in Africa. At this particular juncture, I mention certain patterns as a prologue to 
investigating that part of the variation which is accounted for by institutions of 
property rights. In 1970, average income in Ethiopia, as measured by real GDP per 
capita, was a quarter of that in Côte ďIvoire. The narrowing of the income gap after 
three decades can, at best, be described as negligible, with the corresponding figure 
standing at 34 percent. A more emphatic case in point is that of two of the resource-
rich economies in the region; namely, Cameroon and Botswana. At the beginning of 
the period, the average income ratio for the two countries was about 1.67 in favour of 
the former. Over subsequent decades, the Botswana economy grew so strongly that, 
by 2003, its average income was 3.34 times higher than that of Cameroon. It is not 
difficult to discern the level of disparities if I also consider those economies that 
regressed during the period (for instance, Chad and former Zaire).   
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What is of more interest to us here is that those differences in economic 
outcomes occurred in tandem with corresponding disparities in economic policies. In 
the better-performing countries, the share of national output allocated to consumption 
was increasingly substituted by spending on investment, while I observe a 
contrasting picture for the slow-growing economies. On a broader level, countries in 
the top quartile of the income ladder were either democracies (i.e. labelled ‘Free’ by 
Freedom House) or stable autocracies. Our concern in this discussion is not with the 
implications of democracy for property rights per se. Rather, it is the mapping from 
rules of law and corruption, as sets of proxy of property rights, to economic growth 
in Africa. For instance, Botswana, South Africa, Cape Verde, Mauritius and Namibia 
scored highest, as least corrupt on the corruption index perception index of 
Transparency International. I hypothesise that the fact that these countries also did 
well in terms of economic growth signifies a statistically meaningful relationship 
between property rights and economic performance. I can make similar assertions 
with regard to lack of rule of law, where governments often resort to such diverse 
predatory policy instruments as inflation tax or direct expropriation, to the detriment 
of the economy. The discussion below addresses the economic growth implications 
of the rule of law and corruption in turn. 
7.1.1) Rule of law 
 
A handful of rule of law variables, which essentially provide comparative 
measures of countries’ political institutions vis-à-vis a credible property rights 
regime benchmark, suggest that there existed sizeable variations among African 
countries in the distribution of this political variable. Using the rule of law variable in 
the Freedom House data for 2006, one can derive such country-groupings including 
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those with total absence of rule of law amid political violence (Congo DR and 
Sudan), those in which rule of law was practically non-existent (Zimbabwe and Togo) 
as well as other countries that compare favourably with the better performers 
globally (Cape Verde and Ghana). A median value of 7 for the rule of law in Africa, 
wherein the global maximum is 16, indicates that African countries did not 
necessarily fare poorly on the basis of this measure. Another point worth noting is 
that the mean of the rule of law variable in Africa is almost equivalent to the median. 
The significance of this pattern is that the region hosted as many better performers as 
those with lower rule of law scores, which, conventionally, is assumed to be skewed 
to the left. This is arguably a reflection of the transitions, albeit fragile ones, that 
many African countries made to more democratic forms of governance since the 
early 1990s.  
Table 16 Rule of law and income in Africa (Selected countries) 
Country Rule of Law* Average 
Income** 
Rank*** 
Sudan 0 6.48 43 
Zimbabwe 0.06 5.86 42 
Burundi 0.25 4.60 31 
Ethiopia 0.31 5.08 30 
Rwanda 0.38 5.30 28 
Gabon 0.44 8.52 23 
Tanzania 0.63 5.83 13 
Namibia 0.63 7.77 10 
Lesotho 0.69 6.85 6 
Ghana 0.75 5.74 8 
South Africa 0.82 8.52 4 
Cape Verde 0.88 7.20 1 
 
NB. * Rule of law is from Freedom House data and is 
standardised here to [0,1] values. It refers to 2006 when 
the earliest disaggregated data was available.** Average 
Income is measured by the natural logarithm of GNI per 
capita for the year 2005 (The Little Data Book on Africa, 
the World Bank). *** Refers to a country’s ranking in the 
Regional distribution of Rule of Law. Note that I chose 
the 12 countries only to show the general distribution. 
Three cases from each quartile are chosen to provide the 
broader picture. 
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A visual inspection of the distribution of the rule of law and economic growth 
variables indicates that there is an underlying positive relationship between them. 
Those countries such as Burundi and Ethiopia, whose political history was marred by 
long years of political instability and correspondingly weak levels of rule of law, 
were at the lower end of the income ladder. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, provides a 
textbook case whereby a sudden downward spiral in rule of law led to a significant 
contraction in the economy. The rule of law-economic growth relationship becomes 
all the more apparent when I take a couple of points into consideration. Firstly, the 
full cross-country data shows that the simple correlation between these two variables 
is positive and significant at one percent. Secondly, the slope gets steeper when I 
control for the income bonanza, which the new oil exporting countries in the region 
(most notably, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan) enjoyed as of recent years. The gist of 
the matter is that, although this snapshot on the positive nexus between rule of law 
and economic growth in Africa is hardly adequate to make causal inferences, it is, at 
the same time, commensurate with propositions of political theories on the economic 
implications of rule of law.   
7.1.1.1) Operationalisation of rule of law 
 
Disaggregated Freedom House scores on rule of law across countries were 
only available since 2006. Nevertheless, rule of law is a major component of the civil 
liberties segment of the Freedom House index and, therefore, the latter can be used to 
proxy rule of law for previous years. Here, I do not delve into explaining the 
construction of the civil liberties index, since the issue was addressed in a previous 
chapter. Also, unlike the case in a previous chapter where I used the aggregate civil 
liberties index, our focus in this case is only the rule of law component. I draw the 
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other set of rule of law variables from the Index of Economic Freedom, which is a 
joint publication of the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal (Heritage 
2008). This data source has a number of attributes as compared to other widely-
applied subjective measures of rule of law. Unlike several other rule of law variables, 
which encounter structural breaks due to measurement changes, methodology 
amendments with regard to the Index of Economic Freedom (henceforth, IEF) kept 
comparability across time and space intact. Its reliance mostly on objective indicators 
to construct the Index is also another merit of this source. It should be stressed here 
that the objectivity of the IEF data was only a reference to its construction largely 
from published documents, in contrast to subscription of expert opinions. 
Additionally, the IEF rule of law variable is very much focussed on its economic 
resonance, while I find a much broader meaning assigned to rule of law in other 
sources such as the Freedom House index. More interestingly, the IEF defines 
property rights entirely from the perspective of rule of law, in that security of 
property rights is defined as the ‘ability of individuals to accumulate private property, 
secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state’ (See, 
www.heritage.org/research). The overall index is a simple average of ten individual 
variables on economic freedom including business, trade, fiscal, government size, 
monetary, investment, financial, property rights, corruption and labour.  
The property rights component assesses the degree to which a country’s laws 
protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those 
laws. Note that the IEF scores were based on a number of specific qualifications that 
assess institutions. These qualifications were not always clearly stipulated as, for 
example, between ‘no corruption’ and ‘corruption is nearly non-existent.’ The 
scaling is as follows: 
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 Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces 
contracts efficiently and quickly. The justice system punishes those who 
unlawfully confiscate private property. There is no corruption or 
expropriation. (100%)   
 Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces 
contracts efficiently. The justice system punishes those who unlawfully 
confiscate private property. Corruption is nearly non-existent, and 
expropriation is highly unlikely. (90%)  
 Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces 
contracts efficiently, but with some delays. Corruption is minimal, and 
expropriation is highly unlikely. (80%)   
 Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system is subject 
to delays, and is lax in enforcing contracts. Corruption is possible but rare,  
and expropriation is highly unlikely. (70%) 
 Enforcement of property rights is lax and subject to delays. Corruption is 
possible but rare, and the judiciary may be influenced by other branches of 
government. Expropriation is highly unlikely. (60%)   
 The court system is inefficient and subject to delays. Corruption may be 
present, and the judiciary may be influenced by other branches of government. 
Expropriation is possible but rare. (50%) 
 The court system is highly inefficient, and delays are so long that they deter 
from the use of the court system. Corruption is present, and the judiciary is 
influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is possible. (40%) 
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 Property ownership is weakly protected. The court system is highly 
inefficient. Corruption is extensive, and the judiciary is strongly influenced 
by other branches of government. Expropriation is possible. (30%) 
 Property ownership is weakly protected. The court system is so inefficient 
and corrupt that outside settlement and arbitration is the norm. Property rights 
are difficult to enforce. Judicial corruption is extensive. Expropriation is 
common. (20%) 
 Private property is rarely protected, and almost all property belongs to the 
state. The country is in such chaos (for example, because of ongoing war) that 
protection of property is almost impossible to enforce. The judiciary is so 
corrupt that property is not protected effectively. Expropriation is common. 
(10%) 
 Private property is outlawed, and all property belongs to the state. People do 
not have the right to sue others and do not have access to the courts. 
Corruption is endemic. (0%) 
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Figure 7 Rule of Law and economic growth in Africa 
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NB. The graph shows country groupings on the horizontal 
line against scores on rule of law (in percentage terms) 
on the vertical line. I draw data for the rule of law 
variable from Heritage (2008) while that for economic 
growth is Heston et al. (2006). Numbers at the top of 
each bar represents percentage of countries in each group.  
 
 
For analytical purposes, I classify African countries on the basis of their 
performance, both along the IEF rule of law variable and their economic 
performance, for the period 1995-2000. Given that there is a 0.85 correlation 
between the IEF rule of law component and the property rights sub-component, the 
use of the former variable here should be tenable. Accordingly, Group one countries 
consist of those with improvements on rule of law but not economic growth; Group 
two includes those with deterioration in rule of law, but which managed better 
economic growth; Group three countries enhanced their rule of law scores but did not 
exhibit economic growth, and Group four comprises countries that performed 
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positively on both variables. I now derive a number of probabilities to elaborate the 
importance of rule of law for economic growth. The conditional probability of a 
country not experiencing economic growth given that it had improved its rule of law, 
is only 0.22. This means that about four out of five countries that alter their political 
variables upwards with regard to rule of law are likely to register better economic 
growth. Only 14 percent of the countries in Africa with enhanced rule of law regimes 
experienced a contraction in national output. This group contains fewer countries 
than the other groups, and some of these include Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar and 
Malawi. It is indicative of the co-variation between rule of law and economic growth 
in Africa. 
The opposite of the above scenario is one whereby a country registers better 
economic growth despite negative changes in rule of law. This captures the situations 
in such countries as Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Equatorial Guinea, 
Mauritania and Sudan. Again, I ask what the likelihood is of a country being in this 
vector. The conditional probability for a given country to perform economically 
better, while being at the lower end of the rule of law scores, is about 0.45. At its 
face value, this figure seems to suggest that the relationship between rule of law and 
economic growth is weak in Africa. Nevertheless, a closer scrutiny of the data 
reveals that the majority of countries in this group are oil-rich economies whose 
national income was boosted by new oil discoveries and higher prices. In the 
empirical section below, I control for these outliers and show that rule of law remains 
a strong predictor of income. Finally, the largest group is accounted for by countries 
that improved their rule of law institutional quality and also their economic 
experiences. While this group accounts for 38 percent of the total, the other group, 
which contains countries in which neither economic growth nor rule of law occurred 
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(24 percent), comprises, among others, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Togo 
and Zimbabwe.   
The second set of rule of law variables is derived from the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) project on African Governance 
Indicators. In contrast to the IEF data discussed above, this measure relies on expert 
and public perception regarding governance in 27 African countries (See, UNECA 
2008). It consists of three research components, i.e. an opinion-based study using a 
national expert panel of 70-150 national experts across project countries, a national 
sample survey using a stratified two-stage probability sample, ranging from some 
1300-3000 households across Africa, and desk-based research of factual information 
and hard data. The study used 83 individual indicators which were reduced into 27 
subject matter variables on quality of governance. Each of the 27 variables was 
placed under seven major components; namely, political representation, institutional 
effectiveness and accountability, executive’s effectiveness, human rights and rule of 
law, civil society organisations and media independence, economic management, and 
control of corruption. Discrete values of between 0 and 5 (inclusive) were assigned 
to each of the 83, indicators while the study applied no weights in deriving 
component-level and overall indices. It is important to mention that, of the 27 
countries in the study, two (Egypt and Morocco) are excluded from our analysis. The 
relevance of this point becomes clearer later in the discussion.   
7.1.1.2) Rule of law indicators 
 
As explained above, the UNECA dataset for 2005 contains a large number of 
variables that assess quality of governance in each participating country. I select two 
of these which, arguably, have a direct relevance to the rule of law with regard to 
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providing a credible regime of property rights. Although one can identify a few 
overlapping points, each of these variables on its own captures a battery of different 
aspects of rule of law. A brief description of these variables is given hereunder: 
 Respect for the rule of law which includes constitutional checks and 
balances status, leadership’s respect for the rule of law, police respect for 
human rights, citizens’ confidence in law enforcement organs, monitoring 
violations by police and prisons, civil society organisations’ monitoring of 
violations by police and prisons, penalty for violation of human rights by 
police, participation in conflict resolution, watchdog organisations’ 
independence from the executive, enabling government practices and policies, 
tax system equitability, tax system influence on local investment, and tax 
system influence on foreign investment. 
 Law enforcement organs which includes law enforcement officials’ 
recruitment criteria, police force composition, police training, police 
equipment, watchdog organisations’ independence from the executive, and 
effectiveness of watchdog organisations.   
It is often the case that there exist strong associations among the many variables 
used to measure quality of political and economic governance. For example, rarely 
do I find a situation where a strong property rights regime co-exists with a loose 
system of checks and balances on executive discretion. This underlines the utility of 
constructing a composite variable that quantitatively measures rule of law. It 
provides us with a rationale for reducing the extensive dimensionality of the rule of 
law variables. To this end, I apply a principal components method so as to construct 
a composite rule of law variable. The presentations with regard to building this third 
political variable and the empirical tests are dealt with in the analytical section below. 
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To sum up, I have introduced the three rule of law variables that shall be used to 
quantitatively assess the nexus between a credible regime of property rights and 
economic growth in Africa. The first one is derived from the Index of Economic 
Freedom, while the second vector (consisting of two separate variables) is drawn 
from the African Governance Indicators. The third rule of variable is an overall index 
constructed using principal component analysis. In the next section, I provide 
African empirical evidence to test the hypothesis on positive mapping from rule of 
law to economic growth. 
7.1.1.3) Data and analysis 
 
I begin with a descriptive analysis of the distribution pattern of the variables 
in the model. Since the economic covariates were defined and elaborated in the 
preceding chapter, our focus here is on the political variables which measure rule of 
law. Also, note that, henceforth, Rule (IEF) is sourced from the Index of Economic 
Freedom while Rule (One) and Rule (Two) signify the two variables from the 
African Governance Indicators; namely, respect for the law and the law enforcement 
organ. Earlier, I undertook a group-based analysis to show the predominance of 
countries with positive changes in rule of law. At the country-level data, this 
translates into a mean value of 0.40 with a standard deviation of 0.15. The observed 
gap between the cluster-based distribution and that at the country-level indicates that, 
despite a general trend towards better rule of law in the region, I still note significant 
disparities among the countries. The observation that the rule of law variable was not 
driven by individual extreme values is further supported by an almost equivalent 
median value. Using the Rule(One) and Rule(Two) variables, I derive similar 
patterns in that the central tendency measures for rule of law exhibit a mid-point 
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concentration. The bulk of countries in the region could not be described as very high 
performers or very poor performers on the rule of law scales. As shown in Table 17, 
our use of the three variables suggests that measurement error could not have 
significantly affected the functional relationship between rule of law and economic 
growth in Africa.  
Table 17 A correlation matrix between rule of law and economic growth 
 Income Openness Rule(One) Rule(Two) Rule(IEF)
Income 1.00     
      
Openness 0.35 
(0.02) 
1.00    
      
Rule(One) 0.45 
(0.00) 
0.37 
(0.04) 
1.00   
      
Rule(Two) 0.40 
(0.01) 
0.32 
(0.05) 
0.94 
(0.02) 
1.00  
      
Rule(IEF) 0.69 
(0.00) 
0.64 
(0.06) 
0.60 
(0.03) 
0.59 
(0.02) 
1.00 
 
NB. Depending on the size of missing values, the number 
of observations in the correlation matrix is between 38 
and 44. Figures in parenthesis are P values.  
 
 
The statement that measurement error did not pose a serious problem is 
justified on the grounds that, although the political variables were drawn from 
different sources, the correlation matrix shows a strong link between average level of 
income and all elements of the rule of law vector. In a similar vein, there exists a 
strong correlation between the two sets of political variables. A couple of notable 
points emerge from this pattern of strong correlation among the political variables. 
Firstly, it endorses our assertion that each institutional variable actually evaluates the 
same dimension, i.e. rule of law. Secondly, the application of the political variables 
jointly as predictors of economic growth creates a problem of multicollinearity. Put 
differently, the cost in terms of loss of degrees of freedom is substantially higher than 
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the gain in the form of additional information. I also observe a strong association 
between each rule of law variable on the one hand and degree of openness on the 
other. What this implies is that the effect of rule of law on economic growth partly 
filters through the former’s positive impact on investment in openness. The 
coefficient estimates on rule of law in the economic growth equation could be biased 
downwards because that proportion of the rule of law-human capital link was not 
accounted for. 
At this point, it should be recalled that, previously, I underlined the small n 
feature of the African Governance Indicators which was further aggravated, since I 
exclude two North African countries from the dataset. One way to tackle this 
problem is to proxy the relevant variables for those countries not included, using 
another comparable index. It is tabulated in the African Governance Indicators study 
that there was very high correlation with Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) index produced by the World Bank (See UNECA 2008 for 
correlations with other measures). 
Table 18 Level of correlation between selected World Bank Governance 
indicators and Africa Governance indicators (Percent by Level) 
 Correlations with 24 Africa 
governance indicators in each 
interval (% of all correlation) 
 
Less than       34-66%  More     
34%                            than 66% 
World Bank Institute Rule of Law Score 0 54 46 
World Bank Institute Government Effectiveness Score 4 42 54 
World Bank Institute Corruption Score 13 83 4 
World Bank Institute Voice and Accountability Score 0 46 54 
CPIA 16: Property Rules and Rule-based Governance 0 29 71 
CPIA 17: Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management 38 63 0 
CPIA 18: Effectiveness and Revenue Mobilisation 79 21 0 
CPIA 19: Quality of Public Administration 83 17 0 
CPIA 20: Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption 4 96 0 
Average of Governance CPIAs 0 100 0 
NB. This table is reproduced from UNECA (2008) 
 
 258
Briefly, the CPIA is constructed using 16 criteria grouped in four components, 
of which property rights and rule-based governance is one. Using this source 
provides a fair assessment of the status of rule of law in countries that otherwise were 
missing from the data. Because the CPIA index is primarily used by the World Bank 
to determine each country’s share in aid allocation (also known as IDA Resource 
Allocation Index), it apparently excludes a number of middle-income countries in 
Africa. One should note that quantitative analysis based solely on countries included 
in the African Governance Report was not practical, since the small size of the 
sample made any statistical inference implausible. Of the 41 countries included, data 
for nineteen countries is drawn from CPIA scores. So far, I have used several 
descriptive statistics and graphical presentations to argue that, in conformity with the 
propositions of political theory, there exists a positive association between rule of 
law and economic growth in Africa. Next, I investigate whether these correlations 
enable us to make causal inferences.  
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Table 19 Rule of law and economic growth in Africa 
Variable OLS with 
Rule 
(One) 
OLS with 
Rule 
(Two) 
OLS with 
(IEF) 
Openness 0.58 
0.24 
0.02 
0.61 
0.23 
0.01 
0.30 
0.19 
0.11 
    
Rule(One) 2.33 
0.91 
0.01 
  
    
Rule(Two)  2.11 
0.91 
0.02 
 
    
Rule(IEF)   3.17 
0.81 
0.01 
    
Constant 3.89 
0.85 
0.00 
3.89 
0.86 
0.00 
5.72 
0.31 
0.00 
    
R-squ. 
F(2,38) 
N 
0.33 
9.97 
41 
0.40 
8.60 
41 
0.44 
9.65 
38 
 
NB. Note that Rule (One) and Rule (Two) variables were 
constructed using the African Governance Indicators and 
CPIA. The third one uses IEF data. Figures below each 
coefficient estimate refer to robust standard errors and 
p-values respectively. All the F values are significant 
at one percent. 
 
 
The findings reported above show that differences in rule of law among 
African countries did indeed cause the countries to register different levels of 
economic performance. Model one highlights this point, with the help of the respect 
for the rule of law variable in the African Governance Indicators. It should be noted 
that causality is as much, if not more, a theoretical issue as an empirically 
investigated matter. As such, I consider the findings on the mapping from rule of law 
to economic growth to signify a causal relationship for at least two reasons. The 
models are based on very plausible economic and political theories that postulate 
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causal links. Moreover, the empirical findings tally with these theoretical predictions. 
One also needs to caution that the interpretation of coefficient estimates in semi-
logarithmic models, as in all the models used in the analysis, is not straightforward. 
Accordingly, I transform the estimates into discrete values using a specific formula, 
i.e. еβ-1 where β is the parameter estimate. Ceteris paribus, a one percent difference 
in rule of law could make a country’s economy better or worse by 6.8 percentage 
points as compared to others. I should stress here that I are not stating that a one 
percent improvement in rule of law causes a country to grow economically by 6.8 
percent. Rather, the percentage figure predicts the degree of income variation that 
can be accounted for countries whose rule of law variables differ by one percentage 
point. 
These results are further endorsed by those from models two and three. The 
second model investigates the economic growth implications of rule of law proxied 
by the law enforcement organs variables. The coefficient estimate for this variable is, 
in fact, stronger than that for the other two variables. In this case, a one percent 
difference in the quality of the law enforcement organs in Africa was amounted to 
about seven percent of the income disparity. Broadly, this paints a picture of the 
close association between rule of law and economic growth. For instance, the size of 
Zimbabwe’s economy, as measured by real GDP per capita, once deemed to be an 
African potential success story, was only 48 percent of that of Cape Verde. This is 
paralleled by a 24 percent difference in quality of rule of law that existed between 
those two countries. The third model based on the rule of law variable derived from 
the IEF also provides evidence of the positive nexus of this variable with economic 
growth, albeit with a lower level of significance. That the link between the political 
variable and economic growth in this model was not as strong as the previous two 
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models, can partly be attributed to the fact that, unlike the African Governance 
Indicators, this index evaluated African countries on a world-wide scale. As 
indicated in table above, the rule of law variable proxied by the civil liberties index 
of the Freedom House data was rather weak in predicting economic growth in Africa.  
Hitherto, I have not delved much into assessing the temporal dimension of the 
economic effects of the rule of law of variables. This is perhaps not as serious a 
shortcoming as it seems, because institutional variables are known to be notoriously 
sticky. In other words, institutions take a great deal of time to evolve. It is also the 
case that institutions are path-dependent; thereby further narrowing the scope for 
significant temporal variation. Bearing these points in mind, I exploit the Rule (IEF) 
data to investigate whether the cluster-level variations in rule of law were associated 
with corresponding differences in economic growth. In a fast-globalising world, 
where the cross-border movement of factors of production is greatly intensified, the 
use-values of a sustained and credible regime of property rights cannot be overstated. 
To account for this time dimension, I construct a new variable as follows: 
 Countries with high rule of law scores (greater than or equal to 0.5) both at 
the start and end of IEF period. (1.00) 
 Countries below mid point at the start but managed to make the transition to 
higher levels. (0.75) 
 Countries that improved their rule of scores but still remain below average. 
(0.50) 
 Countries that were above average and subsequently on significantly 
deteriorated in their rule of law scores. (0.25) 
 Countries that remained worse performers throughout the whole period. (0.00) 
 262
The intuition behind the momentum variable is to assess the dynamics of rule of law 
in Africa. In a region where political reform reversals were widespread, it is logical 
to put a higher weight on countries that succeeded in preserving a strong rule of law 
regime over a longer time period. The second group of countries which registered 
major strides in rule of law may not have the economic pay-offs forthcoming in the 
short-run, as economic agents still include their past records into account when 
making decisions. I follow similar logic to categorise countries into the remaining 
groups.    
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Table 20 Temporal changes in rule of law and economic growth in Africa 
Variable OLS with 
Momentum
OLS with 
interactive 
term 
OLS with 
interactive 
term 
OLS with 
term for 
non-
linearity
Openness 0.21 
0.07 
0.00 
0.29 
0.06 
0.00 
0.21 
0.07 
0.00 
0.31 
0.07 
0.00 
     
Momentum 0.88 
0.35 
0.02 
   
     
Rule(One)*Momentum  1.55 
0.59 
0.01 
  
     
Rule(IEF)*Momentum   1.81 
0.55 
0.00 
 
     
Rule(One)2    2.53 
1.18 
0.04 
     
Constant 5.91 
0.22 
0.00 
5.95 
0.22 
0.00 
6.17 
0.18 
0.00 
5.73 
0.28 
0.00 
     
R-squ. 
F(2,40) 
F(2,37) 
N 
0.65 
23.89 
 
41 
0.66 
23.78 
 
41 
0.68 
 
28.17 
38 
0.61 
20.96 
 
41 
  
NB. All the estimates above assess temporal effects, 
either through an interactive term or squared value of 
the institutional variable, as in Rule (One)2. Figures 
below each coefficient estimate refer to robust standard 
errors and p-values respectively. The F values are 
significant at one percent. 
 
I draw a number of inferences from the above empirical table. Firstly, the 
economic growth effect of changes in rule of law was more pronounced in countries 
that were consistently performing well and in those that made significant strides. The 
estimate for the parameter Momentum in model four is positive and significantly 
different from zero. Although this temporal measure of the rule of law variable is 
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lower in absolute terms, than estimates based entirely on cross-sectional aspects, it 
still suggests that not only positive changes in rule of law, but also the capacity to 
sustain rule of law, mattered for economic growth in Africa. In models five and six, 
this variable is interacted with two of the rule of law variables discussed before. I in 
particular would seek to establish the temporal dimension of rule of law losses its 
predictive power, once I control for the cross-sectional effect. As is clearly seen in 
the findings, the positive effect of changes in rule of law, measured along a time 
scale, on economic growth, remained intact even after I allowed for end-of-period 
rule of law scores. The additional advantage of both models five and six is that they 
show that the interactive term results are not sensitive to choice of the specific rule of 
law measure. 
In the last model, I empirically tested whether theoretical assertions on the 
non-linear effects of institutions hold true in our data. For instance, for two equal 
scores in rule of law, the countries could experience different impacts on economic 
growth, if rule of law was already entrenched in one more than in the other. In the 
same way, this implies that the degree to which a unit change in rule of law affects 
economic growth can differ for the same country, whether it was already enjoying a 
better property rights regime or not. Following the practice from estimation of 
earning functions (See, for example, Lam and Schoeni 1993), this is dealt with by 
adding the square of the independent variable as a right hand-side argument. The 
results indicate the existence of a built-in effect, in that the better a country fared in 
its rule of law score, the higher were the economic pay-offs of further improvement. 
Note also that the F-values in all of the models were significant at one percent, 
implying the joint-significance of both the economic covariates and the political 
variables. Finally, I conducted different model specification tests to establish the 
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robustness of the empirical findings. These include quintile regression, robust 
regression, as well as regression with robust standard errors. Robustness tests also 
show that coefficient estimates on the political variables were not sensitive to 
changes in the type of economic controls applied. Note that, these tests are not 
reported here for the sake of brevity.  
7.1.2. Corruption 
 
Corruption, defined in very broad terms as the ‘misuse of public office for 
private gain’ (Treisman 2000:399), is widely considered detrimental to the economic 
well-being of countries .A reverse effect from low levels of income to higher levels 
of corruption is also a very plausible proposition, even though empirical evidence of 
this posited trend is rather sparse. In an insightful review of the literature on 
corruption, Treisman (2007) explains the intricacies involved in research on 
corruption. The negative association between economic growth and corruption can 
easily be discerned by studying the distributional pattern of both of these variables in 
global data. African countries account for a disproportionate share of countries 
perceived to have high levels of corruption. For instance, data from the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International consistently show that only 
two countries in the region score more than the CPI midpoint of 0.5. Of the 29 non-
OECD countries that registered greater than or equal to the mean score of 4.7, only 
four were African countries; namely Botswana, Cape Verde, South Africa and 
Mauritius. I also observe sizeable differences with regard to corruption among 
African countries, in that the cleanest economy in the region (Botswana) having a 
score about five-times that of the most corrupt (Nigeria). In line with the overall 
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theme of the study, I primarily focus on the intra-region variation in the political 
variable and its effect on economic growth.  
7.1.2.1) Operationalisation of corruption 
 
One feature of the recent trend in the proliferation of corruption data was that 
most such indices were constructed as aggregated averages of already existing 
measures. Since the bulk of these utilise the CPI, a brief account of the methodology 
applied to derive the CPI index is in order. The CPI itself conglomerates data from 
14 sources that originated from 12 independent institutions. All the sources basically 
report the corruption perceptions predominantly held by experts, both non-resident 
and resident. To tackle problems of comparability caused by the heterogeneity of the 
sources, the CPI index applies matching percentile and beta transformation 
techniques that allow for standardised scores. Countries are then ranked based on the 
opinion survey; from the worst case scenario (0) to the least corrupt one (10). The 
two most important sources that feed corruption data on African countries into the 
CPI were the African Development Bank and the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment index (The World Bank). The CPI additionally provides data on a 
confidence range, and the number of surveys used that can be used to assess the 
reliability of the scores for each country. As Figure 8 indicates, a pattern of strong 
association between economic growth and levels of corruption in Africa is very 
apparent. 
 
 267
 
Figure 8 Corruption and economic growth in Africa 
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NB. This plot of (natural log of) real GDP per capita 
against scores on corruption suggests a strong positive 
correlation between the two variables. Note that the 
corruption scores are standardised into [0,1] values with 
higher scores indicating less corruption. The income and 
corruption score variables, which refer to year 2000 
values, were drawn from the PENN World Table (Heston et 
al. 2006) and TI (2008) respectively. 
 
 
It is true that research on corruption/economic growth relationships raised 
more questions than answers. At the same time, the close correlations I observe 
between those two variables were not spurious. In the discussion below, I provide 
empirical evidence, based on African data, which verifies this last statement. In so 
doing, I argue that the almost equivalent levels of income between, say, Namibia and 
Equatorial Guinea- despite large difference in corruptions scores-were weak enough 
to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of corruption on economic growth. Rather, 
the claim is that the underlying true relationship is one that maps corruption and 
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economic growth with a positive slope. Nevertheless, this was not straightforward a 
phenomenon as it had appeared on the surface. A closer look at the scatter diagram 
above indicated that those countries that registered better scores on corruption did 
indeed show correspondingly better values on other conventionally-applied 
governance indicators. This, coupled with the high value judgement input in their 
construction, created a high likelihood of measurement error. In addition, the 
possibilities that the effects of corruption on economic growth could be mediated by 
other political/institutional factors were, often, overlooked. As such, our analysis 
below shall be shaped by taking into consideration these latter issues.  
7.1.2.2) Analysis 
 
Before I begin with a descriptive analysis of the variables in question, it is 
only imperative to introduce the additional political variables I use in this section. 
More specifically, I chose two political variables deemed to have strong influence on 
corruption; namely, freedom of the press and associational and organisational rights. 
Freedom of the press is one of the main outputs of Freedom House which evaluates 
countries based on three major categories. The 23 questions on the state of press 
freedom in a country assess the legal, political and economic dimensions, so as to 
classify countries on a scale of 0 to 100. Even though these measures date back to 
1980, quantifiable indicators have only been available since the mid-1990s. The 
associational and organisational rights variable, on the other hand, is a sub-
component of its flagship publication, i.e. Freedom in the World. Broadly, it assesses 
the political space within each country that allows for the establishment and 
independence of civil society organisations. I need to introduce a note of caution here 
in that, because the earliest available year for the availability of associational and 
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organisational rights data was 2006, a similar cross-country distributional pattern has 
been assumed for previous years. Clearly, the major setback of this approach is that I 
fail to adequately account for the dynamic effects of the arguments. 
Table 21 A correlation matrix on corruption and economic growth 
Variable Income Corruption Press Association 
Income 1.00    
     
Corruption 0.61 
(0.00) 
1.00   
     
Press 0.35 
(0.02) 
0.63 
(0.00) 
1.00  
     
Association 0.23 
(0.13) 
0.61 
(0.00) 
0.80 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
NB. Note that corruption data was drawn from CPI and IEF 
while Press and Association were from FH. Number of 
countries included is 44. Figures in parenthesis are P 
values. 
 
 
As Table 21 on pair-wise correlations shows, economic growth was strongly 
and positively associated with corruption and press freedom. Recall that corruption 
was coded in such a way that higher values indicated lesser levels of corruption. This 
was not the case for the association and organisational rights variable. There seems 
to be a parameter shift in this variable, in that, while comparing a cluster of the five 
high-performing countries shows a distinct pattern with respect to others, the 
relationship became inelastic among the subset of the other countries. Put differently, 
the positive effect of associational and organisational rights on economic growth may 
not be so strong for countries at very low levels of development. A related derivation 
from the above table is that countries with better scores on corruption also enjoyed 
wider press freedom and associational and organisational rights. These observations, 
however, should not conceal the fact that African countries fared badly on all 
indicators. Such a pattern of low region-level average scores was even more 
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significant for corruption, in which case the relevant statistic stood at only 0.28. 
Cross-country variation in corruption scores among African countries was also 
weaker as, partly, a consequence of many countries sharing the same score.   
I ran a number of models to test for the causal effects of the political variables 
on economic growth in Africa. Earlier, I mentioned that corruption data are usually 
very noisy, as the possibilities for measurement error were high. Not only is this due 
to its high correlation with other political variables, but it is also due to its heavy 
reliance on perceptions. In particular, there exists a high probability of a halo effect, 
in which other, better governance indicators create an upward bias in experts’ 
evaluations. In order to address such measurement problems, I augment the basic 
models with two more error-in-variables correction models. It is shown in Table 22 
that, even after controlling for possibilities of measurement error, corruption 
remained a strong factor in explaining cross-country growth variation in Africa. The 
predictive powers of models two and three were noticeably better as compared to the 
original specification. Note that an accurate account of the effects of corruption on 
economic growth requires the unravelling of a whole set of complex relationships, 
which, in turn, presupposes a much larger sample than I have here. Furthermore, the 
temporal dimension of the relationship was difficult to establish as a result of lack of 
reliable data. The exercise here, however, provides preliminary evidence as to why 
the corruption-economic growth nexus in Africa is worthy of further investigation. 
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Table 22 Economic effects of corruption and associated variables in Africa 
Variable OLS 
(Corruption) 
EIV* 
(Corruption) 
EIV** 
(Corruption) 
OLS 
(Press) 
Openness 0.41 
0.04 
0.00 
0.21 
0.06 
0.00 
0.15 
0.06 
0.02 
0.29 
0.06 
0.00 
     
Corruption 4.02 
1.16 
0.00 
4.64 
1.29 
0.00 
6.76 
1.59 
0.00 
 
     
Press    1.33 
0.48 
0.01 
     
 272
Table (Contd.) 
Association     
     
Constant 5.37 
0.29 
0.00 
5.24 
0.31 
0.00 
4.82 
0.35 
0.00 
5.74 
0.25 
0.00 
     
R-squ. 
F(2,25) 
N 
0.68 
26.37 
28 
0.70 
28.53 
28 
0.78 
39.36 
28 
0.63 
21.56 
28 
 
NB. EIV* is an Error-in-Variables regression with a reliability factor of 0.9. EIV** is an Error-
in-Variables regression with a reliability factor of 0.7. I use this method to minimise 
measurement problems of the corruption variable. OLS is applied in the first, fourth and fifth 
models. Figures below each coefficient estimate refer to robust standard errors and p-values 
respectively. 
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The findings in models four and five endorse the observations I made earlier 
regarding the economic growth effects of press freedom and associational and 
organisational rights. More to the point, press freedom had a direct and significant 
impact on economic growth in Africa, while the coefficient estimate for associational 
and organisational rights was very weak. This may not be surprising, in that civil 
society organisations in Africa, as in most other parts of the world, are strong 
advocates of redistributive policies aimed at addressing equity objectives. More often 
than not, such policies are at odds with economic efficiency principles and, hence, 
are very likely to entail costs in terms of growth forgone. Nonetheless, our primary 
preoccupation in this section is not with the economic growth implications of press 
freedom and associational and organisational rights per se. What I wished to 
ascertain was weather the part of the effects of press freedom and associational and 
organisational rights on economic growth filters through corruption. Inasmuch as 
these effects are significant, one can deduce that press freedom and associational and 
organisational rights encourage a more secured property rights regime. Table 23 
encapsulates these notions and provides empirical evidence which, on balance, 
supports the proposition of a positive relationship. 
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Table 23 Further evidence on the corruption-economic growth link in Africa 
Variable OLS with 
corrupt*press 
OLS with 
corrupt*legal 
OLS with 
corrupt*polit 
OLS with 
corrupt*econ 
Openness 0.41 
0.04 
0.00 
0.38 
0.06 
0.00 
0.29 
0.06 
0.00 
0.29 
0.07 
0.00 
     
Corrupt*press 2.91 
1.06 
0.01 
   
     
Corrupt*legal  1.37 
0.95 
0.16 
  
     
Corrupt*polit   5.36 
2.11 
0.02 
 
     
Corrupt*econ    6.64 
3.35 
0.06 
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Table (Contd.) 
Corrupt*assn.     
     
Constant 5.96 
0.21 
0.00 
5.99 
0.23 
0.00 
6.04 
0.20 
0.00 
6.05 
0.21 
0.00 
     
R-squ. 
F(2,26) 
N 
0.66 
25.26 
41 
0.59 
19.05 
41 
0.65 
24.04 
41 
0.62 
21.16 
41 
 
NB. The idea behind the above estimates is to test if the effect of different rule of law 
indicators on economic growth manifest through their effect on corruption. Notwithstanding the 
fact that hardly any institutional variable is strictly exogenous to economic growth, the results 
provide a broader picture. Figures below each coefficient estimate refer to robust standard 
errors and p-values respectively. All the F values are significant at one percent. 
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The approach I followed to disentangle that portion of the effect of press 
freedom and associational and organisational rights on economic growth, mediated 
through the latter’s impact on corruption, was to augment our basic model through 
interactive terms. Its analogy from calculus is the partial derivative of corruption to 
press freedom and associational and organisational rights, multiplied by the partial 
derivative of economic growth to corruption. In previous discussion, I found that 
individually, corruption and press freedom causally affect economic growth in Africa 
while evidence on associational and organisational rights suggested otherwise. In 
model six, the interactive term between corruption and press freedom is positive and 
significant at one percent. This suggests that countries whose political systems allow 
for broader press freedom enjoy better levels of property rights as proxied by 
corruption. The net effect of this scenario is to enhance economic growth in such 
countries. Such was not the case, however, for associational and organisational rights, 
as the relevant parameter estimate in last model is only significant at ten percent. It 
still represented a significant improvement from the findings on the direct effect of 
this variable on economic growth reported earlier. One can think of a couple of 
plausible explanations as to why this is so. Firstly, civil society organisations could 
hardly be described as champions of the cause of economic growth. The claim that 
economic growth is not a panacea for all social ills is actually the bread and butter of 
most such organisations. Secondly, the underlying functional relationship between 
this variable and economic growth may not be totally linear. 
I further probe into the links between press freedom and corruption, by 
decomposing the former into its three constituent parts. The legal environment 
component of this variable assesses media laws and regulations and a government’s 
tendency to use these instruments to restrict freedom. When I interacted this term 
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with corruption, I found that the effect on economic growth was rather weak (model 
seven). This suggests that economic agents in Africa do not consider the statutory 
rules on press freedom to be robust instruments for credible regimes of property 
rights. The political environment component of press freedom evaluates the degree 
of political control over the content news media, which ranges from editorial 
independence to access to information and censorship. The size and level of 
confidence on this variable in model eight underscores its utility as a strong indicator 
of commitment. Those countries which registered better scores on the political 
environment systematically provided for credible regimes of property rights and, 
therefore, higher levels of economic growth. The economic environment component 
deals with identity, concentration and transparency in ownership of media. The 
coefficient estimate on the interactive term of this variable with corruption, as 
reported in model nine, falls in between the two other components. Neither legal 
instruments nor economic factors were as strong as political determinants of press 
freedom in instilling a credible regime of property rights, which, in turn, were 
essential for economic growth.   
7.2. A composite rule of law variable 
 
Throughout the discussions so far, I symbolised the rule of law variable as a 
double-edged sword, in that inasmuch as its multi-dimensionality provides a 
researcher with a rich array of insights, this same character of the variable creates 
certain serious practical problems. I know that the better governed countries would 
have credible rules on property rights, clear and impartial enforcement mechanisms, 
plausible rules that tie the hands of governments, and so on. I also know that these 
attributes are not mutually exclusive, as they tend to co-vary strongly. What I cannot 
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say is that the observed correlations among the variables are entirely stochastic so 
that I can treat each variable as fully exogenous. There exists a high likelihood that 
either an underlying common factor explains these relationships or a linear 
combination of the variables provides a better proxy for the rule of law variable. Our 
primary focus in this section is the exploration of this communality in the variation 
of the individual variables vis-à-vis the rule of law measure to construct a composite 
variable. This composite variable is then applied on the empirical model, so as to 
investigate the extent to which it explains cross-country economic growth 
differentials in Africa.   
The method I use to this end, and thus derive less number of variables that 
account for most of the variation, is factor analysis with principal component factors. 
A stepwise presentation on the discussion is provided below. 
7.2.1. Data 
 
The data used in this analysis are drawn from the African Governance 
Indicators, certain features of which were explained in a previous discussion. It is 
supplemented by CPIA.  For a detailed account of which countries were included and 
the theme coverage of the data see Appendix Q. Each variable is ranked in ascending 
order based on the percentage of respondents who assigned the given factor the least 
level of satisfaction. African countries on average scored higher in every sub-
component of political representation, including political system and power 
distribution, while they fared very poorly with regard to decentralisation, tax evasion 
and corruption. A case in point with respect to the relative importance of the political 
factors in the overall index was provided by the question of competitiveness of 
African political systems. Accordingly, data indicated that about 56.1% of 
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households surveyed by the study found the political systems in African countries to 
be competitive. Leaving aside the question of what makes political systems 
competitive, a study by the African Research Program at Harvard University finds 
that, out of 1127 country-years between 1970-1990 in Africa, in 63% of cases, 
executives in Africa were elected, while in 22% of cases more than one party 
competed (See http://africa.gov.harvard.edu).  Surprisingly, the domain of countries 
deemed to have less competitive political systems by the ARG opinion surveys 
included countries labelled as ‘free’ by Freedom House, such as Botswana and South 
Africa, as well as ‘not-free’ ones such as Chad and Zimbabwe. Another dimension in 
which the political structure of the countries region rated highly was adherence to 
constitutionalism. Nevertheless, that pattern in the data on African Governance 
Indicators which is of interest to us is the strong correlations among the variables. 
7.2.2. Operationalisation 
 
This part of the exercise consisted of two major components. Firstly, a factor 
analysis of principal components factors is used to reduce the variable dimension of 
the data. Secondly, I use scores from retained variables to derive a composite 
measure of rule of law for each country.  I derive the principal component factors 
and corresponding scores as follows: 
 A correlation matrix was calculated first, which, on balance, showed that the 
variables were significantly correlated. Ideally, I would have preferred more 
of the variables to have been significantly correlated than I actually got for 
our data. More importantly, however, the political variables showed strong 
associations among themselves, and with other dimensions such as economic 
management. 
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 The next step was to derive the un-rotated factors using principal component 
factors method. I found that the first factor on its own accounted for about 
38% of the overall variation, while adding another two factors raised the 
proportion of the total variation explained by the three factors to about 66%. 
The remaining eight factors each could only represent less than 10% of the 
total variation.     
  
 In factor analysis, there exists no blueprint as to how many of the factors 
should be retained. The rule of thumb is to retain those with eigenvalues of at 
least one. Eigenvalue is used as a criterion for determining the numbers of 
factors to retain and as a measure of variance accounted for by a given 
dimension.   
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     Figure 9 Eigenvalues of the factors 
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NB. In this graph, the vertical axis shows eigenvalues, 
while the factors are provided in the horizontal axis. It 
shows that six factors pass the criterion of eigenvalue 
1. The line provides a fairer account of the 
contribution of each factor in explaining the total 
variation. For instance, the length of the line between 
the first two points endorses the point that the first 
factor on its own accounts a significant degree of 
variation. I draw data from UNECA (2005).  
 
 
As can be seen from the graph above, a criterion of a minimum eigenvalue of one 
left us with six factors to retain. The six factors together account for 84% of the total 
variation. 
Rotated factor loadings provide us with information on how the variables were 
weighted for each factor and the correlations between the variables and the factor. 
For instance, I can observe that, for the first factor, relatively larger weights were 
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assigned to the political factors. Finally, I draw the factor scores for each of the six 
scores using Bartlett’s algorithm.  
 
7.2.3. Analysis 
 
Now that I have derived the factor scores, the composite rule of law variable 
is constructed as a weighted average of those variables with the highest variation 
with respect to each factor. For the purposes of brevity, I focus on those values 
associated with the first factor. This shall not entail much loss of analytical power 
because I showed earlier that the first factor had an eigenvalue three times more than 
any other. Also in this factor the amount of variation was concentrated in six major 
variables; namely power distribution, political system, political party freedom and 
security, law enforcement organs, efficiency of government services and 
decentralisation of structures. Each variable in turn decomposes into a string of 
dimensions that assess those particular attributes of the variable. For instance, the 
variable power distribution is made up of parliamentary election mode, regional 
assemblies membership, local assemblies membership, constitutional checks and 
balances status, legislature’s independence, legislature’s control and judiciary’s 
independence. Based on the factor scores, the composite rule of law variable, Ŕ, was 
derived according to the following formula: 
  Ŕ = 0.17502β1 + 0.15601β2 + 0.14986β3 + 0.13128β4 +0.11871β5 + 0.10618 β6 
           where βi refers to each of the variables introduced above respectively. 
Note that the variables were recorded as ranks and, hence, a lower absolute 
value for the variable implies a higher level of rating. Another point worth 
mentioning is the limitation in terms of country coverage of the data. To circumvent 
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this problem, I proxy values for countries not included based on their IEF scores, 
which were elaborated in a section above. 
 
 
Table 24  A composite rule of law variable and economic growth in Africa 
Variable OLS Least 
squares 
with 
robust 
standard 
errors 
Robust 
least 
squares 
Quintile 
Regression
Openness 0.31 
0.04 
0.00 
0.26 
0.06 
0.00 
0.23 
0.05 
0.00 
0.23 
0.08 
0.01 
     
Rule of law 0.72 
0.26 
0.01 
0.72 
0.18 
0.00 
0.69 
0.23 
0.01 
0.78 
0.30 
0.02 
     
Constant 4.59 
0.62 
0.00 
4.59 
0.48 
0.00 
4.71 
0.55 
0.00 
4.54 
0.70 
0.00 
     
R-squ. 
F(2,38) 
N 
0.66 
21.98 
41 
0.66 
23.21 
41 
NA 
18.78 
41 
0.36* 
NA 
41 
 
NB. NA refers to relevant statistic not available or not 
appropriate. *A pseudo-R2 was given here. A McFadden’s 
pseudo R-square between 0.2 and 0.4 is normally 
considered highly satisfactory. Figures below each 
coefficient estimate refer to standard errors and p-
values respectively. Reported F values are significant at 
one percent. 
 
As can be deduced from table above, the coefficient estimates on the 
composite rule of law variable lend further support to the proposition I made at the 
beginning, that variations in rules of law among African countries systematically 
explain corresponding differences in the economic well-being of the countries. The 
parameter estimate in the first model uses ordinary least squares, whereby the 
predictive power of the rule of law variable was significant at one percent. In fact, 
the coefficient estimate on the rule of law variable was all the stronger when I altered 
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the model specification to account for possible outlier effects. This was shown in 
model two, which estimated the model using a linear least squares regression with 
robust standard errors. Both models, three and four, i.e. robust least squares 
regression and quintile regression, return results that emphatically reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on the composite rule of law variable were 
not different from zero. Additionally, the joint significance of the right-hand side 
arguments in the model was shown by the corresponding F values, which were all 
significant at one percent. Results for robustness tests using alternative controls are 
not reported here. All in all, the rule of law variable, which was considered as a 
potent institutional tool for a credible regime of property rights, was a strong 
determinant of economic growth in Africa.  
7.3. Discussion and summary 
 
The overarching objective of this chapter was to investigate whether the 
theoretically postulated links between rule of law and economic growth hold water 
when subjected to African data. Those institutions, which ensure a broad prevalence 
of rule of law in a country, feed into economic growth largely via the effect of the 
rule of law variable on property rights. More specifically, our research problem was 
to look for empirical evidence from Africa that established the systematic nature of 
the observed mapping between such rules and economic growth differences among 
countries in the region. To do so, I broke down the vector of institutions on security 
of property rights into three major components. The first one dealt with the question 
of individual rule of law variables and their impacts on economic growth. With the 
help of data from the Index of Economic Freedom and the African Governance 
Indicators, I showed that there existed ample evidence to support the proposition that 
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rule of law explained economic growth variation in Africa. I also found similar 
results in the second component, in which the presence/absence of credible regimes 
of property rights was proxied by levels of corruption. In the final component, I 
constructed a composite rule of law variable based on factor analysis with principal 
component factors. The findings with respect to this composite variable provided 
further evidence of the importance of constitutional rules in bringing about secured 
property rights, and hence, better economic growth. When controls are included for 
fixed factors such as, geography, ethnic fragmentation and colonial history, the 
coefficient estimates (not reported here for brevity reasons), by and large, remain 
strong. 
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Chapter 8. Veto players, credible commitment and economic 
growth in Africa 
 
This chapter deals with the third pillar of institutional solutions to problems 
of credible commitment; namely, veto players. Recall that in preceding chapters, I 
discussed, with the help of empirical evidence, the degree to which credible 
commitment, via institutions of delegation and a string of rule of law variables, 
shaped the economic growth trajectories of African countries. Within the broader 
theme of positive political theory, which underscores the centrality of political 
processes in determining economic policy choices, I hypothesise that credible 
commitment to growth-friendly economic policies is a positive function of the 
number of veto players and variations in their preferences. Apparently, such a 
proposition stands in stark contrast to the fragmented political systems literature in 
that, in the veto players model, executives made up of diverse groups lead to better 
economic policies, albeit in terms of commitment to the status quo policy. Put 
differently, and in a strictly positive sense, the inability to collectively act, be it 
within the executive or in its interactions vis-à-vis the other organs of government, is 
considered a virtue policy-wise. It is a caveat of political theory that I hardly find any 
research that assesses the joint effects of multiple actors in a given political system, 
which nevertheless provides a useful line of research. 
As mentioned above, our task here is to investigate whether empirical data on 
Africa upholds the theory-supported nexus between veto players and economic 
performance, which is mediated by the former’s effects on economic policy choices. 
To put matters into perspective, I draw on Tsebelis (1995) to hypothesise that the 
veto players paradigm (note that this variable is a composite of a number of veto 
players and of diversity in their preferences) instils stability in the policy regime, 
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which, in turn, is conducive to economic growth. As shall be explained below, while 
the direct empirical links between economic growth and veto players in Africa were 
weak, I also find that the effects of the veto player variable on economic growth 
becomes stronger as long as existing policies are pro-growth.  
With these points in mind, the road map to analysing the economic effects of 
veto players in this chapter is as follows. In the section immediately following, I 
provide a brief précis of political theory on the subject, accompanied by anecdotal 
evidence from Africa. I do so with the intention of highlighting the research problem. 
In the following section, I discuss the logic behind the operationalisation of the veto 
players variable within the two, and most probably the only comprehensive, existing 
sources. I then present and analyse the results from the quantitative estimation of the 
parameters. The last section summarizes and concludes. As shall be explained in due 
course, the analysis here adds value in two ways. Conceptually, I identify one 
important anomaly in existing measures of veto players and treat it by introducing 
interactive terms. Methodologically, I use a recently introduced powerful estimation 
technique for panel data with time-invariant variables; namely the fixed-effect vector 
decomposition technique.  
8.1) Do veto players matter for economic growth? 
8.1.1) The Problem 
 
Had it been the case that one had a definitive answer to the above question, it 
would have sufficed to state that it encapsulated the subject matter of this particular 
chapter. Nevertheless, the best I can hope for from political theory is a qualified 
affirmative response, in that the economic effects of the existence of multiple veto 
players in a political system depends as much on this institutional variable as on 
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other variables. Accordingly, I use this section to shed light on this rather grey area 
in political theory and to further restate our research problem. A few examples help 
clarify the point. With the exception of former Portuguese colonies, where 
independence struggles were very violent, most African countries gained their 
independence through well-orchestrated (incoming leaders were groomed by 
departing colonial masters) multi-party elections. However, no sooner had the 
political transitions occurred, than in most of those countries, political pluralism was 
sacrificed to nationalist goals with devastating costs in terms of instability (e.g. 
Benin, Nigeria and Ghana), while a few, including Botswana, Gambia and 
Zimbabwe, kept up their pre-independence momentum. The adverse implications of 
political instability in the former block of countries manifested themselves through 
significant and frequent policy reversals, both by incumbents and newly-installed 
governments. 
The pay-offs in terms of economic growth for those countries which pursued 
credible macroeconomic policy regimes were significant. The stark contrast in 
economic performance of two of the resource-rich economies in the region provides 
a testimony to the critical importance of the quality of policy in defining long-term 
economic growth trajectories. In contrast to the assertions of schools of thought that 
trace political economic paths along identity lines, Botswana was in no better 
position as compared to Nigeria at the advent of independence. Apart from being 
landlocked and situated at the centre of a conflict-prone sub-region, its share of 
national income allocated to consumption was one of the highest. Its citizens 
commanded a level of income almost equivalent to that of Nigerians by the early 
1970s. As Figure 10 clearly indicates, subsequent policy regimes and economic 
performance between the two countries were diametrically opposed to each other. 
 289
Nigeria consistently qualified as a textbook example of the ‘Dutch disease’, in that 
its real exchange rate continued to appreciate, whereas Botswana sustained a 
competitive real exchange rate regime. Over the period under consideration, 
Nigeria’s real exchange rate fluctuated 4.5 times more than that of Botswana. Three 
decades later, not only has Botswana managed to channel about 14.21 percent of its 
GDP to investment, while the figure for Nigeria stands at 3.87 percent, but the 
income ratio has reached 6.75 in Botswana’s favour. 
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Figure 10 Economic policy volatility in Africa 
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NB. This plot highlights the contrast in economic 
policies between Botswana (the spike lines) and Nigeria. 
I calculate real exchange rates as the quotient of the 
natural log of nominal exchange rate and purchasing power 
parity over GDP. In addition to having a very stable 
exchange rate regime, Botswana’s real exchange did not 
fall below zero at any time. Data was drawn from the Penn 
World Table (See Heston et al. 2006).Note that the polcon 
veto player variable (Henisz 2002)is constructed along 
three dimensions; namely legislature, judicial 
independence and devolution of power to sub-national 
governments. Hence, Botswana scored better than Nigeria.   
 
The gist of the matter is that it is not because Botswana, or any other better 
performing economy for that matter, was particularly endowed with benevolent 
executives, that it sustained a growth-friendly policy regime for so long. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the notion of executive benevolence is, at best, a fallacy, 
I know that rational actors form expectations based on tangible indicators of 
commitment. I maintain here that it is the presence of institutional veto players and 
their credibility in narrowing the scope of executive discretion in important policy 
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tools that ultimately holds the key. Put differently, if the private sector had perceived 
a high risk of expropriation, say through corruption, then it would not have made 
those growth-enhancing investments that otherwise entail large sunk costs.  
Nevertheless, the presence of multiple veto players in the political system can 
only serve as a necessary condition for promoting credible commitment. The point 
that there does not exist an automatic direct relationship between the existence of 
multiple veto players and good economic policies can be observed from the 
experiences of the Gambia. Although this country was considered politically free by 
Freedom House in the 1970s and 1980s, a condition which essentially allows for 
institutional veto players to exist, its economic policies were erratic. Discussions 
above lead us to underline the point that the presence of veto players does not cause 
the adoption of good policies per se. Rather, it promotes economic growth by 
preserving status quo economic policies that already are growth-friendly. 
8.1.2. The Concept 
 
I mentioned in passing in the introductory text, that one important 
contribution of this chapter is to underscore the point that the economic effects of a 
veto players based credible commitment paradigm is conditional on the type and 
quality of the status quo policy. Having a political system that embodies multiple 
veto players does not necessarily signal the adoption of policies that promote 
economic growth. Apart from rephrasing the research problem with the help of some 
anecdotal evidence above, it is worth noting that the veto players literature 
overlooked this critical point. Let us begin by defining the concept. Veto players are 
‘individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rules for collective 
actors) is required for a change of the status quo’ (Tsebelis 1995:289). Note also the 
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difference in the commitment technology of veto players from the other two 
institutional solutions to problems of credible commitment. Governments delegate 
policy prerogative to a conservative Central Banker to cause tight monetary policy; 
governments introduce constitutional fiscal rules to cause fiscal balance; but a veto 
players system is introduced to preserve the status quo rather than cause it. 
No discussion of the veto players paradigm is complete without drawing 
insights from the seminal works of George Tsebelis. Accordingly, he has stated that 
‘the potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack 
of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the 
cohesion (similarity of positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of 
these players’(Tsebelis 1995:289). In Tsebelis (1999), he provided empirical 
evidence arguing that the presence of multiple veto players with divergent 
preferences did indeed limit the number of significant laws passed (See also Tsebelis 
1997 & 2002). I can draw a number of insights from his work to in order to study the 
effects of veto players on economic growth. Firstly, in terms of political economics, 
one can draw hypotheses as to if and how countries that differ with regard to the 
distribution, in number and diversity of preferences, of veto players, map into 
corresponding differences in policy choices. Secondly, I can also link the choice of 
legislations under scrutiny to objective measures and/or apply statistical diagnostic 
techniques to assess selectivity bias, or omitted variable bias so as to deal with them 
accordingly.  
As the overwhelming message from Tsebelis’ extensive works show, policy 
is the undisputed go-between veto player variable and the economic performance 
variables. What I need to ask is, then, whether or not policy stability, as caused by 
the veto player variable, maps into better economic performance. A case in point is 
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MacIntyre (2001), who applies a veto player’s paradigm to explain the Asian 
financial crisis in the 1990s.  Accordingly, he showed that the variations in the 
scaling down of investment and GDP in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand strongly correlated with differences in terms of the size of veto players 
among the countries. The implications of the veto player paradigm also manifest 
themselves through its impact in shaping interest-group politics. In this regard, 
Immergut (1990) undertakes a comparative analysis of the health systems of 
Switzerland, France, and Sweden, in which policy outcomes ultimately rested on the 
interactions of veto players.  
James Madison’s assertion with regard to the positive implications on rule of 
law of presence of multiple veto players in a political system does also have strong 
relevance to the economic performance of countries. One formal logic to such view 
postulates that, as the number of veto players in government increases, their ability to 
collude on accepting bribes declines, while the incentive to vote on legislations 
strengthening the rule of law increases (Andrews and Montinola 2004). In such 
situations, the positive implications of veto players for economic growth derive from 
the former’s nexus with rule of law. Other notable studies on the subject include Moe 
and Caldwell (1994), on comparisons between presidential and parliamentary 
systems and Palmer et al. (2004) on the effects of heterogeneity of parliamentary 
democracies. Irrespective of differences among studies on veto players with regard to 
providing variable measurements that were amenable to empirical analysis, Beck et 
al. (2001) and Henisz (2002) clearly stand out in terms of wider coverage of both 
country and temporal dimensions. I defer in-depth discussions of these latter two 
sources of data to section below since I mainly draw on them for the forthcoming 
analysis. Now that I have provided a more refined version of the research problem, 
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backed up by empirical evidence and by the shortcomings of political theory, I next 
turn to a presentation of how the veto players variable has been operationalised. 
In order to shed light on the micro-political foundations on the nexus between 
veto actors and economic growth, I draw on the selectorate theory of Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2001 and 2003). Accordingly, all polities are made-up of three 
nested and changeable groups, in which the largest group consists all residents. The 
selectorate is a smaller group that has a formal role in expressing a preference over 
the selection of the leadership. Though this group has a clearly stated say in 
leadership selection, it may or may not have direct influence on the outcome of 
leadership selection. The winning group, on the other hand, which is a sub-set of the 
selectorate group, is critically essential if the incumbent is to remain in office. In 
situations where the selectorate is larger relative to the winning coalition, supporters 
of the leader are particularly loyal because of the cost and risk of exclusion if the 
incumbent is overthrown. They postulate weaker bonds when the sizes of the 
selectorate and the winning coalition are comparable. 
The economic implications of the relative sizes of the selectorate and the 
winning coalition filter through the choice of policies such as on public spending and 
taxation. Put differently, the incumbent chooses public policy in such a way that 
public resource allocation (that is between public goods and private goods) 
maximizes her political survival chance. When the size of the winning coalition is 
sufficiently large, in which case the veto power of individual members diminishes, 
the incumbent could afford to provide for good public policies. In contrast, leaders of 
small winning coalitions who choose good policies not only risk defection of 
members of the winning coalition but also face high risk of being replaced by 
 295
challengers. Note that the idea of good and bad policies in these cases reflects the 
extent of public resources to public and private goals.   
8.2 Operationalisation of the veto players variable 
 
A number of practical issues come to the fore when one attempts to 
quantifiably measure political concepts. To start with, and even for a concept like 
veto players wherein scholars were seldom at loggerheads on its definition, the 
variable was ultimately measured so as to reflect what the researcher sets out to 
achieve. In our case, this means that I refrain from the Tsebelis’ dichotomy of 
institutional vis-à-vis partisan veto players. Instead, I utilise the Beck et al. (2001) 
and Henisz (2002) veto players variables since those sources allow broader coverage 
of countries. Additionally, I would add little value by constructing new indicators 
since, as shown clearly above, the problem has been more on the variables’ inclusion 
into the model, i.e. the production function. It is, then, only imperative that I should 
take an in-depth look into how each of the above veto players variables were 
operationalised. I emphasise, in particular, three traits of the variables; namely, their 
conceptual and measurement details, spatial and temporal scope and limitations, if 
any. Needless to say, I give closer attention to the African dimension of the data. 
These variables were by far the broadest in terms of quantifying the veto players 
variable.  
8.2.1. Checks (DPI) 
 
At the very beginning of this chapter, I underscored the point that political 
theory is blurred in its propositions with regard to the political economy effects of 
multiple and preference-wise diverse veto players. In the same breath I speak of 
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multiple veto players inducing the adverse consequences of political fragmentation 
(fiscal policy being the most pronounced case), the inability to collectively act could 
help preserve existing policies and hence promote credible commitment. To the best 
of our knowledge, no study has so far been made investigating the net effect of these 
rather conflicting political variables. Nor is a general equilibrium solution to the 
political market our overarching interest here. I make this point for the sole reason 
that the construction of the checks variable reflects this delicate line between 
collective action and credible commitment. More to the point, the Beck et al. (2001) 
checks variable(s) was simply an augmented version of an earlier index developed by 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) wherein the latter, also known as the Index of Political 
Cohesion, indicated the positive mapping between the size of political players and 
public debt. Assuming away the collective action paradigm, I elaborate on how the 
veto players variable (checks) promotes credible commitment via policy stability. 
Accordingly, the presence of multiple (that is, more than one) veto players 
was, first and foremost, a function of the degree of electoral competition for 
executives and legislatures. As per this criterion, countries with no legislature or 
which have un-elected legislature, or an elected legislature but with one candidate or 
legislature totally under the aegis of one party, but with multiple candidates, were 
assigned a value of one for the checks variable. The veto players variable for the rest 
of the countries, including those where multiple parties were legal, regardless of 
whether one party won all the seats, or either side of a 75% threshold seats, was 
dichotomised into the two dominant forms of government. In presidential systems, 
checks was incremented by one for each chamber of legislature, unless the 
president’s party had a majority in the lower chamber and a closed list system was in 
place. The variable was also increased by one for each party allied to the president’s 
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party but with ideological preferences more in tune with the main opposition party. 
In parliamentary systems, checks was incremented by one for each coalition partner 
needed to maintain a majority and for each government coalition party whose 
economic preferences closely matched the main opposition party. However, a prime 
minister’s party was not considered a veto player if there was a closed system. 
A number of points, which highlight the limitations of this version of the veto 
players variables, are worth noting. Firstly, this veto players variable did not 
transcend the regime type classification so as to provide a uniform measure. For 
instance, I can not tell accurately if Nigeria’s score compared to, say South Africa, 
was, by default, partly explained by differences in the type of regime. Secondly, the 
executive and legislature electoral criterion tended to mix dissimilar entities, in that it 
made little distinction between one-party dominant states such as Botswana, 
Tanzania and Namibia. Another point was that it overlooked the differences between 
the largely advisory role of the House of Chiefs (i.e. the Upper House) in Botswana 
and the National Council of Namibia. Thirdly, and on a related note, the construction 
of veto players was narrowly confined to the executive and legislature. It is, however, 
clear that the judiciary and sub-national levels of government could also hold 
substantial veto leverage. These concerns were, to a substantial degree, dealt with in 
the second veto players variable, as shall be explained below. 
8.2.2) Polcon (Henisz) 
 
The veto players variable developed by Witold J. Henisz (See, Henisz (2002)) 
did certainly have a stronger pertinence to analysing economic implications of 
differences in institutional checks on policy-making. This is all the more apparent 
when one assesses the rationale behind the construction of this particular veto players 
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variable (hereinafter polcon) in the first place. To start with, it was decidedly 
focussed on identifying the extent to which policy change was feasible under a given 
political system. Polcon provided a quantifiable measure of the extent to which a 
change in the preference of any one political actor could induce a change in 
government policy. Compared to the veto players variable introduced in section 
above, the orientation of polcon was more in tune with a credible commitment 
paradigm. Furthermore, this variable’s emphasis was on those policy changes that 
had significance to economic actors; most notably to private investors. At this 
juncture, and without passing judgement on polcon’s reflection of the status quo 
policy, I can safely state that it provided the most relevant and broad measure to 
investigate the political economy of veto players. It is, then, logical to undertake a 
closer scrutiny of the concepts and technicalities applied to construct this variable.  
The formal model used to construct polcon allowed for five political actors to 
have a veto say on policy matters; namely the executive, the lower and the upper 
houses of the legislature, sub-federal units and the judiciary. Based on a very strong 
assumption whereby the status quo policy (Xo) and the preferences of all actors were 
independently and identically drawn from a uni-dimensional policy space [0,1], the 
utility of a given political actor from a policy outcome X was equal to -|X-X1| where 
X1 was the most preferred policy point for the political actor in question. I can 
deduce that maximum utility for this political actor was at 0 (when X= X1) and a 
minimum of –1 (when X=0 and X1=1, or vice versa). What is of much relevance for 
investors was not the type and quality of existing policy per se. Rather, it was the 
‘extent to which a given political actor is constrained in his or her choice of future 
policies’ (Henisz 2000:7). This variable was in turn calculated by subtracting from 
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one the expected range of policies for which a change in the status quo could be 
agreed by all the veto players in the system.  
One prediction of the model is that political discretion was a negative, albeit a 
non-linear one, function of the number of independent veto players in the system. Put 
differently, the ability of any one political actor to alter the status quo policy should 
correspondingly be reduced as approval was required from a number of veto players. 
It, therefore, is the case that investors consider an executive facing fewer checks 
from other players to be incapable of credibly committing to a policy stance. Using 
mathematical rules on expectations regarding uniform distributions, the expected 
difference between the preferences of any two actors was given by 1/(n+2) where n 
refers to number of veto players. This means that, if the veto players were only the 
executive and the lower chamber, then their expected difference in policy 
preferences was ¼. In the uni-dimensional policy space [0,1], six possible preference 
orderings were predicted by the model. With XE, X0 and XL representing policy 
positions for the executive, status quo policy and legislature policy preference 
respectively, the preference orderings include:   
XE= ¼ ,X0 = ½ ,and XL= ¾  
XE= ¾ ,X0 = ½ ,and XL= ¼  
XE= ¾ ,X0 = ¼ ,and XL= ½  
XE= ½ ,X0 = ¼ ,and XL= ¾  
XE= ¼ ,X0 = ¾,and XL= ½  
XE= ½ ,X0 = ¾,and XL= ¼  
As can be observed from the above orderings, the preferred policy points for 
the executive and the legislature were located on either side of the status quo policy. 
Since both prefer the latter to each other’s point, policy constraint was one. In each 
 300
of the remaining four cases, political constraints were assigned a value of ½, because 
there exist policy points that were preferred by both to the status quo policy. The 
expected level of political constraint under this scenario, which was the average of 
the political constraint over all orderings, was equal to 2/3. A notable caveat of this 
approach is, perhaps, the possibility that the expected differences in policy 
preferences of any two actors were reduced as the number of veto players increases. 
If one goes by the formula given above (i.e. 1/(n+2)), then the expected difference in 
preferences is only 0.2 when the veto players are three in number, 0.17 when they are 
four, 0.14 when they are five, etc. To put it more bluntly, the model’s predictions 
(from the perspective of only number of veto players) are valid when the number of 
veto players in the system is two. For instance, if there were three veto players the 
expected difference in the preferences of any two actors is 0.2 and, to fit this into a 
uni-dimensional policy space, one of the veto players should necessarily have a 
policy point that exactly matches either the status quo policy, or one of that of one of 
those other veto players. 
Be that as it may, it is now clear that a simple count of the number of veto 
players falls short of capturing the effective levels of political constraints. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the legislature, for instance, wields an institutional 
check on the executive, this could become immaterial if the same party controls both 
branches of government. Polcon addressed this problem in a number of ways. Firstly, 
when two or more veto players were completely aligned, the game reverted to an 
outcome where the others do not count as veto actors. If, for example, the lower 
chamber (in a situation where only the lower house and the executive were veto 
players) was completely dominated by the party of the executive and hence had its 
preferences totally aligned with the latter, then the outcome would be as if there 
 301
existed only one veto player in the system. This implies a political constraint of zero, 
provided the executive itself was not a coalition. Secondly, polcon depends partly on 
the extent of fractionalisation of the legislature when the opposition party dominated 
the legislature, or when the executive party had some level of majority. It applies the 
conventional fractionalisation formula which measures the probability that two 
randomly-drawn actors were from different parties.  
A snapshot of the distributional pattern of the veto players variable, as 
quantified by polcon, is in order. I do so by diagrammatically showing how the 
variable evolved over time for a selected, and yet representative, group of countries 
in the region. Benin is from a set of countries which, during the first three decades of 
independence, went through drastic political upheavals, while Cameroon has been 
dominated by a stable autocratic regime. Botswana managed to keep a relatively 
open political environment and stability which Zimbabwe, for all its early potential, 
failed to do. Madagascar falls in between the extremes of political instability and 
stable systems. As can be observed from Figure 11, the distributional pattern of this 
particular variable further confirms the overall assertion of the research that African 
political economy is a diverse set in terms of institutional qualities. 
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Figure 11 Veto players in Africa: A mixed record 
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NB. In this graph, I show the spread in the veto players 
variable for five African countries. On the one hand, the 
erratic nature of the variable in Madagascar and Zimbabwe 
contrasts with the more stable values for Benin while, on 
the other, I observe diametrically different scenarios 
between Botswana and Cameroon. Data is drawn from Henisz 
(2006). 
 
Neither the presence of temporally enduring and strong veto players, nor the 
utter absence of veto players signifies the modal cases in Africa. Botswana and 
Cameroon respectively provide cases in point. Despite the complete dominance of 
the Botswana Democratic Party since independence, the country’s high score in the 
veto player variable stemmed from the broader powers which its legislature and 
judiciary had at their disposal. Cameroon’s situation is a far cry from that of 
Botswana, in that the heavy-handed rule of RDPC hardly entertained any other veto 
actor in the country’s political system. The trends I observe from the experiences of 
Benin, Madagascar and Zimbabwe apply to the majority of countries. Since the late 
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1950s, when most African countries began to gain political independence, their 
political systems were in a roller coaster with several swings in the political space. 
The number and diversity of preferences of veto players also fluctuated accordingly. 
8.3. Data and analysis 
 
Discussions so far have highlighted a couple of major points that shall shape 
forthcoming analysis in this section. I first delved into the existing literature to drive 
home the point that, in contrast to conventional views, the economic effects of 
differences in number and diversity of veto players among countries were conditional 
on the qualities of macroeconomic policies. Some anecdotal evidence was used to re-
orient the research question. In this section, I shall go a step further and provide 
systematic empirical evidence that establishes our overarching hypothesis, i.e. veto 
players did not cause good policies but helped make policies credible. This in turn 
informed the second point I make at this juncture. I add more value by elaborating on 
how existing measures of veto players could be augmented to better account for the 
economic effects of these political variables by concentrating on developing new 
quantifiable measures. It is this gap in theresearch, the link between economic 
growth and policies, as mediated by the veto players variable, that I attempt to 
address here. As was the case in the previous chapters, I include descriptive statistics 
and quantitative analysis to assess the impact of this institutional variable on 
economic growth in Africa. 
So far in this research, I have used a mixture of cross-sectional models and 
panel specifications to explain the economic growth implications of the institutions 
under scrutiny. In this chapter, I use the panel data for the statistical tests. That the 
Solow economic growth model has long remained a workhorse for investigating 
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determinants of economic growth is not an overstatement. I followed a similar 
approach in this study by building a Solow-type Cobb-Douglas production function 
of forty-five African economies. Recall also discussions in previous chapters that 
underscored the rationale of using such analytical methods, both in its broader 
analytical calibre and its relevance to Africa. In the chapter on methodology, I 
presented a detailed list of econometric models that underscored the use-values of 
applying panel specifications to explaining determinants of cross-country growth 
differences. It was shown that, for dynamic models such as the one applied here (that 
is, for models which have lagged values of the dependent variable as one explanatory 
variable) the most appropriate models were system-GMM models. While the 
application of advanced estimation techniques helped address such problems as 
endogeneity bias and omitted variable bias as well as enhancing the robustness of our 
estimates, I have so far paid little attention to one feature of our main 
(political/institutional) variables.  
Institutional variables were often time-invariant or very rarely exhibit 
significant changes. Consider, for instance, the case for type of political systems or 
electoral systems. I could classify countries on the basis of such systemic attributes 
as presidential or parliamentary systems and yet I do not find a given country 
changing from one system to another on very many occasions, if at all. In such cases, 
using such conventional estimation techniques as fixed effect models poses at least 
two major problems. As is widely discussed in the econometrics literature (See 
Balatagi 2001, Hsiao 2003 and Wooldridge 2002), these techniques fail to estimate 
time-invariant variables, because they use only within variance for estimation and 
disregard the between variance. Additionally, it leads to inefficient estimates and, 
therefore, less reliable point estimates of variables. In their presentation at the 2005 
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American Political Science Association conference, Thomas Pluemper and Vera E. 
Troeger (Pluemper and Troeger 2005) introduced a three-stage estimation technique 
that enables one to estimate time-invariant models in a fixed effect specification. In 
this chapter, I also apply this technique which is otherwise known as the fixed effects 
vector decomposition method. The three stages one needs to follow to deal with the 
estimation of the time-invariant variables, using a fixed effects vector decomposition 
model are as follows: 
I run the conventional fixed effects model with time-variant variables as 
right-hand side arguments and retain predicted values. The latter are differences 
between actual values of the dependent variable and the residuals. Note that the 
predicted values include both the observed and unobserved unit effects as well as 
unit means of the time-varying variables and the residuals. 
In this stage, I regress the unit effects retained in the previous procedure on 
the time-invariant variables. This critical stage helps decompose the unit effects into 
two parts, i.e. an unexplained part, and a part explained by the time-invariant 
variables. 
I finally run the full model using the time-variant, time-invariant and the 
unexplained part of the unit effects. It was recommended that this third stage be 
estimated using pooled OLS (Plǘmper and Troeger 2005). 
I conclude this section by mentioning a few points with regard to the data 
used and the estimation techniques elaborated above. Data for the construction of the 
variables in the basic Solow model were drawn from the PENN World Tables 
(Heston et al. 2006). Economic growth was measured by the change in the natural 
log of  real GDP per capita (constant prices: chain series) between the start and end 
dates of each period. Note that the time dimension of the data includes five-year 
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periods beginning from 1960 and ending in 2004. I control for initial levels of 
income by including the natural log of real GDP per capita at the start of the period. 
For instance, the natural log of real GDP per capita on 1960 represents initial income 
for the period 1960-64. Similarly, I include as an explanatory variable the average 
annual levels of investment for each country-period bracket. As is the case 
conventionally, I assume technological progress and the depreciation rate to be 
uniform across countries and, hence, I include a term which was the rate of 
population growth augmented by 0.05 (Islam 1995, Mankiw et al. 1992). In order to 
empirically test our hypothesis that the economic effects of veto players were 
conditional on the quality of status quo policies, I include proxies for such policies 
using the online data from the African Research Program at Harvard University. 
Accordingly, share of current government consumption spending in GDP, the black 
market exchange premium and levels of inflation were applied to represent fiscal 
policy, trade policy and monetary policy respectively. 
8.3.1.) Descriptive analysis 
 
As the title of this sub-section indicates, I are primarily interested here in 
summarising and describing the variables, without making any inferences. An array 
of descriptive statistics on individual as well as joint distributions of variables helps 
us attain such an objective. Recall that, in discussions above on the operationalisation 
of the political variables on veto players, a selected segment of data was utilised to 
provide a brief synopsis of the variables’ distribution. A closer look into the spread 
of data serves an important objective beyond a descriptive summary of the variables 
in use. More importantly, it not only enables us to assess whether the distributions of 
the data do, in fact, allow for legitimate inferences later on, but also facilitates an 
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early detection of extreme values in the data. For instance, it is conventionally 
required in describing the data that the variable(s) of interest be normally distributed. 
I could at the same time, invoke the central limit theorem for sufficiently large data, 
as is the case here, in order to accommodate this requirement. Although the 
descriptive statistics I use below include the Solow covariates and the policy 
variables, the major concern is naturally with the explanatory variables, i.e. the 
political variables.   
I begin with a summary of the veto players variables. As shown in Table 25, 
the mean value for the number and diversity of veto players in Africa for the period 
under consideration, as measured by the checks variable, was 1.67. This rather small 
value was reflective of the fact that, in about 65 percent of cases, African countries 
had a score of only one, while about 75 percent of the cases fell between one and two 
veto players (inclusive). The veto players measure provided by checks did not 
necessarily imply that better-governed states would correspondingly entertain for 
more and diverse sets of veto players in their political systems. For instance, 
countries normally deemed to be free, including Benin, Senegal and South Africa (by 
Freedom House) shared scores on the veto players variable equal to those of such 
autocracies such as Cameroon and Guinea. Such values were somewhat perplexing, 
given the fact that the construction of checks used executive and legislature elections 
as one criterion. Additionally, had it set the presence of credible elections as a 
defining factor, it would not have provided Cape Verde a lower score than Ethiopia 
and Nigeria. A more emphatic indication of the left skewed pattern of the distribution 
of the veto players variable was given by the median value of one. 
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Table 25 Descriptive statistics on political and policy variables 
Stats Checks Polcon Monetary Fiscal Trade 
Mean 1.67 0.13 25.84 23.30 0.27 
      
Median 1.00 0.00 8.60 21.30 0.09 
      
Max 5.00 0.86 513.91 82.36 2.14 
      
Min 1.00 0.00 -3.57 2.62 -0.00 
      
SD 0.97 0.23 136.61 13.34 0.39 
      
N 250 361 254 311 228 
  
NB. Definitions of the policy variables were given in 
main text above. The trade distortion index was derived 
as log{[100*(Black market exchange rate-official exchange 
rate)]/100+1}.Data refers to the panel of forty-five 
African countries for the period 1960-2004. 
 
In one important sense, veto players as measured by the two sets of indicators 
paint a similar picture on the distribution of this political variable in Africa. A 
median value lower than the mean for the political variable indicated in the case of 
the checks variable was matched by that from the polcon variable. According to this 
latter measure, a median value of zero lends support to the view that, for most sample 
points (that is country-period), African governments held an unfettered discretion on 
policy matters. Numerically, this meant, that between the early independence year of 
1960 and 2004, a given African government was more than two-thirds likely to have 
encountered no veto player when making policies. Such a scenario clearly affirms 
that credible commitment was indeed a commodity in short supply in Africa. Note 
that the values for veto players, according to polcon, swing between a low of 0 and a 
maximum of 1. Two of the maximum values under this measure were 0.86 for South 
Africa for the 1995-1999 period and 0.79 for Benin for the 1990-1994 period. 
Nevertheless, polcon pointed to a more close association between the overall quality 
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of governance in a country and the presence of multiple veto players with diverse 
preferences.  
Figures on measures of central tendency and spread also underscore the point 
that, on average, macroeconomic policies were far from ideal. That governments in 
the region manipulated monetary policies to meet myopic political ends was not 
difficult to discern, given the distributional pattern of inflation. Arguably, neither the 
mean nor the median values for this policy tool adequately reflected the abysmal 
nature of policies in this regard. This is because, even in the presence of sizeable 
missing data, I observe a significant trend of erratic policy choices. The same can be 
said with regard to fiscal policy and trade policy for the countries. For the period 
under scrutiny, African countries spent as much as 23 percent of their GDP on 
current government consumption, which was also very close to the median value. 
The relevance of such a figure in terms of highlighting the predominance of 
distributive politics, executed through fiscal policy, and its negative impact to 
economic rationality, was more than symbolic. As explained earlier, it is not the 
implications of economic policies on economic growth per se which epitomize our 
theme here. Rather, it is the scale of interactions, if any, between these policy 
variables and the political variables on veto players that captures the centrepiece of 
our presentation.  
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Table 26 A correlation matrix between variables on veto players and economic 
policy tools 
 Checks Polcon Monetary Fiscal Trade 
Checks  1.00 
(250) 
    
      
Polcon  0.50 
 0.00 
(249) 
1.00 
(361) 
   
      
Monetary -0.09 
 0.20 
(195) 
-0.06 
 0.28 
 (245) 
1.00 
(254) 
  
      
Fiscal -0.24 
 0.00 
(188) 
-0.07 
 0.10 
(277) 
0.07 
(0.31) 
(200) 
1.00 
(311) 
 
      
Trade -0.06 
 0.09 
(135) 
-0.16 
 0.45 
(211) 
0.07 
0.35 
(148) 
0.06 
0.37 
(213) 
1.00 
(228) 
  
NB. Entries below correlation values refer to levels of 
significance and figures in parenthesis show number of 
observations. 
 
If our hypothesis that the effects of veto players on economic growth 
depended on the quality of economic policy already in place were to hold water, then 
it would be logical to expect a weaker correlation between these two sets of variables. 
Put differently, I posit a view that the presence of multiple veto players with diverse 
preferences with regard to policy choices was not a sufficient condition for the 
former to have a causal effect on policy choices. It is true that having better scores in 
the veto players variables allows for a positive premium through its impact on policy 
stability. Zimbabwe provides us with a classic case in which the presence of a veto 
actor did not signify better policies or institutions. The government of Robert 
Mugabe re-established the senate in 2005, making the country’s legislature a 
bicameral one. Going by conventional practice, this should have implied an 
improvement as the additional House equates with an incremental veto player. 
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Nevertheless, this very political act was actually a reneging on constitutional rules by 
the regime (Europa 2007). Political theory was not of much help either, as its 
assertions in this regard were, at best, incongruous. 
Figures in the correlation matrix table presented above tally, on balance, with 
the propositions made so far. I take note of the weak correlations between the 
political variables and two of the three policy instruments. While fiscal policy, 
measured by the share of current government consumption spending in GDP, showed 
a significant negative association with the variables on veto players, the situation was 
markedly different for both monetary policy and trade policy. It suggests that 
countries with multiple veto players with diverse preferences were more likely to 
have lower proportions of their GDP earmarked for government consumption 
expenditure. In contrast to this case, there existed no significant correlations between 
polcon and checks on one side and trade and monetary policies on the other. A 
couple of points are worth mentioning at this juncture. Firstly, the assertions on the 
strength of the correlations should not to be construed as having originated only from 
the corresponding values between each political variables and the economic policy 
variables. It was also informed by the close associations between the two political 
variables on veto players themselves. Secondly, the exercise of testing for causal 
relationships presupposes a systematic quantitative investigation to which I turn  next.  
8.3.2) Quantitative analysis 
 
This section’s main focus is to investigate whether empirical evidence from 
Africa endorses the proposition that there exist causal relationships between political 
variables that account for veto players in a country, and its rates of economic growth. 
As causality is as much a theoretical issue as it is an empirical one, I looked in 
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discussions above into stipulations from political theory to draw testable hypotheses. 
Such an exercise provided us with a mixed a result, in that political theory was rather 
grey when it came to explaining the economic implications of veto players. I then 
backed up these weaknesses in political theory with some anecdotal evidence, so as 
to refine the hypotheses. Accordingly, what I are concerned with primarily here, is 
the effect on economic growth of veto players, mediated through the quality of status 
quo economic policies. Another issue of interest in this part of the chapter is to apply 
a new estimation technique that potentially addresses one problem in the behaviour 
of the political variables, i.e. the time-invariant nature of the variables. More 
specifically, I augment the conventional estimations such as pooled OLS and fixed-
effects models with a fixed-effects vector decomposition model. This latter model 
apparently improves the robustness of the parameter estimates.  
8.3.2.1) Basic model with political variables 
 
Essentially, our claim is that the full model, which includes all the variables 
elaborated above, performs better than the more restricted one that only accounts for 
the veto players variables. A logical roadmap towards testing such propositions is to 
first test the evidence for the latter type of models. I begin by looking into the direct 
effects of veto players on economic growth. Coefficient estimates presented in Table 
27 take up the case, when veto players are measured by the polcon variable. 
Regressions are based on pooled OLS, fixed-effects and fixed-effects vector 
decomposition models. Results from all the models suggest that the differences in 
terms of number and diversity of veto players significantly explain the corresponding 
differences in economic growth among the countries in the region. Although this is 
reflected more strongly in the latter model, there exist a few factors that cast doubt 
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on its validity. Not only has the model managed to systematically explain only a 
small proportion of the overall variation (as indicated by a low R2 value), but also the 
F-values return a not-so-strong joint significance for all the variables. Similar points 
could be made in relation to the OLS model. 
Table 27 Economic effects of veto players (Polcon) 
Variable OLS Fixed-Effects Fixed-Effects 
Vector Decomposition 
Initial 
Income 
 0.00 
 0.01 
 0.63 
-0.08 
 0.03 
 0.00 
-0.10 
 0.08 
 0.18 
    
Investment  0.05 
 0.01 
 0.16 
 0.10 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.16 
 0.08 
 0.05 
    
Population -0.04 
 0.03 
 0.12 
-0.08 
 0.03 
 0.02 
-0.17 
 0.09 
 0.07 
    
Polcon  0.10 
 0.04 
 0.01 
 0.08 
 0.04 
 0.06 
 0.14 
 0.04 
 0.00 
    
Constant -0.09 
 0.08 
 0.28 
 0.08 
 0.21 
 0.03 
 0.14 
 0.50 
 0.24 
    
R-squ. 
F(4,332) 
F(4,288) 
F(4,236) 
N 
 0.09 
 8.22 
- 
- 
337 
- 
- 
12.41 
- 
337 
 0.12 
- 
- 
6.19 
242 
 
NB. Polcon is drawn from Henisz (2002). Population refers 
to the conventional ln(η+g+δ) in the Solow model. Figures 
below coefficient estimates are robust standard errors 
and levels of significance respectively. All F values are 
significant at one percent. Number of countries included 
is forty-five in all cases. 
 
Furthermore, the two widely used economic covariates lose their explanatory 
powers in both of these models. In the fixed-effects model, on the other hand, one 
can deduce that political variables which account for differences in veto players 
caused variations in economic growth only at a ten percent level of significance. 
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Given that all the other variables in this model behaved correctly, that is, in terms of 
direction of causation and significance levels, it is fair to conclude that empirical 
evidence on the direct effect of veto players on economic growth in Africa is rather 
weak. The point estimate to the tune of 0.08 for polcon in the fixed-effects model 
could well have emanated by chance. These findings, however, should not come as a 
shock. Had the model returned a significant coefficient estimate for polcon, I would 
have taken it with a grain of salt anyway. In the absence of coherent theoretical 
stipulations which directly link veto players with economic performance, results 
from quantitative studies remain spurious. Setting the question of political theory 
aside for a moment, I expect to derive comparable results when the measure for the 
veto players variable is checks. Recall the strong correlations between the two 
variables reported in section above. 
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Table 28 Economic effects of veto players (Checks) 
Variable OLS Fixed-Effects Fixed-Effects 
Vector Decomposition 
Initial 
Income 
 0.02 
 0.01 
 0.18 
-0.12 
 0.04 
 0.00 
 0.02 
 0.01 
 0.18 
    
Investment  0.05 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.10 
 0.03 
 0.00 
 0.05 
 0.02 
 0.00 
    
Population -0.04 
 0.03 
 0.21 
-0.04 
 0.05 
 0.44 
-0.04 
 0.03 
 0.21 
    
Checks  0.00 
 0.01 
 0.83 
-0.01 
 0.01 
 0.59 
 0.00 
 0.01 
 0.83 
    
Constant -0.17 
 0.09 
 0.06 
 0.76 
 0.29 
 0.01 
-0.17 
 0.09 
 0.06 
    
R-squ. 
F(4,238) 
F(4,195) 
F(5,236) 
N 
 0.07 
 4.37 
- 
- 
 243 
- 
- 
 7.04 
- 
 243 
 0.10 
- 
- 
 4.37 
 243 
 
NB. Checks is drawn from Beck et al. (2001). Population 
refers to the conventional ln(η+g+δ) in the Solow model. 
Figures below coefficient estimates are robust standard 
errors and levels of significance respectively. All F 
values are significant at one percent. Number of 
countries included is forty-five in all cases. 
 
As is shown in Table 28, when I use the checks variable to measure veto 
players, I emphatically fail to reject the null hypothesis that there does not exist 
direct and statistically meaningful relationships between this variable and economic 
growth in Africa. Note the contrasting findings I found when the veto players 
variable was measured by polcon and checks. It is indicative of the fact that the 
polcon variable is more suited to accounting for the economic growth implications of 
veto players than the checks variable. It is explained that one manifestation of the 
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weakness of this latter variable was the insignificant coefficient estimates for checks 
in the OLS, fixed-effects and fixed-effects vector decomposition models. 
Additionally, the introduction of checks into the models led the other economic 
covariates to return insignificant coefficient estimates. Intuitively, this means there 
exist no empirical grounds to asserting that the presence of multiple veto players in a 
political system should automatically bring about expansion in national output. The 
case of Benin and Cape Verde illuminates this point. Despite the fact that both these 
countries were deemed free (often indicative of the presence of institutional veto 
players) since the early 1990s, with Benin having consistently higher scores in terms 
veto players than Cape Verde, the latter’s economy grew at an annual average rate of 
4.33 percent during 1990-2004 period, as opposed to Benin’s economy which grew 
at only at 1.54 percent.  
8.3.2.2) Basic model with policy interactive terms 
 
If political theory was not forthcoming in capturing the direct effects of veto 
players on economic growth and if empirical evidence on such structural relationship 
was thin (both these were established by discussions so far), did other channels then 
exist whereby the nexus between economic growth and veto players could 
materialise? I earlier provided an affirmative reply to this research problem, by 
declaring that the presence of multiple veto players helps promote economic growth, 
by ensuring credibility to the status quo policies. This particular section attempts to 
provide empirical evidence from Africa to back up such stipulations. I do so with the 
help of variables on monetary policy, fiscal policy and trade policy which affect the 
rate of growth of national output. As shown in Table 29, in the case of monetary 
policy, I have adequate evidence to make a causal inference on the notion of veto 
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players affecting economic growth conditional on the quality of policy. To start with, 
both the constituent terms and the interactive term, were on their own, significant. 
Secondly, notwithstanding the fact that poor monetary policy adversely affects 
growth, the effect on economic growth is marginally lower for countries with 
multiple veto players. Thirdly, the coefficient estimates remained strong in all three 
models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 29 Veto players, policy and economic growth (monetary policy) 
Variable OLS Fixed- Fixed Effects 
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Effects Vector 
Decomposition
Initial Income 
 
-0.01 
 0.01 
 0.47 
-0.11 
 0.03 
 0.00 
-0.00 
 0.01 
 0.77 
    
Investment  0.05 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.10 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.04 
 0.02 
 0.07 
    
Population -0.06 
 0.03 
 0.05 
-0.11 
 0.04 
 0.01 
-0.05 
 0.03 
 0.05 
    
Polcon  0.14 
 0.05 
 0.00 
 0.14 
 0.06 
 0.01 
 0.14 
 0.05 
 0.00 
    
Monetary -0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
-0.02 
 0.00 
 0.00 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.00 
    
Polcon*Monetary -0.01 
 0.00 
 0.04 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.02 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.04 
    
Constant  0.03 
 0.09 
 0.70 
 0.75 
 0.24 
 0.00 
 0.16 
 0.38 
 0.04 
    
R-squ. 
F(6,228) 
F(6,191) 
F(7,228) 
N 
 0.15 
 6.85 
- 
- 
235 
- 
- 
9.40 
- 
235 
0.18 
- 
- 
7.05 
235 
 
NB. Monetary refers to rates of inflation and is drawn 
from ARP (2008). Population refers to the conventional 
ln(η+g+δ) in the Solow model. Figures below coefficient 
estimates are robust standard errors and levels of 
significance respectively. Number of countries included 
is forty-five in all cases. All F values are significant 
at one percent.  
 
The most important message from the estimates above is that the effect on 
economic growth of monetary policy was not a linear one, in that it partially hinged 
on the presence of veto players. The contrasting experiences of Mauritius and 
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Tanzania in the 1970s and 1980s provide a good analogy. State interventionist 
policies in Mauritius, which occurred amid broader veto players in the system, did 
not result in output contraction, whereas the outcome was altogether different for 
Tanzania. Unfortunately, I could not report similar findings with regard to fiscal 
policy. These are presented in Table 30 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 30 Veto players, policy and economic growth (fiscal policy) 
Variable OLS Fixed-
Effects 
Fixed Effects 
Vector 
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Decomposition
Initial Income -0.00 
 0.01 
 0.28 
-0.06 
 0.04 
 0.07 
-0.00 
 0.01 
 0.02 
    
Investment  0.05 
 0.01 
 0.00 
 0.11 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.05 
 0.02 
 0.02 
    
Population -0.06 
 0.03 
 0.04 
-0.15 
 0.05 
 0.00 
-0.06 
 0.03 
 0.04 
Polcon  0.14 
 0.05 
 0.00 
 0.14 
 0.06 
 0.01 
 0.14 
 0.05 
 0.00 
    
Fiscal -0.02 
 0.16 
 0.09 
-0.02 
 0.20 
 0.11 
-0.02 
 0.16 
 0.09 
    
Polcon*Fiscal -0.00 
 0.00 
 0.63 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.23 
-0.00 
 0.00 
 0.63 
    
Constant  0.01 
 0.09 
 0.91 
 0.47 
 0.27 
 0.08 
 0.04 
 0.17 
 0.84 
    
R-squ. 
F(6,255) 
F(6,216) 
F(7,255) 
N 
 0.12 
 5.85 
- 
- 
262 
- 
- 
8.17 
- 
262 
 0.15 
- 
- 
6.23 
262 
  
NB. Fiscal refers to current government consumption as a 
share of GDP and is drawn from ARP (2008). Had there been 
adequate data, this policy variable would have been 
better captured by budget deficits. Population refers to 
the conventional ln(η+g+δ) in the Solow model. Figures 
below coefficient estimates are robust standard errors 
and levels of significance respectively. Number of 
countries included is forty-five in all cases. All F 
values are significant at one percent. 
 
The proportion of GDP a country allocates to current government 
consumption is a useful indicator of fiscal policy and adversely affects economic 
growth. While this variable on its own was a strong predictor of economic growth 
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performance in Africa, its interactions with the veto players variable was very fragile 
in affecting growth. The magnitude of the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth 
did not vary in accordance with the distribution in number and diversity of veto 
players among countries. A third macroeconomic policy regime under scrutiny is 
trade policy. As mentioned before, this policy was proxied by the black market 
premium which indicates the degree of distortion in trade policy. Table 30 captures 
results under this scenario.       
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Table 31 Veto players, policy and economic growth (trade policy) 
Variable OLS Fixed-
Effects 
Fixed Effects 
Vector 
Decomposition
Initial Income -0.02 
 0.01 
 0.15 
-0.19 
 0.06 
 0.00 
-0.00 
 0.01 
 0.03 
    
Investment  0.05 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.05 
 0.02 
 0.03 
 0.05 
 0.03 
 0.04 
    
Population -0.06 
 0.04 
 0.02 
-0.15 
 0.06 
 0.03 
-0.03 
 0.04 
 0.45 
    
Polcon  0.22 
 0.08 
 0.01 
 0.04 
 0.02 
 0.03 
 0.21 
 0.08 
 0.01 
    
Trade -0.04 
 0.03 
 0.06 
-0.04 
 0.01 
 0.01 
-0.03 
 0.03 
 0.01 
    
Polcon*Trade -0.02 
 0.01 
 0.06 
-0.10 
 0.04 
 0.03 
-0.02 
 0.03 
 0.01 
    
Constant  0.01 
 0.12 
 0.96 
 1.41 
 0.43 
 0.00 
 0.11 
 0.02 
 0.05 
    
R-squ. 
F(6,196) 
F(6,152) 
F(7,190) 
N 
 0.11 
 4.04 
- 
- 
197 
- 
- 
8.87 
- 
197 
 0.22 
- 
- 
5.87 
197 
 
 
NB. Trade refers to black market premium and is drawn 
from ARP (2008). Population refers to the conventional 
ln(η+g+δ) in the Solow model. Figures below coefficient 
estimates are robust standard errors and levels of 
significance respectively. Number of countries included 
is forty-five in all cases. All F values are significant 
at one percent. 
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As in the case for monetary policy, coefficient estimates on trade policy also 
provide a broader indication that the effect of veto players on economic growth was 
positive and significant, on the condition that already existing policies were pro-
growth. The point I are making is that, while it is untenable to declare that the 
existence of multiple veto players directly affects economic growth, it is, at the same 
time, very likely that these political variables exhibit indirect effects by making 
existing policies credible. I refrain from elaborating on the findings on each of the 
parameter estimates, for the sake of brevity. I should, however, be very cautious so 
as to avoid reading too much into the figures. In several instances, the models’ total 
explanatory power was not as strong as one would have preferred. The limitations in 
data also made other rigorous tests of robustness impossible. It is, nevertheless, 
crystal clear that a better accounting for the effects of veto players as commitment 
technologies on economic growth can be better provided by interacting them with 
macroeconomic policies.  
Before I terminate our discussion on the veto players’ paradigm, it is useful to 
highlight a few points. Firstly, while there exist several cases whereby economic 
growth of countries was preceded and/or accompanied by the presence of larger 
number of veto players, one also observes the economic growth trajectories of East 
Asian countries which came amid situations of strong government. Notwithstanding 
the fact that such diversity in growth paths is a stylised fact of economic growth, it 
also implies that a fuller understanding of economic growth presupposes case studies 
as well. It is also an endorsement of the point that both quantitative and qualitative 
studies are required to reveal the causal determinants of economic growth. Secondly, 
as is elaborated in the text above, the veto players’ variable used in this study 
accounts for both the number of veto players and diversity of their preferences. It is, 
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nevertheless, a worthy exercise for future work to disentangle the effects of these 
factors on economic growth.  Note should also be taken that, though not reprted for 
brevity purposes, results in all models remain statistically stron when I controlled for 
such fixed factors as geography, ethnic fragmention and colonial history.    
8.4) Discussion and summary 
 
I have consistently espoused the view that political institutions which 
credibly commit governments to growth-friendly policies hold the key in defining the 
long-run trajectories of economic growth in countries. Research in the tradition of 
political economics is pivotal in explaining such assertions, with the help of 
empirical data. As I did for the two other broad institutional solutions to problems of 
credible commitment (institutions of delegation and constitutional rules), I dealt with 
the question of how to quantifiably explain the economic resonance of institutions of 
veto players in Africa in this chapter. A detailed survey of the literature identified a 
number of weaknesses, which made the notion of a direct link between veto players 
and economic growth questionable. I also augmented our assertions that political 
theory was vague in this respect, with some anecdotal evidence from Africa. It was 
further underlined that the two comprehensive measures of veto players, i.e. polcon 
and checks, provide a starting point to dealing with the issue of veto players-
economic growth nexus. Methodologically, I showed that the application of fixed-
effects vector decomposition model helps address the stickiness problem in 
institutional variables. Finally, using monetary, fiscal and trade policy indicators, I 
found that the economic growth implications of veto players were conditional on the 
quality of status quo macroeconomic policies.  
 
 325
Chapter 9. Conclusion 
9.1) A brief recapitulation 
 
Inasmuch as I emphasise that Africa could not afford to lose more ground in 
terms of economic growth, it is also of paramount importance to emphasise that it is 
the quality of its political institutions that ultimately defines its economic 
performance. Nonetheless, there hardly exists a blueprint as to which specific forms 
such institutions should take. What is a very useful line of investigation in this regard 
is to investigate whether there are systematic relations between cross-country 
variations in economic performance and political institutions. One growing aspect of 
political economics research asserts that institutional innovations that address 
governments’ inherent tendency to renege on policy commitments hold the key. Put 
differently, the moment we discard our faith in the random birth of benevolence and 
omnipotent governments, whose undying interest is the welfare of their people, and 
instead concentrate on institutional innovations which curtail executive discretion, 
then we are better placed to explain the fundamental factors behind the economic 
growth differentials. After all, the notion that a strong government, which is capable 
of ensuring security of property rights, is equally capable of expropriation of private 
property dates back to the writings of John Locke (1690). 
In one important sense, I have been forced to ‘reinvent the wheel’, in that 
many scholars have been sceptical about the use-values of investigating the effects of 
formal institutions in an African context. The onus was on this study to justify its 
research method, by providing evidence that falsifies those propositions which rule 
out comparative studies on the African continent. I went to great lengths in this 
research to establish not only that, in contrast to the African particularism thesis, is 
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African political economy a diverse set, but also that African data on the subject 
obeys conventional political theory stipulations. Simply put, the bulk of African 
economies have long been at the lower end of the global income ladder since, in 
addition to having less of the proximate factors, such as physical and human capital, 
they lacked those institutions that would have reduced the wide spread economic 
policy excesses of their governments. When populism gained much ground 
immediately after independence in many African countries, its first prey was private 
initiative. Governments, one after another, expropriated private property, levied very 
high tax rates and took similar measures, all of which stifled private investment. 
Present-day Zimbabwe provides us with a textbook example of the mammoth costs 
of absence of institutions that credibly insulate economic objectives from myopic 
political goals.  
The most important common characteristic feature of the string of institutions 
of credible commitment I dealt with in this study, is that all reduce the scope for 
executive discretion. Be it in the form of transferring policy-making prerogative to an 
entity outside the control of the executive (institutions of delegation), or setting 
strong rules of the game (rule of law) or preserving the status quo policies (veto 
players), the positive analysis showed that countries’ differences in terms of these 
institutions directly mapped onto their variations on the economic growth scale. In 
doing so, I strongly assert that the tendency to divide African economic performance 
between the very few successes (i.e. Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa) and the 
rest, is as wrong as denying the fact that the region did, for a long time register 
lacklustre performance as compared to other regions. While I place much emphasis 
on a broad set of political institutions that credibly commit governments to adopt and 
preserve economic growth-friendly policies, it would be naïve to assume that 
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bringing about such institutional change requires a simple transplant. In a nutshell, 
this thesis has shown that unfettered governments, which are unable to credibly 
commit to growth-promoting policies, explain some of Africa’s economic problems 
over the past several decades. 
9.2) Limitations of the study 
 
It is imperative that the findings and discussions presented in this thesis be 
considered in the light of a number of factors. Firstly, this research is not an 
antithesis to another rather dominant branch of research that views African political 
economy outcomes from the perspective of socio-cultural factors such as patronage 
in politics. As is clearly stipulated from the outset, our aim was decidedly to examine 
economic growth implications of formal political institutions of credible commitment 
in Africa. Notwithstanding the fact that I did not use this research systematically to 
disprove any other paradigm on Africa, the study still pinpointed several reasons as 
to why one has viable grounds to casting doubt on other competing variables, such as 
geography and ethnic diversity. Secondly, caution is advised with regard to drawing 
inferences based on the parameter estimates discussed in the study. I were unable to 
subject some of the findings to rigorous tests of robustness, since the available data 
did not allow for such an exercise. It was, in particular, difficult to test whether the 
findings would remain intact for alternations in datasets. Related to this, the very fact 
that I occasionally relied on data from different sources, meant that the compatibility 
between these datasets could be limited. On the other hand, I provided correlation 
values among different indicators so as to partially circumvent this problem.  
Thirdly, a widely observed feature of many political variables is that they 
were not amenable to quantitative measurements. There exists a sizeable subjective 
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element in operationalising such types of variables. Although scholars broadly agree 
on the appropriate conceptualisation of these variables, much room is left for the 
researcher’s discretion and value judgements. One unavoidable consequence of this 
scenario is that the variables measured, in such a way, could be affected by 
measurement error. Fourthly, in certain cases, theoretical stipulations drawn from 
formal political models were not directly amenable into quantitative investigation. 
For instance, we had little way of knowing whether a given tight monetary policy 
emanated because the Central Bank is independent, or because the government itself 
applied self-restraint in its fiscal spending. Finally, this study did not probe into other 
institutions that help to credibly commit governments, including devolution of 
political and fiscal powers to lowers tiers of government as well as delegation of 
policy making prerogative to a regional or global institution. A case in point is given 
by recent political theory, which associates Chinese economic success with a market-
preserving federalism. Delegation to a regional or global institution is also all the 
more important in that, in the current reality whereby regionalism dominates 
multilateralism in international trade, Africa’s best chance of instilling credibility to 
economic policies may lie outside individual country borders.  
9.3. Looking ahead 
 
In the same way that I speak of Africa as being home to a mosaic of ethnic 
and religious groups, one also observes diversity in terms of types and quality of 
political institutions among the countries. Despite broader consensus that reforms in 
political governance hold the key to positively changing the plight of many African 
countries, such views have not been equally matched by research on the types, 
modalities and effects of formal political institutions in Africa. As such, this study 
 329
only scratched the surface, thereby highlighting the need for further research effort 
on these types of institutions in Africa. Certainly, the starting point towards this 
objective would be the establishment of a database on the diverse African political 
institutions. Another direction for research is an investigation of a broader set of 
institutions of credible commitment. In addition to those already studied, I know that 
a country’s joining a regional or multilateral institution often implies the transfer of 
some of its own policy making prerogative. Nevertheless, the implications of such 
political decisions on economic policies, particularly from a commitment perspective, 
have not so far been given much attention. The same could be said of other types of 
political institutions which possess some relevance to credible commitment.  
In a global context, the study highlighted the otherwise contrasting 
implications of the number and diversity of political actors for credible commitment 
and collective action. While in certain situations the existence of multiple veto actors 
in a political system results in adverse policy outcomes, we also understand that, in 
other contexts, the same structure in the political system could lead to better policies. 
Existing research does not tell us where the line of demarcation is with regard to 
situations in which multiple players affect economic policies positively and 
negatively. This leads us to underline another fruitful line of research. In the study, I 
identified two major channels through which the effects of political institutions on 
economic performance filter through. Some of these directly lend commitment to the 
whole set of institutional frameworks in the country, while other types of institutions 
of credible commitment affect policies only. For instance, whether or not the size and 
diversity in preferences of veto players affect economic performance depended on 
the type of status quo policies. If that is the case, then, research on identifying the 
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dynamics between political institutions, economic policies and economic outcomes 
could be very useful. 
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      Appendix A.  Basic Solow variables for an African panel 
data 
 country year cid Income 
Initial 
Income Investment Population
Benin 1960 1 0.011504 6.862664 2.172702 0.501355
Benin 1965 1 0.081577 6.925173 2.090015 0.746955
Benin 1970 1 0.128195 7.006306  2.15131 0.785823
Benin 1975 1 -0.08262 7.059093 2.063322 0.815461
Benin 1980 1 0.013385 7.030168 2.309189 0.840049
Benin 1985 1 -0.1015 7.088208 2.308049 0.859761
Benin 1990 1 0.033622  6.99068 1.971278 0.874688
Benin 1995 1 0.077925 7.030327 2.025432 0.885645
Benin 2000 1 0.072365 7.132074 2.062338 0.969015
Botswana 1960 2    0.998192
Botswana 1965 2    1.069763
Botswana 1970 2 0.474531 7.063048 3.223082 1.103978
Botswana 1975 2 0.231908 7.677567 2.929732 1.162146
Botswana 1980 2 0.201849  7.92614 2.901393 1.204314
Botswana 1985 2 0.323701 8.241255  2.41468 1.234356
Botswana 1990 2 0.084147 8.598279 2.964497 1.254936
Botswana 1995 2 0.065351 8.685788 2.876674 1.268254
Botswana 2000 2 0.221063 8.889646 2.766035 0.161721
Burkina Faso 1960 3 -0.1521 6.643386  1.29013 0.688446
Burkina Faso 1965 3 0.070122 6.470908 1.728338 0.705449
Burkina Faso 1970 3 0.016719 6.537271 2.146548 0.706197
Burkina Faso 1975 3  0.03216  6.54064 2.274261 0.698325
Burkina Faso 1980 3 -0.0147 6.622244 2.461827 0.686339
Burkina Faso 1985 3  0.107937 6.665544 2.262962 0.675113
Burkina Faso 1990 3  0.03005 6.717865 2.200703 0.671697
Burkina Faso 1995 3 0.099484 6.713928 2.445433 0.680362
Burkina Faso 2000 3 0.139705  6.83863 2.226574 0.900807
Burundi 1960 4 -0.09362 6.517095 0.811343 0.526477
Burundi 1965 4 0.001045 6.463201 0.933226  0.70841 
Burundi 1970 4 -0.01396 6.689624  0.61792 0.610308
Burundi 1975 4 0.132778 6.682434 1.234152 0.425255
Burundi 1980 4 -0.03848  6.79565 1.640059 0.230103
Burundi 1985 4  0.053591 6.830507 1.546181 0.060065
Burundi 1990 4 -0.22842  6.9715 1.385538 -0.03794 
Burundi 1995 4 -0.0314 6.745119  1.48101 -0.02721 
Burundi 2000 4 0.088242 6.549422 1.779529 0.669117
Cameroon 1960 5 0.024739 7.573901 1.081572 0.747792
Cameroon 1965 5 -0.01469 7.593974 1.533267 0.874831
Cameroon 1970 5 0.031751 7.574024 1.739061 0.894935
Cameroon 1975 5 0.107824 7.596222 1.755168 0.909146
Cameroon 1980 5 0.332987 7.770713 1.685401 0.924967
Cameroon 1985 5 -0.26951 8.172678 1.741048 0.943065
Cameroon 1990 5 -0.22652 7.900763 1.582783 0.963514
Cameroon 1995 5 0.117951 7.663342  1.40303 0.985909
Cameroon 2000 5 0.092971 7.812674 1.479278 0.771109
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Cape Verde 1960 6 0.012567 7.256269 2.79132 1.07534
Cape Verde 1965 6 0.353345 7.229933 2.470809 1.25367
Cape Verde 1970 6 -0.01047 7.650611 2.702538 1.138004
Cape Verde 1975 6 0.037967 7.521004 2.657601 0.949979
Cape Verde 1980 6 0.255667 7.565255 2.804915 0.721171
Cape Verde 1985 6 0.088324 7.906709 2.669717 0.453785
Cape Verde 1990 6 0.083636 7.960875 2.739861 0.155428
Cape Verde 1995 6 0.251109 8.157032 2.743394 -0.15379
Cape Verde 2000 6 0.026441 8.51386 2.527187 0.974959
Central African Republic 1960 7    0.596127
Central African Republic 1965 7    0.677632
Central African Republic 1970 7 -0.13742 7.034379 2.960194 0.694531
Central African Republic 1975 7 0.147534 6.903577 2.264385 0.712609
Central African Republic 1980 7 -0.03899 6.971096 1.872634 0.730161
Central African Republic 1985 7 -0.00564 6.931179 2.122248 0.74716
Central African Republic 1990 7 -0.25233 6.911727 2.046904 0.763757
Central African Republic 1995 7 0.133119 6.69701 2.093184 0.780275
Central African Republic 2000 7 -0.06288 6.851291 1.506094 0.367904
Chad 1960 8 0.014823 7.040317 1.502698 0.545354
Chad 1965 8 -0.21245 7.07443 1.540877 0.606039
Chad 1970 8 -0.09344 6.898402 1.859677 0.627031
Chad 1975 8 -0.40307 6.905924 2.248216 0.659443
Chad 1980 8 0.136938 6.44109 2.168599 0.679685
Chad 1985 8 0.03402 6.766284 1.968822 0.691619
Chad 1990 8 0.032391 6.724529 1.956624 0.698461
Chad 1995 8 -0.01807 6.799602 1.994534 0.703012
Chad 2000 8 0.063339 6.720835 3.017896 1.102669
Comoros 1960 9 0.266918 7.210567 2.043573  
Comoros 1965 9 0.191032 7.359035 2.359374  
Comoros 1970 9 -0.00727 7.412027 2.75183  
Comoros 1975 9 -0.01675 7.551413 2.342135 0.873556
Comoros 1980 9 0.023721 7.551591 2.866719 0.975812
Comoros 1985 9 0.002021 7.621528 2.543262 0.979892
Comoros 1990 9 -0.09783 7.589305 2.106412 0.948363
Comoros 1995 9 -0.14678 7.415957 2.05681 0.913308
Comoros 2000 9 -0.06159 7.214343 2.273477 0.025484
Congo, Rep, 1960 10 0.01781 6.91721 3.658883 0.966318
Congo, Rep, 1965 10 0.13114 6.954276 3.598761 1.066428
Congo, Rep, 1970 10 0.110999 7.128833 3.432978 1.084317
Congo, Rep, 1975 10 0.220733 7.329376 3.10625 1.100485
Congo, Rep, 1980 10 0.328405 7.666807 3.575918 1.115174
Congo, Rep, 1985 10 -0.17527 7.959521 2.673422 1.127713
Congo, Rep, 1990 10 -0.30843 7.885073 2.287211 1.13748
Congo, Rep, 1995 10 -0.35532 7.676515 1.92187 1.144061
Congo, Rep, 2000 10 0.099318 7.15944 2.346017 1.099372
 333
Appendix A (Contd.) 
Congo, Dem, Rep, 1960 11    1.020187
Congo, Dem, Rep, 1965 11    1.124093
Congo, Dem, Rep, 1970 11 0.049054 7.248938 1.531819 1.120368
Congo, Dem, Rep, 1975 11 -0.15808 7.224112 2.064772 1.08674 
Congo, Dem, Rep, 1980 11 -0.1916 7.059978 2.236564 1.071189
Congo, Dem, Rep, 1985 11 -0.07998 6.866892 2.268507 1.069769
Congo, Dem, Rep, 1990 11 -0.57972 6.883473 2.178504 1.07838 
Congo, Dem, Rep, 1995 11 -0.19682 6.209676 1.76968 1.09315 
Congo, Dem, Rep, 2000 11 0.16181 5.88374 2.341515 0.89812 
Cote d'Ivoire 1960 12 0.224755 6.91721 2.232572 1.286786
Cote d'Ivoire 1965 12 0.194249 6.954276 2.336345 1.372961
Cote d'Ivoire 1970 12 -0.01156 7.128833 2.42007 1.385855
Cote d'Ivoire 1975 12 0.137688 7.329376 2.632043 1.39683 
Cote d'Ivoire 1980 12 0.035289 7.666807 2.127641 1.405814
Cote d'Ivoire 1985 12 0.142674 7.959521 1.23539 1.412018
Cote d'Ivoire 1990 12 -0.18186 7.885073 1.217691 1.414355
Cote d'Ivoire 1995 12 0.079268 7.676515 1.695215 1.412504
Cote d'Ivoire 2000 12 -0.073 7.15944 1.181981 0.775598
Djibouti 1960 13    1.850021
Djibouti 1965 13    1.841217
Djibouti 1970 13    1.823667
Djibouti 1975 13    1.776425
Djibouti 1980 13 -0.10771 7.195937 1.181981 1.750452
Djibouti 1985 13 0.04355 7.344603 1.181981 1.750172
Djibouti 1990 13 -0.28808 7.569861 1.181981 1.772805
Djibouti 1995 13 0.27988 7.646148 1.181981 1.812158
Djibouti 2000 13 -0.01156 7.64676 1.181981 0.727536
Equatorial Guinea 1960 14 0.07598 7.7061 0.798224 0.257103
Equatorial Guinea 1965 14 0.14044 7.760552 1.096552 0.761563
Equatorial Guinea 1970 14 0.24467 7.605263 0.999887 0.473469
Equatorial Guinea 1975 14 0.05632 7.683247 0.620195 -0.53563
Equatorial Guinea 1980 14 -0.12263 8.432652 0.47326  
Equatorial Guinea 1985 14 -0.14394 8.239823 0.553796  
Equatorial Guinea 1990 14 -0.53292 8.247422 1.326371  
Equatorial Guinea 1995 14 1.64442 8.130271 3.578118  
Equatorial Guinea 2000 14 0.57891 8.383854 3.292513 0.951551
Ethiopia 1960 15 0.06916 6.877739 1.252728 0.774528
Ethiopia 1965 15 0.07598 6.962329 1.373186 0.964383
Ethiopia 1970 15 0.04245 7.09484 1.137484 0.974693
Ethiopia 1975 15 0.00674 7.617297 0.83315 0.978846
Ethiopia 1980 15 -0.07848 7.570752 1.15616 0.978218
Ethiopia 1985 15 -0.071 7.436411 1.429602 0.975495
Ethiopia 1990 15 0.25031 7.368327 1.137757 0.973654
Ethiopia 1995 15 0.17427 6.935497 1.56128 0.974496
Ethiopia 2000 15 -0.05359 8.778717 1.386255 0.820005
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Gabon 1960 16 0.432923 5.991665 2.873941 -0.38957 
Gabon 1965 16 0.174634 6.100588 2.330362  
Gabon 1970 16 0.378704 6.172494 2.105797 -0.8907 
Gabon 1975 16 -0.34245 6.193098 1.725914 0.091568
Gabon 1980 16 -0.10913 6.225152 1.678691 0.579189
Gabon 1985 16 -0.13165 6.135478 1.510534 0.879944
Gabon 1990 16 0.046393 6.139302 1.381244 1.073934
Gabon 1995 16 -0.19218 6.409813 1.692419 1.194638
Gabon 2000 16 -0.12034 6.586682 1.848794 0.824825
Gambia, The 1960 17 -0.03619 8.816021 0.577357 1.032798
Gambia, The 1965 17 0.016432 9.339397 0.818051 1.02773 
Gambia, The 1970 17 0.021249 9.582691 0.642655 1.036522
Gambia, The 1975 17 -0.14763 9.932562 1.438291 1.06857 
Gambia, The 1980 17 0.052895 9.66614 2.255908 1.11063 
Gambia, The 1985 17 0.019021 9.54738 2.008943 1.154487
Gambia, The 1990 17 -0.09394 9.47422 2.357096 1.191763
Gambia, The 1995 17 0.180982 9.508351 2.604041 1.217229
Gambia, The 2000 17 -0.018 9.253288 2.253201 1.059903
Ghana 1960 18 0.542255 6.581873 3.638056 1.165657
Ghana 1965 18 0.926781 6.76963 3.063519 0.6549 
Ghana 1970 18 0.170644 6.807128 2.309702 0.70072 
Ghana 1975 18 0.092516 6.90222 2.238037 0.821491
Ghana 1980 18 -0.05762 6.776347 1.552112 0.921896
Ghana 1985 18 0.126961 6.802239 1.495029 0.993247
Ghana 1990 18 0.012345 6.814104 1.691423 1.033432
Ghana 1995 18 -0.0019 6.649244 1.943165 1.043198
Ghana 2000 18 0.033529 6.860517 1.700492 0.598122
Guinea 1960 19 -0.09155 6.020683 1.659789 0.763781
Guinea 1965 19 -0.08444 5.805406 1.836131 0.84118 
Guinea 1970 19 0.025728 6.958429 1.922788 0.825473
Guinea 1975 19 0.026695 6.989142 1.922788 0.757961
Guinea 1980 19 -0.16276 7.040195 1.922788 0.656672
Guinea 1985 19 0.062509 6.92153 2.30518 0.527068
Guinea 1990 19 -0.03345 7.049958 2.317029 0.385387
Guinea 1995 19 0.120908 7.1097 2.110204 0.252948
Guinea 2000 19 0.141141 7.238641 1.530249 0.798813
Guinea-Bissau 1960 20 0.195806 8.030126 2.211913 -1.31152 
Guinea-Bissau 1965 20 0.143471 7.960303 1.919887 -0.59814 
Guinea-Bissau 1970 20 -0.04197 7.747778 2.504365 -0.29015 
Guinea-Bissau 1975 20 -0.14428 7.781381 2.555129 -0.08101 
Guinea-Bissau 1980 20 0.259717 7.840942 2.751914 0.152671
Guinea-Bissau 1985 20 0.021556 7.651985 2.868186 0.389206
Guinea-Bissau 1990 20 -0.03186 7.697893 3.076514 0.612668
Guinea-Bissau 1995 20 -0.15482 7.724226 2.572767 0.813792
Guinea-Bissau 2000 20 -0.2669 7.842326 1.748543 1.061126
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Kenya 1960 21 0.038793 6.19984 2.140637 1.155989 
Kenya 1965 21 0.043805 6.454097 2.305866 1.197004 
Kenya 1970 21 0.07503 6.538212 2.877265 1.20901 
Kenya 1975 21 0.05802 6.633147 2.601354 1.222295 
Kenya 1980 21 -0.06335 6.229792 2.488424 1.236033 
Kenya 1985 21 0.145842 6.448794 2.362638 1.250712 
Kenya 1990 21 -0.07144 6.474477 2.115814 1.267047 
Kenya 1995 21 -0.0219 6.456157 2.244111 1.284876 
Kenya 2000 21 -0.03979 6.636471 2.165007 0.736733 
Lesotho 1960 22 0.199848 7.072736 1.129233 0.631682 
Lesotho 1965 22 0.015707 7.130299 1.925057 0.658043 
Lesotho 1970 22 0.249999 7.048595 2.273764 0.666022 
Lesotho 1975 22 0.251357 7.076823 3.069197 0.672361 
Lesotho 1980 22 -0.06104 7.149783 2.766038 0.682065 
Lesotho 1985 22 0.092314 7.051856 2.775112 0.695634 
Lesotho 1990 22 0.086061 7.210227 3.482107 0.713048 
Lesotho 1995 22 0.194318 7.155225 3.314576 0.733878 
Lesotho 2000 22 0.090585 7.144975 3.087939 -0.00832 
Liberia 1960 23    1.039854 
Liberia 1965 23    1.091372 
Liberia 1970 23 0.014499 6.356021 1.880982 1.098972 
Liberia 1975 23 0.098608 6.557247 2.497591 1.103898 
Liberia 1980 23 -0.02085 6.558212 1.858872 1.107356 
Liberia 1985 23 -0.53234 6.663414 1.196494 1.109808 
Liberia 1990 23 -1.17196 7.105417 1.151097 1.112012 
Liberia 1995 23 0.874295 7.083061 1.181727 1.114569 
Liberia 2000 23 -0.32173 7.183856 1.181727 0.96293 
Madagascar 1960 24 -0.00126 7.31442 1.409437 0.967202 
Madagascar 1965 24 0.07808 7.5142 1.538155 0.886014 
Madagascar 1970 24 -0.06512 7.603005 1.520592 0.876157 
Madagascar 1975 24 -0.05014 7.402634 1.426528 0.887291 
Madagascar 1980 24 -0.15935 7.449318 1.308499 0.909163 
Madagascar 1985 24 -0.04256 7.400278 1.311688 0.936328 
Madagascar 1990 24 -0.08163 6.316081 1.088044 0.961743 
Madagascar 1995 24 -0.03801 5.139029 1.067853 0.980948 
Madagascar 2000 24 -0.09162 6.157911 1.643368 1.077913 
Malawi 1960 25 -0.00305 7.14481 1.645628 0.882249 
Malawi 1965 25 0.06839 7.117595 2.147996 0.927633 
Malawi 1970 25 0.25602 7.230563 2.871953 0.959692 
Malawi 1975 25 0.13433 7.145299 2.834796 1.025206 
Malawi 1980 25 -0.002 7.068351 2.349132 1.062207 
Malawi 1985 25 -0.08121 6.903336 1.920191 1.081039 
Malawi 1990 25 0.18135 6.822905 1.919149 1.094092 
Malawi 1995 25 0.00514 6.736219 1.625677 1.108663 
Malawi 2000 25 -0.04353 6.71281 1.838724 0.743698 
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Mali 1960 26 -0.28124 6.132226 1.741759 0.669965 
Mali 1965 26 -0.00235 6.208872 2.261409 0.77223 
Mali 1970 26 -0.01573 6.176865 2.199176 0.790804 
Mali 1975 26 0.14856 6.438296 2.384679 0.826268 
Mali 1980 26 -0.08211 6.578834 2.197881 0.822307 
Mali 1985 26 0.18208 6.612149 2.024987 0.792771 
Mali 1990 26 0.06505 6.526392 2.034782 0.757967 
Mali 1995 26 0.20278 6.718808 2.023611 0.732469 
Mali 2000 26 0.12274 6.732199 1.767937 0.89736 
Mauritania 1960 27    0.842991 
Mauritania 1965 27    0.871763 
Mauritania 1970 27 0.03405 7.160986 2.534774 0.876176 
Mauritania 1975 27 -0.00187 7.239265 2.766189 0.880282 
Mauritania 1980 27 -0.08003 7.146284 2.950704 0.883776 
Mauritania 1985 27 0.06994 7.065724 2.835351 0.887306 
Mauritania 1990 27 0.07571 7.12206 2.29099 0.891488 
Mauritania 1995 27 0.06893 7.235266 2.122239 0.896656 
Mauritania 2000 27 -0.06215 7.327439 1.972497 0.964413 
Mauritius 1960 28 0.28593 8.205642 2.906692 1.025203 
Mauritius 1965 28 -0.11215 8.437918 2.48804 0.700585 
Mauritius 1970 28 0.21603 8.348469 2.503861 0.642165 
Mauritius 1975 28 0.14406 8.673446 2.666812 0.589351 
Mauritius 1980 28 0.10499 8.739713 2.160273 0.540442 
Mauritius 1985 28 0.25679 8.903488 2.3588 0.499552 
Mauritius 1990 28 0.15884 9.198913 2.482355 0.472492 
Mauritius 1995 28 0.12535 9.426118 2.392965 0.462115 
Mauritius 2000 28 0.11439 9.62384 2.440714 0.046063 
Mozambique 1960 29 0.08652 6.731412 0.361523 0.81038 
Mozambique 1965 29 0.13859 6.808333 0.566418 0.885164 
Mozambique 1970 29 0.11716 6.909384 0.912283 0.890803 
Mozambique 1975 29 -0.03171 7.041175 0.912283 0.877025 
Mozambique 1980 29 -0.17352 7.032289 0.890274 0.851295 
Mozambique 1985 29 0.27531 6.728437 1.103305 0.823674 
Mozambique 1990 29 -0.03518 7.018715 1.157416 0.810134 
Mozambique 1995 29 0.15981 6.795281 1.579647 0.819843 
Mozambique 2000 29 0.28398 6.996846 1.728421 0.750846 
Namibia 1960 30    0.881972 
Namibia 1965 30    0.942148 
Namibia 1970 30 -0.08061 8.567209 2.534757 0.958073 
Namibia 1975 30 0.03074 8.527565 2.51496 0.987105 
Namibia 1980 30 0.00404 8.534839 2.678025 1.021529 
Namibia 1985 30 0.02327 8.483504 2.011745 1.051337 
Namibia 1990 30 0.08220 8.41285 2.362343 1.063996 
Namibia 1995 30 0.00437 8.495963 2.431128 1.053254 
Namibia 2000 30 0.05321 8.56951 2.317767 0.870323 
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Niger 1960 31 0.05571 7.06256 0.941324 0.954626
Niger 1965 31 -0.12204 7.154068 0.85671 1.002817
Niger 1970 31 -0.27602 7.006623 1.219972 1.013725
Niger 1975 31 0.12762 6.949233 2.170912 1.027078
Niger 1980 31 -0.17984 7.119668 2.050694 1.04125
Niger 1985 31 -0.05233 6.945215 1.979558 1.056014
Niger 1990 31 -0.15489 6.909334 1.698851 1.071003
Niger 1995 31 0.05096 6.733176 1.89055 1.085818
Niger 2000 31 -0.00146 6.693881 2.210684 1.142193
Nigeria 1960 32 0.00217 7.008306 1.086407 0.970581
Nigeria 1965 32 -0.1185 6.934105 1.47432 1.005668
Nigeria 1970 32 0.20150 6.941847 1.923274 1.012038
Nigeria 1975 32 -0.10418 7.089327 2.429038 1.018457
Nigeria 1980 32 -0.11186 6.910482 2.254252 1.024872
Nigeria 1985 32 0.06033 6.859604 1.331347 1.031919
Nigeria 1990 32 -0.00016 6.966826 1.439442 1.040407
Nigeria 1995 32 0.11035 6.851629 1.623402 1.050658
Nigeria 2000 32 0.11944 6.97908 1.547435 0.90211
Rwanda 1960 33 -0.22961 6.92745 0.13122 1.102441
Rwanda 1965 33 0.17452 6.741713 0.24885 1.158771
Rwanda 1970 33 -0.07351 6.961694 0.51753 1.166568
Rwanda 1975 33 0.29501 6.825308 0.97822 1.1712 
Rwanda 1980 33 -0.0501 7.128664 0.9645 1.176387
Rwanda 1985 33 0.00074 7.09821 1.05963 1.181691
Rwanda 1990 33 -0.6536 6.907995 1.11135 1.186814
Rwanda 1995 33 0.14901 6.733426 1.13485 1.191432
Rwanda 2000 33 0.24593 6.925664 1.16094 1.062989
Sao  Tome & Principe 1960 34    0.44059
Sao Tome & Principe 1965 34    0.343098
Sao Tome & Principe 1970 34 0.12717 6.913857 3.466765 0.329237
Sao Tome & Principe 1975 34 0.45937 7.108187 3.002425 0.563324
Sao Tome & Principe 1980 34 -0.37901 7.504419 3.230556 0.745396
Sao Tome & Principe 1985 34 0.09991 7.203696 2.995549 0.892214
Sao Tome & Principe 1990 34 -0.12389 7.293215 2.661829 1.034024
Sao Tome & Principe 1995 34 -0.0223 7.147197 2.862641 1.144428
Sao Tome & Principe 2000 34 0.01644 7.170258 2.745947 0.760905
Senegal 1960 35 -0.08696 7.481899 1.256595 0.962159
Senegal 1965 35 -0.12098 7.395298 1.396438 1.013079
Senegal 1970 35 -0.07503 7.310477 1.767925 1.025354
Senegal 1975 35 0.02004 7.278484 1.642576 1.039027
Senegal 1980 35 -0.01552 7.252621 1.673678 1.052917
Senegal 1985 35 -0.00621 7.289051 1.708648 1.065591
Senegal 1990 35 -0.06401 7.273752 1.81622 1.075148
Senegal 1995 35 0.11486 7.193265 1.888157 1.080658
Senegal 2000 35 -0.11082 7.359703 2.120059 0.912997
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Sierra Leone 1960 36    0.497643 
Sierra Leone 1965 36    0.587698 
Sierra Leone 1970 36 0.02633 7.190209 1.239527 0.608042 
Sierra Leone 1975 36 -0.02669 7.223456 1.241247 0.630173 
Sierra Leone 1980 36 -0.01213 7.202825 1.255613 0.652572 
Sierra Leone 1985 36 -0.16212 7.250273 1.260099 0.673544 
Sierra Leone 1990 36 -0.26324 7.072346 1.144784 0.690852 
Sierra Leone 1995 36 -0.35591 6.853743 0.557858 0.70332 
Sierra Leone 2000 36 0.04175 6.527563 1.166054 0.702993 
Somalia 1960 37    0.767689 
Somalia 1965 37    1.054301 
Somalia 1970 37 0.06720 7.220849 1.746782 0.948053 
Somalia 1975 37 -0.09857 7.235446 2.159432 0.543752 
Somalia 1980 37 -0.13596 7.032457 1.982567 0.210513 
Somalia 1985 37 0.12721 6.780785 2.142269 0.220675 
Somalia 1990 37 -0.2838 6.902682 2.271735 0.584223 
Somalia 1995 37 -0.07482 6.600918 2.165355 1.033426 
Somalia 2000 37 -0.0135 6.524487 2.203635 1.215362 
South Africa 1960 38 0.116111 8.50251 2.019533 1.016548 
South Africa 1965 38 0.097266 8.655995 2.355953 0.79739 
South Africa 1970 38 0.026847 8.772125 2.524577 0.790205 
South Africa 1975 38 0.053147 8.835542 2.392879 0.801843 
South Africa 1980 38 0.027537 8.933018 2.429548 0.815234 
South Africa 1985 38 0.004449 8.943355 2.025957 0.826779 
South Africa 1990 38 -0.05414 8.950863 1.896762 0.834299 
South Africa 1995 38 0.075996 8.900565 2.094927 0.836789 
South Africa 2000 38 0.105994 9.015062 2.076634 0.523122 
Sudan 1960 39    0.847903 
Sudan 1965 39    0.891507 
Sudan 1970 39 0.097823 6.905342 2.657188 0.911788 
Sudan 1975 39 0.003571 7.006804 2.904917 0.943933 
Sudan 1980 39 -0.11877 6.968512 2.642616 0.981035 
Sudan 1985 39 0.061411 6.876708 2.212781 1.018749 
Sudan 1990 39 0.066421 6.95585 2.006201 1.052092 
Sudan 1995 39 -0.15356 7.041867 2.15001 1.078257 
Sudan 2000 39 0.116965 6.954362 2.405311 0.769276 
Swaziland 1960 40    0.959047 
Swaziland 1965 40    0.922862 
Swaziland 1970 40 0.399773 7.932122 2.618925 0.931123 
Swaziland 1975 40 0.198832 8.4102 2.421978 0.937445 
Swaziland 1980 40 -0.00728 8.617337 2.447413 0.956058 
Swaziland 1985 40 0.251741 8.607558 2.387771 0.982976 
Swaziland 1990 40 -0.0203 8.907959 2.223611 1.014566 
Swaziland 1995 40 0.116447 8.908678 2.157489 1.047833 
Swaziland 2000 40 0.078241 9.049823 1.874958 0.729584 
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Tanzania 1960 41 0.121388 6.218759 0.706476 1.066235 
Tanzania 1965 41 0.095762 6.323158 1.081415 1.112478 
Tanzania 1970 41 -0.01972 6.355361 1.595848 1.118217 
Tanzania 1975 41 -0.01597 6.363425 1.651667 1.118756 
Tanzania 1980 41 -0.11235 6.346426 1.647373 1.116555 
Tanzania 1985 41 -0.01631 6.219456 1.821351 1.113208 
Tanzania 1990 41 -0.04798 6.213087 2.060538 1.110867 
Tanzania 1995 41 0.522279 6.186147 1.597946 1.110945 
Tanzania 2000 41 0.110746 6.705223 1.365895 0.791536 
Togo 1960 42 0.138783 6.724529 1.70801 0.392417 
Togo 1965 42 0.277283 6.9403 1.938158 1.323967 
Togo 1970 42 0.009271 7.176797 2.031051 1.433929 
Togo 1975 42 0.06245 7.163374 2.671676 1.415317 
Togo 1980 42 -0.25728 7.191753 2.41621 1.352238 
Togo 1985 42 -0.01133 6.838105 2.563486 1.246525 
Togo 1990 42 -0.02904 6.812697 2.302174 1.092526 
Togo 1995 42 -0.03372 6.800627 2.200615 0.87138 
Togo 2000 42 -0.06154 6.713163 2.266007 0.969294 
Uganda 1960 43 0.058798 6.77213 0.821427 1.388047 
Uganda 1965 43 0.11785 6.845018 1.083898 1.446693 
Uganda 1970 43 -0.01908 6.964296 0.809834 1.39032 
Uganda 1975 43 -0.27366 6.937993 -0.00696 1.319821 
Uganda 1980 43 -0.02002 6.615436 0.74919 1.236399 
Uganda 1985 43 -0.01099 6.522122 1.147495 1.148423 
Uganda 1990 43 0.236526 6.563856 1.096704 1.069308 
Uganda 1995 43 0.17759 6.76148 1.273706 1.009919 
Uganda 2000 43 0.051201 6.963937 1.186889 1.056368 
Zambia 1960 44 0.047187 6.813917 3.875759 1.031681 
Zambia 1965 44 -0.15612 7.073439 4.261472 1.107416 
Zambia 1970 44 0.026316 7.171403 4.514783 1.099591 
Zambia 1975 44 -0.02659 7.222281 3.536621 1.077501 
Zambia 1980 44 0.003457 7.19173 2.240074 1.061835 
Zambia 1985 44 0.020721 7.110361 1.67657 1.056143 
Zambia 1990 44 -0.17814 7.014401 1.620528 1.062113 
Zambia 1995 44 0.007305 6.720594 2.411373 1.079492 
Zambia 2000 44 0.089047 6.763481 2.724003 0.604685 
Zimbabwe 1960 45 -0.02977 7.739855 2.514453 1.188884 
Zimbabwe 1965 45 0.044133 7.758722 2.674241 1.202362 
Zimbabwe 1970 45 0.214256 7.97055 2.80132 1.205662 
Zimbabwe 1975 45 -0.08468 8.136618 2.416738 1.212669 
Zimbabwe 1980 45 -0.04515 8.079575 2.399162 1.222331 
Zimbabwe 1985 45 0.10539 8.027878 2.455524 1.230894 
Zimbabwe 1990 45 -0.08455 8.146289 2.578181 1.233253 
Zimbabwe 1995 45 0.10950 7.967499 2.585148 1.227285 
Zimbabwe 2000 45 -0.28903 8.088233 2.430139 0.349472 
NB. To construct these variables, we divided the temporal 
dimension of data into nine equal time periods, i.e.1960-
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64, 1965-69,1970-74,1975-80,1980-84,1985-89,1990-
1994,1995-1999,and 2000-2004.This helps to purge any 
short-run fluctuations in the variables. Income is the 
change in log of real GDP per capita between the start 
and end of period for each time episode, Initial Income 
is real GDP per capita at the start of each time bracket, 
Investment refers to the natural logarithm of the share 
of investment in real GDP per capita averaged over each 
time bracket, and Population is a natural logarithm of 
the sum of population growth augmented by 0.05. This 
latter variable accounts for the assumption of constant 
technological progress and depreciation rate. 
Source: Author’s calculation using data from PENN World 
Tables. 
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Income Coefficient Std.Err. t P>t 
Initial Income -0.092330 0.0310267 -2.90 0.003
Investment  0.103631 0.0208223  4.98 0.000
Population -0.083727 0.0359921 -2.30 0.021
Benin  0.520809 0.2349878  2.22 0.027
Botswana  0.773019 0.2756562  2.80 0.005
Burkina  0.490029 0.2232457  2.20 0.029
Burundi  0.501415 0.2191968  2.29 0.023
Cameroon  0.649919 0.2547896  2.55 0.011
Cape Verde  0.621264 0.2588389  2.40 0.017
Central Africa R   0.443430 0.2326588  1.91 0.058
Chad  0.428603 0.2280373  1.88 0.061
Comoros  0.462832 0.2530513  1.83 0.068
Congo (DR.)  0.358379 0.2314336  1.55 0.122
Congo  R.  0.476995 0.2530754  1.88 0.060
Cote D’Ivoire  0.658571 0.2499769  2.63 0.009
Djibouti  0.682253 0.2571436  2.65 0.008
Equatorial 
Guinea 
 0.832871 0.2583892  3.22 0.001
Ethiopia  0.678419 0.2441967  2.78 0.006
Gabon  0.413921 0.2091617  1.98 0.049
Gambia  0.792554 0.3081911  2.57 0.011
Ghana  0.678224 0.2287666  2.96 0.003
Guinea  0.479925 0.2265111  2.12 0.035
Guinea Bissau  0.470060 0.2562103  1.83 0.067
Kenya  0.467045 0.2229524  2.09 0.037
Lesotho  0.557673 0.2392349  2.33 0.020
Liberia  0.404201 0.2302128  1.76 0.080
Madagascar  0.526045 0.2303098  2.28 0.023
Malawi  0.564485 0.2356040  2.40 0.017
Mali  0.485162 0.2182863  2.22 0.027
Mauritania  0.494805 0.2443054  2.03 0.044
Mauritius  0.748360 0.2891365  2.59 0.010
Mozambique  0.691794 0.2276362  3.04 0.003
Namibia  0.637092 0.2835406  2.25 0.025
Niger  0.495031 0.2331523  2.12 0.034
Nigeria  0.569568 0.2327572  2.45 0.015
Rwanda  0.635468 0.2305398  2.76 0.006
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
 0.444421 0.2464222  1.80 0.072
Senegal  0.547109 0.2437707  2.24 0.025
Sierra Leone  0.482425 0.2330331  2.07 0.039
Somalia  0.417828 0.2324796  1.80 0.073
South Africa  0.705226 0.2892762  2.44 0.015
Sudan  0.482465 0.2379154  2.03 0.043
Swaziland  0.782584 0.2862241  2.73 0.007
Tanzania  0.589004 0.2144501  2.75 0.006
Togo  0.512827 0.2355843  2.18 0.030
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Uganda .6695577 0.2272231  2.95 0.003
Zambia .4047249 .2410963 1.68 0.094
Zimbabwe .5616613 .2680894 2.10 0.037
NB. This table presents coefficient estimates of the 
basic Solow model variables as well as country controls. 
Estimation is by fixed-effects model. 
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Appendix C African cross-sectional economic growth model 
variables 
country Income InvestmentPopulation
Initial 
Income Openness H(1) H(2) Region
Benin 7.132074 2.022871 8.768481 6.99068 3.985194 2.34 2.1 1 
Botswana 8.889646 2.653946 7.363749 8.598279 4.564489 6.28 5.35 0 
Burkina Faso 6.83863 2.269028 9.410613 6.717865 3.853985   1 
Burundi 6.549422 1.710188 8.650624 6.9715 3.045984 1.38 1.23 0 
Cameroon 7.812674 1.371181 9.601817 7.900763 3.869786 3.54 3.17 1 
Cape Verde 8.51386 2.480731 5.994809 7.960875 4.444373   0 
Central Africa R. 6.851291 1.693779 8.160944 6.911727 3.935237 2.53 2.11 1 
Chad 6.720835 2.014903 9.03823 6.724529 4.213957   1 
Comoros 7.214343 2.086914 6.360266 7.589305 4.045317   0 
CongoDR 5.88374 1.951608 10.85534 6.883473 2.481329 3.03 3.18 0 
CongoR 7.15944 2.248129 7.940755 7.885073 4.429634 5.14 4.68 1 
Cote d'Ivoire 7.683247 1.625311 9.671908 7.760552 4.234179   1 
Djibouti 8.383854 0.887891 6.065691 8.247422 5.034171   0 
Ethiopia 6.586682 1.12493 11.04534 6.139302 3.405023  1.15 0 
Equatorial Guinea 8.778717 3.510948 6.16165 7.368327 4.796192   1 
Gabon 9.253288 1.740466 7.109013 9.47422 4.647949   1 
Gambia 6.860517 2.119864 7.220462 6.814104 5.220634 2.31 1.86 0 
Ghana 7.238641 1.619388 9.878643 7.049958 4.508644 3.89 4.01 0 
Guinea 7.842326 2.061787 9.064385 7.697893 3.874024   0 
Guinea Bissau 6.636471 1.599388 7.153255 6.474477 4.607354 0.84  1 
Kenya 7.144975 2.173615 10.31924 7.210227 4.067255 4.2 3.99 0 
Lesotho 7.5142 3.132446 7.521226 7.183856 5.053991 4.23 4.47 0 
Liberia 6.157911 1.181727 8.05484 6.316081 4.057804 2.45 2.26 0 
Madagascar 6.71281 1.415853 9.649013 6.822905 3.893379   0 
Malawi 6.732199 1.728109 9.294092 6.526392 4.208884 3.2 2.58 0 
Mali 6.953417 1.843719 9.274758 6.761816 4.044529 0.88 0.76 1 
Mauritania 7.327439 1.9947 7.889032 7.12206 4.595863 2.42 1.94 0 
Mauritius 9.62384 2.497329 7.072736 9.198914 4.827096 6 5.55 0 
Mozambique 6.996846 1.88707 9.779773 7.018715 3.787383 1.11 1.19 0 
Namibia 8.56951 2.529721 7.510036 8.41285 4.616124   0 
Niger 6.693881 2.025513 9.227557 8.41285 3.783524 1.02 0.82 1 
Nigeria 6.97908 1.353254 11.72602 6.909334 4.034936   0 
Rwanda 6.925664 1.308333 8.90987 6.966826 4.00142 2.56 2.03 0 
Sao Tome & Principe 7.170258 2.757475 5.074424 6.907995 4.675695   0 
Senegal 7.359703 1.591274 9.188538 7.293215 4.418617 2.55 2.23 1 
Sierra Leone 6.527563 1.316408 8.556926 7.273752 3.311247 2.4 1.99 0 
South Africa 9.015062 2.043814 10.65376 7.072346 3.877772 6.14 7.87 0 
Sudan 6.954362 2.388763 10.46538 8.950864 3.082074 2.14 1.91 0 
Swaziland 9.049823 2.122262 7.021245 6.95585 4.958043 6.01 5.73 0 
Tanzania 6.705223 1.264127 10.42726 8.907959 3.847682 2.71  0 
Togo 6.713163 2.24071 8.523727 6.213087 4.384693 3.33 2.83 1 
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Uganda 6.963937 1.141033 10.06458 6.812697 3.541994 3.51 2.95 0
Zambia 6.763481 2.552565 9.189988 6.563856 4.035252 5.46 5.43 0
Zimbabwe 8.088233 2.519308 9.408037 7.014401 4.129585 5.35 4.88 0
NB. Income refers to the mean of the natural log of real 
GDP per capita between 1990-2003, Investment is the mean 
of the natural log of share of investment in Income, 
Population is the mean of the natural log of population 
over same period, Openness is the mean of the natural log 
of the share of exports plus imports in Income, Initial 
income is the natural log of Income at start of period, 
H(1) and H(2) refer to number of average schooling years 
for the 15-plus and 20-plus population, and Region is a 
dummy for membership in BCEAO or BEAC. We source H(1) and 
H(2) from Barro and Lee (2000) and draw on PENN World 
Tables for others. 
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Appendix D. Country notes on Central Banks Governors in 
Africa 
Banque Centrale des Etats de l' Afrique de l' Ouest (BCEAO) was established in 
1962 and has had the following five governors: R. Julienne(1962-1974), A. 
Fadiga(1974-1988), A.D. Ouattara (1988-1990), C.K. Banny (1990-2005), P-H. 
Dacoury-Tabley (2005-Present). Information is available at: 
http://www.bceao.int/internet/bcweb.nsf/french.htm?OpenFrameset 
Banque des Etats de l' Afrique Centrale was established 1972. Its governors have 
been: C. Joudiou (1973-1978), C. Ove Mba (1978-1990), F. Mamaleplot (1990-
2007), P. Andizimbe (2007-Present). Information is available at 
http://www.beac.int/index.html   
Botswana: Established in 1975, the Bank of Botswana has had seven governors. 
They are: H.C.L. Hermans (1975-1978), B.C. Laevitt (1978-1980), F.G. Mogae 
(1980-1982), C.N. Kikonyogo (1982-1987), H.C.L. Hermans (1987-1997), B. 
Goalathe (1997-1999), L.K. Mohohlo (1999-Present). Information available at: 
http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/article.php?articleid=338 
Cape Verde: Since its establishment in 1975, the Banco de Cabo Verde have had the 
following governors: C.V. Santas (1976-1988), A.A. de Luz (1989-1992), O.M. 
Sequeira (1992-2005), C.A. de Burgo (2005-Present). Information drawn from 
http://www.pjsymes.com.au/articles/capeverde.htm 
Ethiopia: Between 1963 and now, the National Bank of Ethiopia have had the 
following eight governors: M. Lemma (1959-1974), T. Degefe (1981-1983), L. 
Tekeher (1983-1985), T. Gebre Kidan (1985-1994), B. Tamirat (1994-1999), L. 
Berhanu (1999-2002), D. Jale (2002-2005), T. Atnafu (2005-Present). We draw 
information through an interview with public relations officers in the Bank. The first 
governor’s tenure dates back before the official date of the Bank’s establishment 
since for those years the Bank also undertook commercial banking services. 
Ghana: Established on 4th March 1957, the Bank of Ghana has had the following 
eleven governors: A. Eggleston (1957-1959), H. Kessels (1959-1962), W.M.Q. Halm 
(1962-1965), A. Adomako (1965-1968), J.H. Frimpong-Ansah (1968-1973), A. 
Nikoi (1973-1977), A.E.K. Ashiabor (1977-1983), J.J. Addo (1983-1987), G.K. 
Agama (1988-1997), K. Duffor (1997-2001), P.A. Acquah (2001-Present). 
Information available at http://www.bog.gov.gh/index/php?linkid=268#599 
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Kenya: The Central Bank of Kenya was established in 1966. Its governors include: L. 
Baranski (1966), D. Ndegwa (1966-1982), P. Ndegwa (1982-1988), E. Kotut (1988-
1993), M. Cheserem (1993-2001), N. Nyagah (2001-2003), A. Mullei (2003-2007), 
N.S. Ndung'u (2007-Present). Information available at: 
http://www.eastandard.net/InsidePage.php?id=1143994847&cid=159 We also 
appreciate the generous support of the former governor of the Bank, Dr. Andrew 
Mullei, in providing us information. 
Lesotho: Established in 1978, the Central Bank of Lesotho began its operations in 
1980. Its governors have been: K. Molemohi (1979-1982), M. Maruping (1982-
1988), S. Schoenberg (1988-1997), M. Matekane (1997-2006), M. Senaoana (2006-
Present). Information available at: 
http://www.lesotho.gov.ls/articles/2005/Brief_History_CBL.htm 
Madagascar: Banque Centrale de Madagascar was established in 1974, more than 
ten years after the country left the CFA franc zone. Its governors have been: L.M. 
Rajaobelina (1973-1983), R. Randriamaholy (1984-1988), B. Razafimanjato (1988-
1993), R.J. Ravelomanana (1993-1994), G.E. Ravelojaona (1996-2007), F. 
Rasamoely (2007-Present). Information drawn from: http://www.banque-
centrale.mg/index.php?id=ml_9#gv 
Malawi: The Reserve Bank of Malawi was established in 1964 and has had ten 
governors since. They are: A.E. Perrin (1968), D.E. Thomson (1968-1971), J.Z.U. 
Tembo (1971-1984), L.C. Chaziya (1984-1986), J.C. Hara (1986-1988), H.J. 
Lesshafft (1988-1992), F.Z. Pelekamoyo (1992-1995), M.A.P. Chikaonda (1995-
2000), E.E. Ngalande (2000-2005), V. Mbewe (2005-Present). Information available 
at: http://www.rbm.mw/general_info/index.asp 
Mauritius: The Bank of Mauritius was established in September 1967. Its governors 
include: A. Beejadhur (1967-1972), G. Bunwaree (1973-1982), I. Ramphul (1982-
1996), M.D. Maraye (1996-1998), R.B. Roi (1998-2006), R. Bheenick (2007-
Present). For information, See Bheenick (2007) in Bibliography. 
Mozambique: Banco De Moçambique was established in May, 1975. It has had six 
governors since. They are: A. Cassimo (1975-1978), S. Viera (1978-1981), P. Ratilal 
(1981-1986), E. Comiche (1986-1991), A.A. Malelane (1991-2005), E.G. Gove 
(2005-Present). Information is available at: 
http://www.bancomoc,mz/documents/DOI/Governors.pdf 
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Namibia: Established in 1990, the Bank of Namibia has had four governors (one 
Dutch, one Swedish, one Malaysian and one Namibian). They are: W.L. Bernard 
(1990-1991), E. Karlsson (1992-1993), J. Ahmad (1994-1996), T.K. Alweendo 
(1997-Present). Information available at: 
http://www.bon.com.na/Content/TopLevelItems/AboutUs/History/aspx 
Nigeria: The Central Bank of Nigeria was established in 1959. It has had the 
following nine governors: R.P. Fenton (1958-1963), A.A. Mai-Bornu (1963-1967), 
C.N. Isong (1967-1975), M.A. Ciroma (1975-1977), O.O. Vincent (1977-1982), A.A. 
Ahmed (1982-1993), A.A. Ogwuma (1993-1999), J.O. Sanusi (1999-2004), C.C. 
Soludo (2004-Present). Information is available at: 
http://www.cenbank.org/AboutCBN/allgovernors.asp 
Rwanda: The National Bank of Rwanda was established in 1966. Its governors 
include: J.A. Brandon (1964-1965), Hattori (1965-1971), J.B. Birara (1971-1985), A. 
Ruzindana (1985-1990), D. Ntirugirimbabazi (1991-1994), G. Niyitegeka (1994-
1995), F. Mutemberezi (1996-2002), F. Kanimba (2002-Present). Information is 
available at: http://www.bnr.rw/governance.aspex 
Sao Tome & Principe: Banco Central de S. Tomé e Prìncipe has had the following 
five governors: A.C. David (1992-1994), C.Q.B. De Sousa (1995-1999), D.C. 
Silveira (1999-2006), A.A. De Carvalho (2006-2008), M. De Sousa (2008-Present). 
Information is available at: http://www.bcstp.st/Banco/Historical.pdf 
South Africa: In its eighty-eight years existence, the South African Reserve Bank 
has had eight governors. They are: W.H. Clegg (1920-1931), J. Postmus (1932-1945), 
M.H. de Kock (1945-1962), G. Rissik (1962-1967), T.W. de Jongh (1967-1980), 
G.P.C. de Kock (1981-1989), C.L. Stals (1989-1999), T.T. Mboweni (2000-Present). 
Information is available at: http://www.reservebank.co.za/  
Sudan: Established in 1960, the Bank of Sudan has had fourteen governors. They are: 
M.H. A. Beheiry (1959-1963), E. Elfeel (1964-1967), A. Mayrgani (1967-1970), A. 
Hassan (1970-1971), A.A.M. Aburiesh (1971-1972), I.M.A. Nimir (1973-1980), E.H. 
Belail (1980-1983), F.I. Elmagbool (1983-1985), I. E-M. Mekkihamad (1985-1988), 
M.E. Elshaikh (1988-1990), E.S. Elshaikh (1990-1993), S.M. Hassan (1993-1996), A. 
H. Ahmed (1996-1998), S.M. Hassan (1998-Present). Information is available at: 
http://www.cbos.gov.sd/english/id/oldgov_e.htm 
Tanzania: Established in 1966, the Bank of Tanzania has had six governors. They 
are: E.L. Mtei (1966-1974), C. Nyirabu (1974-1989), G. Ruthinda (1989-1993), I.M. 
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Rashidi (1993-1998), D.T.S. Ballali (1998-2008), B. Ndulu (2008-Present). 
Information is available at: http://www.bot.tz.org/AboutBOT/Former_Governors.htm 
Uganda: The Bank of Uganda has had nine governors during the forty-two years of 
its existence. They are: J. Mubiru (1966-1971), S. Kiingi (1971-1973), Onegi-Obel 
(1973-1978), H. Kajura (1978), N. Gideon (1979-1980), L. Kibirango (1981-1986), S. 
Kuggundu (1986-1990), C.N. Kikonyogo (1990-2000), E.T. Mutebile (2001-Present). 
Information is available at 
http://www.bou.or.ug/bouwebsite/opencms/bou/about/org_and_governors.html 
Zambia: Established in 1964, the Bank of Zambia has had thirteen governors. They 
are: H.C. Harret (1964-1967), J.B. Zulu (1967-1970), V.S. Musakanya (1970-1972), 
B.R. Kuwani (1972-1976), L.J. Mwananshiku (1976-1981), B.R. Kuwani (1981-
1984), D.A.R. Phiri (1984-1986), L. Chivuno (1986-1987), F.X. Nkhoma (1987-
1989), J.A. Bussieres (1990-1992), D. Mulaisho (1992-1995), J. Mwanza (1995-
2002), C.M. Fundanga (2002-Present). Information is available at 
http://www.boz.zm 
Zimbabwe: The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe existed since 1956. The names and 
tenures of some of its governors, only of those information is available, are as 
follows: K. Moyana (1983-1993), L. Tsumba (1993-2003), G. Gono (2003-Present). 
We use different press issues available online to source the material. 
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Appendix E Country notes on Central Banks legislations in 
Africa 
Below are the relevant Central Bank legislations for the countries under 
considerations. In certain instances (e.g. Cape Verde and Rwanda), only major points 
of the legislations are highlighted in the source. Sources and detail information are 
provided in the appendix on African Central Bank websites.  
Banque Centrale des Etats de l' Afrique de l' Ouest (BCEAO):-Traité Constituant 
l'union Monétaire Ouest Africane (1973), Art. 15-21. 
Banque des Etats de l' Afrique Centrale:-Status De La Banque Des Ètats De 
L'Afrique Centrale (1970, 2007). 
Botswana: Bank of Botswana Act 1996 
Comoros:  Les Status de le Banques Centrale des Comores (1987) 
Ethiopia: Monetary and Banking Proclamation 1994. 
Ghana: Bank of Ghana Act, PNDCL 291 (1992), 2002 Act 612. 
Kenya: The Central Bank of Kenya Act 1966, 1997. 
Lesotho: The Central Bank of Lesotho Act 1978, 2000. 
Madagascar: Loi No. 94-004 du 10 Juin 1994 Portant Status de la Banque Centrale 
de Madagascar. 
Malawi: Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 1989. 
Mauritius: The Bank of Mauritius Act 1968, 2004.  
Mozambique: Banco de Moçambique Decree 2/75, 1/92. 
Namibia: Bank of Namibia Act 8/1990, 15/1997. 
Nigeria: Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958, 1997, 1998. 
Sao Tome & Principe: Lei Organica do Banco Central Decreto Lei No. 8/1992. 
South Africa: Banks Act 1990. 
Sudan: Central Bank of Sudan Act 2002. 
Tanzania: Bank of Tanzania Act 1995, 2006. 
Uganda: Bank of Uganda Act 1969, 1993. 
Zambia: Bank of Zambia Act 1996. 
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Appendix F. CBI Variables for Africa  
Country Economic Political Overall  Economic Political Turnover 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central Africa R. 
Chad 
Congo 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Comoros 
Equatorial G. 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau  
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
São Tomé & Principe 
South Africa 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
0.88 
0.75 
0.88 
0.38 
0.88 
0.63 
0.88 
0.88 
0.88 
0.88 
0.75 
0.88 
0.63 
0.63 
0.88 
0.63 
0.63 
0.88 
0.75 
0.63 
0.63 
0.75 
0.63 
0.88 
 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.88 
0.63 
0.63 
0.38 
0.38 
0.38 
0.63 
 
0.63 
0.88 
0.63 
0.63 
0.44 
 
 
 
 
0.50 
0.13 
0.50 
0.38 
0.50 
0.38 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.13 
0.50 
0.38 
0.38 
0.50 
0.38 
0.63 
0.50 
0.13 
0.25 
0.38 
0.50 
0.13 
0.50 
 
0.50 
0.38 
0.25 
0.50 
0.25 
0.50 
0.25 
0.13 
0.13 
0.50 
0.00 
0.13 
0.50 
0.50 
0.38 
0.25 
 
 
 
0.69        0.50          0.33        0.093 
0.69        1.00          0.67        0.2069 
0.38        0.50          0.33        0.093 
0.69        0.00          0.00 
0.69        0.625        0.67        0.0857 
0.69        0.625        0.67        0.1652 
0.69        0.625        0.67        0.0857 
0.69        0.625        0.67        0.0857 
0.69        0.625        0.67        0.0857 
0.69        0.50          0.33        0.093 
0.50        0.50          0.00        0.1603 
0.69        0.625        0.67        0.0857 
0.50 
0.50        0.25          0.00        0.1707 
0.69        0.625        0.67        0.0857 
0.63        0.625        0.33        0.25 
0.69        0.00          0.00        0.1679 
0.44        0.50          0.33        0.93 
0.44        0.50          0.33        0.1593 
0.50        0.625        0.33        0.08 
0.63        0.00          0.00  
0.38        0.50          0.33        0.1764  
0.69        0.50          0.33        0.25 
0.50        0.50          0.33        0.093 
               0.25          0.00        0.2978 
0.44        1.00          1.00        0.05        
0.38        0.05          0.00        0.2414 
0.69        0.50          0.33        0.2143 
0.44       0.50           0.33        0.093 
0.19       0.50           0.00        0.1666 
0.31       0.00           0.00        0.1623 
0.25       0.50           0.00        0.2666  
0.25       1.00           1.00        0.097 
0.56 
0.31       0.25           0.00        0.1931 
0.38       0.00           0.00        0.3182 
0.69       0.25           0.33        0.1316 
0.56       0.50           0.33        0.093 
0.44       0.50           0.33        0.2368 
0.44       0.50           0.33        0.279 
              0.50           0.33        0.15 
NB. The first three columns of data are Central Bank 
independence indices from Arnone et al. (2007) while in 
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the last three we provide corresponding figures developed 
in this thesis. 
Source: Own calculation and Arnone et al. (2007) 
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Appendix G. Data sources for economic and political 
variables 
Variable Source Remark 
Real GDP Per 
Capita 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt_62form.php See 
Heston 
et al. 
(2006) 
Investment http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt_62form.php See 
Heston 
et al. 
(2006) 
Real GDP Per 
Capita Initial 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt_62form.php See 
Heston 
et al. 
(2006) 
Population http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt_62form.php See 
Heston 
et al. 
(2006) 
Economic 
policy 
variables 
http://africa.gov.harvard.edu See 
ARP 
(2008) 
Central Bank 
independence 
http://www.centralbanking.co.uk/links/index.htm See CBI 
(2007) 
Judicial 
independence 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt See 
USSD 
(2007) 
Judicial 
independence 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 See 
Freedom 
(2007) 
Constitutional 
Rules 
http://www.heritage.org/Index See 
Heritage 
(2008) 
Constitutional 
Rules 
http://www.uneca.org/agr2005 See 
UNECA 
(2008) 
Constitutional 
Rules 
http://www.transparency.org See TI 
(2008) 
Veto players http://www.management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz See 
Henisz 
(2006) 
Veto players http://econ.worldbank.org See 
Beck et 
al. 
(2001) 
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Appendix H. African Central Banks on the Web 
Country Web Address 
BCEAO* http://www.bceao.int 
BEAC** http://www.beac.int 
Botswana http://www.bankofbotswana.bw 
Burundi http://www.brb.bi 
Cape Verde http://www.bcv.cv 
Comoros http://www.bancecom.com 
Djibouti http://www.banque-centrale.dj 
Ethiopia http://www.nbe.gov.et 
Gambia http://www.cbg.gm 
Ghana http://www.bog.gov.gh 
Guinea http://www.bcrg.gov.gn 
Kenya http://www.centralbank.go.ke 
Lesotho http://www.centralbank.org.ls 
Madagascar http://www.banque-centrale.mg 
Malawi http://www.rbm.mw 
Mauritius http://www.bom.intnet.mu 
Mauritania http://www.bcm.mr 
Mozambique http://www.bancomoc.mz 
Namibia http://www.bon.com.na 
Nigeria http://www.cenbank.org 
Rwanda http://www.bnr.rw 
Sao Tome & Principe http://www.bcstp.st 
Sierra Leone http://www.bankofsierraleone-centralbank.org 
South Africa http://www.reservebank.co.za 
Sudan http://www.bankofsudan.org 
Swaziland http://www.centralbank.org.sz 
Tanzania http://www.bot-tz.org 
Uganda http://www.bou.or.ug 
Zambia http://www.boz.zm 
Zimbabwe http://www.rbz.co.zw 
NB.*BCEAO countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinèe 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. **BEAC includes Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. 
Source: Web links available at 
http://www.centralbanking.co.uk/links/index.htm  
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Appendix I. Basic Solow robustness test on Botswana and 
Mauritius 
Variable Fixed 
Effects 
(Full 
Sample) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(Botswana 
Excluded) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(Mauritius 
Excluded) 
Initial Income 0.91 
0.03 
0.00 
0.92 
0.03 
0.01 
0.91 
0.03 
0.01 
    
Investment 1.11 
0.02 
0.00 
1.11 
0.02 
0.00 
1.11 
0.02 
0.00 
    
Population 0.92 
0.03 
0.02 
0.92 
0.03 
0.03 
0.92 
0.03 
0.03 
    
Constant 1.75 
0.41 
0.02 
1.66 
0.41 
0.04 
1.69 
0.43 
0.04 
    
N 
F(3,323) 
F(3,309) 
371 
12.77 
- 
364 
- 
11.97 
364 
- 
11.80 
NB. In the three models above, we run fixed-effects 
estimation technique on the full sample as well as 
excluding the two countries from the sample. All the F 
values are significant at one percent. 
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Appendix J. Basic Solow robustness tests (different 
specifications) 
Variable Robust Cluster Bootstrap Jackknife 
Initial Income  0.91 
 0.03 
 0.00 
 0.94 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.89 
 0.04 
 0.00 
 0.91 
 0.03 
 0.01 
      
Investment  1.11 
 0.03 
 0.00 
 1.13 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.09 
 0.04 
 0.02 
 1.11 
 0.04 
 0.00 
     
Population -0.08 
 0.03 
 0.02 
-0.08 
 0.04 
 0.03 
-0.07 
 0.04 
 0.00 
-0.06 
 0.04 
 0.06 
     
Constant  1.75 
 0.38 
 0.01 
 1.75 
 0.42 
 0.03 
 1.79 
 0.49 
 0.04 
 1.62 
 0.47 
 0.04 
     
N 
F(3,323) 
Wald chi2 
371 
8.86 
- 
371 
8.65 
- 
371 
- 
22.45 
371 
7.29 
- 
NB. In order to account for heterogeneity, we subject the 
fixed-effects model to the tests mentioned above. All the 
diagnostic parameters (i.e. F and Wald chi2) are 
significant at one percent. 
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Appendix K. Basic Solow augmented for policy variables (robustness tests using different specifications) 
Variable Robust Cluster Bootstrap          Jackknife 
Initial Income -0.09 
 0.05 
 0.05 
-0.08 
 0.03 
 0.05 
-0.07 
 0.08 
 0.23 
-0.09 
 0.08 
 0.24 
     
Investment  0.07 
 0.04 
 0.08 
 0.07 
 0.03 
 0.03 
 0.07 
 0.03 
 0.04 
 0.07 
 0.04 
 0.09 
     
Population -0.19 
 0.08 
 0.02 
-0.14 
 0.07 
 0.02 
-0.14 
 0.13 
 0.15 
-0.19 
 0.12 
 0.03 
     
Openness  0.01 
 0.00 
 0.03 
 0.01 
 0.00 
 0.08 
 0.01 
 0.00 
 0.47 
 0.01 
 0.00 
 0.03 
     
Monetary -0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
-0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
-0.00 
 0.00 
 0.65 
-0.00 
 0.00 
 0.83 
     
Fiscal -0.01 
 0.00 
 0.05 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.06 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.28 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.39 
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Appendix K (Contd.) 
Human capital -0.01 
 0.00 
 0.07 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.17 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.52 
-0.01 
 0.00 
 0.55 
     
Constant  0.77 
 0.35 
 0.03 
 0.77 
 0.32 
 0.02 
 0.77 
 0.56 
 0.16 
 0.77 
 0.56 
 0.04 
     
N 
F(7,145) 
Wald chi2 
188 
5.18 
- 
188 
47.62 
- 
188 
- 
34.45 
188 
2.29 
- 
NB. In the above models, we subject the augmented Solow model to different specifications; namely 
Standard errors adjusted for 36 clusters; standard errors of parameters bootstrapped; jackknife 
standard errors. All the diagnostic parameters (i.e. F and Wald chi2) are significant at one 
percent. 
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Appendix L. CBI estimates robustness tests (different specifications) 
Variable LS RRG QR LS RRG QR LS RRG QR 
Openness 0.57 
0.21 
0.01 
0.39 
0.24 
0.12 
0.27 
0.14 
0.03 
 
0.49 
0.19 
0.02 
0.46 
0.22 
0.05 
0.39 
0.26 
0.04 
0.59 
0.20 
0.01 
 0.61 
 0.61 
 0.01 
 0.50 
 0.17 
 0.00 
          
Political  CBI 1.27 
0.47 
0.01 
0.82 
0.52 
0.06 
0.82 
0.48 
0.04 
      
          
Economic CBI    1.37 
0.49 
0.01 
1.36 
0.48 
0.01 
0.43 
0.58 
0.03 
   
          
Turnover       -3.95 
1.93 
0.06 
-3.69 
 1.56 
 0.01 
-4.59 
 1.56 
 0.01 
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Regional       -0.80 
0.27 
0.01 
-0.78 
 0.26 
 0.01 
-0.75 
 0.26 
 0.01 
          
Constant 4.58 
0.76 
0.00 
5.32 
0.96 
0.00 
6.42 
0.98 
0.00 
4.68 
0.73 
0.00 
4.78 
0.87 
0.00 
5.32 
0.99 
0.00 
5.68 
0.95 
0.00 
 6.09 
 0.83 
 0.00 
 6.16 
 0.88 
 0.00 
          
R-squ. 
F(2,41) 
F(3,40) 
0.40 
15.2 
- 
- 
10.3 
- 
0.17* 
- 
- 
0.39 
10.95.64 
- 
10.1 
- 
0.15* 
- 
- 
0.37 
5.95 
- 
- 
6.79 
0.20* 
- 
- 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
NB. In the above models, LS refers to Least squares with robust standard errors; RRG refers to 
robust regression; and QR refers to quintile regression.*Refers to Pseudo-R2.All F values are 
significant at one percent.
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Appendix M. CBI estimates robustness tests (different 
controls) 
Variable LSR LSR LSR LSR LSR LSR 
Human 
Capital 
0.28 
0.11 
0.01 
 0.25 
0.08 
0.00 
  0.33 
 0.07 
 0.00 
 
       
Initial 
Income 
 
 
 
0.51 
0.16 
0.00 
 0.55 
0.14 
0.00 
  0.54 
 0.16 
 0.00 
       
Political 
CBI 
0.80 
0.64 
0.22 
1.11 
0.43 
0.01 
    
       
Economic 
CBI 
 
 
 
 1.05 
0.47 
0.04 
1.47 
0.37 
0.00 
  
       
Turnover  
 
 
   -3.12 
 1.95 
 0.12 
-4.32 
 1.61 
 0.01 
       
Regional  
 
 
   -0.08 
 0.07 
 0.27 
-0.64 
 0.26 
 0.02 
       
Constant 6.14 
0.18 
0.00 
 
 
3.22 
1.08 
0.00 
6.00 
0.17 
0.00 
2.66 
0.88 
0.00 
 6.74 
 0.44 
 0.00 
 4.19 
 1.32 
 0.00 
R-squ. 
F(2,26) 
F(2,41) 
N 
0.61 
19.42 
- 
29 
0.48 
- 
17.51 
44 
0.65 
19.91 
- 
29 
0.56 
- 
39.58 
44 
0.55 
12.16 
- 
29 
 
0.48 
- 
10.69 
44 
       
Control Human 
Capital 
Initial
Income 
Human 
Capital
Initial
Income 
Human 
Capital 
Initial
Income 
NB. To test robustness of findings, we replace the 
economic control with human capital (HC) and Initial 
Income (II) alternatively. All models are run using least 
squares with robust standard errors. All F values are 
significant at one percent. 
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Appendix N. JI estimates robustness tests (different 
specifications) 
Variable OLS Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Robust 
Regression
Quintile 
Regression 
Openness 0.65 
0.19 
0.00 
0.65 
0.21 
0.00 
0.57 
0.21 
0.01 
0.45 
0.14 
0.00 
     
 
JIOv 
 
0.38 
0.14 
0.01 
 
0.38 
0.16 
0.02 
 
0.41 
0.15 
0.01 
 
0.55 
0.10 
0.00 
     
 
Constant 
 
4.14 
0.80 
0.00 
 
4.14 
0.78 
0.00 
 
4.42 
0.86 
0.00 
 
4.62 
0.56 
0.00 
     
N 
R-squ. 
F(2,41) 
N 
44.00 
0.36 
11.51 
44 
44.00 
0.36 
12.53 
44 
44.00 
- 
9.08 
44 
44.00 
0.18* 
- 
44 
aic 97.25 97.25 . . 
NB. *Refers to pseudo R-squared. Figures below each 
coefficient estimates refer to standard errors and p-
values. All the diagnostic tests (i.e. F and aic) are 
significant at one percent. 
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Appendix O. JI estimates robustness tests (different controls) 
Variable LSR LSR 
Human Capital 0.36 
0.06 
0.00 
 
   
Initial Income  
 
 
0.62 
0.17 
0.00 
   
JIOv 0.02 
0.21 
0.18 
0.33 
0.21 
0.04 
   
Constant 6.12 
0.19 
0.00 
2.66 
1.16 
0.03 
   
R-squ. 
F(2,26) 
F(2,41) 
N 
0.56 
15.88 
- 
29 
0.40 
- 
12.65 
44 
   
Control HC II 
NB. We apply least squares with robust standard errors 
with the economic controls human capital (HC) and initial 
income (II). All the F values are significant at one 
percent. 
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Appendix P. Basic Solow with controls for colonial history 
Variable Dummy Used Data truncated 
Initial Income -0.00 
 0.02 
 0.09 
-0.09 
 0.03 
 0.00 
 
Investment 
 
 0.07 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 
 0.11 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 
Population 
 
-0.05 
 0.03 
 0.08 
 
-0.09 
 0.04 
 0.02 
 
Colonial 
 
-0.03 
 0.05 
 0.54 
 
Constant -0.06 
 0.11 
 0.59 
 0.54 
 0.24 
 0.02 
F(3,353) 
N 
 7.21 
365 
 6.84 
340 
NB. In these models, we tested if results were driven by 
the late joiners of statehood in the region. Accordingly, 
in model (1) we included a dummy for those countries 
which got independence after 1970. In model (2), we 
deleted any data for these countries that predates 1970. 
The Solow variables remain strong. The F values are 
significant at one percent. 
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Appendix Q. A brief description of the African governance 
indicators 
Type of data:- Based on national experts’ and households opinion surveys. 
Countries:- Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
Governance variables:-  Political system, political party freedom/security, power 
distribution, political representation, electoral process independence/credibility, 
judiciary’s effectiveness, investment policies attractiveness, pro-investment tax 
policies, economic management, respect for rule of law, corruption control, 
legislature’s effectiveness, human rights and rule of law, CSO/media independence, 
law enforcement organs, tax system efficiency/corruption, human rights, institutional 
effectiveness/accountability, state structure management, executive’s effectiveness, 
civil service transparency/accountability, government services efficiency, and 
decentralisation of structures.  
Source: UNECA (2008)  
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Appendix R. A correlation matrix between fixed factors and 
quality of institutions in Africa 
Variable Ethnic Geography Britis
h 
French Rule Veto Delegatio
n 
        
Ethnic  1.00 
 
405 
      
        
Geography  0.57 
 0.00 
378 
1.00      
        
British -0.09 
 0.06 
405 
-0.31 1.00     
        
French  0.27 
 0.00 
405 
 0.36 
 0.00 
378 
-0.57 
 0.00 
405 
1.00 
 
405 
   
        
Rule -0.22 
 0.00 
405 
-0.38 
 0.00 
378 
 0.17 
 0.00 
405 
-0.21 
 0.00 
405 
1.00 
 
405 
  
        
Veto -0.01 
 0.75 
361 
-0.32 
 0.00 
346 
 0.25 
 0.00 
361 
-0.21 
 0.00 
361 
 0.40 
 0.00 
361 
 1.00 
 
 361  
 
        
Delegation  0.33 
 0.00 
342 
 0.44 
 0.00 
315 
-0.45 
 0.00 
342 
 0.72 
 0.00 
342 
-0.28 
 0.00 
342 
-0.24 
 0.00 
 342   
1.00 
NB. Data for ethnic fragmentation is drawn from Alesina 
et al. (2003). The geography variable, which measures 
risk of malaria, is drawn from Sachs (2003). British and 
French refer to colonial origins. For the institutional 
variables, Rule refers to Freedom House classification on 
the rule of law while Veto and Delegation are the Polcon 
veto players variable and Central Bank Independence 
variable respectively. Figures below correlation values 
indicate significance levels and number of observations. 
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Appendix S. A note on the joint effects of institutions of 
credible commitment on economic growth in Africa 
 
It is clear from the discussion in previous chapters that the channels, through 
which the effects of institutions of credible commitment manifest on economic 
growth, are multidimensional. Notwithstanding the fact that the underlining function 
of all the institutions is to limit the scope for opportunistic behaviour of governments, 
each institutional variable has its own, though not necessarily unique, micro-political 
foundations. For instance, while the preservation of stable prices is the hallmark for 
an independent Central Bank, the veto players paradigm deals with a broader set of 
policy tools. The point which I make here is that, given the breadth and width of each 
institution of credible commitment, analysis of the partial effect of each institution of 
credible commitment, as is undertaken in this research, is justified. This, however, 
does not rule out the use values of assessing the joint effects of all or several of the 
institutions in question, as is shown in table below. 
 
The exercise to assess the joint effects of the three institutions of credible 
commitment returns mixed results. To start with, institution of delegation, as 
represented by the CBI values, loses its explanatory power on economic growth 
performance in Africa. This is no surprise given the fact the values of this variable are 
more tuned for static comparisons than capturing the dynamic movements of the 
variables. As the availability of data on the evolution of Central Banks in Africa 
improves, one shall be in a better position to explain the effects of these variables on 
economic performance. Secondly, I find rule of law to be the most potent variable, in 
that its coefficient estimates remain strong even after I control for the other 
institutional variables as well as the fixed factors. Thirdly, the effects of the veto 
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player variable on economic performance in Africa, when assessed jointly with other 
institutional variables, remains, by and large, continue to be strong, albeit less robust 
when compared to its partial estimates in Chapter 8. 
Variable OLS Fixed-
Effects 
Fixed Effects 
Vector 
Decomposition
Initial Income -0.00 
 0.01 
 0.24 
-0.06 
 0.02 
 0.07 
-0.00 
 0.01 
 0.02 
    
Investment  0.05 
 0.01 
 0.02 
 0.11 
 0.02 
 0.00 
 0.05 
 0.02 
 0.01 
    
Population -0.06 
 0.03 
 0.04 
-0.15 
 0.05 
 0.00 
-0.06 
 0.03 
 0.04 
Delegation  0.14 
 0.05 
 0.15 
 0.17 
 0.09 
 0.21 
 0.22 
 0.08 
 0.12 
    
Rule of Law  0.04 
 0.01 
 0.02 
 0.08 
 0.03 
 0.02 
 0.02 
 0.04 
 0.01 
    
Veto  0.01 
 0.00 
 0.10 
 0.04 
 0.01 
 0.02 
 0.08 
 0.03 
 0.05 
    
Constant  0.01 
 0.09 
 0.91 
 0.47 
 0.27 
 0.08 
 0.04 
 0.17 
 0.84 
    
R-squ. 
F(6,255) 
F(6,216) 
F(7,255) 
N 
 0.28 
 3.62 
- 
- 
245 
- 
- 
7.15 
- 
262 
 0.21 
- 
- 
4.22 
271 
NB. I use selected variables from the many institutional 
variables applied in the study. Accordingly, CBI variable 
accounts for delegation (under a strong requirement that 
extrapolates point values to all periods), rule of law is 
from Freedom House, and the interactive term between 
polcon and fiscal policy is for the veto players variable. 
In all the cases, I controlled for the three fixed 
factors; namely geography, ethnic fragmentation and 
colonial history. Figures below coefficient estimates are 
robust standard errors and levels of significance 
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respectively. Number of countries included is forty-five 
in all cases. All F values are significant at one percent. 
 
One needs to take into account a few points when reading these results. This 
thesis is essentially designed to investigate the effects of the three institutions of 
credible commitment individually. In addition to this issue of research design, all the 
institutional variables are not amenable for joint assessment in light of the fact that 
some are based on cross-sectional models while others on panel data estimates. Still, 
this line of research, whereby the joint effects of a string of institutions of credible 
commitment on economic outcomes is analysed, is a useful direction for future 
research. 
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